Limited visibility and right measures

Transcription

1 Limited visibility and right measures

2 Fire Department of PPT Professional FRS Voluntary FRS 3 Fire stations located on Metro Depots 124 employees 31 employees/shift 24/7 service 4 units Located on our Bus Depots

3 Reacting to limited visibility and implementing right security measures Outlining the problems created by limited visibility and looking for solutions Choosing the best method for evacuation and ensuring best possible attack plans for firefighters Examples of chemical attacks and looking for methods to prevent it and limit casualties

4 Limited Visibility Pitch black darkness» Chaos» Panic Smokescreen From fire Artificial» Low oxygen / intoxication» Unnecessary injuries» Distrust» Zero cooperation

5 Basic metro tunnel layout

6 Step up way, safe place Walking path Water supply High Voltage 750V DC

7 Tunnel connections Every 200 meters Magnetic door locks Panic open mechanism Fire resistant for 90 minutes

8 Fast and safe approach Train dispatching provides exact location Fire dispatching sends the nearest unit and informs national Fire Rescue Service (FRS) Choice of entering point (closer station, further station, ventilation) FRS arrives at the entering point within 15 minutes Incident location within next 10 minutes Securing the working place Executing the attack plan

9 Evacuation Primary evacuation is performed by train driver Providing necessary information Sending as many people as possible away in safe parts of the metro system Doing second check of the train if possible, providing first help Secondary evacuation is done by station supervisors Sending people from tunnel in the station and above the ground Providing information, where to reach medial service Further progress is done by Integrated Rescue System Police organising people Medical Rescue Service providing medical help Fire Rescue Service Check incident, make safe workplace, evacuate remaining persons, make safe workspace for MRS

10 Hand rail cart; weight 55 kg / load capacity 250 kg

11 Actual fire in metro station in 2016 National FRS arrived within 5 minutes Company FRS arrived within next 3 minutes (8 total) Same radio frequency allowed fast information exchange NFRS located the fire one level below ground in technical background In cooperation the attack plan was set in motion

12 Actual fire in metro station in 2016 Almost zero visibility Superior knowledge and direct access to cameras allowed fast and effective action Fire was from a trash container from one of the shops Evacuation of technical background was done CFRS Station was closed for 1 hour due to high CO level

13 Portable gas detectors Raid M 100 2x TETRA

14 Gas detection Detector Gas 1 Gas 2 Gas 3 Gas 4 TETRA 1 O2 (%) CH4 (LEL*) H2S (ppm) CO (ppm) TETRA 2 O2 (%) CL2 (ppm) HCN (ppm) NH3 (ppm) Gas Name Range Alarm 1 Alarm 2 O2 Oxygen 0 25 % 19 % 23,5 % CH4 Methane 0 100% LEL* 20 % LEL 40 % LEL CO Carbon monoxide ppm H2S Hydrogen sulphide ppm 5 10 NH3 Ammonia ppm CL2 Chlorine 0 20 ppm 0,5 1 HCN Hydrogen cyanide 0 30 ppm 5 25 * Low explosion level Methane is 4,4% of air

15 Code Substance 1 piece 2 pieces 3 pieces 4 pieces 5 pieces 6 pieces 7 pieces 8 pieces G nerve paralytic substances GA GB Tabun Sarin GD GF Soman Cyklosarin VX VX 9 20 VXR Russian VX HD HN L AC GSI HSI Yperit sulphite Yperit nitride Lewisit Hydrogen cyanide simulant G simulant H ppb Gas detection ppb H blistering substance T general toxic substances ppb ppb Simulating substances ppb ppb ppb > 360 > 400 > 400 > 300 > 400 > 6000 > 1600 > 5000 ppb > 700 > 500

16 Basic chemical attack strategy Detection and samples collection I. Detect Evacuation and rescue of persons II. Protect Decontamination III. Decon

17 Breathing apparatus tender Iveco

18 Chemical attack Outlining possible targets Limit the likeness of those places Detect unattended objects Collect samples to be aware of the substance Ensure that you detected the right substance Chose right attack plan Identify the location of the substance Stop further spread Decontaminate every affected person including firefighters

19 Possible chemical attack Unattended suitcase in common exit in transfer station Limited transport on 2 lines Limited transport on tram network Area closed for more than 1 hour Detecting of any chemical substances leaking from the baggage Forming attack plan

20 Possible chemical attack Pyrotechnic ready to check the baggage NFRS ready to save the pyrotechnic CFRS ready to detect dangerous substances CFRS ready to attack the fire in case of explosion In the end it was just forgotten baggage but you can never be sure!

21 Recent London attack Open station easier access Incident during peak travel hours Limited access to cameras older station Incident correctly identified but not on first try due to previous experience Poor device design minimal casualties Good video material to work with modern train Line operation within 12 hours not station due to investigation Increase of Police force Increase in station security More armed persons, higher risk of casual incident turning bad

22 Thank you for your attention! Contact Prague Public Transport Tomas Dobrovolny Risk Manager in Fire Department Tel: Mobile: Mail: Company Web: