SOUTHEAST CORRIDOR EXTENSION CORRIDOR EXTENSION LRT PROJECT PRELIMINARY ENGINEERING DESIGN PHASE. Preliminary Hazard Analysis FINAL.

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1 SOUTHEAST CORRIDOR EXTENSION CORRIDOR EXTENSION LRT PROJECT PRELIMINARY ENGINEERING DESIGN PHASE Preliminary Hazard Analysis October 15, 2009 Developed by: Parsons Transportation 1700 Broadway, Ste. #900 Denver, Colorado Interactive Elements, Inc. 60 East 42nd Street, Suite 2035 New York, New York PARSONS TRANSPORTATION GROUP

2 Preliminary Hazard Analysis RECORD OF REVISIONS Revision Number Date Reason for Revision Authorization Final Parsons/IEI Southeast Corridor Extension 2 October 2009

3 Preliminary Hazard Analysis TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page RECORD OF REVISIONS...2 LIST OF ACRONYMS...4 FOREWORD PROCESS INTRODUCTION PURPOSE OBJECTIVES SCOPE APPROACH Define the System Identification of Hazards Hazard Categorization of Hazards SOUTHEAST CORRIDOR EXTENSION PROJECT DESCRIPTION PROJECT OVERVIEW PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSES ORGANIZATION OF THE ANALYSIS APPENDIX A INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING THE PHA FORM West Corridor Preliminary Hazard Analysis for Final Design PHA A-0 PHA B-0 PHA C-0 PHA D-0 PHA E-0 PHA F-0 Alignment Track Station Train Control OCS Overpass/bridge Southeast Corridor Extension 3 October 2009

4 Preliminary Hazard Analysis LIST OF ACRONYMS EE: EOL: FTA: HAR: HRI: IEI: LMIS: LRT: OHA: PD: PTG: PHA: RTD: SE: SSPP: TVA: Environmental Evaluation End of Line Federal Transit Administration Hazard Assessment and Hazard Risk Index Interactive Elements Incorporated Limited Major Investment Study Light Rail Transit Operating Hazard Analysis Planned Development Parsons Transportation Group Preliminary Hazard Analysis Regional Transportation District Southeast Safety and Security Program Plan Threat and Vulnerability Analysis Southeast Corridor Extension 4 October 2009

5 Preliminary Hazard Analysis FOREWORD Interactive Elements Incorporated (IEI) performed this Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) for the Regional Transportation District (RTD), Southeast (SE) Corridor Extension Project. For each of the hazards listed in this report, possible controlling measures are identified that will reduce these hazards to an acceptable level of risk. RTD will need to determine which of these possible controlling measures will actually be implemented and whether the implemented measures will lt in the desired risk reduction. It is RTD s responsibility to implement mitigating and corrective actions such as resolving non-conformances to the design documents and specifications, developing a comprehensive inspection and maintenance program, training employees, and implementing safety-related operating procedures. Southeast Corridor Extension 5 October 2009

6 1.0 PROCESS Preliminary Hazard Analysis 1.1 INTRODUCTION Each RTD transit project must provide safe and reliable transit service. RTD personnel and their consultants and contractors are expected to mplement high-standards of safety and system assurance throughout the planning, design, construction, installation/fabrication, testing, pre-operational, and operational phases of all transit projects during RTD s transit system s life cycle. The RTD System Safety Program Plan (SSPP) is designed to eliminate and/or control identified hazards to the lowest practical level. Hazards that cannot be eliminated or reduced in the project design are to be controlled by providing safety and warning devices, adequate training, and/or written operating, emergency and maintenance procedures/instructions for RTD personnel to prevent the occurrence of accidents. This PHA presents a detailed assessment of potential hazards that may be associated with the SE Corridor Extension Project. It is based on the preferred alignments and preferred conceptual design alternatives. The analysis is provided as part of the project Environmental Evaluation (EE), in order to identify hazards and eliminate them through design, mitigates them by control measures, or determi m to be acceptable as-is. It is envisioned that this document will be expanded and finalized during subsequent phases of the projects. 1.2 PURPOSE A PHA is part of a formalized process to identify, eli inate and control hazards. Its goal is to clarify and systematically assess conditions that could potentially affect a system s safe operation. The PHA s purpose is to: Identify and evaluate the effects of hazardous conditions on personnel, equipment, and the public; Define and evaluate countermeasures to eliminate or control the identified hazards; Provide timely notification of hazards for personnel who must resolve them; and Document the safety concepts incorporated and used during design, and provide the basis for developing procedures to either mplement the design s safety concepts or resolve the hazard if the design did not provide resolution. Southeast Corridor Extension 6 October 2009

7 Preliminary Hazard Analysis Consequently, the PHA is designed to assist designers and RTD in designing, building, and operating safe and efficient extensions to the current operating system. 1.3 OBJECTIVES PHA objectives are to: Identify potential hazards resulting from failure of system elements, and determine their impact on the overall system, people, environment; and the Identify hazardous activities that could affect the rail system s safe operation; Identify potential accidents and the consequences (e.g., fatalities, injuries, damage, etc.) associated with each hazardous condition; Identify measures that will prevent accidents by eliminating or controlling the underlying hazards; and Document the hazard analyses results in a clear and concise manner; facilitating resolution of the unresolved hazardous conditions identified and indicating those that have been resolved. 1.4 SCOPE The analysis presented in this document is meant to assist RTD staff in identifying potential safety issues associated with the SE Corridor Extension Project, which is currently in the EIS stage. The PHA is not intended to be a comprehensive list of all hazards potentially occurring on the Project. The analysis focuses primarily on hazards that may result in fatal or severe injury, or catastrophic or substantial loss or damage to the operating system. The Hazard Analysis Guidelines for Transit Projects issued by the U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Transit Administration (FTA) were used to guide the analysis contained in this report. The SE Corridor Extension Project is defined by its systems, facilities, and rolling stock, and the environment in which they operate. The hazards identified and recommended corrective actions relate to the equipment, environment, procedures, and public interfaces in the SE Corridor Extension. A number of hazards identified are generic in nature and are applicable to most light rail projects. Hazards that are specifically unique to the SE Corridor Extension Project are also identified. Southeast Corridor Extension 7 October 2009

8 1.5 APPROACH Preliminary Hazard Analysis System Safety is the application of special technical, engineering, managerial skills to the systematic, forward-looking identification and control of hazards. The System Safety concept calls for safety analyses and hazard control actions. Hazard Analysis is an essential function in design, from the concept e through development. The System Safety approach focuses on the prevention of accidents by eliminating and/or controlling safety hazards in a syste ic manner. The goal is to reduce the identified hazards to the lowest practical level through the most effective use of resources. This process helps assure that hazards are identified and translated into risks, which are then analyzed, assessed, prioritized, and resolved, accepted or tracked to closure. The primary goal is accident/incident prevention through an informed decision-making process. It should be noted that a PHA is not the same as failure analysis. This distinction is important, because a hazard involves the risk of loss harm and a failure does not always result in loss or harm. The Hazard Identification and Process is shown in Figure 1. DEFINE THE SYSTEM Define the physical and functional characteristics, the people, procedures, facilities, equipment, and the environment IDENTIFY HAZARDS Identify hazards and undesired events Determine the causes of hazards ASSESS HAZARDS Determine severity Determine probability Decide to accept risk or eliminate/control RESOLVE HAZARDS Assume risk; or Implement corrective action v Eliminate v Control Figure 1 Hazard Identification and Process Southeast Corridor Extension 8 October 2009

9 1.5.1 Define the System Preliminary Hazard Analysis The initial step in the PHA process is to define the physical and functional characteristics of the system to be analyzed. These characteristics are presented in terms of the major elements that make up the system. An understanding of how the individual system elements interface with each other i essential to the hazard identification effort. The SE Corridor Extension Project s systems have been identified through the design criteria, conceptual engineering, and other project documents. This PHA does not include a safety assessment of current or future rail vehicles. PHAs for rail vehicles are typically the vehicle manufacturer s responsibility Identification of Hazards After defining the system, the second step in the PHA ess involves identifying hazards and determining the hazards associated with operating the SE Corridor Extension and its causal factors. Information for this hazard identification step will be obtained from the following sources, which are described i detail in the following sections: RTD accident/incident data and experience Accident/incident data from other rail operating systems Expert opinion and hazard scenarios Formal analysis Design data and drawings Accident/Incident Data from RTD and Other Transit Systems Accident/incident data from RTD will be examined to gain insight on what has happened in the past. Data from similar operating rail systems and the National Transit Database will also be examined. Expert Opinion and Hazard Scenarios The PHA prepared for the West Corridor Project will be used to provide a starting point for identifying the types of triggering events or undesirable events that could occur. Judgment by the designer s civil, systems, and safety engineers will also be considered. To assist in understanding the mechanism by which accidents occur, hazard scenarios will be developed. These scenarios briefly outline potential situations and equipment malfunctions that could impact the rail system s safety. scenarios include selected undesirable events (i.e., derailment, fire, collision, etc.) and a summary of possible cause and results. The scenarios are intended to represent potential real-world events and, as such, have been derived primarily from other operating systems experiences. Southeast Corridor Extension 9 October 2009

10 Preliminary Hazard Analysis Formal Analysis This PHA is a basic hazard analysis technique used to identify hazards. The PHA is an inductive analysis technique that uses a top do approach (e.g., define the system, define the hazards, then resolve the hazards) to determine the effects of a system event or system malfunction. The PHA format provides an organized, systematic framework to follow in presenting potential hazards, causes, recommendations, and hazard control references. A key point concerning this analysis, as used for this report, is that it provides a checklist and the opportunity to consider a large number of potential hazards. This is important because historical data and experience do not necessarily reflect all potential safety hazards and their effects. Design Data and Drawings Design data and drawings will be reviewed and associated operational hazards will be identified. The review of the design and this analysis are intended to ensure that the safety principles defined in the RTD design criteria are maintained. As with each of these methods of identifying hazards, developing the PHA requires experience and lessons learned from the RTD transit system and similar transit systems, and familiarity with the operation and equipment proposed for the SE Corridor Extension. This PHA will involve input from designers, safety specialists and other experienced rail transit professionals Hazard Categorization The third step in the PHA process is to categorize the identified hazards in ms of each hazard s severity or consequence and the probabil of occurrence. The United States Department of Defense document Standard Practice for System Safety, MIL- STD-882D, establishes system safety criteria guidelines for determining hazard severity and probability. The hazard severity categories listed in Table 2 provide a qualitative indication of the relative severity of the possible consequences of the hazardous conditions. For this PHA s purposes, the severity category assigned was based on the worst-case event. See Table 1 below. Description Category Definition Table 1 Severity Categories Catastrophic I Death, system loss, or severe environmental damage Critical II Severe injury, severe occupation illness, major system or environmental damage Marginal III Minor injury, minor occupation illness, minor system or environmental damage Negligible IV Less than minor injury or occupational illness, less than minor system or environmental damage Southeast Corridor Extension 10 October 2009

11 Preliminary Hazard Analysis The hazard probability levels listed in Table 2 represent a qualitative judgment of the relative likelihood of occurrence of an accident/incident caused by an uncorrected or uncontrolled hazard as a result of a particular event or series of events. Once the severity of a hazard has been determined, the Team must consider the probability of its occurrence. The Team will assess hazard probability by placing the frequency of hazard activation in one of the five traditional categories: Frequent, Probable, Occasional, Remote, and Improbable. They are defined as: Table 2 Categories Description Level of occurrence or experience Frequent A Likely to occur frequently or to be continuously experienced Probable B Can be expected to occur more than once in the life of a system or a particular location or piece of equipment Occasional C Likely to occur sometime in the life of a system or a particular location or piece of equipment Remote D Unlikely but possible to occur in the life of a system or a particular location or piece of equipment Improbable E Highly unlikely, but not impossible to occur in the life of a system or a particular location or piece of equipment Together, the hazard severity and probability properties measure a hazard s magnitude and the priority for applying control measures. Hazards are then examined, qualified, addressed, and resolved based on the severity of a potential outcome and the likelihood that such an outcome will occur. The value derived by considering a hazard s severity and probability is the Hazard Risk Index (HRI). The resulting risk index is a measure of the acceptability or undesirability of the hazard and s applied to the Hazard Assessment Matrix, as shown in Table 3. Table 3 Risk Categories and Determination Risk Category HRIs in Risk Category Acceptable Criteria High Moderate Low IE, IIE, IIID, IIIC, IVA, IVB Acceptable with review Trivial The Hazard Assessment Matrix assists the decision-making process in determining whether a hazardous condition should be eliminated, controlled, or accepted, in terms of severity and probability. If the potential for an accident/incident reveals a Category I (catastrophic) occurrence with a Level A (frequent) probability, the system safety effort should be to eliminate the hazard through design or at the very least to implement Southeast Corridor Extension 11 October 2009

12 Preliminary Hazard Analysis redundant hazard control measures prior to entering the extension s operational phase. An extreme (Category I) or severe (Category II) hazard risk may be tolerable if it can be demonstrated that its occurrence is highly improbable. A probable or Level B hazard may be tolerated if it can be demonstrated that the re of the occurrence would be marginal (Category III) or negligible (Category IV). This provides a basis for logical management decision-making, considering hazard s severity and probability of Hazards After completing the hazard assessment, identified hazards can be resolved either by assuming the associated risk with the hazard or by eli ing or controlling the hazard. The most cost effective and technologically efficient approach is to eliminate a known hazard by changing the design on paper rather than retrofitting a design once the project is placed into operation. Thus, adequate elimination or control of risk depends on the ability to accomplish the necessary tasks as early as possible in a project s design phases. As hazards are identified, there is an order of precedence in the hazard control process known as the Hazard Reduction Precedence Sequence. Various means are employed to reduce the risk to an acceptable level, including: Design for Minimum Risk The System Safety Hazard Reduction Precedence Sequence s first step is to eliminate the hazard. For example, collisions at grade crossings may be eliminated by grade separating the crossing. In some cases, hazards are inherent and cannot be eliminated completely through design. In other cases eliminating hazards is not practical or financially feasible. If the hazard cannot be eliminated, it should be reduced to an acceptable level by incorporating fail-safe devices and principles in design, incorporating high- reliability system components, and using redundant or backup hardware and software devices. Safety Devices Hazards that cannot be eliminated or minimized through design may be controlled by using appropriate safety devices. These are permanent system design features that improve safety by automatically controlling the risk of hazard without human interaction. Examples of safety devices include interlock switches, protective enclosures, guards or barriers, and safety pins. Periodic functional checks of the safety devices should be made. Warning Devices If designing for minimum risk and using safety devices cannot effectively control the hazard, warning devices should be used. Warning devices do not provide definitive protection but help prevent accidents and/or reduce the consequences of an accident. Warning devices detect the potentially hazardous condition and generate an audible and/or visual warning signal. The signal should prompt a correction before the condition actually becomes hazardous. Fire alarms and enunciator panels are examples of warning devices. Since warning devices Southeast Corridor Extension 12 October 2009

13 Preliminary Hazard Analysis require a human response, the design should minimize the possibility of human error in that response. Warning signals and their application should be designed to minimize the likelihood of false alarms that could ary hazardous conditions. Procedures and Training If it is not possible to eliminate or control hazards designing for minimum risk or to adequately reduce the associated risk with safety and warning devices, procedures and training should be used. However, this is the lowest level of control, and relies on training to recognize the hazard and personnel actions to avoid the hazard. Hazard Acceptance/System Disposal Where it is not possible to reduce a hazard by any means, a decision must be made to either accept the hazard or dispose of the system. Frequently, acceptable hazard resolution requires a combination of the methods of control described in this section. 2.0 SOUTHEAST CORRIDOR EXTENSION PROJECT DESCRIPTION 2.1 PROJECT OVERVIEW The SE Corridor Extension consists of the extension of light rail south from the current Lincoln End of Line (EOL) Station, 2.3-miles to the new RidgeGate EOL Station. It consists of three stations, three grade-separated overpasses, one potential at-grade crossing, and one Park-n-Ride. As delineated in the Limited Major Investment Study (LMIS) preferred alternative, the extension follows the I-25 alignment south from Lincoln Station to the southbound exit ramp from I-25 to Lincoln Avenue. The extension crosses over Lincoln Avenue; returns to existing grade; and continues south to the Sky Ridge Medical Center. Prior to reaching the first of three stations, the Sky Ridge Station, the alignment again becomes elevated. The Sky Ridge Station is anticipated to be an elevated station located just north of the Medical Center. It is planned as an in-line station with no proposed Park-n- Ride parking. There will be a Kiss-n-Ride drop off area and the station will be linked with local bus and circulator bus connections. As described in the LMIS preferred alternative, the alignment will continue south and then turn east and cross over I-25. The alignment then returns to existing grade and may cross a potential at-grade crossing at Street B, a local street proposed as part of the RidgeGate Planned Development (PD). The alignment then continues south below existing grade to the second station, the Lone Tree City Center Station. This station is also planned as an inline station that will provide service to the primary mercial core of the RidgeGate PD. The station will be located one level below street grade and provide opportunities to integrate retail development with transit. There will be no Park-n-Ride at this location, Southeast Corridor Extension 13 October 2009

14 Preliminary Hazard Analysis but a curb-side drop off, pedestrian access, and links with local buses are planned. It is anticipated that only the platform will be funded through FasTracks, and the station will be funded and built as adjacent development occurs. The alignment returns to grade and continues south from the City Center Station. It elevates again to cross over the proposed RidgeGate Parkway to the RidgeGate Parkway EOL Station located southeast of the proposed I-25 and RidgeGate Parkway Interchange. As originally depicted, this station will have 2,000 surface parking spaces, provide regional, local, and circulator bus connections, and provide a Kiss-n-Ride drop off-area. When the Southeast Corridor Extension is completed, it will be incorporated into the overall RTD system. Lines originating from the proposed three new stations will become part of the E Line, F Line, and G Line that currently along the Southeast Corridor (SE Corridor Extension Figure 5). The estimated travel time to Lincoln Station from the RidgeGate EOL Station is approximately 5 minutes. Figure 5: Southeast Corridor Extension Southeast Corridor Extension 14 October 2009

15 Preliminary Hazard Analysis 3.0 PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSES 3.1 ORGANIZATION OF THE ANALYSIS The remainder of this report contains the individual preliminary hazard analyses, organized in the following sequence. The unique numbers identify each analysis and are included in the PHA worksheets at the end of each of the following sections. A. ALIGNMENT B. TRACK C. STATIONS D. TRAIN CONTROL E. OVERHEAD CONTACT SYSTEM F. OVERPASSES/BRIDGES Southeast Corridor Extension 15 October 2009

16 Preliminary Hazard Analysis APPENDIX A INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING THE PHA FORM The PHA Form is to be completed as indicated below (refer to sample shown): Southeast Corridor Extension SYSTEM - Element of the Southeast Corridor Extension. SUBSYSTEM - Sub element of a system or component. PHA NO. - PHA identification number. REV NO. - Revision number of the identified PHA. PERFORMED BY and DATE Name of Individual performing the assessment through Column 5a and date of assessment completion. REVIEWED BY and DATE - Name of Individual confirming correct completion of Columns 5b through 8 and date of review completion. APPROVED BY and DATE - Name of Individual approving the design resolution of hazard and date of approval. Column 1. Number: A unique consecutive number assigned to each hazard. Column 2. : Concise, but adequate, description of the hazard. Southeast Corridor Extension 16 October 2009

17 Preliminary Hazard Analysis HAZARD CAUSE /EFFECT Column 3a. : Description of the potential cause(s) of the hazard. Column 3b. : Description of the effect(s) of the hazard on the subsystem, or system, or individuals. Column 4. Assigned Initial Risk Index (IRI) number and letter to the hazard based on best judgment of severity and probability, followed by the word, followed by an assigned Risk Index (RRI) number and letter to the hazard based on judgment of severity and probability assuming that corrective actions identified in Column 5a will be implemented. Column 5a. Possible : Description of design solutions or other actions that may be employed to reduce the severity, probability of occurrence, or both, of the hazard. Column 5b. : Description of the measures taken to address the hazard. Column 6. Assigned Final Risk Index (FRI) number and letter to hazard based on judgment of severity and probability based on design or other measures taken, as identified in Column 5b. Column 7. Description of the method(s) used to verify that the Column 5b have actually been put in place. sures shown in S: Column 8. Explanatory or other information that may be entered any signatory for use by future reviewers/approvers in reaching a conclusion as to the acceptability of the assessment, or its resolution, or its risk. Southeast Corridor Extension 17 October 2009

18 SYSTEM: Alignment PHA NO.: A-1 A-1 LRV Fire Electrical short circuit igniting flammable materials Human action igniting flammable materials Ignition of flammable liquids on-board, beneath, or on top of vehicle. LRV stopped adjacent to a wayside fire Injury, death, equipment damage, service disruption I-C I-D 1. Design LRV with low smoke, low combustible and low toxic materials 2. Install fire extinguishers on LRVs 3. LRV Inspection and maintenance procedures should be designed to assure wiring integrity and proper containment of lubricants and flammable liquids 4. LRVs should be prohibited from operating along wayside with fire and smoke visible 5. Develop emergency procedures for fire incidents CATEGORIES AND DETERMINATION SHEET 1 OF 6 PERFORMED BY: M. Cephas DATE: March 20, Verify LRVs are designed in accordance with industry standards 2. Verify that fire extinguishers are required on LRVs 3. Verify LRV inspection and maintenance procedures will be designed to assure wiring integrity and proper containment of lubricants and flammable liquids 4. Verify LRVs are prohibited from operating along wayside with fire and smoke visible 5. Verify emergency procedures for fire incidents are in place 6. Provide manual opening of LRV doors, intercoms, and radio for emergency notification 7. Provide signage, tunnel walkways and lighting for patron evacuation 6. Verify LRV doors can be opened manually and emergency communications are in place 7. Verify signage, tunnel walkways and lighting requirements for patrons are included in tunnel design

19 SYSTEM: Alignment PHA NO.: A-2 A-2 Fire/smoke on alignment Fire at station, wayside building, or brush Motor vehicle fire at crossing or adjacent to ROW Wood tie fire at special work Ignition of flammable materials used for maintenance or stored near alignment Injury to passengers, employees, or the public, equipment damage, service disruption II-C II-D 1. Design to eliminate or minimize flammable materials on alignment and at stations 2. Inspection and maintenance procedures to assure clearance of excessive debris and brush on alignment and prohibit storage of flammable materials 3. LRVs should be prohibited from operating along wayside with fire and smoke visible 4. Develop emergency procedures for alignment fire incidents CATEGORIES AND DETERMINATION SHEET 2 OF 6 PERFORMED BY: M. Cephas DATE: March 20, 2009 REVIEWED BY: S. Reese DATE: _May 12, Verify design eliminates or minimizes flammable materials on alignment and at stations 2.. Verify inspection and maintenance procedures and verify flammable materials will be stored appropriately 3. Verify LRVs will be prohibited from operating along wayside with fire and smoke visible 4. Verify emergency procedures for alignment fire incidents

20 CATEGORIES AND DETERMINATION SYSTEM: Alignment PHA NO.: A-3 A-3 Pedestrian on restricted alignment Unrestricted access to track alignment Inadequate signage Lack of public education on dangers of entering alignment Injury, death, service disruption I-C I-D 1. Design fencing and warning signs in alignment areas where intrusion is likely (schools, playgrounds, residential neighborhoods) 2. Require LRV operators to continuously observe alignment and stop short of person or object observed 3. Implement rail safety education programs for schools, community groups, local radio and TV SHEET 5 OF 6 PERFORMED BY: M. Cephas DATE: March 20, Verify design includes fencing to be installed along guideway 2. Verify LRV operators are required to observe the alignment and stop short of person or object observed 3. Verify implementation of rail safety education programs for schools, community groups, local radio and TV

21 CATEGORIES AND DETERMINATION SYSTEM: Alignment PHA NO.: A-4 A-4 Motor vehicle on alignment Stalled vehicle on alignment at crossing Vehicle drives onto alignment at crossing Off-road vehicle drives onto or across restricted alignment Collision causing injury, death, derailment, equipment damage, or service disruption I-C I-D 1. Design/install fencing and warning signs in restricted alignment areas where vehicle intrusion is likely 2. Design warning signs and install CCTV to monitor grade crossings 3. Rulebook to require LRV operators to continuously observe alignment and stop short of person or object observed SHEET 6 OF 6 PERFORMED BY: M. Cephas DATE: March 20, Verify fencing and No Trespass signs will be installed in track areas 2. Verify CCTV will be installed at grade crossings 3. Verify Rulebook requires LRV operators to continuously observe alignment and stop short of person or object observed 4. Implement rail safety education programs for schools, community groups, and local media 4. Verify implementations of rail safety education programs

22 CATEGORIES AND DETERMINATION SYSTEM: Track PHA NO.: B-1 B-1 Pumping (unstable) track Improper track bed design Poor installation Poor maintenance Track bed undermined by water Derailment, death, injury equipment damage, service disruption I-D I-E 1. Design track in accordance with AREMA and ASTM criteria 2. Inspection and maintenance procedures to include assurance of track system stability, 3. Require Train Operators to notification OCC when any perceived change in ride quality is perceived SHEET 1 OF 6 PERFORMED BY: M. Cephas DATE: March 19, Identify spec that verifies track is designed in accordance with AREMA and ASTM Standards 2. Verify in SOPs that inspection and maintenance procedures include assurance of track system stability 3. Verify in Rulebook that Train Operators are required to notification OCC when any perceived change in ride quality is perceived

23 SYSTEM: Track PHA NO.: B-2 B-2 Spread rail (wide gauge) Poorly designed, defective, or improperly installed rail Poor inspection and maintenance Derailment, injury, death, equipment damage, service disruption I-D I-E 1. Design rail system in accordance with industry standard, including heat stressing welded rail strings and utilizing QA/QC procedures to assure rail system meets specifications CATEGORIES AND DETERMINATION SHEET 2 OF 6 PERFORMED BY: M. Cephas DATE: March 19, Verify in Specs that track design is based on AREMA and ASTM Standards and that QA/QC will assure designed rail system meets specs Stresses due to excessive speed or LRV weight Rail expansion (kink) due to prolonged periods of high temperature 2. Test and certify completed rail fastening system to assure compliance with design 3. Inspection and maintenance procedures to include assurance of rail fastener integrity, use of track geometry car on regular basis 4. Require Train Operators to notification OCC when any perceived change in ride quality is perceived 5. Post speed limit signs on curves and other areas of civil speed restriction 6. Use restraining rails on curves 2. Identify specs that require rail fastening system to be tested and certified 3. Verify Inspection and maintenance procedures will include assurance of rail fastener integrity, use of track geometry car on regular basis 4. Verify the Rulebook requires Train Operators to report to OCC any track condition or situation that could be hazardous to train operations 5. Verify speed limit signs are included on drawings 6. Verify in contract documents that guard rails are included on curves in

24 B-2 (con t.) 7. Perform walking inspections of entire track system; daily inspections during high heat periods CATEGORIES AND DETERMINATION compliance with the Design Criteria 7. Verify SOPs require walking track inspections

25 SYSTEM: Track PHA NO.: B-3 B-3 Broken rail or broken weld Rail defect Weld defect Wheel loads too high Rail overstressed on curve Rail contraction (pull-apart) due to prolonged periods of extremely cold temperature Derailment, injury, death, equipment damage, service disruption I-C I-D 1. Design rail system in accordance with industry standard for wheel loads, welding, heat stressing, and broken rail detection; utilize QA/QC procedures to assure rail and welds meet specifications 2. Test and certify completed rail installation to assure compliance with design 3. Inspection and maintenance procedures to include assurance of rail integrity, use of track geometry, with ultra sonic testing or rail integrity on regular basis CATEGORIES AND DETERMINATION SHEET 3 OF 6 PERFORMED BY: M. Cephas DATE: March 19, Verify in specs track design is based on AREMA and ASTM Standards and OCC will receive a signal when a broken rail is detected in the system; and QA/QC procedures will assure design weld specifications compliance 2. Verify Specs detail required testing and QC to assure installation is in compliance with design 3. Verify inspection and maintenance procedures require assurance of rail integrity, use of track geometry car, with ultra sonic testing of rail integrity on regular basis 4. Require Train Operators to notify OCC of any perceived change in ride quality 5. Post speed limit signs on 4. Verify that the Rulebook requires Train Operators to report to OCC any track condition or situation that could be hazardous to train operations 5. Verify drawings show

26 B-3 (con t.) curves and other areas of civil speed restriction 6. Use restraining rails on curves 7. Perform walking inspections of entire track system CATEGORIES AND DETERMINATION locations of speed limit signs on curves and other areas of civil speed restriction not governed by the train control system 6.Verify contract documents show emergency guardrails will be utilized on curves in compliance with Design Criteria 7. Verify SOPs require walking track inspections

27 SYSTEM: Track PHA NO.: B-4 B-4 Excessive rail wear Rail hardness less than required Poor inspection and maintenance Derailment, injury, equipment damage, service disruption II-C II-D 1. Design rail system per industry standards; including super elevation and rail guards to help prevent excessive rail wear; verify QA/QC procedures are in place CATEGORIES AND DETERMINATION SHEET 4 OF 6 PERFORMED BY: M. Cephas DATE: March 19, Verify that track design specs are based on AREMA and ASTM Standards; curves will be super elevated; and rail guards will be designed per industry standards; and QA/QC procedures will assure design weld specifications compliance Inadequate super elevation on curves Poor wheel/rail interface 2. Assure super elevation and guardrails are installed as designed 3. Inspection and maintenance procedures to include assurance of proper rail profile 4. Require Train Operators to notify OCC when any perceived change in ride quality is perceived 2. Verify that contract documents specify required construction inspection and testing to assure super elevation and guardrails are installed as designed 3. Verify inspection and maintenance procedures include assurance of proper rail profile using a track geometry car on a regular basis 4. Verify the Rulebook requires Train Operator to report to OCC any track condition or situation that could be hazardous to train operations

28 CATEGORIES AND DETERMINATION 5. Post speed limit signs on curves and other areas of civil speed restriction 6. Perform walking inspections of entire track system; paying particular attention to wear patterns 5. Verify design shows location of speed limit signs on curves and other areas of civil speed restriction not governed by the train control system 6. Verify SOPs require walking track inspections that includes paying attention to wear patterns

29 CATEGORIES AND DETERMINATION SYSTEM: Track PHA NO.: B-5 B-5 Inadequate wheel/rail adhesion Wet leaves on rail Oil/grease on rail Collision, derailment, injury, death, equipment damage, service disruption I-B I-D 1. Design rail greasing systems to minimize grease spread on rails 2. Design alignment to minimize adjacent trees SHEET 5 OF 6 PERFORMED BY: M. Cephas DATE: April 2, Verify rail greasing systems are designed to minimize grease spread on rail 2. Verify contract specifications minimize number of trees in proximity to alignment 3. Inspection and maintenance procedures to keep trees and brush cut back and to remove leaves from rail 4. Require operators to report leaves or contaminants on rail or any abnormal traction conditions and require operators to operate at reduced speed when they are present 3. Verify SOPs require walking track inspections 4. Verify SOPs and Rulebook require Operators to report leaves or contaminants on rail, or any abnormal traction conditions, and Operators are required to operate at reduced speed when they are present

30 CATEGORIES AND DETERMINATION SYSTEM: Track PHA NO.: B-6 B-6 Unobserved track switch operation Remote operation from location without visual of switch or track conditions Derailment, injury, death, equipment damage, service disruption I-C I-D 1. Design train control system to prevent switch movement when train is in approach to a track switch 2. Provide OCC with CCTV coverage of track switch SHEET 6 OF 6 PERFORMED BY: M. Cephas DATE: April 2, Verify train control system design will mechanically lock switch points to prevent accidental switch movement in front of approaching train 2. Verify CCTV coverage of track switches 3. Develop training and public education programs to warn that switch movement can be expected at any time 4. Inspection and maintenance procedures should require blocking and clamping switches when working in their vicinity 3. Verify training and public education programs on switch movement dangers and remote operation will be implemented 4. Verify inspection and maintenance procedures require blocking and clamping switches when working in their vicinity

31 SYSTEM: Station PHA NO.: C-1 C-1 Fire/smoke on station platform Debris ignited by discarded cigarette Minor to serious injury due to exposure to fire II-C or other source of and smoke ignition Ignition of flammable materials used for cleaning or maintenance stored on or near station Short circuit in station electrical wiring LRV involved in fire/smoke enters station Equipment loss System loss II-D 1. Use fire resistant or non combustible materials on station platforms 2. Establish emergency procedures for addressing fire/smoke on station platform and hold emergency drills in conjunction with fire and police departments 3. Provide routine clean-up at platforms 4. Prohibit storage of flammable materials on or near stations unless they are in appropriately fire rated, secure enclosures 5. Design electrical circuits in stations to applicable codes, including grounding and insulation flammability requirements, and require inspection and test to assure installation complies with design 6. Develop LRV fire/smoke procedures to minimize impact on stations and passengers on platform CATEGORIES AND DETERMINATION SHEET 1 OF 9 PERFORMED BY: M. Cephas DATE: April 2, Verify fire resistant or non combustible materials will be used on station platforms 2. Verify emergency procedures re established for addressing fire/smoke on station platform and that emergency drills in conjunction with fire and police departments will be conducted 3. Verify platform maintenance 4. Verify flammable materials will not be stored on or near stations 5. Verify electrical circuits in stations are in compliance with applicable codes 6. Verify LRV fire/smoke procedures are developed to minimize impact on stations and passengers

32 SYSTEM: Station PHA NO.: C-2 C-2 Platform/LRV gap is too large Inadequate design Construction error LRV load leveling failure Injury, loss of wheelchair access, service disruption III-C III-D 1. Ensure platform to car distance is designed to meet ADA requirements 2. Confirm proper distances during construction and integration testing CATEGORIES AND DETERMINATION SHEET 2 OF 9 PERFORMED BY: M. Cephas DATE: April 2, Ensure platform to car distance is designed to meet ADA requirements 2. Verify specifications require verification of construction tolerances in accordance with drawings and specifications 3. Design LRV car load-leveling systems 4. Develop procedures to aid disabled passengers if load leveling fails 5. Institute a maintenance and inspection program for load leveling system 3. Verify LRV design incorporates car load-leveling systems with secondary metal springs that support the car body should the air spring or compressed air supply fail 4. Verify procedures are developed in place to aid disabled passengers from a disabled train 5. Verify procedures exist for maintenance of LRV suspensions

33 CATEGORIES AND DETERMINATION SYSTEM: Station PHA NO.: C-3 C-3 Electrical shock Improperly insulated, grounded, or covered electrical wiring due to Design or installation deficiency; vandalism, or rodent activity Minor to severe shock causing death or injury Loss of power I-D I-E 1. Comply with applicable electrical codes 2. Use vandal resistant screws on electrical access plates located in public areas SHEET 3 OF 9 PERFORMED BY: M. Cephas DATE: April 3, Verify electrical systems comply with all applicable building codes and state and local codes 2. Verify vandal resistant fasteners will be used in public areas Lack of proper electrical box coverings or failure of maintenance personnel to replace protective coverings 3.Restrict access of unauthorized individuals into equipment rooms and panels 4. Follow proper maintenance procedures for electrical systems 5. Assure electrical systems are constructed as designed 3. Verify RTD s access management program restricts unauthorized personnel from equipment rooms and panels 4. Verify proper maintenance procedures for electrical systems will be followed 5. Verify inspection requirements are clearly spelled out in contract documents

34 SYSTEM: Station PHA NO.: C-4 C-4 Sharp or protruding objects Poor design Lack of quality control during installation Lack of proper maintenance Vandalism Injury to passengers or employees due to fall, cut, or penetration wound III-C III-D 1. Eliminate all sharp and protruding edges, and tripping hazards, in station design 2. Verify stations are constructed in accordance with design CATEGORIES AND DETERMINATION SHEET 4 OF 9 PERFORMED BY: M. Cephas DATE: April 3, & 2. Verify specs require the elimination of all sharp and protruding edges, and tripping hazards, in station design 3. Verify stations are regularly inspected, and repaired as necessary to eliminate potential; hazards 3. Stations should be regularly inspected, and repaired as necessary to eliminate potential; hazards

35 CATEGORIES AND DETERMINATION SYSTEM: Station PHA NO.: C-5 C-5 Person on trackway in station area Visually impaired cannot distinguish edge from rest of platform Lack of warning of approaching train Passenger waiting on platform is pushed/shoved into path of approaching train Death, injury; System interruption I-D I-E 1. Provide tactile warning strip along platform to delineate platform edge 2. Require LRV operators to sound a warning when entering a station 3. Provide warning signs and public education program on dangers of entering trackway 4. Limit access to platform per code occupancy requirement SHEET 5 OF 9 PERFORMED BY: M. Cephas DATE: April 3, Verify design requires ADA compliant tactile warning strips along platform edges 2. Verify LRV operators are required to sound a warning when entering a station platform area 3. Verify RTD will provide warning signs and public information programs as deemed necessary 4. Verify platform access will be limited per code occupancy Unauthorized trespass across tracks person intentionally jumps into path of approaching train 5. Establish a security presence at stations 6. Monitor platform and tracks via CCTV and provide PA/VMS announcements 5. Verify RTD will provide security as needed 6. Verify CCTV and PA/VMS systems are included in design

36 CATEGORIES AND DETERMINATION SYSTEM: Station PHA NO.: C-6 C-6 Slippery or uneven station walking surfaces Improper design Improper construction Inadequate maintenance Wet surfaces Injury to patrons or employees III-C III-D 1. Design slip resistant walking surfaces that will remain even over their useful life 2. Provide adequate lighting 3. Provide adequate station drainage. SHEET 6 OF 9 PERFORMED BY: M. Cephas DATE: April 6, Verify slip resistant walking surfaces are included in design. 2. Verify design complies with IEEE C2, National Electrical Safety Code and complies with NFPA Verify platform design includes adequate drainage 4. Develop inspection and maintenance procedures. 4. Verify inspection and maintenance procedures.

37 SYSTEM: Station PHA NO.: C-7 C-7 Platform overcrowding Inadequate platform design Inadequate crowd control Delayed train service Inadequate exiting capacity Injury to patrons or employees; service disruption II-C II-D 1. Design platforms to handle expected peak loading and means to close platforms if overcrowded 2. Design queuing areas adjacent to stations serving special events and exiting capacity to effectively empty platform 3. Develop operations procedures for crowd control CATEGORIES AND DETERMINATION SHEET 7 OF 9 PERFORMED BY: M. Cephas DATE: April 6, Verify station platforms are designed to handle peak loads 2. Verify station queuing areas will be able to handle large crowds on station platforms 3. Verify RTD has procedures in place to handle large crowds on station platforms 4. Provide adequate lighting 5. Provide CCTV coverage at stations to get early warning of impending overcrowding 4. Verify design complies with IEEE C2, National Electrical Safety Code and complies with NFPA Verify CCTV will provided at stations for crowding detection purposes

38 SYSTEM: Station PHA NO.: C-8 C-8 Obstructed sightlines Station design prevents clear view of approaching train unless at platform edge Equipment stored on station blocks sight lines Injury or death if struck while leaning over platform edge I-D I-E 1. Design for clear sightlines to approaching train from at least four feet from platform edge 2. Prohibit equipment/material storage within six feet of platform edges 3. LRV operator should sound warning when entering a station 4. Monitor platform and tracks via CCTV and provide periodic messages on the PA/VMS CATEGORIES AND DETERMINATION SHEET 8 OF 9 PERFORMED BY: M. Cephas DATE: April 6, Verify design provides clear sightlines to approaching train from at least four feet from platform edge 2. Verify equipment/material storage is prohibited within six feet of platform edges 3. Verify LRV operators are required to sound a warning when entering a station 4. Verify platforms and tracks will be monitored via CCTV and provide periodic messages on the PA/VMS

39 CATEGORIES AND DETERMINATION SYSTEM: Station PHA NO.: C-9 C-9 Toxic gas Failure at pipeline adjacent to the station Crash/fire involving vehicle carrying toxic material near station Injury, death, or system loss I-D I-E 1. Identify pipelines or storage tanks in the vicinity of stations carrying toxic substances and relocate away from stations 2. Perform Geological search for natural gas pockets SHEET 9 OF 9 PERFORMED BY: M. Cephas DATE: April 6, Verify pipelines or storage tanks in the vicinity of stations carrying toxic substances are identified and relocated if necessary 2. Provide Geo-tech test borings and existing utility verifications 3. Inspection and maintenance procedures to prohibit use of toxic gases in stations during service hours and prohibit storage of toxic/flammable materials at stations 4. Develop and coordinate emergency procedures with local emergency response agencies 3. Verify gas detection systems are included in design 4. Verify inspection and maintenance procedures to prohibit use of toxic gases in stations during service hours and prohibit storage of toxic/flammable materials at stations 5. Verify RTD s Security and Emergency Response Procedures include responding to toxic gas emergencies

40 CATEGORIES AND DETERMINATION SYSTEM: Train Control PHA NO.: D - 1 D-1 Gate fails to operate when train approaches System fails to detect train Mechanical or electrical problem with gate control and/or mechanism Collision with road vehicle or pedestrian; Injury or death System disruption I-C I-D 1. Design gate and gate control circuits to fail safe in compliance with MUTCD and AREMA recommended practices 2. Minimum shunting sensitivity should be 0.2 ohms SHEET 1 OF 7 PERFORMED BY: M. Cephas DATE: April 6, Verify gate and gate control circuits are designed to fail safe in compliance with MUTCD and AREMA recommended practices 2. Verify minimum shunting sensitivity to be 0.2 ohms 3. Install gate down indication (or Operator s indication) on crossing gate or wayside 4. Require train operators to view gate down indication and other conditions around gate prior to entering the crossing and report failures 3. Verify gate-down indications are required to be incorporated into design 4. Verify train operators are required to view gate down indication and other conditions around gate prior to entering the crossing and report failures

41 SYSTEM: Train Control PHA NO.: D - 2 D-2 Broken gate arm Arm struck by motor vehicle Road vehicle or pedestrian enters crossing Arm broken by natural causes Criminal activity Gate arm no longer provides barrier to traffic lane leading to collision with road vehicle or pedestrian; Injury or death System disruption I-C I-D 1. Design gate with gate positive down indication (grade crossing Indicator) and gate mechanism to follow MUTCD so that counter weight will not permit a gate down indication with a broken arm 2. Rule Book to require train operator to preview gate down indication and crossing condition prior to entering the crossing and report failures CATEGORIES AND DETERMINATION SHEET 2 OF 7 PERFORMED BY: M. Cephas DATE: April 6, Verify gate with gate positive down indication (grade crossing Indicator) and gate mechanism are designed to follow MUTCD so that counter weight will not permit a gate down indication with a broken arm 2.. Verify Rulebook requires that damaged or malfunctioning crossing gates be reported to OCC 3. Stencil emergency phone numbers on crossing gate equipment 4. Coordinate crossing design with CoPUC 3. Verify RTD will to stencil emergency phone numbers on crossing equipment 4. Verify Crossing design will be coordinated with CoPUC

42 CATEGORIES AND DETERMINATION SYSTEM: Train Control PHA NO.: D - 3 D-3 Gate preview time is less than 20 seconds Train approach circuit not long enough for train speeds Coordination with traffic signals and or railway signal system does not provide timely advance warning Road vehicle or pedestrian enters crossing Gate does not lower before train enters crossing leading to collision with road vehicle or pedestrian; Injury or death System disruption Injury or death I-C I-D 1. Design approach circuits of appropriate length 2. Coordinate traffic control/caution system and railway signaling system to ensure proper approach time 3. Require train operator to preview gate down indication and crossing condition prior to entering the crossing and report failures 4. Verify proper gate time has been provided as required by design SHEET 3 OF 7 PERFORMED BY: M. Cephas DATE: April 6, Verify approach circuits are designed of appropriate length 2. Verify traffic control/caution system and railway signaling system are coordinated to ensure proper approach time 3. Verify RTD requires train operator to preview gate down indication and crossing condition prior to entering the crossing and report failures 4. Verify proper gate time has been provided as required by design 5. Educate public using Operation Life Saver or similar campaign 5. Verify crossing gate awareness is in RTD s Public Education Program

43 CATEGORIES AND DETERMINATION SYSTEM: Train Control PHA NO.: D - 4 D-4 Gate preview time greater than 30 seconds Train approach circuit too long for train speeds Traffic signals/caution signal and or TC system delays train Road vehicle drives around gate Collision, Injury, or death I-C I-D 1. Design approach circuits of appropriate length (25 seconds) 2. Coordinate traffic control system and railway signaling system to ensure proper approach time 3. Require train operator to preview gate down indication and crossing condition prior to entering intersection SHEET 4 OF 7 PERFORMED BY: M. Cephas DATE: April 6, Verify approach circuits of appropriate length (25 seconds) 2. Verify coordination of traffic control system and railway signaling system to ensure proper approach time 3. Verify train operators are required to preview gate down indication and crossing conditions prior to entering intersection 4. Verify proper gate time has been provided as required by design 5. Educate public using Operation Life Saver or other similar campaign 4. Verify proper gate time has been provided as required by design 5. Verify crossing gate awareness is in RTD s Public Education Program