Limited visibility and right measures

Limited visibility and right measures

Fire Department of PPT Professional FRS Voluntary FRS 3 Fire stations located on Metro Depots 124 employees 31 employees/shift 24/7 service 4 units Located on our Bus Depots

Reacting to limited visibility and implementing right security measures Outlining the problems created by limited visibility and looking for solutions Choosing the best method for evacuation and ensuring best possible attack plans for firefighters Examples of chemical attacks and looking for methods to prevent it and limit casualties

Limited Visibility Pitch black darkness» Chaos» Panic Smokescreen From fire Artificial» Low oxygen / intoxication» Unnecessary injuries» Distrust» Zero cooperation

Basic metro tunnel layout

Step up way, safe place Walking path Water supply High Voltage 750V DC

Tunnel connections Every 200 meters Magnetic door locks Panic open mechanism Fire resistant for 90 minutes

Fast and safe approach Train dispatching provides exact location Fire dispatching sends the nearest unit and informs national Fire Rescue Service (FRS) Choice of entering point (closer station, further station, ventilation) FRS arrives at the entering point within 15 minutes Incident location within next 10 minutes Securing the working place Executing the attack plan

Evacuation Primary evacuation is performed by train driver Providing necessary information Sending as many people as possible away in safe parts of the metro system Doing second check of the train if possible, providing first help Secondary evacuation is done by station supervisors Sending people from tunnel in the station and above the ground Providing information, where to reach medial service Further progress is done by Integrated Rescue System Police organising people Medical Rescue Service providing medical help Fire Rescue Service Check incident, make safe workplace, evacuate remaining persons, make safe workspace for MRS

Hand rail cart; weight 55 kg / load capacity 250 kg

Actual fire in metro station in 2016 National FRS arrived within 5 minutes Company FRS arrived within next 3 minutes (8 total) Same radio frequency allowed fast information exchange NFRS located the fire one level below ground in technical background In cooperation the attack plan was set in motion

Actual fire in metro station in 2016 Almost zero visibility Superior knowledge and direct access to cameras allowed fast and effective action Fire was from a trash container from one of the shops Evacuation of technical background was done CFRS Station was closed for 1 hour due to high CO level

Portable gas detectors Raid M 100 2x TETRA

Gas detection Detector Gas 1 Gas 2 Gas 3 Gas 4 TETRA 1 O2 (%) CH4 (LEL*) H2S (ppm) CO (ppm) TETRA 2 O2 (%) CL2 (ppm) HCN (ppm) NH3 (ppm) Gas Name Range Alarm 1 Alarm 2 O2 Oxygen 0 25 % 19 % 23,5 % CH4 Methane 0 100% LEL* 20 % LEL 40 % LEL CO Carbon monoxide 0 500 ppm 30 100 H2S Hydrogen sulphide 0 100 ppm 5 10 NH3 Ammonia 0 100 ppm 25 35 CL2 Chlorine 0 20 ppm 0,5 1 HCN Hydrogen cyanide 0 30 ppm 5 25 * Low explosion level Methane is 4,4% of air

Code Substance 1 piece 2 pieces 3 pieces 4 pieces 5 pieces 6 pieces 7 pieces 8 pieces G nerve paralytic substances GA GB Tabun Sarin 10 60 45 100 GD GF Soman Cyklosarin 50 100 VX VX 9 20 VXR Russian VX HD HN L AC GSI HSI Yperit sulphite Yperit nitride Lewisit Hydrogen cyanide simulant G simulant H 20 50 150 175 77 100 1060-1250 ppb 20 40 30 50 Gas detection 60 110 100 150 100 150 20 40 50 120 175 200 100 200 1250-1500 ppb 40 70 50 80 110 160 150 200 150 200 40 70 160 210 200 250 200 250 70 100 H blistering substance 120 200 200 300 200 350 200 250 300 500 350 500 T general toxic substances 1200-1750 ppb 1750-2000 ppb Simulating substances 70 100 80 120 100 200 120 160 210 260 250 300 250 300 100 150 250 300 500 800 500 800 2000-3000 ppb 200 350 160 200 260 310 300 350 300 350 150 200 300 350 800 2000 800 1200 3000-4000 ppb 350 550 200 300 310 360 350 400 350 400 200 300 350 400 2000 6000 1200 1600 4000-5000 ppb 550 700 300 500 > 360 > 400 > 400 > 300 > 400 > 6000 > 1600 > 5000 ppb > 700 > 500

Basic chemical attack strategy Detection and samples collection I. Detect Evacuation and rescue of persons II. Protect Decontamination III. Decon

Breathing apparatus tender Iveco

Chemical attack Outlining possible targets Limit the likeness of those places Detect unattended objects Collect samples to be aware of the substance Ensure that you detected the right substance Chose right attack plan Identify the location of the substance Stop further spread Decontaminate every affected person including firefighters

Possible chemical attack Unattended suitcase in common exit in transfer station Limited transport on 2 lines Limited transport on tram network Area closed for more than 1 hour Detecting of any chemical substances leaking from the baggage Forming attack plan

Possible chemical attack Pyrotechnic ready to check the baggage NFRS ready to save the pyrotechnic CFRS ready to detect dangerous substances CFRS ready to attack the fire in case of explosion In the end it was just forgotten baggage but you can never be sure!

Recent London attack Open station easier access Incident during peak travel hours Limited access to cameras older station Incident correctly identified but not on first try due to previous experience Poor device design minimal casualties Good video material to work with modern train Line operation within 12 hours not station due to investigation Increase of Police force Increase in station security More armed persons, higher risk of casual incident turning bad

Thank you for your attention! Contact Prague Public Transport Tomas Dobrovolny Risk Manager in Fire Department Tel: 00420 222 672 217 Mobile: 00420 724 706 817 Mail: dobrovolnyt@dpp.cz Company Web: www.dpp.cz