MINIMUM MANNING IN THE PORTSMOUTH FIRE, RESCUE, & EMERGENCY SERVICES EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT BY: Brian Spicer, Training Captain Portsmouth Fire, Rescue, & Emergency Services Portsmouth, Virginia An applied research project submitted to the National Fire Academy as part of the Executive Fire Officer Program October 2000
2 ABSTRACT The problem that prompted this research was the Portsmouth Fire, Rescue, & Emergency Services (PFRES) had never studied the benefits of staffing its engine companies with a minimum of four personnel. The purpose of this research project was to evaluate and compare the performance of a four-man engine company with that of a three-man engine company. Historical and evaluative research methodologies were used to answer the following research questions. 1. What were the results of a staffing study that was conducted from October 1, 1999 through September 30, 2000 in the Portsmouth Fire, Rescue, & Emergency Services? 2. What standards are currently in place that impact engine company staffing? 3. What were the initial critical tasks to be performed by the first arriving engine company at a residential structure fire? 4. Did the number of personnel on an engine company affect the time it took for them to advance a 1 ½ hose line, perform a primary search, and establish it s own water supply? The research procedure used in preparing this paper consisted of a literature review, an evaluation of the department s daily staffing, and an evaluation of the data from a PFRES monthly training evolution. The data from the staffing study showed a wide range of staffing levels through out the department. It was determined that staffing levels would be impacted by standards from two separate agencies, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the National Fire Protection Association. It was determined that all first arriving engine companies should be able to advance an attack hand line, perform a primary search, and establish a water supply with in a
3 reasonable amount of time. Engine company staffing was not a significant factor in the performance of the tasks identified in research question number three. It is a recommendation of this research project that engine company staffing remain at its current level as a minimum, further research should be conducted on the issue of minimum manning in the PFRES, and an aggressive training program be implemented to ensure that all personnel are well versed in all standards and regulations pertaining to company staffing.
4 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS 4 INTRODUCTION 5 BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 6 PROCEDURES 10 RESULTS 13 DISCUSSION 19 RECOMMENDATIONS 21 REFERENCES 23 APPENDIX A 25
5 INTRODUCTION The problem that prompted this research was the Portsmouth Fire, Rescue, & Emergency Services (PFRES) had never studied the benefits of staffing its engine companies with a minimum of four personnel. The department wanted to know if a review of the data from a prior training evolution would show a benefit to staffing engine companies with four personnel. The purpose of this research project was to evaluate and compare the performance of a four-man engine company with that of a three-man engine company in the performance of three basic fire ground functions that had been previously tested at the department s training facility. Historical research was used to define the current staffing levels in PFRES and to determine what standards were in place that impact engine company staffing. Evaluative research was used to compare the existing performance data on three and four man engine companies. The following research questions were answered. 1. What were the results of staffing study that was conducted from October 1, 1999 through September 30, 2000 in the Portsmouth Fire, Rescue, & Emergency Services? 2. What standards were currently in place that impact engine company staffing? 3. What were the initial critical tasks to be performed by the first arriving engine company at a residential structure fire? 4. Did the number of personnel on an engine company affect the time it took for them to advance a 1 ½ hose line, perform a primary search, and establish it s own water supply?
6 BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE Portsmouth Fire, Rescue, & Emergency Services was formed in January 1996, when the City Council approved the merger of the Portsmouth Fire Department and the City s Office of Emergency Services. During this same time, the department absorbed the City s Emergency Medical Service from a private third party provider. This merger was the end result of a one year long study aimed at reducing the duplication of emergency services by these agencies. This merger greatly improved the quality of fire service, emergency medical services and emergency management services provided to the community. With this merger complete, the department was now a full service organization providing fire protection, rescue, and emergency services to the community. It protects a 32 square mile urban city with a population of about 100,000 people composing 38,831 households. Residential land uses account for 49 percent of the city's overall land use; almost all of that consists of single-family housing (HUD, 1995). PFRES employs 248 personnel with an annual operating budget of $15 million. Fire service is provided by two battalions, ten engine companies, three ladder companies, and two hazardous materials vehicles operating out of nine fire stations. Rescue is provided by one EMS manager, one EMS supervisor, and four advanced life support ambulances that are staffed 24 house a day. Emergency management and all related functions are provided by the Office of Emergency Services, this consists of the Coordinator and Deputy Coordinator of Emergency Services. The department also maintains a Fire Prevention Bureau and a Training Bureau. The department provides the following services to the community: fire protection, emergency medical service, emergency services, fire prevention and education, hazardous materials response and environmental protection and, shipboard firefighting.
7 The issue of Company staffing had become one of great debate within the PFRES. The department did not have a written policy on staffing and the unwritten policy of apparatus staffing had been to maintain a minimum of three firefighters on all apparatus. This practice of three man staffing across the board would often result in one or more pieces of fire apparatus being required to operate with two firefighters due to sick leave usage or other unforeseen situations. With insufficient staffing, the Battalion Chiefs were faced with the decision of placing apparatus out of service or operating companies with two firefighters. The staffing dilemma was often resolved by a reduction in manpower on one or more of the Department s four ladder companies. It was a common occurrence to find any one of the ladder companies operating with only two firefighters. These two-man ladder companies placed an additional strain on the already understaffed engine companies. Engine companies were often required to assist with the ladder company functions that could not be carried out by a two-man ladder company. This research paper was prepared to satisfy the applied research requirement associated with the Executive Development course at the National Fire Academy. This research relates to the working as a team unit of the Executive Development course. A team is a cohesive group that can work together effectively and efficiently to achieve commonly shared goals (National Fire Academy [NFA], 1998). LITERATURE REVIEW Lack of personnel is a universal fire service problem, regardless of geographic location, population, or type of department (Cottet, 2000). The issue of minimum manning had been one of the most controversial subjects in the history of the fire service (Clark, 1994). It has been a
8 point of contention between groups representing firefighters and fire chiefs, paid firefighters and volunteers, and firefighters and city managers (Whitehead, 1992). The National Fire Protection Association has written extensively on the subject of fire department staffing. The history of the issue of fire department staffing can be traced back to 1954 when it first appeared in the 11 th edition of the NFPA Fire Protection Handbook. The National Board of Fire Underwriters was cited in the 11 th edition of the NFPA Fire Protection Handbook as recommending that engine and ladder companies in high value districts be staffed with seven personnel. It went on to say that other districts could staff engine companies with five members and ladder companies with six members provided they were not in the high value districts (NFPA, 1954). The first nationally recognized standard that addressed firefighter safety was released by the National Fire Protection Association in 1987 and was titled Standard 1500: Fire Service Occupational Safety and Health Program. The 1987 edition of NFPA 1500 recommended that the minimum number of personnel on each engine and ladder company should be four. The issue of staffing did not appear in the main body of the standard, it appeared in the nonmandatory Appendix. The National Fire Protection Association released the second edition of NFPA 1500 in August of 1992. As with the previous edition of 1500, the only reference to minimum staffing remained in the appendix (Varone, 1994). There was a great deal of controversy over whether the minimum staffing requirement should be in the standard itself, or in the appendix (Whitehead, 1992). The NFPA Standards Council issued an amendment to NFPA 1500 in July of 1993. This amendment required that at least four personnel be assembled on scene before interior
9 firefighting operations could begin at working structure fires (NFPA Standards Action, 1993). This release was interpreted and released by the Standards Council in April of 1994. This interpretation of the amendment required that when a company is dispatched from the fire station together as a unit (including both personnel responding on or arriving with apparatus) rather than from various locations, the standard recommends that the company should contain at least four firefighters (NFPA Standards Action, 1994). According to the Fire Department Occupational Health and Safety Standards Handbook, Chapter 6 of NFPA 1500 has been the source of more discussion than any other chapter. The key change in this revision of Chapter 6 was text in paragraph 6-4.4, which concerns personnel required at an incident scene. Again, the chapter specifically addresses an interior working structural fire-fighting operation. The chapter also covers the initial response crew / team. The recent OSHA revision of its requlations (specifically 29 CFR 1910.134 and 29 CFR 1910.120) requires a back up team of at least two people, trained and equipped at the same level as those who are entering an actual or potential IDLH atmosphere. (NFPA, 1999) Paragraph 6-4.1 of the standard recommends that a minimum acceptable fire company staffing level should be four members responding on or arriving with each engine and each ladder company responding to any type of fire. The paragraph went on to state that there were significant reductions in performance and safety where crews have fewer members than four. Five member crews were found to provide a more coordinated approach for search and rescue and fire suppression tasks (NFPA, 1999).
10 The United States Occupational Safety and Health Administration has issued regulations that impact fire department staffing. While OSHA s standard for respiratory protection has impacted staffing requirements for fire departments, it has not mandated staffing changes. This regulation has come to be known as the 2-in / 2-out rule (Bruno, 1998). OSHA does not regulate apparatus staffing; however, it does require a minimum of four personnel be on scene prior to crews working in an atmosphere that is immediately dangerous to life and health (OSHA, 1998). In 1998, Whitehead speaking on the OSHA regulation stated it was the most significant advance in firefighters safety in this decade it will save firefighters lives this year and for years to come. Whitehead openly supported a nationally accepted standard calling for a minimum of four firefighters on each piece of apparatus as a matter of firefighter safety (Whitehead, 1992). In his writings, Whitehead offered a substantial amount of statistical data and unpublished research to support his claim that injuries increased when apparatus staffing was reduced to below four firefighters. In 1993, Erwin cited a decline in firefighter line of duty deaths as a reason why a minimum staffing standard was unnecessary. He wrote in opposition to a proposed nationally accepted minimum staffing standard. The staffing standards and regulations of NFPA 1500 and OSHA 1910.134, respectively, influenced this research project with their discussion of a nationally accepted level of fire company staffing. PROCEDURES The research procedure used in preparing this paper consisted first of a literature review to determine what standards were currently in place that impact engine company staffing. The literature review was conducted at the Learning Resource Center at the National Emergency
11 Training Center, the William R. and Norma B. Harvey Library on the campus of Hampton University, the Library of the Portsmouth Fire, Rescue, & Emergency Services, and the author s personal library. A review of the department s daily manning sheet (Appendix A) was conducted to determine current staffing levels in PFRES. The review determined the staffing levels of all engine and ladder companies over the course of a one-year period. Each daily manning sheet was reviewed to determine personnel on leave, transfers to as well as from each individual engine and ladder company in order to determine the number of personnel on duty for each day of the year time frame. A review of the data from the PFRES monthly training evolution for the month of August of 2000 was conducted to determine if the number of personnel on an engine company would affect the time it would take to perform a given set of task. This evolution was selected to provide members with hands on experience in skills that were determined to be basic to the fire service. A review of the data produced from this training evolution revealed that of the 30 companies that participated, 14 of them (46.66%) were staffed with four personnel. The training evolution required the engine companies to perform three tasks while being timed. Each Company was summoned to the Department s training facility; they were instructed to place their apparatus with crew at a set starting point. On the training officers command, the crew would responded to a 12-foot by 40-foot mobile home. A smoke machine was in the mobile home and was operating for sufficient time to completely obscure vision in the structure. A child mannequin was placed in the last bedroom at the end of the mobile home to simulate a needed rescue. A fire hydrant was located 30 feet from the mobile home. Each crew was instructed to perform as if this were a real scenario taking place in real time. Each company
12 officer was given the following instructions; respond to report of a fire in the dwelling, initiate and complete a primary search, advance one charged 1 ½ hand line into the dwelling, and have engine operator secure his own water supply from the hydrant located near the mobile home. The results from the review of the daily manning sheet and the times from the August monthly training evolution were collected and entered into a spreadsheet. This research project was subject to a number of limitations. The staffing data used in conducting this research came from the Portsmouth Fire, Rescue, & Emergency Services daily manning sheets. These sheets received data input from as few as six personnel and as many as 12 personnel. The data was subject to minor errors such as data entry mistakes, typographical errors, and the failure of personnel to follow prescribed data entry procedures (Varone, 1995). The Author s research was historical research, this by its nature involved the collection of data that was already in existence. This data could not be changed or manipulated, and the researcher had no control over it. There was the possibility of the Hawthorne effect, as the author did not have the ability to design in a control group with the capability of ruling it out (Hebding & Glick 1996). Finally, at all times relevant to this research project, the Portsmouth Fire, Rescue, & Emergency Services was a paid professional fire department. It used traditional engine and ladder companies as the primary means of delivering fire protection services in an urban setting. Readers should exercise caution in extrapolating data from the Portsmouth Fire, Rescue, & Emergency Services to less active fire departments, to volunteer fire departments, or to departments that do not operate traditional engine and ladder companies.
13 RESULTS 1. What were the results of staffing study that was conducted from October 1, 1999 through September 30, 2000 in the Portsmouth Fire, Rescue, & Emergency Services? The data from the staffing study showed a wide range of staffing levels throughout the department. The average amount of time that each company was staffed with four personnel was displayed as a percentage of time for a one-year period. PFRES staffed its ten engine companies with four personnel an average of 52.46 percent of the time over a one-year period. When the data was evaluated department wide, the engine company that was staffed with four personnel for the greatest amount of time was Engine 9. This company was staffed, as an average of the three shifts, with four personnel 88.13 percent of the time. The engine company that was staffed with four personnel the least amount of time was Engine 1. Engine 1 was only staffed with four personnel an average of 11.83 percent of the time (see Figure 1). FIGURE 1 100.00% 80.00% 60.00% 40.00% 20.00% 0.00% Engine 1 Engine 2 Engine 3 Engine 4 Engine 6 Engine 7 Engine 9 Engine 10 Engine 11 Engine 12 Ladder 1 Ladder 3 Ladder 10 When the data was evaluated by shift it was determined that Engine 9 was staffed with four personnel more than any other engine on all three shifts. Engine 9 was staffed with four personnel 91.67 percent of the time on the A shift, 78.33 percent of the time on the B shift, and 94.4 percent of the time on the C shift. While all three shifts were consistent in that
14 they all staffed Engine 9 with four personnel more than any other company, the company staffed with four the least amount of time was divided among the shifts. On the A shift, Engine 10 received the least amount of four man staffing. Over the course one year, Engine 10 A was staffed with four personnel only 8.33 percent of the time. This was compared with 27.22 percent and 40 percent on the B and C shifts respectively. The engine company least often staffed with four personnel on the B and C shifts was Engine 1. Engine 1 B shift was staffed with four men an average of 10.44 percent over the study period, Engine 1 C shift was staffed at four for only 5.19 percent of the time (See figure 2). FIGURE 2 A Shift B Shift C Shift 100.00% 80.00% 60.00% 40.00% 20.00% 0.00% Engine 1 Engine 2 Engine 3 Engine 4 Engine 6 Engine 7 Engine 9 Engine 10 Engine 11 Engine 12 2. What standards were currently in place that impact engine company staffing? NFPA 1500 was developed to improve safety in the fire service. With the exception of 1994, firefighter fatalities have declined every year since the development and implementation of NFPA 1500 (NFPA 1997). NFPA 1500 has had a significant impact on engine company staffing, chapter 6 paragraph 4-1 states; the fire department shall provide an adequate number of personnel to safely conduct emergency scene operations. The definition of an adequate number of personnel was one of great debate prior to the 1997 version of NFPA 1500. To
15 eliminate confusion NFPA issued their interpretation of chapter 6 section 4-1 with the 1997 version of the standard. It is recommended that a minimum acceptable fire company staffing level should be four members responding on or arriving with each engine and each ladder company responding to any type of fire. The minimum acceptable staffing level for companies responding in high-risk areas should be five members responding or arriving with each engine company and six members responding or arriving with each ladder company. These recommendations are based on experience derived from actual fires and in-depth fire simulations and are the result of critical and objective evaluation of fire company effectiveness. These studies indicate significant reductions in performance and safety where crews have fewer members than the above recommendations. Overall, five member crews were found to provide a more coordinated approach for search and rescue and fire suppression tasks. Since the National Fire Protection Agency is a private consensus standards organization, law does not mandate its recommendations. There is nothing in the federal regulations that require compliance with a consensus standard if it is less stringent than a comparable federal regulation. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations are the minimum requirement for fire department staffing (OSHA, 1998). The Federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations require that interior structural firefighting procedures provide for at least two firefighters inside a structure that is on fire. The firefighters on the interior of the structure are required to have contact by
16 voice, or radio with at least two firefighters who are outside of the structure. The two firefighters on the outside of the structure must maintain accountability for and be prepared to rescue the members of the interior team. This regulation has been commonly called the two in / two out regulation (OSHA, 1998). This two in / two out regulation has had a significant impact on the staffing of engine companies. With two in / two out, a minimum of four personnel are required to be on the scene of a structure fire that requires interior operations. Initial attack operations need to be organized in such a way to ensure that an adequate number of personnel are on scene before interior firefighting operations can begin. As this research project was being written, NFPA 1710 was in the standards development process. NFPA 1710: Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression, emergency medical operations and special operations to the public by career fire departments, would specify the minimum criteria addressing the effectiveness and efficiency of the career public fire suppression, emergency medical service, and special operations delivery in protecting the public of the jurisdiction and the occupational safety and health of fire department employees (NFPA, 2000). If adopted, NFPA 1710 would have the potential to impact all career fire departments with respect to staffing of engine companies. 3. What were the initial critical task to be performed by the first arriving engine company at a residential structure fire? The initial actions of a first arriving engine company were determined to be critical to the residents of the City of Portsmouth. With the majority of structure fires in the City of Portsmouth occurring in residential structures, the actions of a single engine company at a residential structure fire could mean the difference between life and death for an occupant who
17 may have been trapped by the fire, smoke, or both. A review of several fire service text was used to develop a list of three critical tasks that should be performed by all engine companies at residential structure fires. The majority of victims who are still inside of the structure would be found in a bedroom. Based on this assumption, Norman says that the first arriving engine company should; secure a water supply, stretch a charged hose line into the structure, ventilate and search the entire structure, and extinguish the fire (Norman, 1998). According to the Essentials of Fire Fighting, a first due engine company should, initiate command, perform search and rescue, protect exposures, secure a water supply, and extinguish the fire (IFSTA, 1999). Based on these sources of information, it was determined that all first arriving engine companies should be able to advance an attack hand line, perform a primary search, and establish a water supply with in a reasonable amount of time. It was determined that engine companies needed to be able to perform these functions in a timely manner as the only company on the scene. 4. Did the number of personnel on an engine company affect the time it took for them to advance an attack hand line, perform a primary search, and establish it s own water supply? An evaluation of the data from the August 2000 monthly in service testing produced a rather unexpected result. It was determined that engine company staffing was not a significant factor in the performance of the three critical tasks identified in research question number three. At the start of this research project it was assumed that the four man engine companies would perform the tasks in less time than the three man companies. The authors finding in the literature review supported this assumption.
18 Figure 3 shows that the four man companies performed the assigned tasks with an average time of 2.56 minutes as indicated by the red line on the chart. Nine of the 14 (64.3%) four man engine companies completed the assigned task below the average time of the other companies. The company with the fastest time completed the task in 1.83 minutes while the company taking the most amount of time required 3.95 minutes. A difference of 2.16 minutes was noted between the fastest and slowest times. 4.00 3.50 3.00 2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 FIGURE 3 Engine 4 A Engine 4 B Engine 4 C Engine 6 A Engine 6 B Engine 6 C Engine 7 B Engine 9 A Engine 9 B Engine 9 C Engine 10 B Engine 10 C Engine 11 A Engine 11 C Figure 4 shows that the three man companies performed the assigned tasks with an average time of 2.58 minutes as indicated by the red line on the chart. Eight of the 16 (50%) three man engine companies completed the assigned task below the average time of the other companies. The company with the fastest time completed the task in 1.75 minutes while the company taking the most amount of time required 3.75 minutes. A difference of two minutes was noted between the fastest and slowest times.
19 FIGURE 4 4.00 3.50 3.00 2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 Engine 1 A Engine 1 B Engine 1 C Engine 2 A Engine 2 B Engine 2 C Engine 3 A Engine 3 B Engine 3 C DISCUSSION Engine 7 A Engine 7 C Engine 10 A Engine 11 B Engine 12 A Engine 12 B Engine 12 C The study results were closely related to the findings of others. The results of this research project showed that the Portsmouth Fire, Rescue, & Emergency Services had experienced a lack of personnel. This was a universal fire service problem (Cottet, 2000). The results of the staffing study revealed that PFRES engine companies were staffed with three personnel an average of 47.54 percent of the time. This lack of personnel made it difficult to comply with NFPA standard 1500. Standard 1500 recommend that engine and ladder companies be staffed with a minimum of four personnel (NFPA, 1997). Limited staffing also required the department to alter its fire ground tactics in order to comply with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration s regulation on firefighting operations. OSHA mandates the presence of a twoperson rescue team as well as a team of at least two firefighters for interior firefighting operations in conditions that are immediately dangerous to life and health (OSHA 1998).
20 In evaluating the results of this research project, it was determined that the lack of a control group was a significant factor. Historical research was used in a portion of this research project and the literature review revealed only a small amount of information on participant bias. The nature of historical research is such that the researcher has no ability to manipulate the experimental environment (Sproull, 1988). The researcher was left with data only, from which conclusions can be drawn (Varone, 1995). The literature review did produce information on the Hawthorne Effect; however, this was considered to be a matter addressed through proper research design. There was no way to determine how long the Hawthorne Effect would last or how to disprove its effect in a historical research document (Varone, 1995). The results from this research project did not indicate that a fourth person assigned to the engine company would significantly increase efficiency with respect to the tasks identified in research question number four. Interpretation of the data revealed a difference of only 0.02 minutes between the three man and four man engine companies in the performance of the tasks. While the research data indicated that the four man company averages were 0.02 minutes faster in their assigned tasks, it would be erroneous to assume that all comparisons between four and three man companies would yield results as competitive as this. This research project was not able to definitively answer the question of why the times were essentially identical between the four and three man companies. It may well be that the company strength, company attitude about training, and the company s team cohesiveness were as much a factor as was the number of personnel assigned to each company. The International Association of Fire Chiefs argued that minimum staffing was best left up to the local jurisdiction. Training, physical fitness programs, seatbelt usage, no-smoking policies, personal accountability systems,
21 and the incident command system had to be taken in to account in determining appropriate staffing levels (Halsey & Briese, 1992). RECOMMENDATIONS The results of the analysis of the historical training data only mildly supported the assumptions made at the onset of this research project. Therefore, it is a recommendation of this research project that all Chief Officers continue to staff engine companies at levels that can effectively and efficiently accomplish assigned tasks while complying with nationally recognized regulations and standards. Engine companies that are housed in single company stations should continue to receive priority in four man staffing. This would decrease the likelihood of an engine company arriving on scene and not having sufficient manpower to safely and legally initiate interior firefighting operations. This recommendation is made on the basis of safety in numbers. It is recommended that further research be conducted on the issue of minimum manning in the Portsmouth Fire, Rescue, & Emergency Services. The author asserts that more in-depth research would show that the results of this research project were subject to the Hawthorne effect. The establishment of a control group prior to initiating the research would be beneficial in eliminating participant bias. Finally, Portsmouth Fire, Rescue, & Emergency Services should under take an aggressive training program to ensure that all personnel from the Fire Chief to the Recruit in basic school are well versed in all standards and regulations pertaining to company staffing. Further research combined with an increased awareness of 2-in / 2-out and NFPA 1500 would be beneficial to PFRES in several ways. First, it would decrease the likelihood of
22 firefighter injury or death. Second, it would reduce the possibility of personnel conducting an illegal fire ground operation.
23 REFERENCES Bruno, H. (1998, February). OSHA Mandates 2-in / 2- out Operations. Firehouse Magazine, 23, 10. Clark, B. (1994, February). Is there safety in numbers? Fire Engineering, 147, 24. Cottet, J. (2000, June). Battling Manpower Shortages. Fire Rescue Magazine, 18, 77 Halsey, J. & Briese, G.L. (1992, March). IAFC Action guide: the 1991-1992 revision of NFPA 1500. (Available from International Association of Fire Chiefs, 1329 18 th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036). Hebding, D.E. & Glick, L. (1996). The Research Process. Introduction to Sociology. p.18 International Fire Service Training Association. (1999). Essentials of Firefighting. 4 th ed. Page 541. Stillwater, OK: Fire Protection Publications, Oklahoma State University. National Fire Academy. (1998). Working as a Team. Executive Development. Emmitsburg, MD. National Fire Protection Association. (1954). Fire Protection Handbook. (11 th ed.). Boston: Author. National Fire Protection Association. (1993, July). NFPA Standards Action.. Quincy, MA: Author. National Fire Protection Association. (1994, April). NFPA Standards Action.. Quincy, MA: Author. National Fire Protection Association. (1997). NFPA 1500: Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety & Health Program. Quincy, MA: Author.
24 National Fire Protection Association. (1999). Fire Department Occupational Health and Safety Standards Handbook. (1 st ed.). Qunicy, MA: Author. National Fire Protection Association. (2000). NFPA 1710: Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments. (2001 ed.). [On-line]. Available: http://www.public.usit.tnfsia Norman, John (1998). Fire Officer s Handbook of Tactics. (2 nd ed.). Saddle Brook, NJ: Fire Engineering. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). (1998) Title 29 CFR 1910.134: Standard for Respiratory Protection. Washington, DC Sproull, N.L. (1988). Handbook of research methods. Metuchen, NJ. Scarecrow press, Inc. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). (1995). Portsmouth, VA. Consolidated Plan for 1995 Executive Summary. [Online]. Available: http://www.hud.gov/cpes/va/portsmva.html Varone, J.C. (1994). Providence Fire Department Staffing Study. Executive Fire Officer Research Project. Emmitsburg, MD: National Fire Academy. Varone, J.C. (1995). Providence Fire Department Staffing Study Revisited. Executive Fire Officer Research Project. Emmitsburg, MD: National Fire Academy. Whitehead, A.K. (1992). Urgent need for comments of NFPA 1500 staffing. International Firefighter, pp 12-14.
APPENDIX A 25