The Spanish Protocol on collaboration in the radiological surveillance of metallic materials

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The Spanish Protocol on collaboration in the radiological surveillance of metallic materials International Conference on on Control and and Management of of Inadvertent Radioactive Material in in Scrap Scrap Metal Metal (Tarragona, 24 24 February 2009) 2009) José JoséManuel Redondo Redondo Deputy Deputy Direction Direction General General for for Nuclear Nuclear Energy Energy Ministry Ministry of of Industry, Industry, Tourism Tourism and and Trade Trade 1

1. Background The Spanish Protocol 2. Agreement making process 3. The Protocol 4. Conclusions 2

1. Background (1) Spain has established a framework of legal provisions and a regulatory system on nuclear safety and radiological protection 3

1. Background (2) Nuclear facilities in Spain Garoña 8 nuclear reactors in operation, located in 6 sites Trillo Asco I y II Vandellós I Vandellós II 2008: Share of nuclear on total electricity generation 18.6 % Almaraz I y II J. Cabrera Cofrentes NPP in operation NPP shutdown NPP in dismantling (dormancy) Fuel assembly manufacturing facility LILW disposal facility 4

1. Background (3) Radioactive and radiodiagnostic facilities LA PALMA STA. C. DE TENERIFE GOMERA HIERRO 19 PONTEVEDRA 12 GRAN CANARIA LA CORUÑA 30 15 PORTUGAL FUERTEVENTURA LUGO 6 ORENSE 4 LANZAROTE HUELVA 11 ASTURIAS 37 LEÓN 11 VIZCAYA GUIPÚZCOA 67 CANTABRIA 37 22 ÁLAVA 20 NAVARRA BURGOS 29 LA RIOJA 3 5 17 PALENCIA ZAMORA SORIA VALLADOLID 2 2 12 SEGOVIA GUADALAJARA SALAMANCA 6 8 MADRID 11 ÁVILA CIEMAT 2 266 CÁCERES 10 BADAJOZ 10 SEVILLA 51 CÁDIZ 25 CÓRDOBA 19 TOLEDO 12 MÁLAGA 22 CIUDAD REAL 12 JAÉN 8 GRANADA 26 CUENCA 4 ALBACETE 7 ALMERÍA 12 ZARAGOZA 34 MURCIA 29 TERUEL 8 HUESCA 6 11 VALENCIA 72VALENCIA ALICANTE 27 LÉRIDA 11 24 CASTELLÓN FRANCIA BARCELONA 223 IBIZA FORMENTERA GERONA 11 MALLORCA MENORCA 15 (Total Baleares) 1,361 Radioactive facilities and 28,438 Radiodiagnostic facilities 5

1. Background (4) Institutional Framework PARLIAMENT GOVERNMENT SUPERVISION Nuclear Nuclear Safety Safety Council Council (CSN) (CSN) Ministry Ministry of of Industry, Industry, Tourism Tourism & Trade Trade (MITYC) (MITYC) Ministry Ministry of of Economy Economy & Finances Finances Ministry Ministry of of Science Science & Innovation Innovation DG DG for for Energy Energy Policy Policy & Mines Mines SEPI SEPI * CIEMAT CIEMAT ** ** REGULATION & LICENSING * SEPI: State Industrial Holding Company ** CIEMAT: Centre for Energy related, Environmental & Technological Research ***ENRESA: National Company for Radioactive Waste POLICY ENRESA*** Waste Waste Producers Producers 6

1. Background (5) Metals and steel related industries are important industrial sectors in Spain and depend to a large extent on the import of scrap (6-7 mill. tons) Experience has shown that a nonnuclear industry can provoke radiological risk 7

1. Background (6) RECOVERING & SMELTING INDUSTRY NUCLEAR FACILITIES RADIOACTIVE FACILITIES RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION All potential radiological risks under surveillance but unforeseen radiological 8 risks appear

1. Background (7) The incident that took place in May, 1998, (smelting of a Cs-137 source in a steel factory located in the south of Spain ), revealed the need of adopting measures to avoid, as far as possible, the repetition of similar events and, if need be, limiting their consequences It gave raise a social concern that materialised in many parliamentary initiatives coming from the most important political parties The problem was not unknown for the Spanish Authorities (CSN) Some steel companies was aware of this risk too. 9

2. Agreement making process (1) From September 98 to November 99 Participants Administration MITYC, CSN, M. of Public Works (National ports), and ENRESA Industrial sector Steel Utilities Association (UNESID) Metal Recovering Association (FER) 10

2. Agreement making process (2) Positive attitude of all parties 11

2. Agreement making process (4) The national regulatory system on nuclear safety and radiological protection was used to work with activities subject to a rigorous and specific regulations 12

2. Agreement making process (4) Arguments of the industrial sector The industry was not used to work having in mind the radiological protection regulations They rejected to be related with the radiological or nuclear field, as a result of the distrust that radioactivity provokes in sectors not involved with this field They considered themselves as victims of a system that is failing to control its materials; and they are carrying out a social work recovering orphan radioactive sources 13

2. Agreement making process (5) Industry has its specific rules 14

2. Agreement making process (5) 15

2. Agreement making process (5) Industry has used to have in mind radiological protection rules 16

2. Agreement making process (6) Main topics of discussion Responsibility Roles Radioactive material management costs Operational procedures Transboundary implications Surveillance in harbours 17

Considered options 2. Agreement making process (7) 1. To issue a Royal Decree Obligatory No references existing Implementation requires a coercive system 2. To sign a collaboration protocol Voluntary Safety objective coincident with industrial sector interest Additional benefits for companies 18

3. The Protocol (1) Signed on November 2, 1999 Contracting Parties Drafters +Trade Unions Implementation procedure Facility register Technical Annex Encouraging the signature Periodic meetings for implementation supervision and tendencies analysis There is a Technical Commission for tracking the Protocol, and a Technical Working Group directed by CSN On this basis a new revision of the Technical Annex was elaborated and entered in operation in January 2005 19

3. The Protocol (2) Implementation procedure Facilities register Creation and maintenance by the MITYC Facility inscription Technical Annex set up technical, administrative and safety commitments 20

3. The Protocol (3) Facilities register (https://oficinavirtual.mityc.es/ivr/) Sector Recovering Steel Other metals smelters Total Facilities registered 106 27 5 138 21

3. The Protocol (4) Content of the Technical Annex Objective, Scope, Definitions Registration Commitments of the Parties Actions in case of detection Special interventions Financing aspects 22

3. The Protocol (5) Content of the Technical Annex Objective To reduce the risk derived from presence of radioactive materials existing in metallurgical scrap and products resulting from its recycling Scope Facilities where metallurgical scrap is processed by melting, fragmentation, cutting, etc. Registration Free and voluntary and means the acceptance of Protocol commitments 23

3. The Protocol (6) Commitments of the Contracting Parties Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade (MITYC): To create and maintenance the Register and communicate registrations To grant a generic transfer authorisation of radioactive material detected from the facility to ENRESA To govern special interventions in case of generalised contamination 24

Ministry of Public Works: 3. The Protocol (7) Commitments of the Contracting Parties To inform CSN in case of event 25

Nuclear Safety Council (CSN): To issue (generic or case by case) safety guidance To inspect surveillance systems To set up radiological criteria Investigation and Exemption levels To inform company and ENRESA on applicability of the generic transfer authorisation To promote training activities Direct intervention if needed 3. The Protocol (8) Commitments of the Contracting Parties 26

National Company for Radioactive Waste (ENRESA): To give technical advise 3. The Protocol (9) Commitments of the Contracting Parties To collaborate to re-send abroad radioactive material To take away radioactive material To collaborate in training activities To subscribe an specific agreement with the companies 27

The subscribing company (1): 3. The Protocol (10) Commitments of the Contracting Parties To install, maintain and operate a surveillance system in each facility To surveillance radiation level in scrap and processed materials To take appropriate measurement to avoid radiological risks 28

The subscribing company (2): 3. The Protocol (11) Commitments of the Contracting Parties To require radiological surveillance certification to the supplier To inform CSN on each relevant detection event To subscribe an agreement with ENRESA To collaborate in training activities 29

3. The Protocol (12) Interventions Imports Certification Steel Facility National scrap Scrapyard UTPR investigation Melting sample CSN 30

3. The Protocol (13) Interventions In the event of radioactive material being detected in a shipment of metallic materials arriving at the installation, the company must: immobilize the shipment within the installation, alert the technical personnel specialized in radiological protection, isolate the radioactive material under safe conditions and keep the radioactive material in custody under safe conditions until it is removed by ENRESA. notify the CSN using the form included in the Protocol, transfer the radioactive material to ENRESA under the terms established in the generic authorization 31

In the event of radioactive material being detected during the process or resulting products, the company must: immediately notify the CSN, 3. The Protocol (14) Interventions with advice from the CSN, attempt to ascertain whether the detection is real, either through its own personnel or with the support of a UTPR, if the detection is real, the company, with advice from the CSN, shall: interrupt affected process, immediately suspend the exit from the installation of products that have been in contact with the contaminated source, where applicable, provide immediate notification to any organization that has received products suspected to have been affected by the incident, require the intervention of a UTPR authorized for this purpose, which shall determine the extent of the contamination 32

3. The Protocol (15) Special interventions If generalised contamination is detected, the company must inform urgently to CSN CSN assess the situation and recommends appropriate measures to MITYC MITYC, upon proposal of CSN, governs intervention activities, in coordination, where necessary, with other competent public organizations and with the affected company 33

3. The Protocol (16) Financing provisions Companies are responsible for all costs In some cases, companies charge to supplier the costs Management of Spanish material can be charged to ENRESA Fund 34

3. The Protocol (17) Complementary documents Register inscription (each facility) Authorisation to transfer RM to ENRESA Generic Defines Investigation and Exemption levels CSN Safety Guide Radiological Surveillance Certification (scrap supplier) ENRESA/Company agreement 35

3. The Protocol (18) Liaison with Spanish regulation Agreements as the Protocol (with others potential affected sectors) are foreseen in Royal Decree 229/2006, of February 24 th, on the control of high activity sealed radioactive sources and orphan sources, which transposes Directive 2003/122/EURATOM 36

4. Conclusions (1) The Spanish system has the following characteristics: is based on a specific legal framework is materialized in a Protocol for collaboration considers as a fundamental aspect information on risks and training in radiological protection to workers has established a Technical Commission for tracking to evaluate possible improvements 37

4. Conclusions (2) Three pillars of the system: 1. information on risk 2. use of surveillance equipment 3. collaboration 38

4. Conclusions (2) 1. information on risk 39

4. Conclusions (2) 2. use of surveillance equipment 2. use of surveillance equipment 40

4. Conclusions (2) National entities related with radioactive matters Workers 3. collaboration Concerned industrial sectors 41

3. collaboration National entities related with radioactive matters RADIOLOGICAL SURVEILLANCE OF METALLIC MATERIALS Concerned industrial sectors Workers 42

The Spanish Protocol Thank you for your attention 43