CERT EMERGENCY PROCEDURES FOR PIPE BRIDGE INCIDENTS

CERT EMERGENCY PROCEDURES FOR PIPE BRIDGE INCIDENTS

1.5 KM PIPE BRIDGE

PIPE LINE PROXIMITY

OBJECTIVES SPECIFY RESPONSIBILITIES & ROLES OF PIPE BRIDGE OWNER, PIPE OWNERS, PRODUCT SENDERS & RECEIVERS E.G. REGULAR INSPECTION & MAINTENANCE OF PIPE LINES, MECHANICAL, ELECTRICAL, INSTRUMENT, SECURITY FACILITIES ETC. ASSIST SIC IN IDENTIFYING AFFECTED PIPES EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURES TO CONTAIN & SUPPRESS INCIDENT WORK WITH STAKEHOLDERS, SCDF & RELEVANT GOVT AGENCIES TO CONTROL AND SUPPRESS LEAKAGE, FIRE OR EXPLOSION.

SCOPE PIPE BRIDGE OWNER - SITE MAIN CONTROLLER (SMC), SITE INCIDENT CONTROLLER (SIC) AFFECTED PIPE LINE OWNERS - ASSISTANT SITE INCIDENT CONTROLLERS (ASC) AFFECTED PRODUCT SENDERS & RECEIVERS - CONTROL ROOM BOARDMEN ZONING - FACILITATE RAPID IDENTIFICATION OF AFFECTED PIPE LINES, PRODUCTS, SENDERS & RECEIVERS ACTIVATION OF COMPANY EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM, SCDF & MUTUAL AID (Oil & Petrochemical Industries Technical Safety Committee)

SIC ASSESS ON SITE ( & OFF SITE) IMPACT OFFENSIVE RESPONSE ADVANCE TEAM ASSESS, RESCUE, ISOLATE VALVE, STOP LEAK PROTECTION TEAM ISOLATE/STOP FLOW, CUT OFF IGNITION SOURCE, PROTECT ADVANCE TEAM - WATER SPRAY/CURTAIN, FOAMING OVER SPILL, COOLING TEAM COOL PIPE BRIDGE TO PREVENT COLLAPSE, COOL PIPE LINES TO PREVENT PRESSURE BUILT UP, RUPTURE, DEFENSIVE RESPONSE STAY OUT OF MAJOR GAS CLOUD & MASSIVE LINE RUPTURE/FIRE, ACTIVATE MONITORS, FIXED SYSTEMS, e.g. DRENCHERS etc. IPP / EVACUATION IN EVENT OF POTENTIAL UNCONFINED VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION (UCVE), DOMINO EFFECT, SEEK IN PLACE PROCTECTION ( IPP) OR EVACUATE TO EVACUEE ASSEMBLY AREA ( EAA )

IPP & EAA SINGAPORE PETROCHEMICAL COMPLEX Schedule XIII DSA & REHAB (OPEN AREA NEAR CANTEEN) TACT HQ & CCS BUS SHELTER PCS FIRE STATION FCP @ YARD OF FIRE STATION VMA (@ OPEN AREA SERAYA BRIDGE ACCESS TO CULVERT 1 Gate 2 PUB COMPLEX VEHICLE ENTRANCE CCR MELS ACCESS TO CULVERT 2 Gate 3 Gate 4 N2/O2 Plant EAA 2 COMMON ROAD Maint. BLDG CCR EGS EO/EG Plant AVE E Warehouse Warehouse AVE D EOD EMPL CCR OFFSITE -1 Utilities CCR Future Plant Area Boiler CCR DSPL Acetylene Black Plant AVE C Office OLEFIN -1 Aromatics Ethylene Plant MTBE OFFSITE -1 AVE B Tankyard RESTRICTED ROAD TACT HQ - TACTICAL HEADQUARTER DSA & REHAB - DIVISIONAL SUPPORT AREA & FCP - REHABILITATION FORWARD CENTRAL POINT Berths 5 Berths 4 VMA - VEHICLE MARSHALLING AREA CCS - CASUALTY CLEARANCE STATION Wind sock Admin. BLDG Office CCR AVE A CCR RHCS Plant EGS Tankyard PCS Tankyard AVE E Boiler GTG Berths 3 AVE D 2SP OLEFIN -2 Ethylene Plant TRACK 10 CCC PP Plant LAB. Maint. BLDG Waste Treatment Area TPC - 1 AVE B Warehouse AVE A MTBE High Flare Aromatics OFFSITE - 2 Utilities CCR LDPE Plant Silo Admin. BLDG AVE A GPS II GLS Additive W/H Pelletizing CCR SPEL II CPSC-1 AVE C HDPE Plant AVE E Silo Silo No2 PUB HDPE Plant Warehouse TPC - II Warehouse Warehouse Admin. BLDG SEPL MEG OFFSITE - 2 Tankyard TRACK 8 Solid Berth UNLOADING BERTH GATE 12 EVACUEES ASSEMBLY AREA COMPANY ASSEMBLY AREA (22) CPSC -2 CCR South Slipway Gate 11 G: \adm-emer/compymap.wpg

ASSISTANT SIC ASSIST SIC IN SUPPRESSING EMERGENCY PROVIDE INFORMATION ON: PRODUCT SDS OPERATING CONDITIONS OF PIPE LINE MITIGATING MEASURES FOR HANDLING HIGHLY FLAMMABLE PRODUCT E.G ETHYLENE OXIDE

PRODUCT SENDERS & RECEIVERS (CONTROL ROOM BOARDMEN) GAS DETECTION FROM PIPE BRIDGE SENDER - can detect leak, excessive flow rate, auto supply cut off? RECEIVER can detect reduced flow rate, increase in temperature, auto receive shut supply? VALVE ISOLATION at site if remote isolation fails DE- PRESSURISE LINE DE- INVENTORISE LINE

ZONING

Pipe Line Owners, Product Senders & Receivers

SINGAPORE PETROCHEMICAL COMPLEX CERT PCS FIRE BRIGADE & COMPLEX COMPANIES PROCESS TECHNICIANS, SHIFT SUPERVISORS & SUPERINTENDENTS 2 DAY FIRE FIGHTING COURSE 1 DAY REFRESHER COURSE EVERY 2 YEARS EACH SHIFT TEAM TO ATTEND ANNUAL COMBINED DRILL WITH PCS BRIGADE ANNUAL EXERCISE WITH SCDF, POLICE & RELEVANT AGENCIES

COMPLEX CERT SCDF PCS FIRE BRIGADE (20) PCS TPC CPSC MEG MELS DOW DSPL EGS EMPL 195 162 46 30 38 18 51 34 8 ( 582 )

PCS FIRE BRIGADE

POSSIBLE SCENARIOS LIQUEFIED SPILL VAPOUR CLOUD UNCONFINED VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION (UVCE) FLASH BACK JET FIRE BOILING LIQUID EXPANDING VAPOUR EXPLOLSION (BLEVE) BRIDGE COLLAPSE

17 th July 2010 Dalian: Crude Oil line; Leak, explosion Flame Height: 30 metres 2,000 fire fighters 15 hours to extinguish

10 th Sept 2010 San Bruno Underground pipe leak

Mexico

Sunoco Refinery s Ethylene Unit fire: 7 May 2009 Boiling Point : - 104 C Olefin for production of PVC, polyester, polyethylene

Pipe line Fire - rupture of corroded 6 Ethylene line

Extent of Damage # 3 6 450 psi ethylene gas product line. This line failed ~6 minutes after the initial line leak. The line itself is deformed due to reaction forces from the leak. # 7 - Failed 2 Spent Caustic Line.

. 4 100 psi propane liquid line from gas plant Process data indicates this line failed ~3 minutes after the initial failure.

12 850 psi steam line failure. This line failed ~ 8 minutes after the initial leak.

Ignition Source Top of fire box would be slight negative pressure. Stack flue gas temperature was ~1000F at the time of the fire. Heater shell leak could pull vapor cloud into the ignition source and then flash back out.

FLASH BACK

TRAINING IN SESSION

TRAINING - PIPE BRIDGE FIRE

SITING ENSURE INTEGRITY OF PIPE BRIDGE DESIGN COMMISSIONING HSE MAINTENACNCE, INSPECTION & OPERATING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OTHERS...

IGNITION SOURCES COMPLEX ; VEHICLES TYPES, GAS LEAK, HYDROCARBON, ETC LIGHT, GAS, HEAVY CONSEQUENCE OF HEATING THANK YOU hong.kim.pong@pcs-chem.com.sg