A brief presentation of the second fire in the Gudvanga tunnel

Transcription

1 A brief presentation of the second fire in the Gudvanga tunnel Marius H. Raddum Accident investigator Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN)

2 Accident Investigation board Norway, AIBN The Accident Investigation Board Norway is a public body of inquiry. The purpose of AIBN investigations is to clarify the sequence of events and factors which are assumed to be of importance for the prevention of transport accidents. The AIBN shall not apportion blame or liability. The AIBN is a permanent, independent body of inquiry for transport accidents. AIBN started out investigating aviation accidents in 1989, and has since seen its area of authority expand to include railway, road traffic and shipping accidents.

3 Director General William J. Bertheussen Advisory staff Human factors Technology Organizational safety Legal adviser Administration Luftfart Jernbane Vei Sjøfart

4 The Gudvanga tunnel some facts The Gudvanga tunnel is a single bore tunnel on the E16 between Aurland and Voss. The tunnel is m long and was first opened for traffic on 17 December Photo: Photo: The tunnel rises at a gradient of 3.5% from Gudvangen towards Aurland Automatic traffic control has been established, with two cameras in each direction.

5 The fire 11 August 2015 On 11 August 2015, a tourist coach caught fire in the Gudvanga tunnel. Witness observations and technical findings indicate that the cooling system started leaking towards the end of the drive, probably as the coach was heading up the Flenja tunnel. Photo:tv2.no The AIBN has not identified a clear cause of the fire. It was not until 300 m after entering the Gudvanga tunnel that the driver observed smoke and stopped the coach immediately. The driver notified the police and quickly evacuated the coach.

6 The triple alert notice to the other emergency services worked as intended. The 110 emergency communication center in Sogn og Fjordane county notified the Traffic Monitoring Centre (VTS), which immediately closed the tunnel with road barriers and a flashing red stop signal. Aurland Fire Service was at the scene of the fire inside the tunnel after approximately 15 minutes. During the first telephone conversation between the 110 center and VTS, VTS was asked to wait to initiate fire ventilation. When the driver removed the fire extinguisher from the wall of the tunnel, the fire ventilation started automatically and the pre-set direction of ventilation was towards Gudvangen

7 The automatic fire ventilation meant that the smoke was ventilated to the most distant exit (11.1 km) through the part of the tunnel that held the greatest number of road users. The automatic system, which is used in several of the longest tunnels in Norway, exposed the road users closest to the scene of the fire to greater danger and reduced their possibility of self-rescue. It also affected VTS and the fire service s ability to gain control of the situation at an early stage.

8 The ventilation status when the fire started: Natural draught and fans 3,8 m/s Gudvangen Aurland m 360 m

9 Fire ventilation starts Gudvangen Fire ventilation 4 m/s Aurland m 360 m Approach from Aurland fire brigade

10 Fire ventilation direction turning Gudvangen Fire ventilation 3,4 m/s m Aurland Approach from Voss fire brigade evacuate trapped road users m 360 m Aurland fire brigade searching for road user wile exiting

11 A scenario with many people on foot in the tunnel, like in the Gudvanga tunnel fire in 2013, was avoided because all 32 passengers from the coach could fit in an empty van that happened to arrive at the scene. 19 vehicles managed to turn around in the tunnel. Three vehicles containing a total of five people were trapped in the smoke in the tunnel, but mobile phone communication with the emergency services helped to ensure that everybody stayed in their cars in the tunnel

12 That the fire brigade decided to reverse the direction of ventilation on being notified that road users were trapped in the smoke further into the tunnel had a decisive impact on the development of the situation. In the AIBN s opinion, this tactic can be further developed and used in other tunnels. The five people who were left in the tunnel were found by firefighters from Voss Fire Service after approximately 1.5 hours and taken to hospital to be treated for smoke injuries.

13 Conclusions of AIBNs investigation

14 It is the AIBN s view that the fire could probably have been prevented had the driver performed a safety inspection of the coach before entering the Gudvanga tunnel.

15 In the AIBN s opinion, the Norwegian Public Roads Administration (NPRA) should change the automatic system so that the ventilation is controlled in a way that facilitates selfrescue Photo:

16 AIBN believes that direct, uninterrupted communication is very important in an emergency, and that VTS should therefore be able to communicate directly with the emergency services by being connected to the Norwegian Public Safety Network (Nødnett). Photo:

17 The investigation shows that the NPRA s equipment and procedures are inadequate, considering that they can be decisive for the outcome of a tunnel fire. The AIBN calls for technology that can provide a real-time overview of the number of vehicles, their location and the number of people inside the tunnel, and an immediate notification from VTS to motorists in the event of a fire. Photo:

18 The decision to turn the direction of the fire ventilation shows that Aurland Fire Service had learnt from the fire in the tunnel in Photo:

19 Fire in the Gudvanga tunnel in 2013 On 5 August 2013, an empty heavy goods vehicle caught fire in the tunnel The driver was unable to extinguish the fire using the 6 kg fire extinguisher from his own vehicle. The direction of the ventilation was turned around so the fire services could enter the tunnel smoke filled 8,3 km of the tunnel trapping 67 road users 28 persons sustained acute smoke inhalation injuries

20 The ventilation status when the fire started: Natural draught and fans 5th. august ,9 m/s Gudvangen Aurland 8,3 km 2,88 km Foto: Monika Blikås

21 Fire ventilation starts (12:05) Gudvangen Fire ventilation 2,5 m/s Aurland 8,3 km 2,88 km Approach from Aurland fire brigade Foto: vg.no

22 Comparison of the fires in 2013 and 2015 (I) 2013 fire m from Aurland side 2015 fire 360 m from Aurland side Fire ventilation manually engaged by fire brigade Fire ventilation automatic engaged when fire extinguisher was removed from the tunnel wall Initially direction of ventilation changed as a result of the engagement of fire ventilation Initially direction of ventilation changed as a result of the engagement of fire ventilation

23 Comparison of the fires in 2013 and 2015 (II) 2013 fire Smoke ventilated towards Gudvanga side 8,5 km 2015 fire Direction of ventilation was turned back to Aurland side The fire fighters gave priority to putting out the fire over evacuating road users The fire fighters let the coach burn and focused on searching and rescuing trapped road users The response personnel on the Gudvangen side had to remain passive because of the smoke 67 road users trapped in smoke Total of 28 cases of acute smoke inhalation injuries 23 seriously injured 5 very seriously injured The response personnel on the Gudangen side started search and rescue as the smoke subsequently cleared 5 road users trapped in smoke Non seriously injured

24 Animation of the Gudvanga fire Gudvanga fire

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