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1 Highlights from the 2014 Triconex Technical Conference View the recorded presentation here Introducing today s presenters: Special Guest: Your host: Eloise Roche, CFSE Global SIS Process Automation Leader Chris Stogner Triconex Brand Director Mike Scott, PE, CFSE Executive Vice President, Process Safety and Technology Farshad Hendi Safety Services Practice Leader Americas & Europe
2 Highlights from the 2014 Triconex Technical Conference Triconex The Cornerstone of Safety Past, Presentation and Future
3 Welcome to the Highlights of the 2014 Triconex Technical Conference Webinar My name is Farshad Hendi 3
4 Featured speakers: Eloise Roche, CFSE Global SIS Process Automation Leader Chris Stogner Triconex Brand Director Mike Scott, PE, CFSE Executive Vice President, Process Safety and Technology 4
5 Agenda 2014 Triconex conference highlights Safety standards updates Introduction to Safety Instrumented System Management Q&A 5
6 Chris Stogner Triconex Brand Director 2014 Triconex conference highlights 6
7 Enhanced MP (3009) V11.0 Application ESD, TMC, BMS, HIPPS and Fire & Gas Features Form / Fit / functional replacement for 3008 Faster application cycle time execution New Hi Performance Main Chassis 8120E Support for UCM 4610 Benefits Future Proof Triconex SIS investments Superior performance for critical applications 7
8 Enhanced MP (3009) 3008 (Current) 3009 (New) Improvement Main Processor MPC bit 50MHz Dual core 32 Bit 800MHz 16x faster Memory 6MB Flash 64Mbytes of Flash 10x bigger 16MB DRAM 256Mbytes of DRAM 16x bigger 32KB SRAM 2Mbytes of NVRAM 62xbigger Application 3008 (Current) 3009 (New) Improvement ESD 59ms 23mS 2.5x Faster TMC 41mS 16mS 8110 Main chassis 2.5x Faster F&G 296mS 111mS 2.6x Faster ESD 59mS 13mS 4.5x Faster TMC 41mS 8mS 8120E New Main chassis 5.1x Faster F&G 296mS 60ms 4.9x Faster Faster and more powerful application performance 8
9 Unified Control and Safety Application Unified integration of DCS engineering and operational environments. Solution Triconex configuration integrated with the Control system Single data entry, common configuration environment Fully integrated real time, SOE and alarm data Triconex as a control station on the Control Network Unified system management Benefits Lower Total Cost of Ownership Reduced physical space Faster installation & commissioning Maintain Separation Operate Engineer UCM Maintain 9
10 Unified Control and Safety Operator Stations Engineering / Maintenance Stations Real Time Data Historian Alarms / SOE Engineering Galaxy Repository Control Network Process Controllers Safety Controllers Dedicated Safety Peer to Peer 10
11 Maintain Independence Control Network Safety Network (Peer to Peer) Control Unified Communication Module (UCM) Safety Triconex Communications Module (TCM) 11
12 Integrated Engineering Experience Engineering / Maintenance Workstation Galaxy Repository Information Control Network Pane Tristation 12
13 Integrated Operator Experience Engineering / Maintenance Workstation Galaxy Repository Information Control Network Pane TCX001 System Management System Monitor Pane Station Information Pane Safety System Information Pane 13
14 Safety View V1.1 Safety View Core functionality Replace rigid safety bypass and other hardwired panel functions with TÜV certified Computer based VDU approach What's New with Version 1.1 New flexible HMI designer for constructing safety related HMI elements New HMI Functions: Alarm Process Values, Bypass Area, Multi-view faceplates, Global Acknowledge, ESD capabilities Status for Health / Alarm block for link health Display additional alarm data Native TSAA Protocol configuration Benefits IEC61508:2010TUV approved to SC3 Flexible design Minimize production downtime due to operator error Easy for clients to standardize Manage operational risk with confidence
15 Electronic Overspeed Trip System Application Components and Case Study 15
16 Trip System Components Basic Components: Mechanical Overspeed Bolt Manual Trip Valve Trip Solenoid Valve Hydraulic Relay Valve Stop Valve Stop Valve Pilot Pros: Simple design - strictly mechanical Cons: Testing challenges Single point of vulnerability 16
17 What is EOSP? What: Electronic Overspeed Protection (EOSP) is a reliable digital means of protecting the turbine from an overspeed event. How: It is generally implemented as an alternative to the mechanical bolt. 17
18 Benefits of EOSP Accuracy (repeatability) Reliability through redundancy Fault tolerance through redundancy Testing without overspeeding the turbine 18
19 Trip System Upgrade Options 19
20 Conversion to EOSP Basic retrofit includes: - Mechanical - Multiple speed probes - Fault tolerant and reliable trip block assembly - Monitoring - Independent processing of speed probes with interface to trip block assembly 20
21 Tooth Wheel and Probes 21
22 Existing Protective System 22
23 QV Retrofit Before After 23
24 Migrating Legacy Shutdown Systems 24
25 Legacy S/D System Types - Not SIS s - None at all or all in one system. - Pneumatic Transmitters & Devices. - Electrical Relays & Devices. - Non-certified PLC s. - Obsolete SIS s (Moore Quadlog, August Systems, GE 90/70 GMR). - Lifecycle Upgrades (Honeywell FSC, Tricon MSW). 25
26 Why Migrate? - Standards/Regulatory/Insurance Requirements. (especially true for Process Heaters/Boilers) - Realization that current shutdown system does not meet required SIL. - Obsolescence/Maintainability. - Capacity/Expansion Issues. - Improved Functionality. - Improved Service Life. 26
27 Why haven t Plants Migrated? - Shutdown systems have been more reliable than other control systems. - Shutdown systems are in the background unlike DCS/PLC which are actively controlling. - Grandfather Clauses (ISA 84, CSA B149.3) - Some S/D systems are easy to fix and support. 27
28 Types of Migrations - Online: Unit running and hot cut-over. - Turnaround: Unit shutdown and offline migration. - Combination: Turnaround portions may be required to facilitate an Online cut-over. 28
29 How do you Choose? - Turnaround Windows/Process Availability. - Project/Construction Resource Availability. - Risk to the plant, impact of a nuisance trip. - Cost (comparison of increased Online project costs versus Turnaround production outage costs) - Fundamentally: Is it possible to do Online? 29
30 Turnaround Migration Advantages - Can t trip the plant! - All work can be completed. - Can prove final elements. - Can prove start-up sequence logic. 30
31 Turnaround Migration Disadvantages - Potentially many start-up issues all at once. - Inability to go back. - Operations start up on a new system during a critical period. - Incorrect design - new IPF s, setpoints, start-up bypasses (lack of) may impair start-up. - Risk to Turnaround schedule. 31
32 Online Migration Advantages - Solves the Turnaround disadvantages. (Deal with problems one at a time, Operations has time to adjust to new system, can revert back) - Ability to truly as-build the existing system, expose undocumented functionality. - Can validate the SIS process reading immediately. - Not a schedule driven activity. 32
33 Online Migration Disadvantages - Lacks Turnaround advantages (F.E./Sequence testing, completes all work) - Hybrid system. Potential inability of Ops to restart without project team. - Plant overrides/impairments required. - Risk of nuisance trips. - May still required Turnaround work. 33
34 Mike Scott, PE, CFSE Executive Vice President, Process Safety and Technology IEC and IEC Update 34
35 Mike Scott, PE, CFSE > Exec VP, Global Process Safety Technology with aesolutions > BS Degree in Mechanical Engineering > Masters of Engineering > Registered Professional Engineer in SC,GA,IL and AK > Author of numerous technical papers related to process safety > Member of ISA and AIChE > ISA Course Developer / Instructor > ISA SP84 Voting Committee Member > ISA Safety Division FGS chair > Past ISA Safety Division BMS Subcommittee chair > IEC committee member 35
36 Update Status IEC61508 Functional Safety of electrical/electronic/ programmable electronic safety-related systems > Revised and released in
37 Update Status IEC61511 Safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector: 2003 In Maintenance Cycle Part 1:Framework, definitions, system, hardware and software requirements Due to be released in 2015 Part 2:Guidelines for the application of IEC Due to release in 2015 Part 3: Guidance for the determination of the required safety integrity levels Due to release in
38 Overview The majority of the changes are improvements to the existing standard. The areas of concern for existing systems: New requirements for Security Risk Analysis could result in modifications to existing systems. Bypassing: Operating procedures need to include compensating measures defined, documented, and in-place. 38
39 IEC61511 Changes Clause 5 > Competency Procedure for SIS Lifecycle > Functional Safety Assessment (FSA) - FSA required periodically during Operations and Maintenance Phase - FSA required as part of MOC - FSA performed by independent person (Project, Operations, and Maintenance) > Functional Safety Audit - Conducted by Independent person Clause 6 Safety life-cycle requirements > Applications Software Lifecycle requirements 39
40 IEC61511 Changes Clause 8 Hazard and Risk Assessment > Security Risk Assessment Clause 9 Allocation of safety functions to protection layers > Instrumented Risk Reduction >10,000 requires additional analysis for Common Cause and independence from other instrumented layers. > BPCS Layer - Single Function limited to RRF < 10 - No more than two function in the BPCS Layer for same hazardous event unless initiating event in BPCS, then only one function. Clause 10 Safety Requirements Specification > Applications program safety requirements (New) 40
41 IEC61511 Changes Clause 11 SIS design and engineering > Safety Manual for all devices > Design resilient to identified Security risks > Hardware Fault tolerance based on IEC61508 Route 2 H > Systematic Capability Requirements for certified devices > Quantification of random hardware failure - Proof Test Effectiveness - Credibility of data used - Data Uncertainty Clause 12 SIS Application Program Development (Major re-write) 41
42 IEC61511 Changes Clause 13 Factory Acceptance Testing (FAT) > This clause is now normative and need determined during planning Clause 16 SIS Operation and Maintenance > Procedures for data collection > Requirement for compensating measures when bypassing or disabled > Bypass log required > Spare parts requirements to meet MTTR requirements > Management procedure for deferrals 42
43 Eloise Roche, CFSE Global SIS Process Automation Leader Introduction to Safety Instrumented System Management You Need More than Hardware and Software 43
44 Presenter Eloise Roche, CFSE > Global SIS Process Automation Leader for The Dow Chemical Company > 23 years in the chemical industry > Experiences include: Process Engineering, Process Automation, Maintenance Coordination, Operating Discipline and Training Coordination, Root Cause Analysis, and Process Safety Management. > B.S. in Chemical Engineering from Rice University, Houston, Texas Disclaimer: This presentation represents the personal views of Eloise Roche and not those of The Dow Chemical Company. 44
45 Purpose It is not feasible to cover all aspects of SIS documentation and management described in ISA-84 in this presentation. This presentation will cover only some common elements of SIS management > Key concepts of the requirement > Key discussion points which in my experience are the most essential for long term success > Briefly note a few process safety incident case studies which may be of interest to review offline 45
46 Acronyms > FTF False Trip Frequency > IE Instrument/Electrical > MTTR Mean Time To Repair (Restore) > PA Process Automation > PFD Probability of Failure on Demand > PHA Process Hazard Analysis > PPM Planned Preventative Maintenance > SCAI Safety Controls, Alarms and Interlocks > SIF Safety Instrumented Function > SIL Safety Integrity Level > SIS Safety Instrumented Systems > SRS Safety Requirements Specification 46
47 Safety Lifecycle Overview My take on ISA Part 1 Fig. 8 A. What can go wrong? How likely is that to happen? Is that acceptable? Can we redesign to make it safer? B. What CAN we do to reduce the risk? What WILL we do to reduce the risk? C. Design to do that D. Implement it and PROVE it does what it is supposed to E. Now PROVE you Kept it that Way (or managed change correctly)! PHA and Inherently Safer Design Protection Strategy defines SCAI, SIL, begins SRS, etc. Complete SRS and related design docs Verification Commissioning Validation Functional Safety Assessment 47
48 Maintenance Key requirement concepts: - PFD proof test interval (including mission time if written proof test procedure coverage < 100% of dangerous failures) - Failure rates (λ) used in SIL calculations depend on doing PPM - Achieving SIL requires that PPM and proof testing are done on time Key discussion points between IE Design, PA Design, Process Eng, Maintenance Rep and Facility Rep - - How to make the instruments accessible? - Is there redundancy available during online testing, will alternate mitigations be needed while device is being tested online, or will the plant always be brought down to an inherently safe state for testing? - What isolation valves, bleeds and taps are needed to facilitate PPM and proof testing per the written procedures? - Don t forget ppm and proof test of the logic solver 48
49 Where is this documented Intended Design: - PHA and Protection Strategy Documentation - SRS: ISA-84 defines minimum content - Other key Plant Safety Information documents: - P&IDs - Instrument wiring diagrams and specifications - Process Control Strategy Documentation (e.g. logic tables) - Computerized Maintenance Management Systems - Written detailed procedures Proof that SIS was implemented correctly and it performs - Field instrument commissioning and independent verification - Code simulation and independent verification - Validation of end-to-end performance of complete SIF - Ongoing Maintenance results (as-found, as-left) data 49
50 Repair Key requirement concepts: - Repair is often in response to random failure actual timing of random failure is unpredictable - The mean time it takes to detect failure and restore to operation (MTTR) is part of the SIL calculation - Need to set up the field instrument hardware, spare parts and personnel so MTTR can be met in an actual repair situation Key discussion points between IE Design, PA Design, Process Eng, Maintenance Rep and Facility Rep: - Much the same as for Maintenance, with the addition of - Ensure parts, personnel, and the equipment are available quickly - How is the SIF going to act initially upon the detected failure (directly affects PFD and FTF calculations)? - Incorporate checks to detect repeated or premature failures 50
51 Case Study Response to frequent failure COMAH Why did it happen? report My high level summary of PART of the incident findings: 1. Large tank of flammable material being filled out of a distribution system. 2. Key Instrument: Tank analog level device had stuck (dangerous failure) 14 times in preceding 3.5 months 3. Frequent repeated failures of this key instrument was not recognized as process safety near miss by maintenance/ operations and/or are not escalated to plant management/process safety personnel Abnormal Normal 4. Analog level sticks again and this time the failure goes unnoticed 5. Flow into tank continues 3 alarms don t ring due to the failed analog instrument 6. Separate LSH interlock fails due to undermanaged change in instrument technology 7. Tank of flammable materials overflows resulting in a very large release 8. Vapor cloud results in a series of explosions Over 40 people injured ~2000 evacuated Large parts of facility destroyed Damage to nearby residential properties Etc. 51
52 Enabling/Bypassing/Impairment > Key requirement concepts: - All these words mean the SIS will intentionally not work during some time when the equipment might be subject to the hazard - If bypass is done automatically for a short unchangeable period of time, it might be OK - If it is a manual bypass that could accidentally be left on or used at wrong time? Problem! - The details of WHO, WHEN and HOW a bypass may be SAFELY used must be documented in a detailed written procedure. - Risk must be mitigated during the bypass - The bypass must be access restricted > Key discussion points: IE Design, PA Design, Facility Leadership, Process Safety - When is it safe to bypass or how can it be made sufficiently safe? - How to access restrict, annunciate, and document? - Who gets to authorize and who gets to use the bypass? 52
53 Case Study - Bypassing U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board Final Investigation Report No I-IL My high level PARTIAL summary: 1. Operator is washing out a reactor and goes to empty out the washwater 2. HUMAN ERROR: Operator goes to identical reactor next to the one he was actually washing and apparently does not notice the different labeling 3. Tries normal control panel to open the dump valve on the (running) reactor 4. Safety interlock prevents valve opening 5. Bypass on dump valve without effective access restriction - procedural management only 6. Operator uses the bypass to force open the valve without following procedure 7. Dumps contents of the running reactor to the slab release and explosion 5 killed 3 Injured ~Local community evacuated Facility mostly destroyed 53
54 Change Management Key requirement concepts: > RECOGNIZING a change > Having leadership WILLPOWER to ensure that the same rigorous discipline is applied to change as to the initial design/construction > Executing the change following the safety life cycle Key discussion points: Facility Leadership, Process Safety > Planning resources to fulfill independent verification reviews and functional safety assessment > How will facility re-validate end-to-end performance of SIF after modification of the SIS > Ensuring robust discipline in making updates to all the related documentation 54
55 Case Study Change Management U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board Final Investigation Report No I-PA My high level summary of PART of the report: 1. Initial design only had one power supply and LSH from downstream tanks were interlocked into it 2. Change: An temporary emergency power supply was installed 3. Supervision decided to rely on alarm response instead of interlocking this 2 nd power supply 4. Temporary 2 nd power supply was never incorporated into plant documents or logic solver 5. Over ~28 years, everyone forgot about the temporary power supply EXCEPT for the operators, who had taught each other to use it during the briefly staffed weekend period to boost flow by running an additional pump 6. One weekend, the operator turned off the normal pump via the logic solver before leaving, but forgot to disconnect the second pump from the emergency power supply 7. Tank of toxic material overflows in the unmonitored plant Fortunately: No fatalities Other site employees successfully evacuated Caused evacuation/shelter-inplace for 2500 nearby residents (three towns) Minor injury to an emergency responder 55
56 Auditing One take on Entropy ( Boltzmann s version) > A structured system will degrade to disorder/chaos over time unless energy is put into the system to sustain the order Put simply: Every device or system will break down if you give it long enough without sufficient upkeep. Or as a well-known leadership adage would put it You get what you Inspect, not what you Expect. SIS Performance and Management Systems must be periodically inspected for weakness and corrected or the PROCESS SAFETY EFFECTIVENESS DEGRADES 56
57 Some key items to Audit for SIS Performance vs. SIL Verification Assumptions > SIF activation frequency > Proof test, PPM, and Diagnostic intervals and as-found failure rates > Repairs meeting MTTR assumptions Bypasses are secured and were used only as authorized Unchanged or Change has been correctly managed > Same make, model, electronic version of hardware devices? > Same configuration, diagnostic alarms, setpoints and delay timers in the application code? > Underlying assumptions of PHA/protection strategy still apply? > Management of personnel changeover PHA, SRS, and other plant safety documentation remain CONSISTENT, COMPLETE, CLEAR and CORRECT 57
58 Summary > The SIS human management systems are just as essential as the SIS hardware and software in meeting SIL performance > Most effective SIS Management begins with the initial design of equipment, instrumentation/automation design, facility layout, spare parts program, and staffing of the organization. > Balance: Inherently safer process design options vs. using protection layers > Need to design the field hardware and safety application software for PPM, testing, and safe impairment > Consistent, Complete, Clear and Correct documentation (Plant Safety Information) is essential to correct installation and to sustaining process safety performance despite change over time > Process Safety program will fail if we don t dedicate enough resources to audit the management systems and correct them 58
59 References > ANSI/ISA Part 1 (IEC Mod) > COMAH Buncefield: Why did it happen? > U.S. Chemical Safety Board Final Investigation Report No I-IL > U.S. Chemical Safety Board Final Investigation Report No I-PA 59
60 Farshad Hendi Safety Services Practice Leader Americas & Europe Closing and Q&A 60
61 2015 Process Automation Global Client Conference April 27 May 1 Dallas, TX Watch for more information coming later this month 61
62 Questions
63 Share your viewpoint Learn what others think 63
64 This session is now available to view OnDemand here 64
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