Hazardous goods management Latest trends in petroleum industry C. Sasi Assistant Vice President Total LPG India Limited
Buncefield UK (HOSL) - December 11, 2005
Training Behaviour SMS LOPA Risk Analysis Facility Design
CURRENT TRENDS IN SAFETY IN PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY Risk Analysis Understanding of Methodology LOPA- Layer of Protection Analysis SMS Safety Management System Fire Protection for Oil Tanks Rim Seal Protection Building Inside the Plant New Trends ( Distances and Blast Proof Buildings ) Safety Instrumentation - LPG Plants I-EFSV Internal Excess Flow Check Valve GPS /GPRS For product Tankers
Risk Analysis Understanding of Methodology
Conventional Understanding Modern Concept
Safety barriers are aimed to bring the residual risk associated with potential accident scenarios to acceptable or to ALARP areas of the Total Risk Matrix Likely Unlikely Very unlikely Tolerable if ALARP High priority Extremely unlikely Acceptable risk Remote Moderate Serious Major Catastrophic Disastrous
LOPA Layer of Protection Analysis
What is Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) Identify hazardous events Determine initiating event frequencies Establishing tolerable levels of risk Analysing each independent safety layer to see if the overall level of risk can be reached If tolerable level of risk cannot be achieved : Additional safety layer must be added OR Existing layers must be strengthened
ACHIEVING ACCEPTABLE RISK Level of Protection Analysis HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 1. Check lists 2. Dow Relative Ranking 3. HAZOP - Hazard and Operability LAYER OF PROTECTION ANALYSIS 1. Express risk target quantitatively 2. Determine risk for system 3. Reduce risk to meet target HAZARD ASSESSMENT - Fault Tree - Event Tree - Consequence analysis - Human Error Analysis More accurate Semi-quantitative analysis to give order-of-magnitude estimate ACTIONS TO ELIMINATE OR MITIGATE - Apply all engineering sciences
Safety & Layers of Protection Safety Instrumented Function
SMS Safety Management System Important Tool for Optimizing the Operational Safety Selection of various Elements is important criteria After Taking care of Design Human Intervention needs to be taken care of
Building the System-use of Loss Causation Model
Building the System-use of Loss Causation Model These are nothing but Safety Management System Element, So Loss Casuation Model throws what element your organization requires through analysis of Immediate and basic causes for Loss
ISSSRS What it is? I3SRS Éléments Leadership and programme administration Management training Inspections Task Analysis Investigation Emergency preparedness Organisationnel rules Employées training Engineering and change management Heath control Personal Communications Matériels and services management System évaluation + Physical Condition Tour
Management of Contractor / contract labourers Significant accidents due to contracted jobs High turnover rates Inadequate training Insufficient instruction Unfamiliar environment Poor communication
Stages in the Selection of Contractors Pre-selection / Pre-qualification Assess a Contractor s suitability for a specific type of work with HSE being a prime consideration. Establish a list of approved Contractors Update the Approved List periodically Contractor considered must meet HSE requirements specific to the project or work Tendering and Contract Awarding HSE aspects should weigh equally amongst the other key items (costs, workmanship, timeliness) in making the final choice Avoid awarding the contract to the lowest bidder without regard to its HSE performance Sub-contractors, when employed, should be approved following a similar evaluation as applied for Contractors 18
Contractor training-link for proper execution of work through PTW Responsibilities for training of Contractor personnel should be stipulated in the contract Level of training will depend on: Type of work Degree of direct Company supervision Location and duration of the work Induction training for new Contractor on the worksite should be given by competent Company personnel Training must be given in the language of the Contractor personnel Contractor supervisors must receive a more intensive induction training On-the-job Control Contractor is responsible for supervision of its personnel Contractor to consult prior to changing supervisory personnel Company management must visibly demonstrate interests in Contractor s activities, e.g. Verify that HSE-related clauses in the contract are complied with Regular safety review meetings with Contractor Right to stop Contractor s activities for HSE reasons Propose measures to improve Contractor s HSE program For large projects, it may be useful to appoint a dedicated HSE Coordinator Use of work permit system to manage the HSE risks involved Monitor Contractor performance through inspection and auditing Contractor should report accidents in a timely and accurate manner to Total management
Fire Protection System Rim Seal Protection for Oil Tanks Working principle System has been divided in the following sub-systems:- a) Linear Heat Detection System. b) The Foam / DCP based Extinguishing System. c) Fire Alarm Panel & Automation a) Linear Heat Detection System Works based on the principle of rate of rise in temperature Maximum temperature beyond the pre-set is sensed by means of a microprocessor based intelligent evaluation unit The sensor element, i.e. the Stainless Steel / Copper Tube, which is in non-pressurized state (ambient pressure only) senses the rate of rise in temperature (pressure) and triggers an audio visual alarm Simultaneously the extinguishing systems are activited.
b) The Foam Based extinguishing system 100% proven substitute of Halon system and is environmental friendly The foam module is of 250 liter charged with 200 liters of pre-mixed foam solution Each foam module can cater 40 Meter Circumference of rim seal area Foam Discharge Manifold with Spray Nozzles are evenly spaced along the Rim Seal and are designed to discharge required Foam solution to control the fire completely. On detection of smallest fire the detection triggers an alarm & immediately actuates the extinguishing system.
Safety Instrumentation for LPG bottling Plants
Buildings inside the Plants Distances / Blast Proof Protection Severity of Pressure wave 0.0013 PSI 10% window broken 0.0689 PSI -90% of window broken 0.0117 PSI 50% of non reinforced building destroyed 0.024 PSI 1% Probability of Eardrum Rupture 0.0689 PSI -1% probability of fatality 0.12PSI 90% probability of fatality General Strength of Blast pressure Wave in explosion is -3 PSI
Risk Analysis is first step to properly place buildings inside the plant Building such as Fire water Pump House and Control Room shall be reinforced with sufficient safety factor to sustain blast pressure wave OISD Distance norm shall be followed to place various buildings inside the plants Purta Cabin erected during project phase Need to be careful in Placing these buildings as many accidents happen during construction phase
LPG Tanker Internal Excess Flow Check Valve (I-EFSV) I-EFSV IS ONE OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS
RESULTS OF PILOT STUDY BY OISD Trials on LPG Tanker by OISD successful Model Used Fischer Make C400 Series ( 2 Nos 2 on Liquid Line and 1.25 on Vapour Line ) Loading time reduced by 10 minutes Unloading time reduced by 30 minutes ( 20 minutes + 10 minutes for vapor) Average time for unloading - one hour & vapour recovery 45 minutes Differential pressure maintained for tank lorry unloading around 2 kg/sq.cm to 3kg/sq.cm Features & Benefits Perform functions of three different units: 1. Primary Shutoff, 2. Excess Flow and 3. Back Check.. Effective leak resistance with TFE spring loaded packing.. Complies with NFPA 58 requirements.. Three closing systems: 1. Manual, 2. Cable or 3. Air. Built-in excess flow valve offers closure when flow exceeds the valve's rated capacity or piping is sheared off at the valve.. Fusible links or plugs melt at 212 F - 220 F (100 C - 104 C) and allow valve closure in the event of a fire at the valve.
Principle of Operation The operational schematic below depicts threaded valves, however flanged styles operate in the same manner. View #1 View #2 The valve is held closed permitting a tight seal by both tank pressure and the valve's closing spring. Move the operating lever in its70 angle travel that allows the cam to place the rapid equalization portion of the valve stem in the pilot opening. This permits a larger amount of product to bleed downstream than if the operating lever were moved into the full open position. View #3 View #4 After a few seconds, when the tank and the downstream pressure equalize, the excess flow spring pushes open the main poppet. The operating lever is moved to the full open position to ready the system for transfer operation. The pump or compressor should not be engaged until the valve is fully opened. During the transfer operation, a flow, or sufficient flow surge, greater than the valve's excess flow spring rating will force the main poppet closed. A small amount of product will continue to bleed through the downstream side, but much less than in View #2. Should this occur, the operating lever should be moved to the full closed position in View #1 and the steps repeated.
GPS/GPRS For Tanker Trucks ( Product Fleet ) Monitors Driver on route behaviour Speed can be controlled by checking speed report generated Real time positioning can be known Reports can through data on harsh breaking / stoppage report Fatigue levels can also be monitored by finding continuous driving trends Driver can be counseled /cautioned through SMS or Telephone call Meets PESO requirement for tachograph Can be integrated with alcohol control device to stop engine in case Driver is under influence of alcohol GPS /GPRS Facilitates Control on Drivers Behavior
GPS/GPRS For Tanker Trucks ( Product Fleet )
GPS/GPRS For Tanker Trucks ( Product Fleet )
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