Networked Application of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Detectors for Early Detection and Warning of CBRN Events in Transit Environments Presented by: Dr. Francesco Pellegrino Lockheed Martin Corporation Maritime Systems and Sensors Mitchel Field, New York 11553-1818 1818 francesco.pellegrino@lmco.com (516) 228-2025 Prepared For: NDIA Conference December 5-8, 5 2005 Tampa, Florida USSOCOM 1
Terrorist Attacks on Transit Systems The Tokyo Subway Attack March 20, 1995 The Madrid Bombing March 11, 2004 The London Metro Bombing July 7, 2005 What s Next? 2
Sample Scenario 1: Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) Spent nuclear fuel rods are supplied by Iran and shipped in a cargo container to Colombia then flown to Mexico and loaded on human mules used to smuggle drugs across the border. They are met in Arizona by sleeper cell agents who take the fuel rods by car toward its final destination. Three men get off subway cars at three different locations in downtown New York and head toward the New York Stock Exchange... 3
The Unique Challenges of the Transit Environment Biological sensing problems High particulate counts Platform counts 100 X outside counts (PPLA) Interferants Diesel trains, vacuum trains mimic Releases Skin cells, pollen mimic the biological signature Chemical sensing problems Interferants Pesticides and rodenticides Cleaning agents, perfumes and deodorants Radiological sensing problems Infrastructure provides many heavy steel obstructions conducive to shielding low level sources 4
The Unique Challenges of the Transit Environment Unusual ambient air currents Train operations Piston effects Diurnal effects Bimodal distributions due to AM/PM rush hours Seasonal effects Pollen/spore count variations 1 Temperature Humidity EMI / RFI Reference 1: An Introduction to Biological Agent Detection Equipment for Emergency First Responders, National Institute of Justice, NIJ Guide 101-00, December 2001 Page 14. 5
Transit MetroGuard System 6
Mission: Protect Riders & Their Infrastructure Airport Coast Police Rail Anthrax Terrorist Joint First Building Cargo Tracking Guard Responder Dispatch Terrorism Security Investigation Decontamination Threat Deepwater Task Integration Training Force Center -Complex Integration Defense Intelligence Homeland Security Public Safety Transit Protection Systems -Systems of Systems -Disciplined Approach -Process-Driven Bringing Domain Expertise to a New Critical Mission 7
Detailed Management of Requirements High reliability in extremely harsh environment Closely tailored to unique transit requirements Aggressive leveraging of COTS sensors & communications Increase System Reliability Probability of Detection Upgradeability Expandability Mean Time Between Failures Calibration Interval Internal Testing False Alarms Airborne Interference Response Time Maintenance Cycle & Cost Acquisition Cost Mean Time To Repair Technology Risk Decrease 8
Act Analyze Acquire Goal: Provide Actionable Intelligence Transit Transit Protection Systems Systems Turning Data into Knowledge... and Knowledge into Action 9
Acquire: Sensor Suite Air Particle Counter UV-LIF Wet Sample Collector Chemical Radiological Controller Power / Communications Driving Detector Requirements Operation in a Harsh Environment Probability of Detection Probability of False Alarms Scheduled Maintenance Interval Calibration Interval High MTBF, Low MTTR Remote Detector Unit (RDU) 10
Analyze: The Advantages of a Networked Approach The basic premise of the networked approach is that a distributed array of detectors can utilize temporal and spatial characteristics of releases to increase the Probability of Detection (PoD) and reduce the Probability of False Alarms (PFA), versus use of single point detectors by Spotting trends Negating single detector failures Requiring fewer detectors to establish coverage 11
Analyze: The Advantages of a Networked Approach Increases Probability of Detection Enables multi-sensor temporal and spatial correlation Lower thresholds for Alerts correlated in time to allow detections that would otherwise go unnoticed Lower thresholds for Alerts correlated in space (e.g., Waterfall Alerts) Decreases Probability of False Alarms High threshold single detector alarms Increases single detector signal to noise requirement Correlation between independent detectors Reduces single detector failure alarms 12
Act: Coordinated CONOPs Subway Infrastructure Sample Collection /Alarm Confirmation Central Command & Control Chem- Bio-Rad- Agent Chem- Bio-Rad- Agent CBRN Sensor 1.. CBRN Sensor N CCTV Video Surveillance Local Control Computer First Responder Interface Reporting Control Local Evacuation Order Emergency Operations Center E M ER G EN C Y R ES P O NS E 13
MetroGuard Application to Scenario 1: RDD Spent nuclear fuel rods are supplied by Iran and shipped in a cargo container to Colombia then flown to Mexico and loaded on human mules used to smuggle drugs across the border. They are met in Arizona by sleeper cell agents who take the fuel rods by car toward its final destination. Three men get off subway cars at three different locations in downtown New York and head toward the New York Stock Exchange... 14
Understanding the Source of the Radiation: Nuclear Fuel Rods There are about 557 nuclear power reactors in the world; about 440 are currently in operation Most nuclear reactors are powered by fuel rods that contain two types of uranium 235 U (2-3%) and 238 U (97-98%) Fuel that is burned in a nuclear reactor undergoes controlled fission, releasing neutrons, other radioactive elements and plutonium ( 239 Pu) 15
Understanding the Source of the Radiation: Nuclear Fuel Rods The Fissioning process results in extremely hot and radioactive spent fuel After 3 years in a reactor, 1,000 lbs. of 3.3 percent enriched uranium (967 lbs. 238 U and 33 lbs. 235 U) contains 1 : 8 lbs. of 235 U (alpha, gamma emitter) 8.9 lbs. of plutonium isotopes (alpha, beta, gamma emitter) 943 lbs. of 238 U and assorted fission products Reference 1: http://www.chemcases.com/2003version/nuclear/nc-13.htm 16
Determining a Reasonable Radiation Threshold OSHA standard of 5000 mrem/year for whole body radiation 1 exposure yields 0.57 mrem/hr Subpart D- Radiation dose limits for individual members of the public 2 The dose in any unrestricted area from external sources, exclusive of the dose contributions from patients administered radioactive material and released in accordance with (35.75), does not exceed 0.002 rem in any one hour References: 1. http://www.nih.gov/od/ors/ds/rsb/exposure.html 2. 56 FR 23398 May 21, 1991 20.1301: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part020/part020-1301.html 17
Radiation Data in a Transit Environment 10 1 0.1 0.01 0.001 18 8/19/04 0:00 8/19/04 6:00 8/19/04 12:00 8/19/04 18:00 8/20/04 0:00 Nominal Thresholds Rad 1 Rad 2 Rad 3 2 0.57 Derived Threshold Hourly Exposure Threshold mrem/hr (Log Scale) 8/15/04 0:00 8/15/04 6:00 8/15/04 12:00 8/15/04 18:00 8/16/04 0:00 8/16/04 6:00 8/16/04 12:00 8/16/04 18:00 8/17/04 0:00 8/17/04 6:00 8/17/04 12:00 8/17/04 18:00 8/18/04 0:00 8/18/04 6:00 8/18/04 12:00 8/18/04 18:00
Radiation Data in a Transit Environment The station operational cycles are not evident in the bulk of the data The handful of outliers (0.08 and 0.1 mem/hr) occurred during normal station busy periods No direct cause identified for any outlier 108 hrs of data radiological readings typically below 0.02 mrem/hr. Possible causes of outliers due to: Presence of passengers treated medically with radioactive injections or implants Granite emissions 19
Sensor Alarm to Video Association Threat Detection Video Monitoring / Association Surveillance / Identification 20
Sensor Alarm to Video Association Wall Street Penn Station RDU NO. Time Gamma Level Video Frame No. FBI DB: Suspect ID RDU 3 T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3 T4 T3 Alert T4 T3 GOLDBERG, T. T5 Wall Penn T5Street Station T6 T4 T6 T4 T7 T5 T7 T5 T8 T6 T8 T6 Time RDU 4 T24 T11 T9 T7 T1 T9 T7 RDU T1 11 36 T2 T2 T3 T3 T25 T12 T4 T4 T5 T4 Alert T4 T5 GOLDBERG, T26 T. T13 T3 T6 T6 T7 T5 T5 T7 T8 T6 T6 T8 T28 T14 T4 T9 T7 T7 T9 RDU 5 T1 T1 T29 T15 T5 T2 T2 T30 T16 T6 T3 T3 T4 T4 T17 T7 T5 T5 T6 T5 Alert T5 T6 GOLDBERG, T. RDU T7 RDU 12 T747 T24 T11 T8 T6 T6 T8 T25 T9 T7 T7 T9 T12 T2 Grand Central Station Grand Central Station RDU NO. Time Gamma Level Video Frame No. FBI DB: Suspect ID RDU 11 T24 T24 T25 T25 T28 T15 T5 T26 T26 T29 T26 T27 Alert T26 T27 T16 T6LADIN, B T28 T28 T30 T17 T7 T27 T29 T27 T29 T28 T30 T28 T30 T24 T29 T31 T29 T31 T30 T32 T30 T32 T25 T11 RDU 12 T24 T24 T26 T12 T2 T25 T25 T26 T26 T27 T13 T3 T27 T27 T14 T4 T27 T28 Alert T27 T28 LADIN, B. Alert T29 T29 T28 Alert T28 T30 T28 T30 T15 T5 T29 T31 T29 T31 T30 T32 T30 T32 T29 RDU 13 T24 T24 T30 T16 T6 T25 T25 T17 T7 T26 T27 T28 T28 T29 T30 T29 T31 T30 T32 Alert T26 T27 T28 T28 T29 T30 T29 T31 T30 T32 LADIN, B. RDU NO. Time Gamma Level Video Frame No. FBI DB: Suspect ID RDU 6 T11 T12 T13 T13 T14 T15 T14 T16 T15 T17 T16 T18 T17 T19 Alert T11 T12 T13 T14 T13 T15 T16 T14 T17 T15 T18 T16 T19 T17 GODWIN, T. RDU 7 T11 T12 T13 T14 T11 T12 T13 T14 T14 T15 Alert T14 T15 GODWIN, T. GODWIN, GOLDBERG, LADIN, B T16 T. T. T16 RDU 8 T15 T17 T16 T18 T17 T19 T11 T12 T13 T14 T15 T15 T17 T16 T18 T17 T19 T11 T12 T13 T14 T15 T15 T16 T17 T16 T18 T17 T19 Alert T15 T16 T17 T16 T18 T17 T19 GODWIN, T. RDU NO. Gamma Level Video Frame No. No. FBI DB: Suspect ID T24 T11 T25 T12 T2 RDU 13 RDU 58 T26 T13 T3 T27 T14 T4 T28 T15 T5 T29 T16 T6 T30 T17 T7 T24 T25 T11 T26 T12 T2 T27 T13 T3 T14 T4 T28 T15 T5 T29 T30 T16 T6 T17 T7 Alert Alert Alert T26 T13 T3 T27 T14 T4 T28 T15 T5 T29 T16 T6 T30 T17 T7 T24 T11 T25 T12 T2 T26 T13 T3 T27 T14 T4 GODWIN, GOLDBERG, LADIN, B. T. T. LADIN, B. GODWIN, GOLDBERG, T. T. 21
Summary Transit environments challenge detector system performance Networked application of CBRN detectors can provide early detection and warning Networked corroboration increases probability of detection and reduces probability of false alarms Analysis of the specific background, the expected propagation of agent material, and interferants is critical to system performance 22
Thank You 23