Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Arcing/Smoke Event with Passenger Evacuation L Enfant Plaza Station, Washington, D.C. January 12, 2015 Joe Gordon - IIC 1
2 North
Fatality and Injuries Passengers, WMATA Employees, and Emergency Responders were exposed to smoke One Passenger died 91 people were treated at hospitals 3
Safety Issues Third Rail Electrical Components Water Intrusion Tunnel Ventilation Railcar Ventilation WMATA Response to Reports of Smoke Emergency Response Radio Communication Management and Oversight 4
Accident Location Emergency exit platform Step (cable cover) Cables Third rail with cover removed 5
Damaged Third Rail Cover Board Consumed Third Rail Jumper Cables 6
Arc Tracking Failure Mechanism Contaminants Moisture Access to conductors Nearby electrical ground Leakage current Heat & electrical scintillations Insulation carbonization Over time a low resistance short to ground develops resulting in electrical arcing 7
Cable Connector Assembly Drawing 8
Electrical Arcing at McPherson Sq. Station March 14, 2016 9
Water Intrusion near Arcing Location Stained and Corroded Steel Liner Plates Water on Track Bed 10
Emergency Ventilation in Transit System Tunnels Insufficient Sufficient No Ventilation Backlayering Image source: RailSystem.net 11
Metrorail s Ventilation System Earliest constructed parts of the Metrorail ventilation system were designed in the 1960s-1970s Includes the Yellow Line tunnel south of L Enfant Plaza Station Designed for temperature control only Predated NFPA 130, hence no compliance requirement Newer parts of the system constructed after 1983 comply with NFPA 130 12
Smoke Detection In Metrorail Tunnels Exact smoke location cannot be determined by Metrorail s smoke detection system Smoke detectors exist only in stations, fan shafts and traction power substations WMATA often has to rely on train operators to report the location of smoke 13
WMATA Rail Operations Control Center (Control Center) 14
Tunnel and Station Ventilation Control Tunnel and Station Platform Fan locations 15
Railcar Ventilation All railcars equipped with ventilation systems Combination of fresh and recirculated air to meet heating and cooling demands Train operators require permission to shut down ventilation 16
WMATA Rail Operations Control Center Response to reports of smoke and fire Failure to follow established procedures Use of revenue trains to investigate reports of smoke or fire Emergency response procedures Control Center Emergency Response Training 17
Adherence to Standard Operating Procedures (SOP s) WMATA SOPs for response to heavy smoke or fire in a tunnel are clearly defined Trains are required to stop 18
WMATA Rail Operations Control Center Control Center notification of emergency responders Detailed information critical to emergency responders 19
911 Call Processing / Dispatch DC-OUC handles 911 calls and dispatches emergency services OUC actions in the accident ROCC call to OUC initiated at 3:22:34 pm OUC dispatched FEMS at 3:26:53 pm OUC required 4 min s 19 sec s 20
Tunnel Evacuation Route 21
DC-FEMS Emergency Response 22
DC Fire and EMS / WMATA Communications Below ground radio communication supported by two independent systems: WMATA system - performed normally during the accident response DC-FEMS system - unreliable service deficiency identified in the weeks prior to the accident problem was corrected immediately after the accident 23
DC Fire and EMS Response Incident Command (IC): 24
DC Fire and EMS / WMATA Preparedness No tunnel evacuation drills by DC-FEMS / WMATA in ~ 5 years (March 2010) 49 CFR 239.103 requires annual drills on FRA regulated properties No FTA regulation for drills on transit rail Quarterly drills - better prepare responders FEMS was unprepared for mass casualty event in WMATA underground system 25
DC Fire and EMS / WMATA After-Action After-action review by FEMS / WMATA - not conducted 49 CFR 239.105 requires After-Action review on FRA regulated properties No FTA regulation for After-Action review on transit rail WMATA - missed opportunity to improve response / procedures to future accidents 26
Safety Recommendations Federal Transit Administration Mayor of the District of Columbia DC Office of Unified Communications DC Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority 27