Appendix A Defining Emergency Response Standards Dorset Fire & Rescue Service Devon and Somerset Fire & Rescue Service JANUARY 2008 Compiled by: Colin Chapman - Dorset Fire and Rescue Service Mike Holme, Ken Anderson and Sally Murphy - Devon and Somerset Fire and Rescue Service Page 1 of 35
CONTENTS 1. Context 2. Background 3. Methodology 4. Sleeping Risks: Research 5. Sleeping Risks: Conclusions 6. Other Buildings: Research & Conclusions 7. Road Traffic Collisions: Research 8. Road Traffic Collisions: Conclusions 9. Performance Data 10. Recommendations Appendices A B C DFRS Pre-determined Attendances South West Response Standards Pre-2004 Response Standards D Extract from National Fire Statistics 2005 E DFRS Prevention Policies and Procedures Bibliography Page 2 of 35
1. Context 1.1 This report details outcomes from work undertaken to identify a process whereby the emergency resources within Dorset and Devon and Somerset FRSs can be deployed in order to minimise risk and improve safety. It is derived from joint research undertaken in 2007 by Dorset, and Devon and Somerset Fire and Rescue Services in conjunction with Exeter University. 1.2 This two-stranded project consist of: Part 1 - Recommendations to define response options and a Response Standard for Sleeping Risk Fires 1, Other Buildings and Road Traffic Collisions (RTCs). Part 2 - Proposal of a Risk Assessment Methodology that will provide a formula for determining risk rating of a specific geographical area. 1.3 Both pieces of work can be considered independently, yet will need to be overlaid to realise the full potential of the project on resource distribution and the complex relationship between prevention activity and an intervention response. 1.4 Fire and rescue services are called, and have the duty, to attend many types of incident. Different incidents require varying levels of resources. Whilst the services would like to attend all incidents as quickly as possible, to alleviate distress and mitigate damage, the criticality of the attendance time varies between incident types. 1.5 Currently, Dorset FRS, similarly to other fire and rescue services, only measures response times to certain types of fires, and does not have a performance indicator measure for response to RTCs. In addition, the statistics that are reported upon, only cover what crews are mobilised to, not what they actually encounter at the scene. For example, if a bonfire spreads to a property, the resulting response times do not count when statistics are reported to CLG. 1.6 The broader definition of sleeping risk rather than dwellings was considered to be more pertinent to the life risks found in Dorset. It is considered necessary to include commercial accommodation such as hotels as the occupants may be classified at greater risk than if they were in their own homes. This was evidenced in the loss of life in the tragic hotel fires in Newquay (August 2007) and Blackpool (September 2007), and the recent incident within sheltered accommodation in Dorset. Apart from a disproportionately high number of hotels, guest houses, etc, Dorset also has four large prison establishments and a myriad of other letting accommodation. 1.7 This report does not recommend a final resource distribution for intervention or prevention activity. To complete the process, the standards defined in this report must take account of the Risk Assessment Model that categorises each area of the Service by risk. This is particularly important in counties with large rural areas with sparse populations as it must 1 Sleeping Risks in Dorset are defined as any premises where members of the public sleep: dwellings, residential/sheltered homes, hotels, bed and breakfast s, houses in multiple occupation, hospitals, prison establishments. Page 3 of 35
be recognised that, if a realistic Response Standard is set, it will not be possible to meet it across all areas, eg remote settlements in the west or north of the county. Therefore, application of other control measures must be considered as part of the Emergency Response Standards, and an effective Integrated Risk Management Plan (IRMP). 2. Background 2.1 The current fire cover standards have been in place since 1936 (amended in 1944 and 1956). These standards were based on property types and were focused predominantly on the risk of fire spread in congested areas (see Appendix C). Little account appears to have been taken of the risk added by the occupants of a building. 2.2 The debate on life risk versus property risk has been debated since the mid-1990s and signified a fundamental shift away from a model based almost entirely on property density to one focused predominantly on risks to life. The 1956 standards remained in place until they were repealed by the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004. The Act requires the production of a National Framework Document that steers fire and rescue services' (FRAs) activity. Within the current Framework Document (2006), FRAs are charged with producing an Integrated Risk Management Plan (IRMP). The Framework states: 2.3 An IRMP will set out an authority s assessment of local risk to life and, in line with this analysis, how it is going to deploy its resources to tackle these risks and improve the safety of all sections of society. The IRMP will identify the ways in which the authority can work in partnership with neighbouring authorities and other agencies to deliver improved public safety. It will also set out the targets an authority has set itself and the standards it will apply to meet the specific pattern of local risk. This will be done in the context of its statutory duty to secure continuous improvement and should achieve Best Value for its local council taxpayers. 2.4 Since the establishment of the standards of fire cover in 1936, greater understanding has been developed on the socio-economic impact on risk. With the risk to life in the home now more apparent and with new legislative requirements to deal with a wider range of life threatening emergency incidents, it is necessary to find a more appropriate method of assessing response to risk. 2.5 The new process developed by Dorset and Devon and Somerset FRSs will propose two strands of risk assessment. Firstly, the emergency response standards described later in this document and secondly a risk assessment methodology which has been devised by Professor Roger Maull 2 of Exeter University working in conjunction with officers from Dorset and Devon and Somerset FRS. This risk assessment methodology is designed to assess the risk of fire from each Ward within the respective counties. It considers the variables of demographics, historical incident and crime data. 2.6 When both are completed, they will be mutually beneficial and may be overlaid to allow true integrated risk management planning. 2 Roger Maull is a Professor of Management in the School of Business and Economics at the University of Exeter. Page 4 of 35
2.7 For RTCs, the risk assessment will be based on historical evidence from fire and rescue services and the Police to assess accident hot spots, coupled with an analysis of overall time available to respond and deal with the incident. 2.8 Sleeping risk fires still account for the greatest proportion of fire related deaths each year. National Fire Statistics (2005) state that 82% of all dwelling fires were classified as accidental and that misuse of appliance/equipment and the mishandling of fire and hot substances (eg careless disposal of smoking materials) were the most frequent causes. In addition, whilst the statistics acknowledge that smoke detector ownership has risen to nearly 80%, in 47% of dwelling fires no smoke alarm was present. An extract from the National Fire Statistics (2005) can be found in Appendix D. 3. Methodology 3.1 Sleeping risks 3.1.1 A body of research already exists in this area (section 4.1), therefore our research concentrates on bringing together the common themes, cross-referencing the findings with our own incident data where possible, and examining action taken by other fire and rescue authorities (FRAs). Sleeping risks may be private or commercial premises and can be defined as any premises where members of the community may reasonably be expected to be sleeping at any time, and include: Dwellings (all house types, flats and houses in multiple occupation) Hotels (including guest houses, BandBs) Hospitals Residential care homes, nursing homes and sheltered housing Caravans (and caravan parks) Prisons 3.1.2 Pre-determined Attendances (PDAs) apply for both property fires and RTCs throughout Dorset (Appendix A) and are consistently applied regardless of travel time or location. It is considered that within Dorset FRS mechanisms exist which already apportion appliances, equipment and personnel to differing types of incidents and that these are sufficiently robust. A caveat remains regarding the impact of extended travel times on fire development, and this is debated later in the document leading to recommendations. 3.2 Other Buildings 3.2.1 Other buildings can be defined as any property that does not ordinarily have an inherent risk from people sleeping on the premises and has a financial value associated with any damage done to the premises from a fire, eg warehouses, exhibition halls, libraries, restaurants, schools or shops. Although there is less available data upon which to come to conclusions, much of the analysis used in commercial sleeping risks is relevant and may be used. Page 5 of 35
3.3 Road Traffic Collisions (RTCs) 3.3.1 The research here is underpinned by the need to get casualties to definitive care within the Golden Hour. This is clearly defined as the time from the moment of impact, to the time the casualty arrives at a point of definitive care. 3.3.2 As above, pre-determined attendances exist for all potential RTC incident types. As with sleeping fires, mechanisms exist to alter and adapt individual potential attendances, yet travel time is not currently taken into account. 4. Sleeping Risks: Research 4.1 In February 1995, the Audit Commission produced In the Line of Fire, a review of value for money aspects of the Fire and Rescue Service (England and Wales). Within this document, the Audit Commission pointed out a weakness in the then current standards of fire cover, in that they did not adequately take account of the presence of people or their activities. They also pointed out that risk levels may vary by time of day, and by the fire safety measures within the buildings. It went on to state that insufficient emphasis was placed on fire prevention (in this case referring to what would now be termed Community Safety). 4.2 This report initiated further activity within the Home Office, who at that time had responsibility for the Fire and Rescue Service, which led to the production of two further reports Safe as Houses and Out of the Line of Fire. Safe as Houses (1997) was the product of the Community Safety Task Force and identified problems with the current arrangements for trying to reduce fires by proactive measures, namely: Questionable leadership and direction Resource issues Duplication of effort Lack of communication with those most at risk 4.3 At that time, there was no statutory duty for fire and rescue services to undertake community safety activities and as a consequence there was a resistance to divert what was seen as already scarce financial resources into this field of activity. 4.4 The report cited examples of proactive measures making a measurable difference, National smoke alarm - campaign Increased ownership from 20% to 79%. Targeted education - (Lothian and Borders) in schools reducing incidence of fire. Community programme - (West Midlands) reduction of fire deaths from 50 to 20 over 6 years. Media Campaign - (Northern Ireland) aimed at increasing smoke alarm ownership and partnership working reduced fire deaths from 27 to 8 over 10 years. Page 6 of 35
4.5 The report concludes that: prevention is better than cure, it called for funding issues to be resolved, for community safety to become the primary focus of the Fire Service and for targets to be set for reducing the incidence of fires, deaths and casualties. 4.6 In response to this report the Fire Brigades' Union (FBU) published a discussion document As Safe as Houses? in which they propose and endorse five philosophies to assist the reduction of fires, deaths and casualties: 1. Prevention is better than cure 2. Detection 3. Reduce the fire load 4. Fire containment 5. Fire Suppression and extinguishment 4.7 Whilst endorsing the concept of community fire safety and the role Fire and Rescue personnel should have in its implementation, the document also calls for appropriate funding and leadership from central government. 4.8 In July 1998, the Home Office produced in response to the Audit Commission s In the Line of Fire, a report entitled Out of the Line of Fire. The recommendations included the following: R1 We believe that risk assessment should be accepted in principle as the way forward for future determination of fire cover. R2 We recommend that fire safety measures be formally included in the planning and assessment of fire cover 4.9 Following the 1995 report In the Line of Fire, ENTEC, a section of the then Department of Transport Local Government and Regions, were commissioned in 1996 to carry out work on: Establishing the principle of risk assessment Demonstrating how risk assessment can be applied to plan fire station location Producing and trialling example methods. 4.10 In a short report entitled National Risk Assessment of Dwellings (1997) they identify that there would be a relatively small reduction in the number of deaths through a faster response time, and a relatively large increase in deaths by a slower response time. It therefore states that A minimum response standard is required in all areas to ensure the risk remains within the limits of tolerability (this is not defined) and goes on to state At no point is risk reduced to negligible level by fire cover alone With regard to Community Fire Safety it suggests 1. that measures can be targeted both geographically and according to household type (This principle of targeting prevention activity is reflected in Dorset FRSs prevention activity, eg Home Safety Checks.) and states that Page 7 of 35
2. At risk households in surveyed areas can be achieved by the use of census data, local authority surveys (such as social service surveys) and fire reports. (This principle of identifying at risk households forms the basis of our joint research with Exeter University Sec 2.5.) 4.11 The Home Office commissioned ENTEC again in 1998, and in a report titled Development and Trial of a Risk Assessment Toolkit for the UK Fire Service, further analysis of response fatality rates relationships for dwelling fires was undertaken. This report calculated the individual risk of death from fire in dwellings by first developing a plot of the likelihood of fatality per fire against Fire and Rescue Service attendance times (from when firefighters were alerted and mobilised, ie from the time that the fire station bells were sounded or firefighter personal alerters were activated). Data used was from attendance times and casualties in dwelling fires reported to the Home office in 1995. 4.12 Over 13,000 reports were used, namely all dwelling fires where a person was reported as a casualty, fatality or being rescued by the FRS in the UK in a single year. This involved calculating the percentage of casualties who were fatally injured when the fire was attended within a given time by the Fire and Rescue Service, as shown in Table 1. 4.13 A later ENTEC Report (1999) Response time fatality rate relationships for dwelling fires clarified that attendance times were banded into 5 minute ranges, namely 1 to 5 minutes, 6 to 10 minutes etc. rather than smaller units of time for two reasons: 1. The difference in fatality rates between (say) 1 minute increments is not (statistically) great, and would not lead to different levels of fire cover, 2. Further sub-divisions of response times would reduce the number of data points on which the fatality rates are derived. This is especially so in the case of the longer response times. 4.14 Therefore, fatality rates are based on 5 minute bands of response times from 1 to 5 to 16 to 20. Responses taking over 20 minutes are treated as one group for two reasons: 1. The number of responses taking over 20 minutes to fires involving casualties is relatively small, and: 2. Persons remaining in burning dwellings for over 20 minutes are likely to be fatally injured (except multi-storey dwellings) or have escaped unassisted 4.15 Thus, for example, in about 8,200 fires attended within 5 minutes, just under 4% of casualties died, compared with 5.5% of casualties in fires attended in 11 to 15 minutes. Attendance time from time of alert by Fire Control. Rate of fatality per casualty 0-5 minutes 0.038 6-10 minutes 0.042 11-15 minutes 0.055 16-20 minutes 0.072 > 21 minutes 0.16 Table 1: Fatality rate per casualty from time of alert Page 8 of 35
4.16 Thus, for example, there is a 1 in 6 chance (a 0.16 probability) of a death in a dwelling fire where a person is reported as a casualty or a rescue when attended in over 20 minutes, and a 1 in 26 (a 0.038 probability) chance of death per fire when attended in under 5 minutes. 4.17 This is shown pictorially in Figure 1. 0.18 Probabliity of death per fire (persons reported) 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.1 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 0 1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 >20 Time bands Response Time (minutes from time of alert) Figure 1: Response time versus fatality rate curve for dwelling fires 4.18 It can be seen from this data that there is little significant increase in the risk of fatality until after 10 minutes has elapsed from the time of ignition. The report therefore concluded: that there is little difference in the risk associated with a 10 minute response standard compared with a 5 minute response standard. Therefore a 10 minute response standard is suggested for all areas of population which have above a certain minimum of persons. 4.19 The numerical threshold was proposed on cost effective ground not on risk control. The level of fire cover that is classified as cost effective is where cost per life saved is no more than 780,000 for a range of communities. 4.20 The effect of response times on fatality rates was recalculated for the later ENTEC Report Response time fatality rate relationships for dwelling fires 1999. The paper aimed to reapply this approach (above) to a larger data set, namely all dwelling fires involving casualties in the period 1984-to 1997, and then separately to urban and rural fires. 4.21 Subsequent work by the Home Office using data from the period 1985-1997 was utilised and confirmed that there was a relationship between response time and fatality rates in these years. Figure 2 shows the result, and mirrors the response time versus fatality rate curve for dwelling fires above (Figure 1). 4.22 The report concluded that the difference in response time-fatality rates relationships between urban and rural areas is not sufficient to warrant the use of different data sets. Page 9 of 35
Probability of death per fire (persons reported) 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.1 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 1995 1998 0 1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 >20 Time bands Figure 2: Response time versus fatality rate curve for dwelling fires 4.23 The ODPM Fire Cover Review 2002, Technical Paper E, confirmed that the number of casualties that become fatalities is dependent upon attendance time, according to the relationships derived by Entec UK Ltd: This relationship was derived from an analysis of FDR1 fires in dwellings over 15 years and shows that a faster fire service response reduces the risk of death. This finding is intuitively right, but it is the first time that any such relationship has been derived. 4.24 The same report references the NHS Executive Review of Ambulance Response Times which concluded that an 8 minute attendance time should be pursued, for all immediately life threatening conditions on the ground that a rapid response time if intervention is to be clinically effective and rapid intervention and effective treatment by front line staff will affect the outcome. 4.25 South Western Ambulance Trust currently measures this response time from when the asset (ambulance/paramedic) is assigned from the mobilising system to the time of arrival at the incident. 4.26 Our own national FRS indicators measure the same standard in terms of a Fire Service response. That is, from time of alert of wholetime station or RDS pagers, to time in attendance at incident. 4.27 It is expected that ambulance trusts will have to realign their response targets nationally from 2009, from the moment that the call is received at the control room to when the asset arrives at the incident. This will severely impact upon their national performance standards of 80% of calls reached in 8 minutes. 4.28 Finally, in 1998 ENTEC produced a toolkit for assessing risk in dwellings. This toolkit took the form of a computerised modelling system which simultaneously compared historic incident data, demographics, travel times and weight of attack (number of appliances and personnel). The system was distributed to all UK FRSs and is intended to allow the prediction of the impact of changes to the resource distribution. Page 10 of 35
4.29 In April 2003, the concept of Integrated Risk Management Plans (IRMP) were introduced to the Fire and Rescue Service via the first IRMP Guidance Notes. Two guidance notes were issued for consultation and in the accompanying letter from Sir Graham Meldrum, (the then Chief Inspector of Fire and Rescue Services), it stated that introducing IRMPs would lead to: a) more effective targeting of resources that will improve community safety, and protective and prevention measures, and b) more dynamic, flexible, and appropriate levels of emergency response to incidents, effectively targeted to save lives and reduce injuries. 4.30 IRMP Guidance Note 1 states: IRMPs are not only about replacing national fire cover standards with local ones. They involve shifting the focus in planning to put people first, looking at the risks arising form the full range of fires and other emergency incidents, and at the options for reduction and management. To be effective they will have to be a fully integrated, risk based approach to community safety, fire safety inspection and enforcement and emergency response arrangements that will contribute to a safer environment and goes on to confirm you may wish to set different standards for fires and for other emergency incidents. 4.31 In response, the FBU in 2004 published a document entitled The National IRMP Document. 4.32 This report is based on: published research carried out to inform the recent Review of Standards of Emergency (pathfinder) Cover 4.33 This research would appear to be the ENTEC report referenced in para 4.13. 4.34 The report goes on to suggest the following critical times in Table 2. Critical event Receipt of first emergency call for incident at Fire and Rescue Control Fire and Rescue Control handling time prior to mobilisation of Fire and Rescue emergency response. Attendance of FIRST fire appliance at incident Attendance of SECOND fire appliance at Incident (where required by CAST) Attendance if THIRD fire appliance at incident (where required by CAST) Maximum running times Zero minutes 2 minutes after first call 8 minutes after first call 11 minutes after first call 13 minutes after first call Table 2: FBU Critical Response Times 4.35 The CAST (Critical Attendance Standard) referred to in Table 2 relates to the suggested resource requirement for dealing with differing types of incident. 4.36 The FBU's National IRMP Document also introduces consideration of the impact and effectiveness of Community Fire Safety activities as a control measure. It states: Page 11 of 35
The number of accidental fires occurring in the UK can be reduced by effective and sustained Community Fire Safety initiatives. The number of accidental fire deaths will fall as a result; Effective arson reduction campaigns can reduce the number of deliberately started fires. This has the potential to reduce fire deaths; Effective and joined-up partnership working across agencies and government departments can improve fire detection and automatic suppression rates. This has the potential to reduce fire deaths; Well planned fire safety legislative inspection and enforcement programmes which are fully integrated with other preventative and intervention strategies can hold down the number of fires occurring in buildings other than the home. This also has the potential to reduce fire deaths. 4.37 This acknowledges that the likelihood of fires can be reduced, but also states that it would not be possible to prevent all fires. 4.38 The concept of Community Safety has now become widely accepted within the Fire and Rescue Service and confirmed by its inclusion in the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 as a statutory duty (Section 6). 4.39 The need to assist people to help themselves in a fire situation has also had an impact on Fire Controls. Whilst once simply a centre for the receipt of calls and the despatching of resources, it has been recognised that the Fire Control Operator has the ability to provide critical information to a person trapped within an incident. This was embodied in the Fire Survival Guide published in Fire and Rescue Service Circular 10/93 which detailed training for Control in Fire Safety and Fire Survival Skills. 5. Sleeping Risks: Conclusions 5.1 It is apparent that earlier reports focused on bringing risk within a tolerable level and used this as a justification for having differing response times for different areas. However, when considering the optimum response times, it is more appropriate to consider the event and not the location. In simple terms, a fire is a fire. The impact of that fire on the sleeping risk of origin is the same, irrespective of location. Therefore, the attendance to that incident should be the same. The introduction of variables such as cost-effectiveness and geography needs to be considered at the point of setting resource distribution. It is indisputable that the longer a fire is left the more severe it will become, therefore, any deviation from the Response Standard should attract more resources. This concept supports the analysis of fire fatalities (paragraph 4.14) and recommendation 3 of the Out of the Line of Fire Report. 5.2 It appears that the likelihood of survival in a fire situation starts to deteriorate after 5 minutes and becomes increasingly more unlikely after 10 minutes. The statement prevention is better than cure is the foundation of Dorset s Community Safety Plan, yet there is a realisation that not all fires can be prevented. Once a fire starts, however infrequently, it will start to have an impact on those present. The FBU report confirms this. However, it goes on to offer some options to mitigate the level of effect: Page 12 of 35
5.3 it is impossible to prevent a person being affected by a fire merely as a result of the speed of response.. it can prevent the casualty becoming a fatality, but response time alone cannot prevent the fire or the products of the fire affecting a person in some way. 5.4 The report goes on to acknowledge that Community Fire Safety activities (see para 4.4) can reduce fires, and it could be assumed increase survival opportunities of people trapped within fires, either by prior education or by Fire Control Operators working with those trapped using the Fire Survival Guide. Therefore, while there will always be a need to respond in the fastest possible time the range of control measures available can either: Increase the speed of response by earlier detection and summoning of assistance and swifter call handling processes, or Increase the chances of survival by self or assisted help. 5.5 The application of a Response Standard based on the concept of a fire is a fire, leads to some natural difficulties. For FRAs in counties with sparsely populated areas such as Dorset, Devon, and Somerset, it would not be possible to deploy resources that would ensure every sleeping risk is covered within the identified Response Standard, unlike more urban FRAs. This could only be possible by having appliances covering all sleeping risks within a given response time. 5.6 Therefore, these properties need to receive the maximum benefit of risk reduction and control methods. For example, the provision of a working smoke alarm could reduce the detection time for a fire by 5 minutes. 3 In addition, by working with the person to create an effective fire plan and skills to extend the survival time within a fire situation, this could improve survival rates for several more minutes. Coupled together, these proactive interventions could increase the survival opportunity for potentially a further 10 minutes. 5.7 Whilst the national statistics show that smoke detector ownership has increased to nearly 80%, the fact that 47% of accidental dwelling fires occurred in properties without a smoke alarm shows considerable work remains. There needs to be a focused effort which targets those households without smoke alarms, in particular those houses deemed to be a greater risk due their demographic circumstances. These statistics suggest that the Service is less likely to be called to a fire in a property fitted with a smoke detector. This could be either those who purchase or are provided with smoke alarms have less likely hood of experiencing a fire, or they are able to effectively deal with the incident without the need to call the Fire and Rescue Service. 5.8 The issue of sparsity raises issues other than the potential inability to cost effectively meet Response Standards across the entire population. As the population becomes sparser, so does the infrastructure. 5.9 Effective water supplies remain the mainstay of firefighting in domestic sleeping risks, and service operations may be severely hampered by the lack of a close reliable water supply. As previously stated, the longer a fire burns the more likelihood is for it to increase in size and intensity. This not only increases the risk to life, but also to the environment by virtue of 3 This is based in the time taken for a fire to progress beyond the room of origin and allow the occupant or a third party to observe it and raise the alarm Page 13 of 35
emissions from the fire and, once the Fire and Rescue Service attend, the contaminated water running off the fire and potentially into drains or water courses. The Fire and Rescue Service is not exempt from the Environmental Protection Act 1990 and must take all reasonable steps to mitigate damage caused by its actions at a fire or at an RTC. Both of these issues will have to be considered when setting the Response Standard, and generally supports the concept, for fires, that the longer the travel time the more resources will be required. 5.10 From the evidence, the emerging theme suggests that Response Standards for sleeping risks need to be considered in two inter-dependent parts. Speed and weight of attack Pro-active measures applied 5.11 For baseline speed and weight of attack, the research shows that the optimum time for emergency intervention lies within the 5-10 minute window. For the Service to have the greatest chance of making a successful emergency intervention, in respect of saving life, it is of paramount importance that the Service works to enable the earliest possible call for assistance. That call needs to be dealt with as quickly as possible to give responding crews the maximum time to attend a property and make a successful intervention. Therefore, the speed and weight of attack can be broken into the three elements, 1. Time to discovery 2. Call handling time 3. Travel time (including RDS staff turning in and all staff dressing in PPE before leaving the station/location. 5.12 The above are distinct sections of one overall timeline. As, from a reactive point of view, we are not fully able to manage the first element, the reactive Response Standard should be expressed from the time from which the service becomes aware of the incident, ie the second the call is received within Fire and Rescue Service Control. As discussed above, current response standards do not measure call-handling time within the continuum of response. 5.13 Much of the research cited throughout this document has only been able to consider the effect of attendance times on fire fatality rates based on the first appliance to arrive. Determining what is an acceptable phased arrival in fire appliance attendance times, ie the time between the arrival of the first appliance and the second as part of the initial emergency response is obviously important as it is this time which will allow the Incident Commander to: Undertake an initial dynamic risk assessment Brief and deploy crews in the initial phase Deploy breathing apparatus crews where necessary before the arrival of the second appliance 5.14 Integrated Risk Management Plans (IRMPs) dictate that consideration of the proactive measures applied (eg the provision of smoke alarms, home safety checks or schools education/streetwise) should be seen as part of the relationship. Page 14 of 35
5.15 Currently, Dorset FRS's existing prevention agenda does not fully integrate with intervention response times. 5.16 The current Home Safety Check Policy and Station Risk Profile Maps do not take into account travel time of appliances and crews. In essence, the Service prioritises risk groups or Priority Wards to receive prevention activity without cognisance of their location, travel times to them in case of fire or fire development before arrival of appliances. 5.17 Similarly, protection activities do not necessarily consider when or where an operational response would respond. This is crucial to commerce and industry when undertaking fire risk assessments under the Fire Safety Order 2005. 5.18 In respect of sleeping risks, three categories of risk present themselves and could be incorporated into the Services prevention agenda: 5.18.1 High Risk Output areas or Wards could be defined as high risk by the Risk Assessment Model (1.2) taking demographics, crime and history into account. Although the risk assessment methodology is predicated on dwelling fire statistics, the wider definition of sleeping risks can equally benefit from the methodology with additional overlays of other risk information, eg Fire Safety Audit compliance For high-risk properties a programme of risk reduction activities will be required, the detail of which will be defined by the demographics of the population and the level of interagency co-operation whether commercial sleeping risks or dwellings. These high-risk areas could be inside or outside of a 10-minute intervention response. 5.18.2 Medium (Special) Risk Should the area or individual property (eg hotel) fall outside the 10-minute response window, they could be defined as special risk due to the additional time for an intervention response to be made and the subsequent fire development. These properties should then receive as a matter of priority a tailored proactive package aimed at: Allowing occupants to be alerted to a fire as soon after ignition as possible Ensuring they are aware of, and have means to call for assistance, as soon as possible Having the knowledge and skills to increase their chances of survival Premises that are not dwellings, should take into account attendance times within their risk assessments 5.18.3 Low (Normal) Risk Areas not falling within the high-risk demographics or are within a 10 minute response time should be categorised as normal risk. Proactive activity in these areas cannot be ignored for three reasons: Page 15 of 35
Prevention is better than cure History only predicts the likelihood of an incident not the potential Risk cannot be managed by speed of response alone Therefore, each must have a package of proactive measures, but where resources do not allow simultaneous activity in all areas those areas designated as high risk or special risk should be addressed first. This relationship between community safety and response times is shown graphically in Table 3 (below) High Prevention/Protection will be proactive Prevention/Protection will be proactive Prevention/Protection will be proactive Community Risk Prevention/Protection will be limited according to available resources Prevention/Protection will be limited according to available resources Prevention/Protection will be proactive Low Prevention/Protection will be available on request Prevention/Protection will be available on request Prevention/Protection will be available on request Faster Slower High Risk Faster Response Time Medium Risk Low Risk Table 3: Theoretical relationship between community safety and response 6. Other Buildings: Research & Conclusions 6.1 Other buildings can be defined as any property that does not ordinarily have an inherent risk from people sleeping on the premises and has a financial value associated with any damage done to the premises from a fire e.g. warehouses, exhibition halls, libraries, restaurants, schools or shops. Perhaps understandably, there is not the same depth of research in recent years for these types of premises as there has been for private dwellings. Page 16 of 35
6.2 However, the Home Office did examine the statistical relationship between attendance time and spread of fire (ie the percentage of fires causing over 5 metres of damage) in other buildings from 1994-1997 shown below in Table 4. Attendance time Percentage of fires causing less than 5m2 of damage Under 5 minutes 25 6 to 10 35 11 to 15 45 16 to 60 55 Table 4: Response time versus fire spread 1994-97 6.3 A later ODPM Report (The Fire Cover Review 2002) confirmed that although there was very little data on which to establish a relationship between the attendance time of the fire service and the societal risk to life in other buildings, an empirical relationship was derived shown in Figure 3. Figure 3: Relationship between attendance time and the percentage of rescues completed for societal risk fires in other buildings 6.5 The Home Office and ODPM research above is not entirely conclusive in determining an optimum response time for such premises. It does however suggest that a 10-minute response time (from time of call) for the first appliance will reduce damage and increase the percentage of rescues completed. 6.4 A suitable attendance time for the second appliance to attend incidents in Other Buildings is considered to be an additional 5 minutes (15 minutes from time of call). This is due to the nature of the premises and the more considered deployment of operational resources at larger more complex premises. The Incident Commander will be liasing with occupiers, confirming roll calls and plans and ensuring detailed briefings rather than contemplating snatch rescues in the case of sleeping risks. Table 7 shows arrival times from time of call to Other Buildings 2004-07, and Table 8 shows arrival times of second appliances to Other Buildings 2004-07. 6.5 Officers in Dorset and Devon & Somerset FRSs are currently assisting the Fire Protection Association with a recently initiated research project into the wider economic, social and Page 17 of 35
environmental impacts of fires in commercial buildings. These consequential impacts will be considered when released. 7. Road Traffic Collisions: Research 7.1 The ENTEC report (1998) (paragraph 4.14) went on to consider Response Standards for Special Services (which includes RTCs). Whilst the report acknowledged that there was a lack of Fire and Rescue Service related data in the area 4, it recommended that a response time based on medical research for the NHS and the NHS Executive Review of Ambulance Service Response Times. This review recommended the medical response times for RTCs (ambulance Service or other medical assistance) of 8 minutes with a Fire and Rescue Service (extrication) Response Standard based on: 15 minutes initial attendance 30 minutes to evaluate, access and extricate casualties 15 minutes for casualty to be conveyed to hospital for treatment 7.2 This Response Standard falls into the concept of the Golden Hour, which is the critical time period from the impact to the casualty reaching definitive care, which can be defined as follows: Understanding the cellular events is central to determining the priorities and strategies in both the first hour (initial assessment) and in the second hour (early definitive care). This second hour requires very strong surgical direction and coordination. 7.3 Dr R Adams Cowley, Maryland Institute (USA) coined the Golden Hour concept for Emergency Medical Services, following research dedicated to survival of shock trauma patients. 7.4 Definitive care can, depending on the trauma, last many hours after the event. The crucial element remains however the assessments made within the first hour, assessments that can commence on the scene and then moving into surgical intervention, if required, in the second hour. Effectively, emergency services aim to get the casualty to definitive care within 60 minutes of the impact occurring. 8. Road Traffic Collisions: Conclusions 8.1 In contrast to sleeping risks, the demographics of a road system or the type of vehicle likely to be at a place at a certain time are more difficult to quantify. However, information is available on the number of recorded accidents by location and the relative traffic densities by time of day in certain areas. This information is already utilised by the Service as a key member of the Dorset Road Safety Tasking and Co-ordinating Group. This has resulted in targeted education, enforcement and engineering activities by the Group within the County. 4 At the time of the ENTEC report Fire Services were not required to report circumstances or outcomes of special service incidents, as they were not made a statutory duty until 2004. Page 18 of 35
8.2 In contrast to the deteriorating situation in a fire, once a collision has happened, it remains stable unless a secondary event occurs as a result of the collision, such as a fire or the release of a hazardous/toxic substance (other than those contained within the mechanics of the vehicles), although any casualties will potentially deteriorate until medical intervention is made. Therefore it is reasonable to set our RTC Response Standard by the need for the casualty to reach definitive care, but weight of attack will remain constant and will not require augmenting as time increases. The attendance of specialist vehicles such as the Heavy Rescue appliance will be determined by the type of vehicle/type of collision not the location or response time. 8.3 When attendance is considered in light of the golden hour, by utilising either road or air ambulances, it is possible for a casualty to reach definitive care within 15 minutes. Given the average extraction time of 30 minutes, this gives a possible maximum attendance time of 15 minutes. 8.4 The Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 Section 8 states that a Fire and Rescue Authority must make the provision for rescuing people from RTCs in its area. This statutory duty for safety of people at RTCs is a new area for the Service and with that responsibility comes the greater need to collect accurate information in order to inform our training, planning and resource provision to deal with RTCs. 8.5 As with sleeping risks and the associated proposed response times and prevention measures, a response standard to Road Traffic Collisions must acknowledge mitigating prevention measures. 9. Performance Data 9.1 The tables below (Tables 4-9) show the percentage of fires (Sleeping Risk and Other Buildings) and RTCs that Dorset FRS have attended within 2004-07 for first and second appliances. This has been measured from Time of Call to Fire Control, to Time in Attendance of the first appliance. (As confirmed above, current response standards measure from the time that Fire Control notifies the station, not when the public notify Fire Control.) 9.2 The call handling time (time from receipt of first call to press send ) is an existing DFRS local performance indicator. The Service aims to answer all calls in 7 seconds, and assign all calls (notify the station) in less than 2 minutes. The Regional FiReControl Project will set performance standards under Benefits Management at % of calls answered in 7 seconds and % of calls mobilised in 60 seconds. Page 19 of 35
Receipt of call 3 year average 2006-07 2005-06 2004-05 to arrival < 5 minutes 18.25% 21.9% 18.0% 15.0% 6 35.30% 39.3% 33.4% 33.6% 7 52.36% 54.5% 51.9% 50.9% 8 66.19% 66.0% 67.65% 65.0% 9 76.74% 76.0% 79.0% 75.1% 10 84.14% 82.4% 86.1% 83.4% 11 88.03% 86.4% 90.2% 87.3% 12 91.17% 90.7% 91.9% 91.0% 13 94.09% 94.3% 94.4% 93.8% 14 95.29% 95.0% 95.4% 95.6% 15 96.41% 95.7% 96.5% 97.2% 15+ 100% 100% 100% 100% Table 4: Receipt of call in Fire Control to arrival of first appliance (sleeping risks) 2004-07 Receipt of call 3 year average 2006-07 2005-06 2004-05 to arrival < 5 minutes 2.8% 1.9% 4.0% 2.3% 6 6.7% 6.5% 8.0% 5.5% 7 17.7% 19.1% 18.5% 15.5% 8 32.8% 35.5% 32.4% 30.6% 9 48.8% 49.1% 48.5% 48.7% 10 61.7% 60.8% 60.9% 63.6% 11 70.9% 71.0% 71.6% 70.0% 12 77.5% 76.9% 79.4% 76.1% 13 83.5% 83.3% 84.5% 82.8% 14 87.0% 87.3% 87.7% 86.0% 15 89.3% 89.2% 90.3% 88.3% 15+ 100% 100% 100% 100% Table 5: Receipt of call in Fire Control to arrival of second appliance (sleeping risks) Page 20 of 35
Receipt of call 3 year average 2006-07 2005-06 2004-05 to arrival < 5 minutes 16.6% 20.1% 13.1% 17.0% 6 35.9% 37.6% 33.2% 37.2% 7 50.2% 54.6% 47.2% 49.1% 8 63.4% 63.9% 60.3% 66.1% 9 71.6% 71.1% 66.4% 77.1% 10 79.6% 80.4% 76.2% 82.1% 11 85.5% 84.5% 83.2% 88.5% 12 88.8% 88.1% 86.9% 91.3% 13 92.2% 91.2% 91.6% 93.6% 14 93.8% 94.3% 92.5% 94.5% 15 95.4% 95.4% 94.9% 95.9% 15+ 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% Table 7: Receipt of call in Fire Control to arrival of first appliance (other buildings) 2004-07 Receipt of call 3 year average 2006-07 2005-06 2004-05 to arrival < 5 minutes 2.9% 1.9% 3.4% 3.2% 6 5.6% 3.8% 6.2% 6.5% 7 14.8% 13.1% 14.7% 16.2% 8 27.6% 28.8% 26.6% 27.6% 9 39.7% 39.4% 40.1% 39.5% 10 50.2% 51.3% 50.8% 48.6% 11 61.1% 63.1% 61.0% 59.5% 12 68.6% 69.4% 68.4% 68.1% 13 73.9% 75.6% 72.9% 73.5% 14 77.0% 77.5% 76.8% 76.8% 15 80.7% 80.0% 83.6% 78.4% 15+ 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% Table 8: Receipt of call in Fire Control to arrival of second appliance (other buildings) 2004-07 9.3 Similarly, Table 9 below indicates the average time taken to attend RTCs from receipt of call in Fire Control to time in attendance. Page 21 of 35
9.4 Dorset, Devon and Somerset - Call answer time to arrival - RTCs (all RTCs) Receipt of call to Percentage of Incidents attended (cumulative) 2004-07 arrival Dorset Devon and Somerset Up to 5 minutes 11.6% 11 6 21.3 18 7 31.9 26 8 41.1 35 9 48.9 45 10 56.5 54 11 65.2 62 12 75.3 70 13 79.7 76 14 82.3 82 15 86.3 86 More than 15 mins 100.0% 100 Table 9: Receipt of call in Fire Control to arrival of first appliance (RTCs) 10. Recommendations 10.1 Recommendation 1 10.1.1 In order to demonstrate the Service s commitment to creating safer communities and integrating risk management it is proposed that we should cease using the existing Standards of Fire Cover indicators that are based on property type and redefine Response Standards based upon life risk and building type/use. 10.2 Recommendation 2 10.2.1 Dorset FRS should express its attendance times as the time taken from call ringing in Fire Control to the arrival of the first appliance 5, as this is the true impact on the caller and the community and it is this timeline that should be considered when analysing survivability rates in fire. 10.3 Recommendation 3 10.3.1 Currently, Fire Control mobilise a Pre-Determined Attendance (PDA) to Property Fires (Appendix A). This is constant throughout the County: two pumping appliances and in certain circumstances an Officer, or, three appliances and in certain circumstances an Officer if there are persons reported in the property. Irrespective of location, the PDA remains the same for the type of risk and the quickest resources will be despatched. 10.3.2 In light of the research, to effectively manage the risk inherent within the communities of Dorset, the following Response Standards are recommended (all times commence when the call first rings in Fire Control). 5 Appliance in this context infers an operational resource that can make an intervention (not an FDS Officer) Page 22 of 35
INCIDENT TYPE EMERGENCY RESPONSE STANDARD Sleeping Risk Other Buildings Existing PDAs apply 1st 5 in 10 mins/80% 2nd in 13 mins/80% Existing PDAs apply 1st in 10 mins/80% 2nd in 15 mins/80% Road Traffic Collisions Existing PDAs apply 1 st in 15 mins/80% Table 10: Proposed Emergency Response Standards 10.4 Recommendation 4 10.4.1 Intervention timelines should be considered a critical component when implementing or proposing prevention or protection activities (Table 3) 10.5 Recommendation 5 10.5.1 DFRS examine the timeline from time of call to arrival at the incident and investigate detailed activities within their own remit that could reduce the Intervention Window. This may include: Advanced call-handling development programme for Fire Control staff Pre-alerting appliances and stations routinely prior to despatch Shorter travel times due to improved mapping, and appliances dedicated to the conditions they operate in (shorter wheelbase etc) Crewing options Greater use of neighbouring FRSs Colin Chapman Dorset Fire and Rescue Service January 2008 Page 23 of 35
Appendix A DFRS Pre-determined Attendances Incident Codes and Relevant Pre-determined Attendance (PDA) CODE TYPE PDA PF Property Fire 2P PFD Property Fire Derelict Building 2P PFP Property Fire Persons Reported 3P PFT Property Fire Thatched 5P VFT Vehicle Fire with Persons Trapped 1R, 1P Key: P - Pumping appliance R - Light rescue pumping appliance Page 24 of 35