risk management and assessment for business Lessons Learned from Real World Application of Bow-tie Method 2010 International Symposium

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risk management and assessment for business Risktec Solutions Lessons Learned from Real World Application of Bow-tie Method 2010 International Symposium BEYOND REGULATORY COMPLIANCE, MAKING SAFETY SECOND NATURE www.risktec.com Bow-tie Lessons Learned Slide 1

Purpose of presentation Bow-tie method Example case study Practical uses and benefits Tips for successful use Bow-tie Lessons Learned Slide 2

The bow-tie diagram Causes Preventive controls Process upset Recovery preparedness Consequences Bow-tie Lessons Learned Slide 3

In more detail Prevention Threat Hazard Mitigation Threat Top Event Threat Barriers Consequence Consequence Consequence Bow-tie Lessons Learned Slide 4

Example case study Overpressure bullets LPG storage bullets Torch, pool or flash fire Overfill bullets Internal corrosion Loss of containment Unignited VC - buildings Unignited VC - neighbors Third-party interference BLEVE other threats Bow-tie Lessons Learned Slide 5

What are the preventive controls? Overpressure bullets Bullets rated 250/operate 179 psi Operator monitors level, P, T & quality. PAH, LAH, TAH HH P trip (179 psi) S/D feed Two PRVs (250 & 262 psi), sized for fire case Loss of containment Bow-tie Lessons Learned Slide 6

What are the mitigative measures? Torch, pool or flash fire Gas detection 10% LEL >> alarm, 40% >> plant ESD feed trip & isolation Detect leak & alarm via operator rounds or CCTV. Plant S/D at local ESD buttons or C/R Muster & acct for personnel Fireproof supports 8 mitigation measures in total Muster areas impaired Multiple muster areas on site, plus offsite point Bow-tie Lessons Learned Slide 7

It s more than a picture: who s responsible and what must they do? Gas detection 10% LEL >> alarm, 40% >> plant ESD feed trip & isolation Instr. Tech Detect leak & alarm via operator rounds or CCTV. Plant S/D at local ESD buttons or C/R Operator Muster & acct for personnel Training Test and calibrate critical instrumentation, ESDs, P & flow sensors & alarms, F&G detection Fireproof supports Mech. Eng. Multiple muster areas on site, plus offsite point Safety Eng. Torch, pool or flash fire Muster areas impaired Bow-tie Lessons Learned Slide 8

What is the critical documentation? Gas detection 10% LEL >> alarm, 40% >> plant ESD feed trip & isolation Instr. Tech Protective sys. spec. & performance stds. Detect leak & alarm via operator rounds or CCTV. Plant S/D at local ESD buttons or C/R Operator Operator schedule & training matrix Muster & acct for personnel Training Emergency response plan Fireproof supports Mech. Eng. Multiple muster areas on site, plus offsite point Safety Eng. Torch, pool or flash fire PFP spec. & perf. stnds. Muster areas impaired Review ER provision Bow-tie Lessons Learned Slide 9

Catalogue of process safety-critical activities Safety-critical role Instrument Technician Safety-critical activity Procedure Verification Maintain protective instrumentation Test (incl. integrity w hazardous area classification) & calibrate critical instrumentation in field locations: - ESD systems - P & flow sensors/alarms - F&G detectors, systems & alarms - Corrosion injection system alarms SAP work order Completed SAP work order Bow-tie Lessons Learned Slide 10

How good are the controls? Example barrier effectiveness rating scheme Barrier Rating Used? Does it work/ is it effective? Very Good Always Always (>99%) Good Frequently Generally (75% - 99%) Unknown Unknown/not guaranteed Unknown/cannot be guaranteed (50% - 75%) Poor Occasionally Possibly (25% - 50%) Very Poor Rarely Currently ineffective (<25%) Un-assessed - Insufficient information Every barrier must be suitable: (1) independent and (2) competent responsible person undertakes critical activity to provide barrier Bow-tie Lessons Learned Slide 11

How good is each control? Torch, pool or flash fire Gas detection 10% LEL >> alarm, 40% >> plant ESD feed trip & isolation Instr. Tech Detect leak & alarm via operator rounds or CCTV. Plant S/D at local ESD buttons or C/R Operator Muster & acct for personnel Training Fireproof supports Mech. Eng. Multiple muster areas on site, plus offsite point Safety Eng. Muster areas impaired Bow-tie Lessons Learned Slide 12

What about overall control? Every threat and consequence for every hazard must have sufficient barriers of adequate rating Requires scheme for assessing overall control Avoid counting barriers (scheme should be relative, not absolute) Bow-tie Lessons Learned Slide 13

Overall control? Provides a guide for focusing effort on risk reduction, rather than measuring acceptability: What else can we do? Can we improve control effectiveness? Can we add more controls? Is it practical to do so? Bow-tie Lessons Learned Slide 14

Can we improve control effectiveness? Torch, pool or flash fire Gas detection 10% LEL >> alarm, 40% >> plant ESD feed trip & isolation Instr. Tech. Detect leak & alarm via operator rounds or CCTV. Plant S/D at local ESD buttons or C/R Operator Recommendation Muster & acct for personnel Training Confirm muster pt. locations & arrangements appropriate for all credible major accident scenarios (e.g. outside LFL) Fireproof supports Mech. Eng. Multiple muster areas on site, plus offsite point Safety Eng. Muster areas impaired Bow-tie Lessons Learned Slide 15

The complete picture Display altogether, or one branch at a time Strengths and weaknesses in process safety clearly visible Coloring of barriers Coloring of threats & consequences Bow-tie Lessons Learned Slide 16

How can we use it in practice? Logical structured approach Communication Formal demonstration Specific risks Critical roles Competencies Critical procedures Auditing Critical systems and performance standards Do we have any gaps in risk control? How do we engage non-risk specialists? Can we really demonstrate control? Will we be in control? Do our people know what is expected of them? Are competence and control requirements aligned? Are they complete and effective? How can we focus audits on what really matters? What are they? Bow-tie Lessons Learned Slide 18

What do bow-ties do for you? 1. Improved understanding Powerful communication tool Readily understood Clear identification of links Keeps sight of big picture Captures previous incidents Bow-tie Lessons Learned Slide 19

What do bow-ties do for you? 2. Greater ownership Encourages wide participation Promotes positive ownership Clear identification of roles and responsibilities Bow-tie Lessons Learned Slide 20

What do bow-ties do for you? 3. Efficiency gains Less labor intensive Helps focus resources A picture paints a thousand words Targets critical maintenance, inspection & testing activities Avoids reinventing the wheel Bow-tie Lessons Learned Slide 21

Tips for success 1. Pitch at the right level 2. Involve the right people 3. Use method to full potential 4. Avoid barrier counting but do verify quality of controls 5. Focus on risk reduction Bow-tie Lessons Learned Slide 22

Summary Improves understanding and encourages ownership of process safety Provides missing link between plant, procedures & people (not just a pretty picture) Provides structured framework for determining whether current control of process safety is good enough Helps to ensure that risks are managed rather than just analyzed Bow-tie Lessons Learned Slide 23