Fire Safety in the Channel Tunnel Caroline Wake Eric Rebeyrotte Steve Demetriou Fire Protection of Rolling Stock Conference Berlin 18-19 March 2015
The Channel Tunnel:A vital link The North / Scotland BIRMINGHAM AMSTERDAM THE HAGUE LONDON Waterloo Hamburg ASHFORD CALAIS GHENT BRUGES LILLE BRUSSELS LE MANS PARIS DISNEYLAND PARIS Frankfurt BREST LAVAL RENNES TOURS Zurich Bordeaux Barcelona LYON Rome
Channel Tunnel History 1986 Treaty of Canterbury Signed TML A joint venture consortium between UK & France 1990 Service tunnel completed For the first time in 12000 years, people can walk across the channel 8 years to design Cost of 9.6 billion
Open for Business The Channel Tunnel was officially opened by HM the Queen and President Mitterrand on 6 May 1994 On the 19 May 1994 the Channel Tunnel opened as a commercial business Eurotunnel operate the Concession
Governance Arrangements Inter-Governmental Commission Channel Tunnel Safety Authority Rescue and Public Safety Working Group Rail Safety and Transport Working Group Emergency Planning Committee/s
The Terminals Folkestone - Kent Sangatte - Calais
The Concession
Eurotunnel Freight Shuttle
Eurotunnel Passenger Shuttle
Class 373 (Eurostar) Train
National Freight Trains
Rolling stock requirements All trains for passengers using the tunnel must have a running capability in case of fire of 30 minutes because we want them to keep running and leave the tunnel so that passengers can be evacuated outside the tunnel. Category B trains (LOC & PASS TSI) only have 15 minutes running capability Specific case in the LOC & PASS TSI was agreed, on the basis of a risk analysis In the worst case it would take 30 minutes for a train on fire to get out of the tunnel Stopping and evacuating the passengers into the service tunnel would not provide the equivalent level of safety to taking them out of the tunnel (although it is possible to do so if the train fails)
Channel tunnel specific case (LOC & PASS TSI) Running capability must be 30 minutes; OR Compliance with a national rule permitting some trains with 15 minutes running capability to use the tunnel National rule not yet defined. Have considered limiting by train length, or by maximum numbers of passengers, to reduce risks of overcrowding in the service tunnel. Need to assess the risk and maintain the level of safety in the tunnel. Will require a change in principle when a fire is identified on a train with only 15 minutes running capability it will have to stop and evacuate immediately (the gap between 2 CPDs is roughly 375 meters all along the tunnel) as it cannot be guaranteed to reach the end of the tunnel. Is this as safe as driving the train out of the tunnel?
Possible developments in passenger evacuation arrangements The existing procedures for evacuating a passenger train: No real case of application until now: because of the very high level of safety of these specific passenger trains (Eurostar and passengers shuttles) because there are no dangerous goods as in the lorry shuttles because there are means of fire extinction inside the engines and the carriages The standard procedure is to drive the train out of the tunnel to an emergency siding
Possible developments in passenger evacuation arrangements The existing procedures for evacuating a passenger train: If a train on fire is not able to get out and stops in the tunnel, the passengers have to walk on the sidewalk until the next cross passage door (gap between two CP: 375 m; length of a HST: 400 m; length of a shuttle: 750 m). In a controlled stop the doors of the train align with the CPDs In an uncontrolled stop the existing procedure for a fire separating the train in two parts is to use the ventilation to provide fresh air to the longest part of the train and to evacuate this part, and then to reverse the ventilation and evacuate the other part of the train An exercise in January 2014 showed that this procedure takes too much time (1 hour)
Possible developments in passenger evacuation arrangements The search for a new procedure of evacuation: CTSA commissioned studies to help accelerate the passengers evacuation: The first considers the possibility to evacuate both parts at the same time, despite the smoke but with help from stratification The second considers the possibility to evacuate a little quicker by opening most of the doors of the train (but only - 8% in the simulation, because the sidewalk is narrow) The third considers opening one extra CPD IGC has not yet modified the procedure
Rail Running Tunnel [7.6m diameter]
Service Tunnel [4.8m diameter]
Tunnel Ventilation SVS NVS Fr portal 3 km Sangatte 38 km Shakespeare Cliff UK portal 9 km
Cross Passage Door
Undersea Crossover
Emergency Response Management Eurotunnel First Line of Response (FLOR) Personnel from KFRS & ONET Securitie from 1 January 2013] Second Line of Response (SLOR) UK ERO s Second Line of Response (SLOR) French ERO s
FLOR First Line of Response Patrol the Service Tunnel in Service Tunnel Transportation System (STTS) vehicles UK FR 2 teams of 4 based close to Portals. Not restricted to mid-point boundary: Main role: evacuation of passengers + initial fire fighting
Emergency Response Contractors Duties UK (KFRS) and French (ONET Securitie) FLOR work under contract to Eurotunnel with the primary duties of:- - Assisting the train crew with evacuation management. - Provide first aid treatment for injured casualties - Provide casualty care and assist train crew with the transfer of passengers onto an evacuation train. Both KFRS and SDIS62, have a statutory duty to undertake SLOR duties regardless of the FLOR contract position.
SLOR - Second Line of Response UK & French Emergency Response Organisations (EROs) Deployment underground via STTS Emergency fleet UK 2 X SLOR FIRE Personnel & equipment FR 2 X SLOR FIRE Personnel & equipment 2 x Ambulances Equipment + 2 Stretchers 2 x Ambulances 2 x Equipment + Stretchers Communications STTS Communications STTS
Channel Tunnel Fires (Freight Shuttles) 18 November 1996 RT South, Interval 3 (France) 21 August 2006 RT South, Interval 4 (UK) 29 November 2012 Emergency Sidings (France) 17 January 2015 RT North, Interval 4 (France) 11 September 2008 RT North, Interval 6 (France)
1996 Fire
2006 Fire
2008 Fire
Fire Fighting Operations The CT presents many challenges:- Access restrictions - transfer of personnel and equipment to the incident scene. Distance of travel to the incident scene. Arduous conditions extreme temperatures and high humidity. Communications, language
Cross Border Considerations Different cultures different approach Language Training Procedures Different national processes CBRN Hazmat Organisational structures French report to Prefect UK independent Equipment Hose connection Breathing Apparatus Incident management Command and control
Incident Structure UK Incident Co-ordination Centre Video Conferencing Eurotunnel Rail Control Centre FRANCE PCO INCIDENT Communications Vehicle Fire Equipment Management Centre Fire Equipment Management Centre
PROJECT SALAMANDER
The Two Phases of Project Salamander Salamander Intervention SAFE
Fire Fighting Intervention Project Salamander initiated after the fire on the 11 September 2008 Developed by a partnership approach Based on six predetermined scenarios Catenary Earthing procedures Deployment of water curtains to prevent longitudinal fire spread.
FLOR Intervention
FLOR Intervention Briefing Diagrams
Salamander Phase Two - SAFE SAFE station project Partnership approach to developing a innovative system for the future Water Mist Fire Suppression System Each WMFSS head 50lpm @ 50Bar Still a need for a F&RS intervention to extinguish the fire
Any Questions?