Gentex. Case Study Economics 243, Fall 2012 Prof Smitka, Washington & Lee University

Transcription

1 Gentex Case Study Economics 243, Fall 2012 Prof Smitka, Washington & Lee University

2 Gentex: Firm Gentex started in Zeeland, Michigan as a maker of industrial fire alarm systems Entrepreneur Fred Bauer used as vehicle to enter car mirror business [pun intended] Why interesting? The flip-switch prismatic rearview mirror is on every car on the road if you can invent a better mirror And Donnelly (subsequently acquired by Magna), the #1 producer in North America, was just up the road, so Bauer knew of the potential market

3 Gentex: Products Auto-dimming mirrors Glare from headlights of cars annoying Flip-switch prismatic mirrors cheap, but awkward Can automate? Sensors for light levels Motor to drive prismatic mirror Maybe, but no market acceptance

4 Gentex: ECM A physical solution was awkward, so How about a chemical one? ca Electrochromatic gel darkens with current So sandwich gel between glass and the mirror Well received on GM luxury cars Profitable for Gentex Good uptake as a high-price option but Gentex charged a moderate price so very profitable for GM, too

5 Goal Continuing (profitable!) monopoly secondary goal: growth How can Gentex achieve this? Donnelly next door is a natural rival News of Gentex s success can t be hidden, esp. in a small town!

6 Generic Issues Auto customers are also small in number Potentially a bilateral monopoly a firm with market power selling to a firm with market power Specific assets are the norm Pricing is inevitably contentious Both are at risk of hardball tactics Greed encourages entry Donnelly was (still is!) just up the road

7 Approaches Customers want multiple sourcing Helped if there are contracting norms Buttressed by a reputation for fair play Suppliers want multiple customers Ditto Multimarket, multiperiod contract context Makes hardball tactics less beneficial to both But managing relationship still difficult Gentex of course wants to keep its monopoly

8 Legal monopoly: patents a moving target, given rivals & new technologies constantly monitor competitors / tech literature Stream of subsidiary patents: as of US patents, 143 patents pending 129 foreign patents, 310 patents pending 16 trademarks, 20 additional pending + foreign

9 Costs: learning curve if can lower, then barrier to entryin addition, gradually lowering prices enlarges market discourages entry Limit Pricing model

10 Innovate in product Exterior mirror 2- and 3-mirror sets Complicated glass Thin glass Spherical and (esp) aspherical glass Additional features integral compass & thermometer, backup camera display keyless entry systems (Homelink ), map lights product differentiation / price discrimination both high-end and low-end packages with different price points complicated product makes harder for potential rivals

11 Vertical structure Tier I vs Tier II how to sell? via other mirror companies!!! lets focus on narrow R&D and production tasks don t need plastics, paint & finish tech if make complete mirror, no company will buy 100% from one firms by giving a share of profits to mirror makers that buy your glass-plus-electronics resistance to using your product is lowered potential competitors help market your mirror!

12 Pricing (reiterated) don t be greedy! let other mirror makers make money let auto companies make money deters entry enlarges market make entry harder! add features, add product variety so that market for plain autodimming mirror is small

13 Using Uncle Sam Government regulatory change to favor where strongest aspheric (outside) mirror standards can you get NHTSA to rule glare is a safety issue? Backup safety standards you can put a little TV inset in the mirror car companies thus don t have to design their instrument panel around a display

14 Sum Innovation as key to firm Entry from above Luxury end of market, where price less central Then push learning curve to take mass market Pricing, product definition: prevent entry capacity also is a barrier: customers want large volumes, so rivals can t start small After 25 years, still 80+% market share Profitable Still increasing market penetration and hence volume