CBSA s Radiation Detection Program (RADNET)

Transcription

1 Protected A CBSA s Radiation Detection Program (RADNET) Khalil Boudjemline CBSA Science and Engineering Directorate Magic Maggiore: Technical Reach-Back Workshop Joint Research Centre, Ispra, Italy March 28, 2017

2 Overview Building a Radiation Detection Architecture - Challenge and Approach - Equipment - Concept of Operations Scientific Reach-back - Cases, CBSA Team Alarm Statistics and Notable Cases Sustaining a Radiation Detection Architecture - Monitoring, maintenance, replacement, R&D 2

3 Radiation Detection Challenge Objective - Scan 100% of imported commercial marine containers for radiological threats Operational Requirements - Large number of containers ~3 M Twenty-foot Equivalent Units (TEU) annually - Geographically distributed marine ports-of-entry - Large variation in imported goods - Environmental extremes - Facilitate the free flow of legitimate goods 3

4 Canadian Approach - RADNET Radiation Detection Network (RADNET) Strategic placement of Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) Networked equipment Remote alarm annunciation Live monitoring Triaged response Established radiation profiles of common commodities Radiation Portal Monitor 4

5 Situational Awareness - Instrumentation Gateway (IGW) IGW provides real-time status of all RPMs nationwide 5

6 Radiation Detection Equipment Radiation Portal Monitors (RSI & SAIC) Car-borne Detectors (RSI) Handheld Detectors (Smiths RadSeeker) Personal Radiation Detectors (Thermo Scientific RadEye) Large-Scale Imaging Systems (Smiths HCV-M) 6

7 RADNET: Concept of Operations 0:10:00 Start Unload Scan/Alarm Assess 0:15:00 Reach-back 1:00:00 Car-borne 12:00:00 X-ray Imaging 0:00:00 0:00:30 Radiation Portal Monitor in a Marine Terminal 7

8 Gamma alarms CBSA Scientific Reach-back - Commodity not listed - Dose rate exceeds the limit set by the Science and Engineering Directorate (SED) - Identified isotope(s) not associated with the commodity - Man-made isotopes - Uranium cylinders - Radioactive materials - Mixed commodities - Other: container number not visible, no image, cab alarms Neutron alarms 8

9 CBSA Scientific Reach-back Team Provided by the CBSA Science and Engineering Directorate (SED) Scientific team - Research scientists - Research engineers - Technologists Trained Radiation Safety Officers (RSOs) Advanced training in gamma spectroscopy Expertise in non-intrusive inspection and radiation measurement 24/7 availability 9

10 ~ 2.5 million scans Over 25,000 alarms annually Alarm Statistics Database of commodities versus measured dose ~ 1-1.5% of containers alarm from naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) - Ceramics, stoneware, abrasives, chemicals, welding rods ~ 0.1% of all scans require scientific reach-back (SED) ~ 0.015% of all scans require Car-borne exam (Local Ops + SED) Better understanding of radiation signatures with new RSI RPMs 10

11 Organisations Involved in Response Canada Border Services Agency (SED + National Targeting Centre) - 24/7 RSO, Targeting and Risk Assessment, Preliminary Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission - 24/7 RSO, Licensing and transport, Disposal Sub-Contractors Health Canada Radiation Protection Bureau - Regulator of consumer goods, holders of Federal Nuclear Emergency Plan (FNEP), health sciences reach-back Royal Canadian Mounted Police/Department of National Defence - Canadian Joint Incident Response Unit (CJIRU) for all CBRNE terrorism related Canada Food Inspection Agency - Administration and enforcement of agricultural and food acts 11

12 Radioactive Material Out of Regulatory Control (RMORC) Following the detection of RMORC - CBSA provides comprehensive information package to the CNSC (manifest, dose and spectral information, x-ray images) - CBSA works with the national regulator (CNSC) to determine interim safety precautions (e.g., isolation, safety zone) - CBSA holds container under customs control pending admissibility decision Importer generally has two options for shipments deemed to be noncompliant: - Return material to point of origin (with placards if necessary) - Hire a CNSC licensee to dispose of contaminated material 12

13 New RSI RPMs have higher sensitivity to low level contamination Containers from Europe (food products and consumer goods) Cs-137 isotope identified (Chernobyl + weapons testing) Workshop organised to standardize response - Canada Nuclear Safety Commission - Health Canada Low-Level Contamination - Canada Food Inspection Agency 13

14 Notable Radioactive Contamination Cases Contaminated container Surface contamination of goods Contaminated goods Manufactured goods containing NORM Selective absorbers of uranium Food contamination Container/Good /Food Origin Isotopes Admissible to Canada Containers (rusted spots) Fukushima Cs-134 Cs-137 Used vehicle parts Fukushima Cs-134 Cs-137 Steel / Melted source during recycling process Yes Asia Co-60 No Mattresses / Pillows Asia Th-232 No Mono Ammonium Phosphate / Tri-sodium Phosphate Dodecahydrate Blueberries / Strawberries Asia U-235 Yes Europe (Chernobyl) Cs-137 Most (low level) shipments Yes 14

15 Case Study Summary Of the 87 containers that have been referred to other government departments - 38 were deemed inadmissible to Canada and returned to the country of origin, - 46 were allowed entry because the detected levels were below the allowable threshold, - 2 importers decided to have the contents of their container sorted and return the contaminated goods to the country of origin, and - 1 container had its goods disposed of in Canada 15

16 Sustaining a Radiation Detection Architecture Calibrated and tested twice yearly - Ensure continuing adherence to N42.35 standard - Newer model calibrated on background PVT panels (gamma-ray detection) replaced on average every 5 years due to decay New Old Complete system currently being upgraded Ongoing R&D Monte-Carlo Simulations 16

17 Radiation Portal Monitor Replacement Currently in the process of updating SAIC RPMs to RSI units - 9 of 11 terminals completed Same detectors: - Large-volume PVTs for gamma-ray detection - He-3 for neutron detection Higher light collection for RSI systems (better energy resolution) Key differences between both systems: PVT energy calibration PVT spectral analysis Old System (SAIC) On-site using test source Energy windowing New System (RSI) Automatic with natural background Isotope identification Data reanalysis No Yes 17

18 Summary Radiation Detection Network (RADNET) - Operations / Technology / Expertise Screening Marine Cargo - Mass screening for everything - Secondary screening based on risk assessment Leverage small staff to support extensive program Leverage commodity database to improve alarm adjudication Real-time system monitoring for situational awareness 18

19 Questions and Discussion 19