Technical Meeting on Radiation Safety in Industrial Radiography IAEA Vienna 23-27 June 2014 An Overview of Security of Radioactive Sources on Industrial Radiography and a Case of Responding to Security Incident involving Radioactive sources Dr. Francisco Cesar Augusto Da Silva Instituto de Radioproteção e Dosimetria - IRD/CNEN Eng. Mario de Boita ARCTEST Serviços Técnicos de Inspeção e Manutenção de Industrial Ltda Brasil
Relevant Security Incident: Sao Paulo 21 October 1985-192 Ir - 0.88 TBq (23.6 Ci) THE EVENT: Day 1: 21 Oct 1985 18:55h At the Company, the team prepared the vehicle with gamma radiography device (Gammamat TIF) to travel 75 km to radiography site (Itupeva City). They made three stops (garage, bank, gas station) during the path. After arriving in the site they went to eat something on Itupeva downtown. THE RECOVERING: Day 1: 21 Oct 1985 A truck driver found a box at the road and took it to his company. At the company the truck driver opened the box and found the gamma radiography device with the key. He showed the device to his friends and opened it. The radioactive source was removed and handled by all. At the end he put back the source inside the device. 10 persons were overexposure and 6 handled the source. When they came back to the vehicle they noticed that the rear door (trunk) had been opened and the box with the gamma radiography device had been stolen. The truck driver took the device to his home and showed to 6 persons: wife, daughter and 4 friends.
Relevant Security Incident: Sao Paulo 21 October 1985-192 Ir - 0.88 TBq (23.6 Ci) THE EVENT: The Company took the following actions: Day 2: 22 Oct 1985 Notification to Regulatory Authority (CNEN) Radiation survey in Itupeva city Radiation survey in drive path between Sao Paulo and Itupeva (75 km) with Geiger-Muller monitor Day 3: 23 Oct 1985 Notification to the local Police Radiation survey in Itupeva city, junkyards and cities near Itupeva with scintillation monitor Radiation survey in drive path between Sao Paulo and Itupeva (75 km) with scintillation monitor Day 4: 24 Oct 1985 Radiation survey of junkyards in Sao Paulo with scintillation monitor Radiation survey in Itupeva city with scintillation monitor THE RECOVERING: Day 2 to 6: 22 to 26 Oct 1985 The gamma radiography device was kept on the kitchen and after on the laundry of the truck driver house.
Relevant Security Incident: Sao Paulo 21 October 1985-192 Ir - 0.88 TBq (23.6 Ci) THE EVENT: Day 5: 25 Oct 1985 Radiation survey of junkyards in Sao Paulo with scintillation monitor Press conference but only with two newspapers THE RECOVERING: Day 2 to 6: 22 to 26 Oct 1985 The gamma radiography device was kept on the kitchen and after on the laundry of the truck driver house. Day 6: 26 Oct 1985 Radiation survey in drive path between Sao Paulo and Itupeva (75 km) with scintillation monitor Interview with one local newspaper Day 7: 27 Oct 1985 The truck driver opened the gamma radiography device, removed the source and showed to his wife again. Day 7: 27 Oct 1985 Interview with three newspapers from Sao Paulo Capital
Relevant Security Incident: Sao Paulo 21 October 1985-192 Ir - 0.88 TBq (23.6 Ci) THE EVENT: Day 8: 28 Oct 1985 Interview with one newspaper from Sao Paulo Capital Interview with TV Globo Television Radiation survey in Itupeva city with scintillation monitor THE RECOVERING: Day 8: 28 Oct 1985 The gamma radiography device was kept on the laundry. Day 9: 29 Oct 1985 The truck driver and his wife watched the warning about the gamma device on the TV Globo. Jornal do Brasil 01 Novembro 1985 Day 10: 30 Oct 1985 The Police was notified and the gamma device was recovered.
Relevant Security Incident: Rio de Janeiro 28 April 2012-75 Se - 0.52 TBq (14.2 Ci) THE EVENT: Day 1: 28 April 2012-23:30h After ending a radiography at one Company, the workers were driving the car with the gamma device (Gammamat SE) when five thieves stopped them and stole the car. The workers warned them about the radioactive source, but the thieves took the car.
Relevant Security Incident: Rio de Janeiro 28 April 2012-75 Se - 0.52 TBq (14.2 Ci) The following main actions were taken: Day 1: 28 April 2012 The workers notified the Police and the Radiation Protection Officer. THE EVENT: Day 2: 29 April 2012 The RPO notified the Regulatory Authority (CNEN) and the IRD Emergency Team. The Band News Radio Broadcast was notified to warn about the radioactive source. Day 3: 30 April 2012 The RPO made contact with many emergency organizations and the media. 15:00h - Press conference with the emergency organizations, CNEN, IRD Emergency Team, Police, RPO, etc. During the Press the Secretary of State for Civil Defense of Rio de Janeiro said that the public safety services were mobilized to recover the silver Renault Logan containing the radioactive material. (From Brazil News)
Relevant Security Incident: Rio de Janeiro 28 April 2012-75 Se - 0.52 TBq (14.2 Ci) Day 4: 01 May 2012 00:35h- A tip made to the Civil Defense led to the recovery of the car containing a device containing radioactive selenium 75. The car and the device - which were stolen Saturday night - were both recovered, apparently intact, on Tuesday morning. The IRD Emergency Team and the RPO were promptly notified. 01:11h - The Police and Civil Defence found the car and confirmed the notification. Police do not believe that the car was targeted for the radioactive material. They believe it was just a common car theft. (From Brazil News) 01:40h The RPO and IRD Emergency Team confirmed the integrity of the gamma radiography device and the radioactive source. THE EVENT:
TOP 10 SECURITY ACTIONS to Prevent Incidents with Industrial Radiography Sources being Transported by Company Owned Vehicle Security of Industrial Radiography Sources - WINS International Best Practice Guide 2012 Install an alarm system on the vehicle to detect an intruder attempting to enter the vehicle At a minimum, a local audible alarm should be activated in case of intrusion. Preferably, the vehicle should be equipped with an alarm system capable of sending a signal (e.g., cellular/radio, etc.) to the driver and other selected remote staff/locations. Equip vehicle with anti-theft device. Consider the installation of a remote engine cut off capability (if allowed by company policies and relevant safety authorities). Track the vehicle. Consider the installation of a tracking device reporting the position of the vehicle. Install a high security lock on the door to the cargo compartment. Whenever possible, the lock should have a shielded shackle to prevent the cutting of the lock. To ensure balanced security, the cargo compartment walls and hinges of door should provide at least equal delay as the door high security lock.
TOP 10 SECURITY ACTIONS to Prevent Incidents with Industrial Radiography Sources being Transported by Company Owned Vehicle Security of Industrial Radiography Sources - WINS International Best Practice Guide 2012 Install a high security lock on the radiography device transport container. To ensure balanced security the transport container should be tied down to the vehicle and its construction should provide at least equal delay as the high security lock. When practical, enforce a two-person rule for access to the radiography device. One way to do this is to provide one individual with the key to the vehicle cargo compartment and another one with the key of the source transport container. In instances where a strict two-person rule cannot be implemented (e.g., operational reasons), the company should demonstrate that they have instituted alternative physical or procedural measures that provide reasonable assurance against an insider threat during transportation.
TOP 10 SECURITY ACTIONS to Prevent Incidents with Industrial Radiography Sources being Transported by Company Owned Vehicle Security of Industrial Radiography Sources - WINS International Best Practice Guide 2012 To the extent possible drivers and/or other transport staff should maintain constant surveillance of the vehicle. Periods when the vehicle is left unattended should be kept to the strict minimum. Whenever possible the vehicle should be parked in areas which are continuously under surveillance (e.g. parking garages with attendants). When left unattended vehicles should be locked and alarms activated. Provide driver(s) and other transport staff with means of communication such as cell phones, radios, satellite phones. Redundant means of communication would be useful to compensate for the lack of coverage of any one technology. In the absence of any reliable means of communications due to lack of infrastructure or remoteness of location the company should implement pre-planned periodic checks for the timely detection of any incident. If possible provide mobile duress alarms for use by the drivers in transit. The buttons should provide an alarm indication at the company alarm station (if applicable) and offsite alarm station (such as security contractor monitoring stations).
TOP 10 SECURITY ACTIONS to Prevent Incidents with Industrial Radiography Sources being Transported by Company Owned Vehicle Security of Industrial Radiography Sources - WINS International Best Practice Guide 2012 In areas where there is a high level of threat conduct route planning to identify potential threats and existing response authorities (police, security contractors...) in order to select the most appropriate route and alternates. When possible have pre-arranged agreements with appropriate law enforcement for assistance in response to an actual or attempted theft of radiography sources. If extensive preplanning is not realistic then at a minimum the company should develop a list of the appropriate authorities to contact in the jurisdictions where the transports are occurring. Provide drivers and other transport staff with written instructions to be implemented in case of security related event. These instructions should include, among others, locations of authorised stops (eating, fuelling, rest, long term parking...), operation of the alarm system, access procedure to the cargo compartment, actions to be taken in case of theft of the vehicle, phone numbers of key company staff and relevant law enforcement agencies. These instructions should be developed in coordination with other applicable transport instructions (operations, safety...). Periodically schedule drills and exercises to evaluate the adequacy of security and response procedures and arrangements and determine the status of their implementation.
LESSONS LEARNED To Industrial Radiography Installation Notify immediately the Regulatory Authority. Contact immediately the Local and National Emergency Organizations (Civil Defence, Police, etc). Contact the Media by Press Conference and prepare very good press communications. CNEN Immediately Action New Regulation about Tracking of Vehicles that Transport Radioactive Materials Revision of the Regulation about Safety and Radiation Protection Requirements to Industrial Radiography Services
Thanks Francisco Cesar Augusto Da Silva dasilva@ird.gov.br - Brasil