BIBLIOGRAPHIC REFERENCE

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2 BIBLIOGRAPHIC REFERENCE Leonard, G. S.; Johnston, D. M.; Saunders W. S. A Hazard warning systems for the Gisborne district: assessment of options, GNS Science Report 2007/04 72 p. G. S. Leonard, GNS Science, PO Box 30368, Lower Hutt D. M. Johnston, GNS Science, PO Box 30368, Lower Hutt W. S. A. Saunders, GNS Science, PO Box 30368, Lower Hutt Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences Limited, 2007 ISSN ISBN i

3 CONTENTS ABSTRACT...IV KEYWORDS...IV 1.0 INTRODUCTION Project Objectives Project Tasks Current national and local Gisborne district CDEM systems Legislation, plans and existing early warning systems EFFECTIVE HAZARD WARNING NOTIFICATION AS PART OF IMPROVED COMMUNITY RESILIENCE Effective warning systems definition Developing understanding and the capacity to respond Effective warning messages Importance of the all-clear message Part of a wider goal: improved community resilience Limitations of early warning systems Gisborne district emergency experience WARNING NOTIFICATION NEEDS IN GISBORNE DISTRICT Sources of warning messages and information Ranking of hazards Different hazards affect different areas, or many areas Varied time-frames for hazard warnings People and the purpose of warnings Rural vs. City populations Warning a diverse population Cost limitations Budget for salaries OPTIONS FOR PUBLIC WARNING NOTIFICATION Natural warning notification Notification via structured organisations and groups to the public Volunteer and community organisations Government organisations/contractors Notification via large companies and institutional staff to those in their care Notification to the public using third-party-organisation hardware Notification using warning-dedicated hardware Relative merits of reviewed notification systems Evaluation of options compared to review requirements Best practice Public understanding of notifications Suitability to hazards in the Gisborne district Time-frames for notification options within effective warnings Ability to apply notification systems nationally Targeting specific geographic audiences Cost-effectiveness Robust and sustainable Speed of implementation COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT AND EDUCATION Motivation Perception of risk Changing attitudes on the value of preparedness Motivation...37 GNS Science Report 2007/04 i

4 5.1.4 Moving from intention to preparation Education and engagement to motivate preparedness and effective warnings Delivering education Maps and signage Community engagement Monitoring of public awareness Barriers and Predictors Improving preparedness Improving warning messages National education strategy Capacity building within key sector groups School education Education of tourists Staff training Government agencies Non-government and volunteer agency potential roles RECOMMENDATIONS Time-lag ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS REFERENCES...47 APPENDIX 1 PART 8(60-62) OF THE NATIONAL CIVIL DEFENCE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN ORDER APPENDIX 2 INTERNATIONAL EXAMPLES...52 A2.1 Japan: Tsunami...52 A2.2 Mexico: Seismic alert...54 A2.3 USA: All hazards...54 A2.4 USA: Tsunami...55 A2.5 Hawaii: Tsunami...56 A2.6 Australia: Flood warnings...57 A2.7 Hong Kong...58 A2.8 Singapore...58 A2.9 UK...58 APPENDIX 3 ANALYSES OF PUBLIC NOTIFICATIONS SYSTEMS...58 A3.1 Notification via natural warnings...58 A3.2 Notification via institutional staff to those in their care...59 A3.3 Notification via structured organisations and groups to the public...59 A3.4 Third-party hardware (and staff): Aircraft hailers/banners...60 A3.5 Third-party hardware (and staff): Amateur radio...60 A3.6 Third-party hardware (and staff): Billboards...61 A3.7 Third-party hardware (and staff): Call-in phone line...61 A3.8 Third-party hardware (and staff): Cell broadcast...61 A3.8.1 Telecom SMSCB...62 A3.8.2 Vodafone Cell Broadcast...62 A3.9 Third-party hardware (and staff): s...62 A3.10 Third-party hardware (and staff): Pagers...63 A Third-party hardware (and staff): New Zealand Police and Fire Service mobile PA loudspeakers...63 A3.12 Third-party hardware (and staff): Power line messaging...63 A3.13 Third-party hardware (and staff): Radio and TV stations...64 A3.14 Third-party hardware (and staff): Radio Data Systems...65 A3.15 Third-party hardware (and staff): Route alert (door-to-door)...65 A3.16 Third-party hardware (and staff): SMS text messaging...65 A Telecom...66 GNS Science Report 2007/04 ii

5 A Vodafone...66 A3.17 Third-party hardware (and staff): Telephone auto-dialler...66 A3.18 Third-party hardware (and staff): Telephone trees...66 A3.19 Third-party hardware (and staff): Tourist Advisory Radio...67 A3.20 Third-party hardware (and staff): Websites/WAP etc A3.21 Third-party hardware (and staff): Warning to GPS receivers...67 A3.22 Warning-dedicated hardware: Fixed PA loud-speakers...68 A3.23 Warning-dedicated hardware: Flares, explosives...68 A3.24 Warning-dedicated hardware: Mobile PA loud-speakers...68 A3.25 Warning dedicated hardware: Sirens (tone, no voice capability)...69 A3.26 Warning-dedicated hardware: Tone-activated alert radio...70 FIGURES Figure 1 A model of components of an effective hazards warning system 2. Step 1 (Early Warning) is a Response activity. Steps 2 through 5, and the associated research and effectiveness evaluation, are the Reduction and Readiness activities necessary for effective response to that early warning Figure 2 The feedback relationship amongst the three key options for natural hazard risk management Figure 3 Flow diagram for warning messages into, and public notifications from, Gisborne CDEMG, and the way in which warnings reach (or are sought by) the community Figure 4 Residential population density (people per square kilometre) for Gisborne district based on the 2001 census area units Figure 5 Warning timeline Figure 6 The social-cognitive process model for preparedness TABLES Table 1 Gisborne CDEM Group reported arrangements for effective response to tsunami warnings, data reported for the current tsunami preparedness review Table 2 CDEM Group Plan (2004) hazard priorities and hazard characteristics (modified after unpublished work of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2001). L = low, M = medium, H = high Table 3 Potential secondary hazards resulting from specific primary hazard events Table 4 Factors of relevance to early warning systems and their time frames 26. Seconds (S), minutes (M), days (D), weeks (W), months (M), years (Y) and decades (D) Table 5 Residential population density (people per square kilometre) compared to land area and population proportions for Gisborne district based on the 2001 census area units Table 6 Start-up and ongoing cost considerations for warning systems Table 7 Categories of loss that can be reduced, i.e. benefit Table 8 Summary of relative merits of warning public notification system options reviewed in more detail in Appendix Table 9 Stage of the education and engagement process/campaign, associated variables and basic strategy that should be applied to each variable GNS Science Report 2007/04 iii

6 ABSTRACT The Gisborne district has a large proportion of the components of an effective warning system in place reaching the majority of its residents. This review defines an effective warning system as one which goes beyond early warning and public notification systems and hardware to ensure the public will respond correctly to warning messages they receive. Effective warnings require both substantial community engagement, and exercising of the warning system both issues are already being addressed in Gisborne. The rural communities of the district regularly experience warning events (especially for flooding). Coupled with a strong sense of community common in smaller settlements, they are well prepared to be resilient to hazard events. The urban centres of Gisborne district, especially Gisborne City, have less experience of hazard events. Cities also have more spread out communities, often based on common interests, which means support networks in individual neighbourhoods or streets may be less-well developed. The Community Link network of Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) volunteers in the district is a particularly powerful community engagement and preparedness tool. The volunteer network is well developed and tested in rural areas. One option that would improve the response to urban warnings is more urban community-link groups that regularly exercise warning response actions. The development of any new public notification hardware for Gisborne district in isolation is probably not a cost-effective option for further improving warning response. Communication links to community-link groups are already regularly tested and relatively robust. National initiatives for public notification of warnings may enhance what is already in place in Gisborne. Of particular interest is the potential for use of emerging mobile technologies. The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) has recently drafted a briefing document outlining steps towards creating a working group to look at mobile technologies, initially focusing on Cell Broadcasting. Gisborne district would benefit from keeping abreast of these advances and consider pushing for timely convening of, and results from, such a working group. Public education, including maps and signage, is the key to effective response to warning systems. Gisborne district will maximise the effectiveness of its warning arrangements by further developing education and planning resources for key hazards (especially tsunami, flooding, and volcanic ash fall) in cooperation with the community. This report reviews factors to be considered when developing educational materials and working with the community, based on research elsewhere in New Zealand and internationally. KEYWORDS Effective warning system, natural hazards, Gisborne, tsunami, public education, public notification GNS Science Report 2007/04 iv

7 1.0 INTRODUCTION Gisborne Emergency Management Office wishes to review the system by which it disseminates warnings to the public of the Gisborne district. This requirement is set out in The Guide to the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan. This project seeks to conduct such a review, building on the methods used in a recent review conducted for the Auckland CDEM Group 1. This review explores wider options for warning decision-making (e.g., thresholds for tsunami evacuation) and public notifications. In addition, it investigates options for public engagement and education, including issues surrounding signage and maps. Warning systems (both human-generated and natural) are needed for a range of different hazards, including those with relatively short warning times (e.g., tsunami, some volcanic eruptions, flooding) and those with longer warning periods (e.g., cyclones, droughts, epidemics). The amount of warning time and immediacy of response will determine which warning systems are appropriate. It may be necessary to use different mechanisms for disseminating warnings with different timeframes. For some hazards, warning systems may not be useful. For hazards such as earthquakes, and at present locally-generated tsunami, official warnings will not be possible. 1.1 Project Objectives The objective of this project is to review current warning arrangements, and to develop a number of recommended options for the dissemination of Emergency Management Office warnings to communities in the Gisborne district. This will ensure that informed decisions can be made for implementing any system changes or new systems. Recommended options should meet the following requirements: They should be based on examples of best practice from elsewhere in New Zealand and overseas. They should be easy to understand and interpret. They should be suitable for hazards in the Gisborne district, with an emphasis on tsunami. They can be applied consistently throughout New Zealand. They can be targeted to specific geographic audiences. They can be implemented quickly and easily. They are cost effective. They are robust. They are sustainable. They address current understandings of social behaviour. GNS Science Report 2007/04 1

8 1.2 Project Tasks In order to meet the project objectives, several tasks have been undertaken in an all-hazard context, with an emphasis on tsunami. This project: updates New Zealand and overseas examples of best practice effective warning systems presented in a recent report to the Auckland CDEM Group 1, with a focus on public notification arrangements. Systems in use in countries with hazard profiles and social values similar to those of New Zealand, e.g., Australia, UK, USA (Hawai i and Washington) will be reviewed. The outcomes of a recent United Nations conference on early warning and the effectiveness of Japanese warning systems will be added; assesses which public notification systems meet the requirements listed under Project Objectives above, with comment on how these best fit within an effective warning system; recommends a number of options for delivery of public warnings ( public notification ) in Gisborne; and discusses and recommends methods for community engagement and education, focusing on signage and maps (as combined planning, education and response tools). In addition, the authors will participate in presentations of the results to the Emergency Management Office or to the wider Council. 1.3 Current national and local Gisborne district CDEM systems This section outlines the national CDEM and Gisborne s existing local warning systems Legislation, plans and existing early warning systems Many warnings are generated or supplied by MCDEM via the national warning system. Under the National CDEM Plan, MCDEM is responsible for issuing warnings of national significance to CDEM groups, local authorities, police, certain government departments, lifeline utilities, and certain broadcasters. CDEM Groups are responsible for disseminating national warnings to local communities, and for maintaining local warning systems. The National Plan does not include local actions and procedures required to disseminate or respond to warnings that is the responsibility of each CDEM Group. Appendix 1 outlines sections of the National Plan, which describes the objective and scope of general warnings, and the national warning system. The Gisborne district is part of the national warning system, and in addition has a local existing warning system in place, with specific warning protocols for heavy rainfall and tsunami. GNS Science Report 2007/04 2

9 According to the Group CDEM Plan, the main method of issuing warnings and information to people about an emergency (which may or may not be declared) will be via the media initially through (1) RadioWorks, (2) Radio Networks and (3) Radio Ngati Porou. This will be supported by the community link organisation, by emergency services and by word of mouth. In the City area, the Gisborne City Fire Brigade siren is not part of the civil defence warning system. In rural areas Volunteer District Fire Brigades may use their sirens to alert the communities that there is something wrong. These may be activated by any three of the Police/Fire Combined Communication Centres, or by radio from the Gisborne Fire Station once authority has been given. Rural stations are located at Te Araroa, Ruatoria, Te Puia, Tikitiki, Tokomaru Bay, Tolaga Bay, Matawai, Whatatutu, Te Karaka, Patutahi, and Manutuke. Any warning from any system is a sign to the public to tune in to the nearest working radio station for information. Detailed staffing, responsibilities and procedures for each section of the Organisation at each phase are shown in the Warning and EOC (Emergency Operations Centre) Activation & Management Standard Operating Procedures. The Gisborne CDEM Group currently has three levels of readiness: 1. "ALERT" Civil Defence Emergency Management Officer will normally notify: Controller Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management Designated Council Departments and utility owners Area Co-ordinators Police Fire Health Mayor (depending on intensity) During the ALERT phase the event will be monitored. The event itself will dictate the level of this activity. 2. "STANDBY" Key people are put on standby The Media Officer is activated Liaison with the emergency services is stepped up Partial Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) established The Adverse Event Plan may be activated Communication systems are activated The Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management is also kept informed. 3. "FULL ACTIVATION" A state of local civil defence emergency is declared EOC is completely activated GNS Science Report 2007/04 3

10 the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management informed The information is published in the Gazette. To ensure a timely response, levels of activation have been predetermined for: Heavy rainfall warnings ALERT Storm warning ALERT Threatening volcanic activity ALERT Tsunami warning STANDBY Earthquake ALERT * Earthquake STANDBY ** Hazardous chemicals ALERT * a felt earthquake of Modified Mercalli Indensity (MM) 4-5 ** where the earthquake has caused obvious damage or is strong enough to cut power or phones or is of MM6 or greater. Gisborne CDEM Group supporting documentation related to warnings include: Warning Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) (mostly superceded by the adverse event plan) Area Coordinators SOP Emergency Operations Centre SOP Communications SOP Community Link SOP Emergency Services Tsunami Contingency Plan Distant tsunami evacuation maps (ten one-zone maps) Civil Defence & Emergency Services Volcanic Contingency Plan Flood Evacuation Contingency Plan Poverty Bay Flats Flood Evacuation Contingency Plan Te Karaka Flood Evacuation Contingency Plan Tolaga Bay Pandemic Contingency Plan (being prepared) Adverse Event Plan GNS Science Report 2007/04 4

11 2.0 EFFECTIVE HAZARD WARNING NOTIFICATION AS PART OF IMPROVED COMMUNITY RESILIENCE In this section we examine the role of warning notifications to the public, within the wider context of effective warning systems and the goal of improving community resilience. The role of any notification system must be carefully considered and must be compatible with a wider strategy to confront hazard effects. For example, if the warning process can identify the likely scale, consequences, and duration of impact, it may allow more time to evaluate available resources and organise them in ways that enhance responses to the emergency. Warnings can be part of an overall strategy to improve community resilience if they are issued to populations capable of acting appropriately on warning information. 2.1 Effective warning systems definition Warning notification systems are the components of early warning systems that deliver warning messages to users who need to make decisions based upon them (public, organisations, etc.). These are also sometimes referred to as alert systems, but the term alert is also often used for warning messages, so this usage is avoided here. Note that public notification is also used in contexts unrelated to warnings, such as the public notification of planning documents. We refer to early warning systems as the hardware, electronics, and communications used, together with the planning necessary to generate and notify a hazard warning. An effective warning system is the wider set of actions necessary to make sure that the message is not only delivered but acted upon in an informed way (Figure 1). In the context of the four Rs of emergency management Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery Step 1 (Early Warning) is a Response activity. Steps 2 through 5, and the associated research and effectiveness evaluation, are the Reduction and Readiness activities necessary for effective response to that early warning. GNS Science Report 2007/04 5

12 Km Km Km 5 Steps to Effective Early Warning Systems within Resilient Communities 1 Early Warning System Public notification may use some or all of these 2 Planning Hardware, electronics, communications and planning necessary to effectively detect a hazard, generate a warning message and transmit them to at-risk regions (including any use of public notification hardware). Multiple channels with consistent, officially-verifiable message. N N Research M 3 4 Decision-making tools: thresholds, evacuation routes and maps, inter-organisational relationships and communication channels. Co-operation, Discussion & Communication Pre-planned and exercised communication between central government agencies, local emergency management agency staff, scientists, media and community representatives. Renewal of contacts must be regular and permanently sustained, to overcome common high staff turnover. Education & Participation Effectiveness Evaluation N Public education, staff training, maps, and signs. Designed with the community. 5 Exercises Scenario development and simulations - table-top and preferrably full, with observation and feedback. Figure 1 A model of components of an effective hazards warning system 2. Step 1 (Early Warning) is a Response activity. Steps 2 through 5, and the associated research and effectiveness evaluation, are the Reduction and Readiness activities necessary for effective response to that early warning. Currently there is no single international best practice that can effectively remove most people from harm s way consistently for all hazards. However, by drawing together a) evidence from observations of public response to past events internationally, b) empirical studies, and c) common sense best practice, recommendations for developing appropriate and effective response to hazard warnings have been grouped into the components shown in Figure 1 (consistent with UN/ISDR Platform for the Promotion of Early Warning, and discussed and justified in detail by Leonard et al. 2006). To illustrate what is involved in an effective warning system, Table 1 shows the recently reviewed 3 state of effective warning system arrangements for tsunami within the Gisborne district (updated to include coverage of the Gisborne tsunami contingency plan, 2006). GNS Science Report 2007/04 6

13 Table 1 Early Warning System: Regional Components Planning Communications Education etc. Gisborne CDEM Group reported arrangements for effective response to tsunami warnings, data reported for the current tsunami preparedness review 3. CDEM Group Plan Who in Group receives warning Where warning comes from Proportion of time can receive warning How warning is received What is done with warning, decisions made Who is contacted once warning received Tsunami warning hardware Tsunami warning hardware testing Arrangements for getting info to public Sub-group-level plans Status of this arrangement for tsunami in Gisborne Written for generic hazards Written for generic hazards Written for generic hazards Written for distant sources Written for distant & local sources Written for distant & local sources Written for distant sources Oral arrangement for generic hazards Written for distant sources Written for distant & local sources Sub-group-level plans were last reviewed Tsunami warning decision preplanning Inundation or evacuation mapping Evacuation decider/ manager Role of police Role of Fire Service Role of other key organisations Arrangements for giving "all-clear" Tsunami warning SOP s Written for distant & local sources Written for distant sources Written for distant sources Written for distant sources Written for distant sources Written for distant sources Written for distant sources Written for distant & local sources Communications with other regions Media/ communications plans Written generic Arrangements with radio station(s) Written for distant sources Oral arrangement for local Tsunami warning public education and distant sources Tsunami training Awareness/ monitoring research Written for local sources Participated in 2003 coastal survey Tsunami-related signs exist Tsunami warning simulations Oral arrangement for distant sources Developing understanding and the capacity to respond Understanding and response capacity are outcomes of the combined effect of all components of an effective warning system (Fig. 1) and wider community resilience. Identifying who the warning is intended for is a significant issue (see also Section 3.3). Several recipient groups can be identified, all with different needs, expectations and capabilities. When developing warning systems, it is thus necessary to consider whose needs have to be served. For example, is the warning intended for emergency management agencies, citizens, community groups (e.g., religious organisations), societal institutions (e.g., welfare agencies, charities), and businesses Given this diversity, the emphasis should shift from the delivery of warning messages per se, to ensuring that each group knows what the messages mean and that they have a capacity to act upon them. Without developing people s capacity to interpret and respond, a myriad of warning content, media of delivery, and technology of delivery may have to be developed to meet the needs of each group, which may not be cost effective. The development of a capacity for a range of people to GNS Science Report 2007/04 7

14 understand and respond to a simpler warning message has additional merit in that it could also be adapted to fit the demands of a range of hazard characteristics, and future new hazards Effective warning messages Effective warning messages are an outcome of both the early warning system and the response planning; both are components of an effective warning system (Fig. 1). The warning messages that need to be conveyed by notification systems influence which systems are most appropriate. Warning messages must not be confused with information disseminated outside of a warning for the purposes of improving resilience, such as the capacity to decide to respond appropriately to warnings. Their purpose and content are different. Research into the effectiveness of warnings system messages has been undertaken for several decades 4; 5. Through this research effort much is known about what makes warnings effective. Public response to tsunami warnings is most dependent upon the information provided by authorities during the event 4. The Partnership for Public Warnings 6 concludes that an effective warning system should: (1) be focused on people at risk; (2) be able to be understood by all in the same way; (3) be capable of reaching people irrespective of what they are doing; (4) be easy to access and use; (5) not create added risk; (6) be reliable; (7) provide appropriate lead time so people can have a chance to protect themselves; and (8) generate authenticated messages. Research has also highlighted the critical importance of the message itself 4; 7. For warning messages to be effective they need to be clear and understandable, accurate, frequent, and credible. They need to be specific to the situation of the recipient (and user), and give specific advice on what the effect will be and what to do to reduce the risk from the impending hazard event 4; 5; 8. Even with a well designed and implemented system, a number of factors may conspire to reduce its ultimate effectiveness 8. The way people respond to warnings has been found to relate to factors such as their age, ethnicity, gender, social status, previous experience of hazards and past warnings, proximity to the hazard, physical clues in the environment, and the responses of others receiving the same warning 5. The recipients of warnings may be from a number of user groups and have a range of needs, roles and responsibilities, and thus respond in different ways 8. Groups with responsibilities to initiate measures to protect the public may include the emergency services, emergency management agencies, mass media, and industry users (e.g., tourism operators). The issue of whether or not to issue a tsunami warning is always a GNS Science Report 2007/04 8

15 difficult decision. To develop capacity to respond effectively and make appropriate decisions by those with warning roles and responsibilities, it is essential that consideration is given to training, exercises, and drills. The at-risk public, who are the usual recipients of warnings delivered by the aforementioned groups, are not themselves a homogenous group. Differing subpopulations with our society (e.g., the young, the elderly, the poor, new immigrants, tourists, those in institutions, etc.) have differing levels of vulnerability, and have been shown to respond in different ways to warnings Although research has consistently shown information provided during an event is the key to an effective response, pre-event education is also important. There has been limited research into the role pre-event public education has in improving warning response 5, but the evidence suggests that well-designed public education initiatives will increase response. To enhance the usefulness of warnings and emergency information issued during an emergency, Mileti 12 suggests that public education should at least address: who will issue the warning messages; what the warning messages could say; how the warning messages will be issued; and what communication media will be used and how to access them. It is also important to include in each message: What should be done in response to that warning message Importance of the all-clear message It is essential to plan to give an all-clear message, and to clearly establish the criteria for issuing this all-clear message (see Hawai i examples, Appendix 2) Part of a wider goal: improved community resilience The effective warning system model given in Figure 1 provides a set of practical components that may, if integrated with other measures beyond a warning system, improve resilience, i.e., the capacity of community members for self-reliance. Two issues are relevant the reception of warning messages, and the relationship between warnings and the capacity of people to respond. It is generally assumed by emergency management agencies responsible for developing warnings to inform people of potentially threatening events, that these warnings will be treated at face value, accepted and acted upon. This assumption is not, however, always justified. For example, recent research on tsunami warnings 13 found that people may choose not to respond to tsunami warnings for several reasons. Some fail to realise the differences in arrival time between local and distant tsunami, and do not believe they have sufficient time to safely evacuate from the danger area. Some don t respond because they worry that evacuating may result in their being trapped in their car on roads blocked by heavy traffic as GNS Science Report 2007/04 9

16 others also attempt to flee. Some may place higher value on locating family members than on acting to protect themselves. Some residents think that because government authorities put economic and political concerns ahead of their safety (e.g., authorities believe warning information and signs adversely affect tourism/business development), that warning systems are inadequate, reducing their willingness to act. Some people are reluctant to respond because they do not wish to appear foolish if they evacuate and it proves to be a false alarm. Some may assume that, no matter what happens, others will come to their rescue. Given that the time between warnings and the actual event may be brief, getting people to act upon receiving the warning is a key aspect of an effective warning process. While the examples of barriers to warning response given above are specific to a given population, they highlight the need to consider the needs and expectations of the intended recipients of warnings. A failure to do so reduces the effectiveness of the warning, and increases the demands on emergency management agencies to deal with emergent problems resulting from people acting in unexpected ways. People also need to be prepared for what happens after they respond to the warning. Resilience requires that warnings should be developed through community engagement. Rural Gisborne district may have some advantage over urban areas of New Zealand, in that the population live in relatively small, somewhat isolated communities. This often leads to a relatively strong sense of local community, and the development of community-support relationships in general. A sense of community and engagement in community activities is positively correlated to resilience 14. The large proportion of Māori living in the district, with the potential for family support networks, may also produce a higher level of inherent resilience. Gisborne has a Community Link programme that empowers local Community Emergency Centres through shared responsibility with Managers and Wardens Limitations of early warning systems An early warning system only activates a decision-making process. The quality of the decision-making is the true measure of the effectiveness of a warning system, therefore, building the capacity to make effective decisions is a key challenge. There are many historic examples where at-risk populations in full or in part have failed to respond to official warnings, even when a well resourced (and what was considered well planned) warning system was operating Many of these failures have resulted from a lack of understanding of the need for a holistic approach linking various elements into an integrated system 17; 20. Warning coverage In some situations there is difficulty notifying diffuse populations. For example, in rural areas and remote coastal or wilderness areas you may never reach all farmers, let alone trampers and surf-casters, etc. Systems must be appropriate to population density, and be available to the majority of people as a priority. Warning effectiveness No early warning system will be 100% effective at mitigating risk, because people make risk- GNS Science Report 2007/04 10

17 acceptance decisions based on the interaction between their needs, expectations and the warning messages, and some of those decisions will lead to no, or only partial, reduction of the risk, as some warnings are ignored. Planning for system failure No warning system is foolproof, and all systems have a potential for failure. For example on the 14th June 2005 a Tsunami Warning was issued for Washington, Oregon, and California, following a magnitude 7.4 earthquake off shore in northern California. The response to the warning was variable and a number of hardware and procedural problems were experienced 15. Public response was also inconsistent across the communities that received warnings. Potential to increase community complacency The existence of a public notification system, or even just a report outlining system options and recommendations, may in fact be counterproductive, creating complacency within some community members, as individuals may transfer responsibility for managing the risk to the authorities promoting the warning system 21. This is especially true if it is not specifically designed as part of a wider programme to improve resilience 11. The management of natural hazard risk relies on balancing three risk management strategies: (1) land-use planning and building codes, (2) effective early warning systems, and (3) engineering modification of the potentially hazardous natural process. The feedback relationship amongst these three strategies is represented in Figure 2; all three strategies have both advantages and limitations when used to develop a risk reduction strategy. Land-use planning & building codes Natural hazard risk management Effective early warning systems Engineering modification of the natural process Figure 2 The feedback relationship amongst the three key options for natural hazard risk management 2. Business and political resistance to warning systems Many proposals for establishing warning systems and disseminating public information about hazards (e.g., erecting signs) are opposed by members of the community who fear negative impacts on business development and tourism. Recently in New Zealand, several councils have rejected the installation of tsunami warning signs (e.g., Gisborne, Wellington and GNS Science Report 2007/04 11

18 Kaikoura). However, a number of studies have shown that initial fears of negative consequences prove to be unfounded, with no long-term business impacts resulting from improved warning systems and public information 13. Realistic ongoing costs and commitment Many warnings systems are developed without a realistic understanding of ongoing costs, which may exceed the initial cost of a hardware-based warning system. Ongoing and regular testing, maintenance, simulation exercises, and evaluation of their effectiveness must be budgeted for, and there must be an ongoing commitment to maintain such activities. There is a need for all components to be present, used in practice exercises, and evaluated on a regular basis to achieve a level of effectiveness. 2.2 Gisborne district emergency experience Gisborne district has one of the higher rates of occurrence of natural hazard emergencies in New Zealand. Flooding is the most common, but the district has also experienced some of the larger historic tsunami (e.g., 10 metres, 1947), cyclone impacts (e.g., Cyclone Bola 1988) and earthquake shaking intensities (e.g., during the Hawke s Bay earthquake, 1931). For some communities the frequency of warnings for flooding alone ensures the notification system is regularly tested. In addition, schools along the coast have annual evacuation drills that simulate earthquake procedures and tsunami evacuations. GNS Science Report 2007/04 12

19 3.0 WARNING NOTIFICATION NEEDS IN GISBORNE DISTRICT This section lays out the variety of social, geographic and hazard situations within the Gisborne district, and how these need to be accommodated in the selection of an optimum set of warning notification arrangements. There are a wide range of public notification systems available (Section 4, Appendix 3); the most common internationally are loud-speaker announcements and media announcements. Within New Zealand there is a wide variety of current and planned approaches. It is frequently asked What is the best system? International research shows that the most appropriate system will vary between communities and should be tailored around the specific nature of the location, society, and hazard 4; 5; 22. The early warning system, of which public notification is a key component, can vary widely depending upon 23 : Technology employed to detect hazard events Reliability of event detection technology and understanding of the resulting data Length of time needed to achieve accuracy in forecasts Reliance on human mediation Types of warning systems and devices used Channels employed to issue warnings Familiarity with, and institutionalisation of, early warning procedures Settings in which the systems are used System goals and objectives The audience will vary in terms of their demographics and function (e.g., welfare agencies, commercial businesses). The activities they are conducting when a notification is given will also be variable, and may vary for the same person at different times. For example, the notification needed for tourists in a motel will be different to that for a permanent resident on the street, or even in that same motel. For the public notification system to be assured as reliable in an event there must be redundancy, an ongoing programme of testing and maintenance, and battery back up 22; 24; 25. Warning processes do not operate within a social vacuum. People are not passive recipients of information, even when it is intended to inform them about significant issues in their environment 11. People make judgements about the information presented and actively interpret it within frames of reference. Some people decide not to respond and some people will respond to warnings that are not intended for them. The public s frames of reference can differ systematically from that of their scientific and civic counterparts who are responsible for developing and delivering risk messages. People interpret information in light of their social context (e.g., social norms, cultural beliefs), their expectations, their past experience, and their beliefs and misconceptions about hazards and how to respond to them. Because people actively evaluate the relevance of warning information for them, they may be disinclined to heed the information or they may interpret it in ways that differ from that GNS Science Report 2007/04 13

20 intended by civic agencies. Hence, to encourage effective understanding of and response to warnings, it is important to understand how people interpret their relationship with hazards. This includes how they interpret hazard and warning information, and identifying which factors influence the interpretive process 11. The starting point is to consider the sources of warning information. 3.1 Sources of warning messages and information While emergency management agencies are the primary source of warnings information (Fig. 3), they are not necessarily the most important from the perspective of understanding warnings issues 11. These agencies are but one source of information. Information is also available, to civic agencies and citizens alike, from the media. In many cases, the media are the more active source, particularly when it comes to reporting warnings, as well as the response and recovery efforts that follow them. The media can strongly influence people s perceptions of hazard characteristics and their consequences, and can influence people s beliefs and attitudes to warnings. The media often deliver information that is filtered, processed, and interpreted to varying extents and with varying degrees of accuracy. This can complicate working with the media. Furthermore, the information the media makes available often extends well beyond the hazards issues per se, to include their interpretation of the credibility of the sources of mitigation plans and the quality of their efforts 11. Greater in-depth analyses of events by the media are not usually provided until well after the event. Given the fundamental uncertainty associated with the periods in which warning processes are activated, there is a potential for misinterpretation. Not all those who receive media coverage will be able to construct an objective view of the warning issues and their implications. Thus, how the media treat hazard complexity and uncertainty can influence levels of trust in information sources (e.g., emergency management, civic and scientific agencies). If this trust is broken, the future integrity of warning systems may be compromised. GNS Science Report 2007/04 14

21 Govt. Departments GeoNet MetServic e PTWC Internal hazard monitoring, warning generation, confirmation, notification procedures Different for different haza rds: early warning provider, message path, receipt methods, notification criteria, warning messages, notification protocols (including notification system(s) used) All must be pre-planned Pre -p la nne d messages, protocol(s) MCDEM Pre -p la nne d warning receipt Gisborne CDEM Group Direct warning supplied / sought Exte rna l wa rning sup plied / sought Notify? Ye s Pre -p la nne d criteria System 1 Notifica tion syste m (s) System 2 System 3 Syste m 4... Resilient community empowered and capable of making appropriate response decisions - requires development of resilience indicators suc h as self-efficacy, and provision of all components of effective warning systems through to education, signage, maps, simulation exercises, and evaluation of these Early warning system Effective warning system Figure 3 Flow diagram for warning messages into, and public notifications from, Gisborne CDEMG, and the way in which warnings reach (or are sought by) the community a. 3.2 Ranking of hazards The Gisborne CDEM Plan lists 27 distinct hazards (Table 2) with so many to consider it is worth focusing the development of public notification systems on those with higher priority first. The CDEM Plan identifies 5 higher, 9 moderate and 12 lower priority hazards (snow and hail were listed but not scored). This classification is based on the SMUG prioritisation model seriousness, manageability, urgency and growth. There are several difficulties associated with assigning a High, Medium, or Low rating to each of these criteria, in that the seriousness rating assigned to a given hazard depends upon the magnitude of the hazard event under consideration; and there is a lack of quantitative data that can be utilised to compare hazard against hazard (Gisborne CDEM Group Plan, 2004). a GeoNet is a non-profit project operated by GNS Science with core funding from the Earthquake Commission. It involves GNS Science building and operating a modern geological hazards monitoring system for New Zealand. The Pacific Tsunami Warning Centre (PTWC) provides tsunami warnings to Pacific countries including New Zealand. MetService provides weather-related warnings within New Zealand. GNS Science Report 2007/04 15

22 It is important to note that ranking hazards high, medium, and low priority poses difficulties for CDEM Groups, as often, few resources will be directed towards the low and some of the moderate hazards. Table 2 CDEM Group Plan (2004) hazard priorities and hazard characteristics (modified after unpublished work of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2001). L = low, M = medium, H = high. SMUG > 8 SMUG 7-8 SMUG < 7 Predictability Detectability Visibility to majority Duration of of the Hazard Lead Time event public Flooding* H H M Hours Days Visible Tsunami local L L M Minutes Hours to days Visible Tsunami distant H M M Hours Days Visible Bio-security emergency M H M Days Days to years Limited Public health emergency M H M Days Days to months Visible Wind storm H H M Hours Hours to days Visible Utility failure communications L M L Variable Hours to days Variable Utility failure IT L M L Variable Hours to days Variable Hazardous substances L M L Minutes Minutes to days Limited Criminal acts L M L Variable Minutes to hours Limited Drought* M H M Variable Days Visible Erosion/instability* H H M Variable Hours to years Visible Fire rural L M M Variable Hours to days Visible Volcanic M H M Variable Hours to days Visible Mud volcanoes M? M Variable Days Visible Storm surge* H H M Variable Hours to days Limited Earthquake L H L Seconds Seconds Limited Utility failure power L M L Variable Hours to days Variable Utility failure water L M L Variable Hours to days Variable Transportation air L M L Minutes Minutes Limited Transportation marine L M M Minutes Seconds Limited Transportation road L M M Minutes Seconds Visible Fire urban L M M Minutes Hours to days Visible Civil unrest L M L Variable Hours to days Limited Transportation rail L M M Minutes Seconds Limited Utility failure - gas L M L Variable Hours to days Variable ** Snow and Hail* H M M Variable Minutes to days Visible *potential to be exacerbated by climate change **not scored, due to be incorporated in next plan The above table describes the characteristics of various hazards. The easiest hazards to issue warnings for are those with a high level of predictability, detectability and certainty, and those that have long lead times and are visible. The most difficult are those with the opposite characteristics low level of predictability, detectability and certainty, and with short lead times and no visibility. Such hazards require rapid response and notification capabilities. Events that span a long duration require plans to frequently update warning information. Certainty GNS Science Report 2007/04 16

23 Table 3 Potential secondary hazards resulting from specific primary hazard events Flooding Tsunami local Tsunami - distant Bio-security emergency Public health emergency Wind storm Utility failure - communications Utility failure - IT Hazardous substances Criminal acts Drought Erosion/instability Fire - rural Volcanic Storm surge Earthquake Utility failure power Utility failure water Transportation air Transportation - marine Transportation road Fire urban Civil unrest Mud volcanoes Transportation rail Utility failure gas Snow and hail (not scored) Primary Event SMUG > 8 Flooding x x x x x x x x x Tsunami local x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Tsunami distant x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Bio-security emergency x Public health emergency SMUG 7 8 Wind storm x x x x x x x x Utility failure communications x Utility failure IT x Hazardous substances x Criminal acts X x x x x x x x x x x Drought Erosion/instability x x x x x Fire rural x Volcanic x x x x x Mud volcanoes SMUG < 7 Storm surge x x Earthquake x X x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Utility failure power x x x x Utility failure water x x Transportation air x x Transportation marine x x Transportation road x x Fire urban x Civil unrest x x Transportation rail x Utility failure gas x x x x Snow and Hail not scored x x x x Any all-hazard public notification system (or group of notification systems) needs also to recognise the possibility of several hazard events occurring concurrently, possibly with one or more secondary hazards being caused by a primary hazard event (Table 3) Different hazards affect different areas, or many areas GNS Science Report 2007/04 17

24 Hazards events potentially affecting the Gisborne district (Table 4) have varied possible spatial extents within the region. For example, some hazards such as erosion, sea level rise, tsunami and storm inundation affect only areas close to the coast. Other pastoral hazards, such as an animal disease outbreak or catastrophic wildfire, affect a wide area of the district. Some hazards affect only the state highway system a major road crash (with or without a discharge of hazardous substances), lifeline failure, or use of the road for evacuation during some other hazard event. Flooding and slope instability can affect specific locations such as river flood plains or steep slopes within the region. In contrast, several hazards can potentially affect any part of the region equally (e.g., falls of volcanic ash from a distant source, drought, human disease epidemics, cyclones and tornadoes). Earthquakes will affect a broad area, but secondary earthquake effects such as liquefaction, amplified shaking and slope instability may affect specific areas within the region Varied time-frames for hazard warnings A number of factors affect the time-frame for issuing warnings, including the means by which a potential problem is detected. First, what monitoring capability exists for each hazard, who monitors it, and is it monitored 24 hours a day, 7 days a week? A second factor is the criteria for determining a potential risk and who makes this call. The next factor concerns issuing a warning its content and the media used. When doing so, is it intended to signal merely a watch or an immediate warning? Other issues: How is the time frame from detecting to warning to impact handled? How are long precursory periods handled? How can authorities ensure warnings are received against a backdrop of activity? How do they handle escalation and de-escalation of hazard activity? How should they handle false alarms? Table 4 outlines different warning lead-times for hazards. Table 4 Factors of relevance to early warning systems and their time frames 26. Seconds (S), minutes (M), days (D), weeks (W), months (M), years (Y) and decades (D) Factor time frame (S) (M) (D) (W) (M) (Y) (D) seismicity, tsunami X X X weather, oceans, floods X X X X soils, reservoirs, snow pack, El Niño X X X people exposed, conflict, migration X X X X crop production, prices, reserves, food aid X X X environmental management and state X X X industry, urban, infrastructure design X X X land use planning, climate change X X 3.3 People and the purpose of warnings GNS Science Report 2007/04 18

25 A number of questions are involved in establishing warning systems. Who is the warning system intended for? For example, is the warning intended for emergency response groups, citizens, or businesses, or is it intended to reach all sectors of society? These groups all have differing needs, expectations, capabilities and objectives. What is the function of the warning? For example, is it intended to signal a need for evacuation, or a need for people to stay where they are? There is thus a need to consider not just the warning system, but also the objectives of the warning and the capacity of its intended recipients to correctly interpret the warning and act in the anticipated manner. What it is that the warning is intended to warn people of? For example, warnings for volcanic hazards cover ash, lava, and gas each has its own effects on infrastructure and health, and each requires a different response. To be effective, a warning may require clear understanding by the recipients about the consequences from which people and businesses must protect themselves. It is therefore, important to link warnings with the capability to understand the implications of a warning and the capacity to act in an appropriate way. Furthermore, given that the distribution of hazard consequences can change with topographic and meteorological conditions, identifying the objectives of warnings, with regard to informing recipients, is challenging Rural vs. City populations Populations in urban areas and in small rural communities (high and low population densities, Figure 4) lend themselves to group notification through such means as PA loudspeakers, more easily than do people scattered across rural areas. Some locations around the Gisborne district, such as holiday areas and beaches, have populations that swell at specific times, and may include some people out in coastal waters. Therefore, more than one notification system is likely to be necessary to reach the majority of the region s population. Given the significant proportion of people in remote rural areas in Gisborne district (26% living in densities of less that 51 people per square kilometre, Table 5), notification systems focused on these groups have received a relatively high priority, especially following Cyclone Bola in A comprehensive network of various communication media including VHF radios now links the CDEM Group Community Link volunteers around the district. The potential for stronger community links in these rural areas means that this may be a highly effective notification system as it stands. The Group reports that the system is regularly tested in many of these communities for heavy rain warnings and flood warnings. GNS Science Report 2007/04 19

26 Hicks Bay Te Araroa Tikitiki Ruatoria Te Puia Springs Tokomaru Bay Motu Matawai Whatatutu Tolaga Bay Te Karaka GISBORNE Legend State Highways Population Density (people per sq.km) Figure 4 Residential population density (people per square kilometre) for Gisborne district based on the 2001 census area units. Table 5 Residential population density (people per square kilometre) compared to land area and population proportions for Gisborne district based on the 2001 census area units. People per square km Number of people Proportion of population Proportion of area < 51 12,648 26% 99.6% ,282 25% 0.3% > ,069 49% 0.1% GNS Science Report 2007/04 20

27 In contrast to this rural setting, urban areas, especially Gisborne City, may need to review their notification systems. The community link system in place for rural areas is not as frequently active, and may not reach as many people in the city. The fire service has maintained tone-only sirens in Gisborne City, but these have been shown to be less than effective for short time-frame hazards (Appendix A3.25). Gisborne district s widely-distributed coastal inhabitants are particularly vulnerable to tsunami hazards. Hazards from distant-source tsunami are relatively well covered by existing radio and telephone-based notification arrangements. For local-source tsunami the only warning in the foreseeable future is likely to come from natural warnings e.g. feeling an earthquake, or seeing a large incoming wave or the sea receding from the shore. This makes community awareness, education, participation, evacuation planning and practice exercises (Section 5) of critical importance to these areas. Urban natural hazard vulnerability is increasing as the city boundaries are encroaching onto the floodplain and onto coastal hazard areas Warning a diverse population The target audience for a warning can vary greatly, and many people will have different needs and undertake different actions upon the receipt of the same warning. Therefore, notification systems and the warnings they disseminate will need to be tailored to the community that is being warned. A mobile population The activities individuals are engaged in at the time can also greatly affect how quickly they receive a warning and also their response. Are they at home, work or school? Is it a week day or weekend? Are they sleeping, listening to the radio, watching TV or out shopping? These varied scenarios need to be accounted for in the planning and type of notification systems adopted. People's location and the main types of communication available to them will change between work, outside activities, home, night and day, summer and winter, etc.. Another issue in high risk zones is the shifts in population concentrations during different periods of the day. Much emergency management planning is based around residential populations; however, at times at-risk populations can increase markedly in certain locations (e.g., coastal motor camps in summer, crowds at sports events, etc.). Urban areas overcoming ambient noise and soundproofing Loudspeakers can have trouble competing with urban noise and wind noise. In Hong Kong this has lead to warnings being integrated within office intranets, which also overcomes internal office noise and sound-proofing (Ming-chung Wong, pers. comm., 2006). Institutional populations An important group are those in institutions. Institutional populations include schools, hospitals, nursing homes, prisons, and other facilities with client populations (this includes facilities for tourists). Research has shown that many of these institutions, despite low preparedness, are very adaptive in responding to warnings and moving their clients if required 19. However, many difficulties have been encountered, highlighting the need for preevent planning with these institutions 4; 5; 27. GNS Science Report 2007/04 21

28 Elderly and Disabled Populations Recent research has shown that a number of age-related issues can affect older adults ability to respond to warnings 28. Mayhorn notes that perceptual changes in older adults can impair their ability to notice warnings during the alerting phase, while limitations in cognitive abilities, such as text comprehension and memory, might limit their understanding in the decision making and response phase. These issues also apply to other disabled groups, who may need special assistance to compensate for their physical and/or cognitive disabilities. Those responsible for the care of elderly and disabled people need to ensure that appropriate information and support is provided during a warning notification for the appropriate response to be undertaken. Schools Warning notifications to schools are particularly important. All schools in New Zealand are required to have detailed plans on how to respond to a range of incidents, and have procedures in place for both evacuation of the school and sheltering within the school buildings. It is important that schools understand the nature and type of warnings they will receive and link them closely with their response plans 27. During any warning phase the separation of children from parents and caregivers is a cause of much anxiety. Experience has shown that if schools are in zones that are being evacuated, the movement of parents and caregivers to collect children, often travelling in from outside the evacuation zone, can cause traffic congestion and hinder the evacuation process 13; 27. This needs to be accommodated in the planning process. Tourists and other transient populations Research conducted during the last decade has highlighted the difficulty in preparing tourists and other transient populations to effectively respond to warning messages 5; 10; 13; 20; 29; 30. Tourists may lack knowledge of the hazards, warning systems, and evacuation procedures; and language and cultural differences, as well as being in an unfamiliar environment, all reduce the effectiveness of warnings. The research highlights the important role of staff training, as it is they who most often will provide key guidance to tourists during a warning notification. Lack of this training has been shown to be a significant problem Cost limitations Relative magnitudes of start-up and ongoing cost for warning systems are estimated for each reviewed option in Appendix 3. These are based on known examples where available, or are best-guesses. Table 6 highlights the different cost categories that must be considered. Evaluated exercises conducted on a regular basis will provide some estimation of effectiveness in the interim, and can and should be fed back into the system design to continue to increase effectiveness in terms of the cost-benefit relationship. GNS Science Report 2007/04 22

29 Table 6 Start-up and ongoing cost considerations for warning systems Financial cost Labour costs (has an associated $ value for commercial organisations, time for volunteers) Initial start-up $ one-off Effort one-off Ongoing (will in total exceed start-up cost at some stage) $ per year Effort per year In contrast, benefit (reduction in loss, Table 7) is difficult to quantify until a wide range of hazard events have occurred to test the system effectiveness in terms of type of loss. Table 7 Categories of loss that can be reduced, i.e. benefit Type of loss Measurement Tangible (Monetary values) Intangible (Non-monetary values) Direct (Physical damage) Damage to infrastructure, buildings and contents, vehicles, etc. Death, loss of memorabilia. Indirect (Flow-on consequences) Production losses, lost salaries and wages, clean-up costs. Disruption of social services, including schooling. Stressinduced illness Budget for salaries It is critical to specifically plan and budget for salaries for people to engage with communities in improving understanding and resilience, and in planning and educating communities. The key here is thinking of (and lobbying for the budgeting of) such salaries as an operational cost like paying for the maintenance of a siren network, they should be considered as an ongoing, permanent maintenance cost. GNS Science Report 2007/04 23

30 4.0 OPTIONS FOR PUBLIC WARNING NOTIFICATION This section summarises the relative merits of the public notification system options reviewed, and compares these against the requirements for recommending systems laid out in Section 1. This section focuses on public notification of warnings, but must be considered in the context of the wider issues associated with effective warning and community resilience outlined in previous sections. Notification options are presented in Section 4.6 as a table for easy relative comparison, but care should be taken not to rely upon that table alone, as it necessarily simplifies aspects of the systems. More detailed analysis of each option is given in Appendix 3. The options are summarised and compared under the following five categories: Natural warning notification Notification to the public via structured organisations and groups Notification via institutional staff to those in their care Notification to the public using third-party organisation hardware Notification using warning-dedicated hardware It is clear that no single system will fulfil all requirements and needs, so the reader should keep in mind a combination of systems when reading these summaries. A combination also provides redundancy in case of the failure of an individual system. The key is the integration of all the systems and resources into one manageable procedure to effect a warning within an identified time period. Any procedures will need to be part of the National Warning System. 4.1 Natural warning notification Natural warnings may accompany most hazards. For example recession of the sea and noise in the ocean may precede a tsunami, tremor or ground deformation may precede a volcanic eruption, smoke indicates a fire, etc. It is important that the public should heed natural warnings and take action, and not wait for an official warning. This is a community resilience issue, and awareness of the potential for multiple warning sources comes with an aware and empowered community (Section 2). Public education campaigns to promote awareness of natural hazards should include information regarding appropriate response to natural warnings, as well as details of any official notification systems. Similarly, education material on official notification systems should include material on the contribution, or otherwise, of any other notification systems, including natural warnings. 4.2 Notification via structured organisations and groups to the public Using structured organisations and groups with self-maintaining contact networks can be effective if the message conveyed is accurate (seen with Australian flood warnings, Appendix 2). However, such groups can also easily disseminate misinformation. The initial GNS Science Report 2007/04 24

31 source of warnings to these groups can be natural or hardware-based (via the CDEM Group or direct). The Community Link network in Gisborne district is a well maintained network of community groups, and is the main means of disseminating warnings and information. For this concept to be maximally effective, resilience work is important, raising communities ability to ascertain what information is useful and correct. This is especially important during prolonged warning situations such as volcanic eruptions in this case, for example, media interpretations and dissemination of ongoing messages may result in incorrect information being conveyed to structured organisations and groups, as well as to the general public. Use of these networks is only as reliable as the communication methods which they employ. Loss or overloading of phone lines may render some of these networks ineffective. Reliance on, or expectations of warnings from, these networks by the public may decrease resilience in the event of the network failing, especially if other complementary notification systems have not been implemented or are ignored. The Department of Conservation (DoC), rural fire services, surf clubs, St Johns Ambulance, and Transit and Council staff are all particularly well suited as warning services because they have members on-duty at some or all times, and are used to employing rapid communication across their networks Volunteer and community organisations CDEM Community Link volunteers Surf clubs Neighbourhood support Rural fire service Royal New Zealand Volunteer Coastguard St Johns Red Cross Salvation Army Religious groups Government organisations/contractors DoC especially rural fire Ambulance Transit Council staff (operational) New Zealand Fire Service Gisborne District Council rural fire Forestry companies rural fire GNS Science Report 2007/04 25

32 4.3 Notification via large companies and institutional staff to those in their care In many instances, tourism operators, those in institutional care (hospitals, retirement homes, etc.), and those working in large companies (factories, port companies, etc.) have an obligation to provide for the safety of those in their care or custody. A list of those large companies and institutions is provided below as an example direct notification to them will potentially affect large numbers of people: Tourism and hospitality operators, especially for transient populations Schools Hospitals Retirement homes Department of Conservation those using the conservation estate Factories, mills and freezing works Port companies 4.4 Notification to the public using third-party-organisation hardware Notification to the public using the hardware and communications systems of third-party organisations (e.g., police, fire services, radio, and television stations) carries reliability, coverage and maintenance questions; it is also potentially a cost-sharing issue. All of these third-parties will need to commit both some level of staff time, as well as hardware. Detailed analysis of each option is given in Appendix 3. Development of existing organisations roles through detailed agreements and planning will probably be the most readily achieved. Cell broadcasting, radio and television provide the ability to warn the most quickly, especially if automatic break-in hardware were to be installed with radio and television (as is required by law in the USA). Pagers, telephone land-line-based systems and SMS systems are limited by the need for a list of contacts to be maintained. High traffic requirements further limits landline and SMS text messaging. Door-to-door route alerts are commonly used overseas, but again only reach a limited number of people per minute. This restricts the timeliness for large populations, but these route alerts can be very effective in small areas or for longer lead-time hazards. Systems that rely on hardware owned and/or used by the public, such as computers, radios, phones, services, phone-line messaging etc., will always be limited by the number of people possessing that equipment and whether they are in a position to be warned by it. Aircraft have substantial equipment but have pilot and craft availability limitations, and the use of billboards would require a substantial time (hours to days) to have any effect. Both of these systems require substantial pre-planning and will probably only reach a minority of the urban and rural populations. By relying on third-parties, the CDEM Group would be introducing another link in the warning chain. Failure of this link could occur in communication to the third party, in a failure in planning, and/or in a failure of the hardware used by that third party. GNS Science Report 2007/04 26

33 Warning to groups of people New Zealand Police (mobile PA loud-speakers) New Zealand Fire Service (mobile PA loud-speakers) Radio and television stations Aircraft Websites Amateur radio Billboards Travel Information FM (available in New Zealand in most tourist areas) Call-in phone line Radio Data Systems (RDS) Warning to individual people Police, GDC rural fire, New Zealand Fire Service, Community Link (door-to-door route alert) Telephone (call lists, auto-dial, telephone trees) especially Community Link Pagers Cell broadcasting (protocol exists, not implemented so far in New Zealand) SMS text messaging s Power line messaging Warning to GPS receivers (protocol being developed) 4.5 Notification using warning-dedicated hardware These systems all notify groups of people at one time. Systems which can notify individuals directly are all owned by third-party organisations (listed above). Dedicated systems include: Sirens Fixed PA loud-speaker announcements Mobile loud speakers Flares, explosives Tone-activated alert radio (not implemented at present in New Zealand) Sirens, PA loud-speaker systems and tone-activated alert radio (not currently used in New Zealand) have the potential to reach the majority of the population, but their cost can quickly reach millions of dollars. The systems are complex and thus require ongoing maintenance and testing. Siren systems require awareness by the public of the warning message conveyed by the sirens. These three factors are likely to be the major system limiters. Sirens are the most commonly suggested form of public notification. However, developing public understanding of their meaning and the best responses, and of maintenance and testing requirements, make sirens a relatively difficult option to make effective. Existing siren infrastructure provides a valuable complement to other options that can more easily be made effective. Any sirens already present within the community are also imbedded within the GNS Science Report 2007/04 27

34 culture and awareness of that community; they have a valuable part to play in supporting warning notification, and they should be maintained (with public education and testing) as part of a wider set of systems, not disestablished. However, within a constrained spending environment the provision of new sirens should probably be well down the list of priorities for new expenditure. 4.6 Relative merits of reviewed notification systems Table 8 is a summary guideline of the notification systems reviewed; it should be read in conjunction with the more detailed analyses in Appendix 3, and all options must be considered in the context of effective warning systems and community resilience improvement (Section 2). Both must be read with caution, because more structured work is required to (1) investigate the feasibility of individual options in detail, and (2) develop the community s capacity to appropriately respond to warnings delivered by these systems. GNS Science Report 2007/04 28

35 Table 8 Summary of relative merits of warning public notification system options reviewed in more detail in Appendix 3. Requirement Higher Priority Moderate Priority Lower Priority Time-range to reach 'first' and 'total pool' of end-users Method/effectiveness reference(s) Ongoing financial cost Ongoing soial/institutional effort required Start-up social/institutional effort required Start-up Cost urban ($) Start-up Cost rural communities ($) Start-up Cost rural diffuse ($) be based on examples of 'best practice' be easy to understand/interpret be suitable to Gisborne hazard context be applied consistently throughout NZ target to specific geographic audiences are cost effective can be implemented quickly and easily address social behaviour models Biological animal disease/epidemic Biological human epidemic* Cyclone* Earthquake Lifeline utility failure* Major crash aircraft Volcanic distant volcanic eruption Biological introduced species/pests* Coastal beach erosion and flooding* Coastal cliff erosion/coastal instability* Coastal sea level rise* Coastal tsunami distantly generated Computer systems failure Criminal acts Fire catastrophic wildfire Fire urban structure fire Hazardous substances Coastal tsunami locally generated Dam failure Drought agricultural drought* Drought water supply drought* Flooding* Land instability* Major crash rail Major crash road Major collision marine Tornado* Via natural warnings Limitations / considerations M,E,T,P,T S-H L M M M M M ? P,T,Tr M-H L M H L L L - - P,T,Tr M-H L M H Aircraft hailers/banners E,T,X,A,P M-H L M H L L L Amateur radio E S-M L M H L L L? Billboards T,E,A H-W M M M L L L A A Call-in phone line E,T,M,S M-W L L L L L L A A Cell broadcast S,X,A,P,C??M-H L L H??? s T,S,L,E M-H L H H L L L - - A A Pagers T,S,L,E,C? M-H L M M L L L Police/fire mobile PA l.sp. T,E,P,S M-H L M M Power line messaging X,A,E,S,P,C?S-H?? H H H H? Radio announcement A,C?,E,T,S,P M-H L M H A -? A ?? - Radio Data Systems X,A,C?,E,S,P S-M?? H??? Route alert (door-to-door) A,E,T,P,T H-D L M M L L L - A A SMS text messaging T,S,L,E,C,X M-H L M H L L L -? - A A Telephone auto-dialler T,S,L,E H-D M H H M M M - - A A Telephone trees T,S,L,E H-D L H H Television A,P,C?,E,T,S M-H L M H A -? A ?? - Tourist Radio C,E,A,S,P,C? M-H L M H 0 0 0? A -? A ?? - Websites/WAP etc. T,E,M,S D-W M L M L L L? - - A -? A ?? - GPS Receiver messaging E, A, S, X M? L L?????- - - Fixed PA loud-speakers C,X,P S H H H M H! H!?????? Flares, explosives E,M,P M M M H L L L X - * * -? * - - * * * * - Mobile PA loud-speakers T,E,P,C M-H M M H M M M? -??? - Sirens C,X,P,M S M H H M H H! - X? * * -? * - - * * * * - * * - Tone-activated alert radio C,E,M S H H H H H H!????? Via Institutional staff to those in their care Via structured org.s & groups to public Dedicated hardware Via 3rd Party hardware and/or staff (X)System complexity, (M)eaning awareness, (A)greements required, (E)xposure to public, (L)ist availability, (T)imeframe, external (S)ystem-reliance, (P)lanning, (C)ost, (Tr)aining GNS Science Report 2007/04 29

36 Legend to Table 8 (previous page) MEETS REQUIREMENT? Meets requirement well - Doesn't meet requirement well [Blank cell] Doesn't meet requirement Uncertain - would require detailed scoping in the Gisborne? district SUITABILITY TO HAZARD Suited May be suited in longer lead-time situations if system works - well and quickly [Blank cell] Not suitable * Would potentially create inappropriate response A Requires a long term awareness and education campaign Uncertain relationship - would require detailed scoping in the? Gisborne district COST 0 No cost L Low cost (less than $10k?) M Moderate cost ($10k to $100k?) H High cost ($100k to $1M+?) H! Very high cost ($10M+?) L M H SOCIAL & INSTITUTIONAL EFFORT REQUIRED Low - fit within existing work load? Moderate - substantial work load increase for one person? High - substantial multi-person Limitations: System comple(x)ity, (M)eaning awareness, (A)greements required, (E)xposure to public, (L)ist availability, (T)imeframe, external (S)ystem-reliance, (P)lanning, (C)ost, (Tr)aining Time-range to reach the first people and total pool of people capable of receiving warning by this notification system: (S)econds, (M)inutes, (H)ours, (D)ays, (W)eeks Notes: * hazard has a potential to be exacerbated by climate change May need separate local, regional and/or national level arrangements for events at these different scales, 1 Assumes free transmission agreement, expensive option for automated transmission break-in system, 2 Assumes material costs only (free advertising agreement possibly feasible for days, but would likely have to pay advertising for longer period warnings) A requires an awareness campaign rather than typical warning GNS Science Report 2007/04 30

37 4.7 Evaluation of options compared to review requirements Best practice International examples of warning systems are given in more detail in Appendix 2; they come from: Australia (flood warnings, media, telephone, and community organisations) Hong Kong (mobile phones) Japan (television-integrated messaging, tsunami) New Zealand (loud-speakers, radio/tv, planning for response) Mexico (seismic alert) USA (mainland and Hawaii, all systems summarised above in Table 8) UK (flood alert systems, cell broadcasting) Basing the analysis on examples of best practice from elsewhere in New Zealand and overseas is limited by a lack of best practice for all hazard public notification, let alone wider effective warning systems. This report has highlighted options that have achieved some success here and overseas, and reviews that evidence Public understanding of notifications The ease with which a public notification system may be correctly interpreted depends on the level of understanding and awareness developed within the community, and on the method of conveying the message (Section 2.1.2). Some notification systems make interpretation easier, especially those that can convey detailed and specific messages about the hazard and its location sirens score poorly against this criteria. It is critical to expect and plan for unofficial warnings as well especially via the media and direct phone calls and personal contact Suitability to hazards in the Gisborne district All of the reviewed options are to some extent suitable for the Gisborne district (as summarised in Section 3.2), but those which can be applied in a spatially varied way, and can contain varied and detailed messages, lend themselves best to the multiple geographically varied hazards and dispersed populations of the Gisborne district. Multiple systems in combination To effectively cover most of the population in most hazard instances a combination of systems will be needed. The use of multiple systems also provides redundancy in the event that one or more system fails. The more systems, however, the more education is required which incurs financial and time costs. If the public expects multiple notification systems to be active in a single warning, however, public response may be reduced if one or more fail. Public education material should include the message that people should respond if one or more systems relays a message. People GNS Science Report 2007/04 31

38 should also respond immediately to natural signs and not wait for a signal from an official warning system. In the case of storm warnings, further updates, or warnings of other hazards, competition with wind noise means that supplementary or alternative methods to loud-speaker systems may be best once the storm starts. Any hazard warning made during a time of high wind may require more than one method of warning as loudspeakers may not be adequate. This is further justification for several parallel warning methods Time-frames for notification options within effective warnings The time taken by all components of an effective warning system (Fig. 1), including the notification system, directly affects the amount of time left for people to respond to the warning and take mitigation actions (Fig. 5). Therefore, the shorter time-frame notification systems options are most appropriate for the widest range of hazards facing the Gisborne district. However, systems with a longer lead-time can still be effective for hazards with a greater lead-time, and also in reinforcing and providing redundancy if used in combination with shorter lead-time systems. Data collection Evaluation Notification Decisionmaking Action (mitigation) Precursors begin Threat recognised Response begins Impact threshold exceeded Figure 5 Warning timeline 32. Resilience: faster and more appropriate decision-making by people The decision-making step that a person goes through also affects their time available for action. Community resilience is important here. The more resilient people are the more they are able to expect, understand and act upon warning messages the faster this decisionmaking process, the more likely the action taken will be appropriate, and the more time is available for this action. Speed of initial data collection and evaluation This action time is also influenced by the time required to collect and evaluate data within the CDEM Group, and for warnings obtained from the National Warning System, the initial time required for these two steps at MCDEM level. Therefore the speed and reliability of the early warning system prior to public notification (and thus also the planning, communication, and exercising of that system), are as critical to the time available for action as is the speed and reliability of the notification system itself. GNS Science Report 2007/04 32

39 4.7.5 Ability to apply notification systems nationally The ability to apply recommended notification options consistently throughout New Zealand depends on the appropriateness of the system to the national hazard profile, the capacity of the nation s CDEM Groups to implement it, and the capacity for communities to make appropriate decisions and effectively respond. The options recommended here for Gisborne are applicable to the nation s hazards because Gisborne has identified for review most or all hazards that threaten New Zealand as a whole. The capacity of CDEM Groups to implement options is heavily influenced by the cost, complexity, and ability to maintain them. Therefore the cheapest, simplest options will be most easily implemented nationally Targeting specific geographic audiences The coverage of some reviewed notification systems (sirens, loudspeakers, cell broadcast etc.) could be physically targeted to specific geographic audiences, whereas the remaining options with a single region-wide application (radio, TV, internet etc.) are able to contain area-specific messages. There may need to be an enhanced focus on the notification of Gisborne district s urban population for short time-frame hazards, especially in Gisborne City. In contrast, Gisborne s Community Link and VHF radio network provides a robust tested link to rural communities, which are up to a quarter of the population (Table 5) Cost-effectiveness Each option reviewed has different cost-benefit parameters (Section 3.4, Appendix 3), making this a highly variable criterion and any comparison highly subjective. It is difficult to forecast effectiveness quantitatively for comparison against a system cost. A system cost must include implementation cost, ongoing maintenance costs and effort/labour, and any social costs around the community having capacity to respond to the system (physical impact of presence of equipment, disruption from test exercises, level of awareness needed) Robust and sustainable The most robust and sustainable options are those that are self-sustained by participation and interest from the community. Notification via community networks, such as operated by Community Link, has the potential to be highly self-sustaining. It cannot, however, be assumed to be robust regular testing and exercising is still needed and there is a substantial effort cost in permanently maintaining and motivating the network. Notification via route alerts has a similar advantage in that it uses existing networks of staff. The more complex hardware-based systems can be maintained as robust but this requires substantial commitment to ongoing testing and maintenance (both a financial and effort cost). Maintenance of the community capacity to respond effectively to a hardware system is as important as the system itself to ensuring it is robust. Effective response capacity may be hard to sustain as people may assume the hardware alone protects them, and that no effort and planning on their part is needed. Natural warnings (when present) are a very robust warning; there is no extra link between the hazard and the person responding. Sustaining the awareness and ability to respond to natural warnings requires ongoing education and participation, enhanced by exercises. GNS Science Report 2007/04 33

40 4.7.9 Speed of implementation The level to which systems can be installed and set up from scratch quickly and easily varies, so this requirement could affect the chosen options heavily if it is given a strong weighting. Development of existing notification system options (awareness of natural warnings, media, police and fire, volunteer organisation networks) will likely have some improved effectiveness in the shortest time-frame. The effectiveness of these systems should continue to improve with continued and ongoing planning, application, test exercises, and evaluation. In the medium term, new technologies with very short lead-times, detailed message content, and wide reach (e.g., cell broadcast, tone alert radio etc.) may be implemented if they are still seen to be cost effective based on detailed scoping. Longer lead-time options with a similar detailed message and varied audiences (e.g., websites, , telephone auto-diallers) may also be considered to augment other systems. Some of the resilience-building initiatives will be very effective in the long term, but are not as fast or technically easy as bolting up hardware. Therefore recommendations are given for three broad time-frames with different complementary options and expected outcomes within each. GNS Science Report 2007/04 34

41 5.0 COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT AND EDUCATION This section focuses on the best practice for effective education and community engagement. This section is modified and updated from a review conducted for the New Zealand national tsunami preparedness review Motivation Perception of risk The benefits of a better understanding of hazard risk are found in increased support for risk reduction activities, in increased readiness and response capability. and in an understanding of how to respond to and recover from events in an efficient manner. In building these capabilities we will also reduce our economic vulnerability to future natural hazards. Expert estimates of risk are based on objective analyses of the likelihood of a given hazard activity occurring within a specific area, and on the magnitude of its consequences. It is common to find considerable disparity between these expert assessments and the manner in which they are interpreted and acted on by the public and other groups (including some councils) 33; 34. This discrepancy sometimes remains even when people are presented with scientific information. People s understanding of risk and their response to risk are determined not only by scientific information or direct physical consequences, but also by psychological, social, cultural, institutional and political processes 35; 36. Factors affecting risk perception are usually not independent and, vary among different hazards. Beliefs about risk and risk reduction behaviour are influenced by psychological factors such as unrealistic optimism and normalisation bias 34. Unrealistic optimism, sometimes referred to as the illusion of invulnerability, is seen where people underestimate the risk to themselves and overestimate the risk to others 37. Thus, while people may acknowledge that a hazard risk exists in their community, they are more likely to attribute its negative implications to others rather than to themselves. This bias leads people to take risky options, and applies to judgments about tsunami and earthquakes, in that citizens think they are better prepared than others, which leads them to think that they will be safe 38; 39. This bias is difficult to change, but it can be affected by showing people lists of precautions that have been carried out by others 37. A normalisation bias results when people extrapolate a capability to deal with major hazards from previous experience in coping with minor but infrequent hazards. Like the optimistic bias, this results in people underestimating risk (relative to scientific and planning estimates), and acting in ways that are counter-intuitive and counterproductive. Denial of risk is a related bias that inhibits positive actions. Furthermore, denial is greatest among people who are most at risk, partly because denial serves to reduce their anxiety. Denial can be reduced by people seeing that they have some control over a hazard. GNS Science Report 2007/04 35

42 The communication of risk information can have a distorting effect, particularly where risks with minor biological or physical consequences elicit extreme concern while more serious risks are underestimated by communities and organisations. This phenomenon has been termed the social amplification of risk 40. Accusations of irresponsible media, organisational incompetence and public hysteria are common 41. The problem arises when sources such as the media overemphasise adverse or catastrophic aspects of a problem and fail to provide a balanced view. It can also arise in situations where there is a lack of trust in information sources, particularly when these sources dismiss the concerns, needs, and interests of the community. An additional bias is a tendency to overestimate the capacity of hazard mitigation strategies to eliminate a threat. This interpretive bias, known as risk compensation 33, is also known as the levee syndrome. The actions and attitudes of people are determined by their perceptions of the level of safety proffered by their environment. Thus, a perceived increase in safety from hazards (e.g., provided by hazard monitoring, or structural mitigation measures such as river stopbanks) can decrease the risk perceived by an individual or group, thus reducing the perceived need for action. This becomes problematic because planners, in the process of engineering structural mitigation or disseminating information on their response role, assume that people s estimates of risk, and thus their behaviour, remain constant. This assumption is unfounded. The dissemination of information on structural mitigation has been found to lead to a reduction in levels of household and personal preparedness, and a transfer of responsibility for safety to civic authorities Changing attitudes on the value of preparedness People differ in their judgements about the value of preparedness actions. A key factor is fatalism, the attitude that nothing that I do will make any difference, so there is no point in trying. In regard to natural hazards, fatalism is the attitude that hazards are so powerful that there is no use preparing. This is common in discussions about locally generated tsunami where the public are told that no warnings are possible. Some people believe that when the big one comes, it will be so powerful that their best efforts will be laid to waste. This fatalism often reflects a failure to distinguish between the uncontrollable force of tsunami, and the relative controllability of some effects by effective evacuations or better land-use planning. News reports of natural disasters, such as earthquakes, usually take the opposite tack and focus on widespread damage rather than buildings that stood firm or people who survived. News reports immediately after an earthquake focus on the greatest damage; by contrast, later reports, such as anniversary reports, are more analytical and focus on the characteristics of the buildings that collapsed and lessons that can be learned. People who read these more analytical reports about the Kobe, Japan earthquake were less fatalistic about the damage than people who read the immediate news reports about the same earthquake 43. Thus, the information that citizens are exposed to can alter their fatalism and understanding. Reporting of the Boxing Day 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami contained many positive stories of non-fatalistic behaviour by people who correctly interpreted early natural warning signs and responded in a way that saved the lives of themselves and others. This was encouraging, GNS Science Report 2007/04 36

43 and publicising such reports will change some people s fatalistic view of tsunami to a more correct perception that appropriate actions can be taken to escape from a tsunami Motivation Changing people s perceptions of risk alone will not necessarily bring about changes in their behaviour or motivate them to carry out actions to address a particular risk. People may not be motivated to prepare if they do not accept that they are at risk or do not perceive the hazards as meriting attention. Irrespective of the level of risk, people may not act if they see the effects of a hazard as insurmountable (low outcome expectancy), see themselves as lacking the competence to act (low self efficacy), or are not disposed to action (low action coping). Even people who are well aware of a potential hazard may not take action if they lack resources to implement protection measures (low response efficacy), transfer the responsibility for their safety to others (low perceived responsibility), distrust information sources, or stress uncertainty regarding the likely timing of a hazard occurrence 14. Figure 6 The social-cognitive process model for preparedness Some people will take no action no matter what information they receive, but the realisation that preparedness may make a difference to hazard warning outcomes is one prerequisite for voluntary action, and with prudent people it is likely to enhance action. An explanation for low preparedness has previously been discussed using a process model 14; 34 of preparedness with three distinct, but related, stages (Fig. 6). Acknowledging the distinction between these stages is important. They comprise different variables and require different intervention strategies to achieve change. GNS Science Report 2007/04 37

44 In the social-cognitive preparation model (Fig. 6), the relationship between people s awareness of risk and their intentions to take action is influenced by the outcomes they expect from the actions and their judgement of their own competence to act (self efficacy). Only low to moderate levels of belief that hazard effects can be mitigated by individual efforts were recorded in the 2003 New Zealand survey 44 and these act to reduce preparedness. Low to moderate levels of self-efficacy also constrained preparedness. Low to moderate levels of these attitudes is consistent with the finding of only low to moderate levels of preparedness intentions. Only 11% of the sample indicated a definite intention to actively prepare Moving from intention to preparation The model also describes how preparedness can be limited or enhanced by several factors. Moderate to high levels of personal responsibility, resource availability (resource efficacy), and sense of community increase the likelihood of preparedness. A final control is the time frame within which people anticipate the occurrence of the next hazard event 14. Those who anticipated a given hazard event occurring within the next 12 months were likely to convert their intentions into actual preparedness. For example, in the 2003 National Survey 44, less than 1% of the sample thought that a tsunami was likely within the next year, and less than 11% within the next ten years 45. The fact that most people do not believe a tsunami could occur in the near future is likely to significantly limit the movement from intention to preparedness. 5.2 Education and engagement to motivate preparedness and effective warnings Research clearly shows that getting people to prepare for natural hazards cannot be achieved through public education alone 46. To motivate people, public education and empowerment strategies 42 that emphasize the salience of hazard issues for community members are required. Improved preparedness and warning responses can also be gained from enhancing community members beliefs in the feasibility of mitigating hazard and warning response through personal actions (e.g., counter beliefs that hazards have totally catastrophic effects), and enhancing their beliefs that they are personally competent to carry out these activities. Changing these factors requires a mix of public education, social policy, training, and empowerment strategies. Converting intentions into actual behaviour, could be enhanced by focusing on encouraging acceptance of a sooner rather than later message. It is also important to understand the belief and attitudes that underpin the above responses. A combination of (1) public education, (2) community empowerment and (3) psychological intervention is required to develop an effective warning response capacity, and to get people to participate in preparedness activities. It is also a process which takes time it is not possible to deliver all three components at once and immediately expect change Delivering education The full range of public education delivery methods that are available and financially feasible should be used. These are likely to include, but are not restricted to, media publicity/coverage, public talks, staff training, maps, signage and printed matter including brochures and posters. GNS Science Report 2007/04 38

45 The focus should be on employing a range of methods to inform as many at-risk people as possible. This can be evaluated and modified to achieve maximal effectiveness through surveys of public awareness, and through observation of simulation exercises. Research has found that public education should include the following actions 46; 47 : Target at-risk groups Use preferred media types Use many media types Use many credible sources Provide hazard information frequently Develop consistent national signage Develop hazard and/or evacuation maps Prepare booklets with specific information and instructional pictures Provide different sources for information searching Don t expect miracles, have a performance target Monitor audiences and programme effectiveness There is room for a mixture of national and CDEM Group-level initiatives. Although Groups are legislatively required to deliver education, recent increases in funding at a national level are available to develop nationally consistent resources, and possibly aid in their delivery, in partnership with Groups. This is consistent with the National Public Education Strategy outlined above Maps and signage Maps and signs are critical for making the public aware of hazards, for visualizing their effects, and for taking the correct action in the event of a warning. The development and maintenance of maps and signage in particular provide a tangible forum for community engagement. The more buy-in individuals feel their community has to education and signage materials, the more-readily the materials will be viewed, trusted and used, both in preparing and during a warning. Hazard and evacuation maps may be, but do not have to be, one and the same. For example, in the case of tsunami hazards in New Zealand, the boundaries of hazardous areas have a large uncertainty. Thus, tsunami hazard maps per se require large caveats in terms of their reliability if used as public information, caveats that are often very difficult to convey simply. However, evacuation maps are nevertheless essential tools for responding to tsunami warnings, even while the hazard boundaries have a high uncertainty attached. With such large uncertainties a margin of safety should be used when deciding on the zones to be evacuated in a given event. Hazard maps need to clearly show the location of hazards with as little complexity as possible. In general, fewer zones and less terminology allow faster and more complete comprehension. Any spatial information must allow the viewer to relate the hazard location to known topography, land use, landmarks and cultural features. Maps should appear as site- GNS Science Report 2007/04 39

46 specific as possible, connecting the hazard with that location for example, include local photos of the hazard or any past events. However, regional and even national consistency of overall method, format, and content are desirable, so that people educated in one area will find the knowledge equally useful for responding to a warning in another area. Similarly, communication among emergency management groups will be improved if methods are used in common. Evacuation zone maps need to clearly show evacuation routes. Maps may make mixed use of 3-dimensional perspective diagrams, air photos and/or plan views, depending on the location and the map-reading familiarity of the end users. These same requirements apply to information signage, such as interpretive maps and posters. Hazard and/or evacuation maps should be incorporated into information signage (and any other educational material) wherever possible, giving a consistent message regarding response to warnings through as many channels as possible. A recent project 48 at the University of Canterbury has reviewed the merits of providing tsunami information boards, which may include maps, as a method of public signage and education. It includes a review of construction methods and potential content. Critical factors for effective direction-giving/warning signage include: Visibility Durability Consistency Ease of understanding Clarity of message (avoid ambiguity) Community ownership and acceptance (fostered by engagement in the development process) Community engagement For the development of public education and the investigation of any new notification options the community should be engaged at both the feasibility and implementation stages. This may include community groups and Civil Defence volunteers from different types of areas small town, city urban, coastal, farming, etc. The Community Link programme already provides substantial engagement of rural communities. Enhancing the involvement of urban populations such as Gisborne City may, therefore, now be a worthwhile priority. The empowerment component of a campaign is achieved through community development programmes that include consultation, for example, community meetings and focus groups. Recommendations are: Target at-risk groups or groups with community influence, e.g., schools. Identify group needs. Carry out programmes one at a time. Have a specific programme objective. Continually re-evaluate programmes. Ideal vehicles for some of this consultation exists in New Zealand within the District Plan, the Long-Term Community Consultation Plan, and the Community Outcomes, local government GNS Science Report 2007/04 40

47 processes. CDEM Group plan development and revision also have statutory requirements (see Appendix 1) for consultation. Psychological intervention Activities can be designed to prepare the community psychologically to cope with natural hazards, thus reducing anxiety and improving self efficacy. These can be incorporated in both public education and community empowerment initiatives, and can include written and verbal information on how to recognise and cope with psychological factors such as problemfocused coping (modifying the cause of a problem, rather than just dealing with a person s reaction to it), anxiety, and stress Monitoring of public awareness Before implementing public education, the audience needs to be understood. The audience s current level of awareness and preparedness needs to be investigated, along with defining at-risk groups and determining the beliefs, needs, and preferences of particular groups. This will provide baseline data to monitor the effectiveness of the campaign and allow a more targeted approach Barriers and Predictors A first step in the process is to understand the barriers that prevent people from preparing and responding appropriately to warnings. Key barriers are: Incorrect risk perception A hazard won t affect this area for another 100 years Optimistic bias A hazard will never affect me Low response efficacy There are more important things than hazards to think about Low outcome expectancy No amount of preparedness will help Normalisation bias Hazards have affected New Zealand in the past and didn t affect us External locus of control Hazards are an act of God Transfer of responsibility Civil Defence will be there to help me It is also important to understand the variables that can predict preparedness, many of which are related to the barriers : These predictors are: Risk perception A hazard affects this area every 100 years Outcome expectancy A certain amount of preparedness will help Self-efficacy I can do something to prepare for a hazard Problem-focused coping I am reducing the risk of a hazard affecting me, not just changing the way I feel about it Critical awareness A hazard could affect this location tomorrow Anxiety I am concerned that a hazard will affect my property (positive anxiety is a motivator; negative or extreme anxiety is a barrier) GNS Science Report 2007/04 41

48 Response efficacy There are more important things than hazards to think about Sense of community I feel at home in my community Improving preparedness In the first stage of a public education campaign, risk perception, critical awareness and anxiety are the variables that need to be addressed, as they are the factors that initially motivate people to prepare. The intention-formation variables (outcome expectancy, selfefficacy and problem-focused coping Sections and 5.2.3) then need to be focused upon in the second stage. After targeting these variables, people should have good intentions to prepare, but can still be hindered by factors such as their perceived timing of the next hazard event, their sense of community, and response efficacy, so these should be addressed in the third stage. Table 9 shows the stage of the process/campaign, associated variables and the basic strategy that should be applied to each variable. Table 9 Stage of the education and engagement process/campaign, associated variables and basic strategy that should be applied to each variable 46. Stage of Process Variable Basic Strategy (1) Precursor Risk perception (2) Intention Formation Critical Awareness Anxiety Outcome expectancy Self-efficacy Problem-focused Coping (3) Moderator Timing of hazard activity Sense of community Response Efficacy Communication Empowerment Communication Psychological intervention Communication Empowerment Empowerment Empowerment Communication Empowerment Empowerment It must be kept in mind that communities are not static populations, and although initially a community may be guided through these stages of awareness and participation, these strategies may need to be periodically repeated to allow for transient and ageing populations Improving warning messages The five key components of warning system public education that are critical for effective response to a warning are 12 : Who will issue the warnings How the warnings will be issued What the warnings could say GNS Science Report 2007/04 42

49 What communication media will be used and how to access them What should be done in response to the warnings (evacuation routes, and hazard/evacuation maps) National education strategy The National Public Education Strategy 49 sets out the strategic framework for public education for the CDEM sector in New Zealand for the period. This document was developed in consultation with the sector, and contains a number of strategies and short to medium and long-term goals within each. The strategy defines programmes that are best coordinated and delivered at a national level by the Ministry, working with the national public education working group, and supports strategies for programmes delivered by CDEM Groups, regional, and territorial local authorities. CDEM Group plans (Section 3) outline a range of public education initiatives that vary from group to group, and these plans, or supporting documents to them, vary in their details of specific education methods, audiences and content. According to the legislation, it is for Groups to decide what education initiatives will be employed within their jurisdiction, supported by national policy (such as the above strategy) and resources. CDEM Groups noted a desire for national direction on consistency and content in some areas, especially signage and hazard/evacuation mapping. 5.3 Capacity building within key sector groups There are key groups within the community that need special consideration or may have leadership roles in a warning School education Education on natural hazards within schools is an effective method of improving awareness at home, and in preparing schools themselves. Any school education must be developed in line with the curriculum and be tailored to the location of each school to make it relevant, thus engaging pupils interest and improving information retention Education of tourists Effective hazard education that is specifically aimed at tourists is difficult to achieve due to language barriers and to the transient nature of tourists. If tourists were able to gain a clear understanding of the potential hazards, the warning systems, and how to respond to these, there would be less reliance on other parties (such as tourism personnel) to assist tourists. However, reaching tourists with this type of information is unlikely to be successful, so other strategies, such as focusing on tourism firms and personnel, need to be considered. Research from Drabek 9; 10 highlights a number of key concerns that the tourism sector needs to address. The perception from tourism personnel has been that if tourists are told that an area is disaster-prone they would be deterred from visiting the area, resulting in a downturn in business. In contrast, interviews held with tourists and visitors 10 show that there is an expectation for improved disaster preparedness, and that failure in an event of a disaster GNS Science Report 2007/04 43

50 would be remembered as a negative experience, resulting in a possible loss of future revenue and lives. From this we can deduce that it is better not to spend too much effort telling tourists about potential natural hazards, but to make sure that tourism firms and personnel are educated and trained in how to respond to warnings Staff training Engaging and educating staff in the service sector are critical factors to improve response to warning systems. Recent research in New Zealand, at Ruapehu ski areas, has found that staff training is critical to achieve the correct public response to warnings (i.e., a relatively high proportion of skiers moving out of harm s way) 2. The most significant lessons learned by tourism personnel who had been involved in a natural disaster are 9; 10 : Plan appropriate protective actions. Do not deny the existence of a threat. Debunk the panic myth the myth that the public panic when warned of disaster. Have one person in charge. Improve employee and customer communication. Plan to provide shelter for customers. Anticipate the needs of special populations. Provide protection for important documents. Recognise family priorities. Structure media relationships (This is a major issue, as media commonly exaggerate and misinform. This can have adverse impacts on current and future tourism business). A number of public and volunteer agencies have key roles during a hazard emergency. Their training needs will be similar to those discussed above for service staff, but will also include extra responsibilities which should be written into plans (see below) Government agencies As well as having staff in need of training (above), CDEM Group member organisations, especially the Police, New Zealand Fire Service, and local government have a potential role in educating the wider population and participating in public notification of warning messages. There are other government agencies that may also have a role, Maritime New Zealand for example. These roles should be discussed and developed in a regular and ongoing way with the wider Group, and be documented in detailed planning Non-government and volunteer agency potential roles There are a myriad of organisations with potential roles in pre-event education and dissemination of warning messages. These include surf lifesaving, rural fire services, port companies, the Royal New Zealand Coastguard, etc. Any incorporation of these agencies would need consultation to determine capacity, expectations and detailed planning. Involved agencies should also be included in exercises. GNS Science Report 2007/04 44

51 Surf lifesaving clubs New Zealand s extensive foreshore and beach areas are vulnerable to tsunami, and experience high public use for most of the year. By their nature, surf lifesaving clubs could play a significant role in evacuations from beaches. In many locations they have the policies, procedures, alert systems and training in place for beach closures. Tsunami-specific training could significantly enhance the capacity of surf lifesaving club members to respond to warnings (including natural warnings, Section 4). These clubs have self-maintaining communication networks that are also potentially available as a warning dissemination system for other hazards. Rural fire service CDEM Groups identify that in almost all areas the New Zealand Fire Service and Rural Fire have a key role in generic emergency management and evacuations. Rural fire authority volunteers are community members, often in remote and sparsely settled areas. They usually have extensive knowledge of the local area and contacts within the community, and are ideal extensions of warning alert systems in areas where dedicated warning hardware is limited. These arrangements are mostly informal oral agreements or perceptions at present, and should be formalised in written Memorandums of Understanding and plans, and enhanced by additional training. GNS Science Report 2007/04 45

52 6.0 RECOMMENDATIONS Recommendations for public notification of warnings in the Gisborne district are made for the short, medium, and long term. Short term (as little as 1 year) Public education, including maps and signage, are the key to effective response to warning systems. Gisborne district will maximise the effectiveness of its warning arrangements by further developing education and planning resources for key hazards (especially tsunami, flooding and volcanic ash fall) in cooperation with the community. Education materials should inform on: the range of hazards and their timeframes, natural warning signs, official warning channels, warning types and content, the existence of multiple warning channels and that some may fail, what to do in response to warnings, location-specific information (details within Section 6.0) Investigate and plan for improved resilience, including the public s ability to understand and make decisions upon, and the motivation to act upon, warning messages. As a starting point the group could consider the methods, purpose, and results so far from the community resilience project currently underway within the Auckland CDEM Group. Medium term (1 to 5 years) Adding more urban community-link groups that regularly exercise warning response actions is one option that would improve the response to urban warnings. National initiatives for public notification of warnings may enhance what is already in place in Gisborne. Of particular interest is the potential for use of emerging mobile technologies. The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management has recently drafted a briefing document outlining steps towards a working group to look at mobile technologies, at present especially focusing on Cell Broadcasting. Gisborne district should keep abreast of these advances and consider pushing for timely convening of, and results from, such a working group. Implement refined methods of improving community resilience that are outcomes of the current resilience projects in New Zealand (especially Auckland Region). Long term (5 to 10+ years) Target wider community resilience. Improved resilience reduces the impacts of natural hazards through several community-driven means including, but not limited to, the ability and motivation to receive, understand, and make decisions based on early warning messages. Such changes to the awareness motivation of the community take place over decades rather than years. GNS Science Report 2007/04 46

53 6.1 Time-lag The time-lag between initiation of notification and receipt by all available people is the critical success factor for any major, new, all-hazard technology-based system. However, The time taken to initiate an early warning prior to notification, and for people to respond, should also be a focus of effort by the CDEM Group. It is unclear whether mobile communications technologies such as cell broadcast can, with full automation of the system, notify all people in seconds, but minutes is certainly feasible. Technological advances in the next few years may well improve this. 7.0 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We thank Auckland CDEM Group for funding a detailed notification-option review on which this report is based, and for (a) including the potential for nationally consistent application; and (b) making results accessible to other CDEM Groups. Gisborne CDEM Group independently recognised a need to review and assess its own notification needs. The Foundation for Research Science and Technology funded underpinning research on early warning systems that has contributed to this analysis. The Ministry for Civil Defence and Emergency Management, at the request of Cabinet, commissioned a national review of tsunami risk and preparedness. That review included a detailed analysis of public education best practice which has been updated and modified here. 8.0 REFERENCES 1. Leonard, G.S., Johnston, D.M., Saunders, W. and Paton, D., Assessment of Auckland Civil Defence and Emergency Management Group warning system options, 2006/02. Institute of Geological & Nuclear Sciences, Lower Hutt. 2. Leonard, G.S., Johnston, D.M., Paton, D., Christianson, A. and Keys, J.B., (submitted). Developing an effective early warning system: ongoing research at Ruapehu volcano, New Zealand. Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research. 3. Webb, T. and (compiler), Review of New Zealand's preparedness tsunami hazard, comparison to risk and recommendations for treatment, GNS Science client report 2005/162, Lower Hutt. 4. Mileti, D.S. and Sorensen, J.H., Communication of emergency public warnings, Oak Ridge National Labority, Oak Ridge. 5. Sorensen, J.H., Hazard warning systems: review of 20 years of progress. Natural Hazards Review, 1: PPW, Improving the effectiveness of the homeland security advisory system, Partnership for Public Warning report by The Workshop on Effective Hazard Warnings, Emmitsburg. 7. Mileti, D.S. and O Brien, P., Warnings and disasters: normalizing communicated risk. Social Problems, 39: GNS Science Report 2007/04 47

54 8. Aguirre, B.E., Homeland security warnings: lessons learned and unlearned. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 22: Drabek, T.E., Disaster Evacuation and the Tourist Industry, University of Colorado, Institute of Behavioral Science, Program on Environment and Behavior, Boulder. 10. Drabek, T.E., Disaster Evacuation Behavior: Tourists and other Transients, University of Colorado, institute of Behavioral Science, Program on Environment and Behavior, Boulder. 11. Paton, D. and Johnston, D., Disaster and communities: vulnerability, resilience and preparedness. Disaster Prevention and Management, 10( ). 12. Mileti, D.S., Communicating emergency public information, Notes from Training Course, revision 2, Boulder. 13. Johnston, D., Paton, D., Crawford, G.L., Ronan, K., Bürgelt, P. and Houghton, B., Measuring tsunami preparedness in Coastal Washington, United States. Natural Hazards, 35(1): Paton, D., Disaster Preparedness: A social-cognitive perspective. Disaster Prevention and Management, 12: Biever, C. and Hecht, J., Alarm bells ringing over US response to tsunami scare, New Scientist, pp Gregg, C.E., Houghton, B.F., Paton, D., Johnston, D.M., Swanson, D.A. and Yanagi, B.S., Tsunami Warnings: Understanding in Hawai'i. Natural Hazards, DOI /s y. 17. Handmer, J., Are Flood Warnings Futile? Risk communication in emergencies. The Australasian Journal of Disaster and Trauma Studies, 2002/2: online journal. 18. Pfister, N., Community response to flood warnings: the case of an evacuation from Grafton, March Australian Journal of Emergency Management, 17(2): Voight, B., The 1985 Nevado del Ruiz volcano catastrophe: anatomy and retrospection. Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research, 42: Leonard, G., Johnston, D. and Paton, D., Developing effective lahar warning systems for Ruapehu. Planning Quarterly, 158: Ballantyne, M., Paton, D., Johnston, D., Kozuch, M. and Daly, M., Information on volcanic and earthquake hazards: the impact on awareness and preparation, Institute of Geological & Nuclear Sciences Limited science report 2000/02, Lower Hutt. 22. (OEM&ODGAMI), O.E.M.a.O.D.o.G.a.M.I., Tsunami Warning Systems and Procedures guidance for local officials., Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries (ODGAMI) Special Paper 35, Portland. 23. Tierney, K., Trinet studies and planning activities in real-time earthquake early warning: Task 2: Lessons and guidance from the literature on warning response and warning systems, Report prepared for the California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. 24. Darienzo, M., Aya, A.L., Crawford, G.L., Gibbs, D., Whitmore, P.M., Wilde, T. and Yanagi, B.S., Local tsunami warning in the pacific coastal United GNS Science Report 2007/04 48

55 States. Natural Hazards, 35(1): Gruntfest, E.C. and Huber, C., Status Report on Flood Warning Systems in the United States. Environmental Management, 13: Basher, R., Global early warning systems for natural hazards: systematic and people-centred. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, A 364: doi: /rsta Ronan, K. and Johnston, D., Promoting community resilience in disasters: the role for schools, youth, and families., Springer, New York. 28. Mayhorn, C.B., Cognitive aging and the procession of hazard information and disaster warnings. Natural Hazards Review, 6: Drabek, T.E., Disaster Evacuations: tourist-business managers rarely act as customers expect. Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly, 41(1): Leonard, G., Johnston, D., Paton, D. and Kelman, I., Mitigating the lahar risk at Whakapapa Ski Area, Mt Ruapehu: Public perceptions and the effectiveness of the new warning system, Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences science report, Lower Hutt. 31. Johnston, D., Becker, J., Gregg, C., Houghton, B., Paton, D., Leonard, G. and Garside, R., in prep. Developing warning and disaster response capacity in the tourism sector in coastal Washington, USA. To be submitted to Disaster prevention and Management. 32. Carsell, K.M., Pringel, N.D. and Ford, D.T., Quantifying the benefit of a flood warning system. Natural Hazards Review, 5: Adams, J., Risk. UCL press, London. 34. Paton, D., Smith, L.M. and Johnston, D., When good intentions turn bad: Promoting natural hazard preparedness. Australian Journal of Emergency Management, 20: Burns, W.J., Slovic, P., Kasperson, R.E., Kasperson, J.X., Renn, O. and Emani, S., Incorporating structural models into research on social amplification of risk; implications for theory construction and decision making. Risk Analysis, 13: Sjöberg, L., Factors in risk perception. Risk Analysis, 20: Weinstein, N.D. and Klein, W.M., Unrealistic optimism: Present and future. Journal of Social & Clinical Psychology, 15: Helweg-Larsen, M., (The lack of) optimistic bias in response to the Northridge earthquake: The role of personal experience. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 21: Spittal, M.J., McClure, J., Siegert, R.J. and Walkey, F.H., Optimistic bias in relation to preparedness for earthquakes. Australasian Journal of Disaster and Trauma Studies, : Kasperson, R.E., Renn, O., Slovic, P., Brown, H.S., Emel, J., Goble, R., Kasperson, J.X. and Ratick, S., The social amplification of risk: a conceptual framework. Risk Analysis, 8: Rip, A., Should social amplification of risk be counteracted? Risk Analysis, 8: Paton, D., Emergency Planning: Integrating community development, community resilience and hazard mitigation. Journal of the American Society of Professional Emergency Managers, 7: GNS Science Report 2007/04 49

56 43. Cowan, J., J., M. and Wilson, M., What a difference a year makes: how immediate and anniversary media reports influence judgments about earthquakes. Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 5: Johnston, D., Leonard, G., Bell, R., Stewart, C., Hickman, M., Thomson, J., Kerr, J. and Glassey, P., Tabulated Results of the 2003 National Coastal Community Survey. 2003/35, Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences science report, Lower Hutt. 45. Johnston, D., Bell, R., Stewart, C., Hickman, M., Thompson, J., Kerr, J. and Glassey, P., The 2003 national coastal survey: assessing community understanding and participation in coastal management in New Zealand, Proceedings of the Coasts & Ports Australasian Conference, 9-12 September 2003, Auckland, New Zealand. 46. Finnis, K., Creating a Resilient New Zealand: Can public education and community development campaigns create prepared communities? An examination of preparedness motivation strategies, Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, Wellington. 47. Mileti, D., Nathe, S., Gori, P., Greene, M. and Lemersal, E., Public hazards communication and education: the state of the art, Natural Hazards Center Natural Hazards Informer issue 2, Boulder. 48. Woods, L., Development of Tsunami Information Boards for Installation at Public Beaches, Resilient Organisations Student Research Report 2005/02, Department of Civil Engineering, University of Canterbury, Christchurch. 49. MCDEM, Working together for prepared communities: National public education strategy , Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM), Wellington. 50. Lee, W.H.K. and Epinosa-Aranda, J.M., Earthquake early warning systems: current status and perspectives, Early Warning Systems for Natural Disaster Reduction. Springer, Berlin, pp Crawford, G., TsunamiReady communities: no overnight solution, Natural Hazards Observer, pp Lachman, R., Tatsuoka, M. and Bonk, W.J., Human behavior during the tsunami of 23 May Science, 133(3462): 1,405-1, Crawford, G., NOAA Weather Radio (NWR) - a coastal solution to tsunami alert notification. Natural Hazards, 35: GNS Science Report 2007/04 50

57 APPENDIX 1 PART 8(60-62) OF THE NATIONAL CIVIL DEFENCE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN ORDER 2005 General warnings 60 Objective (1) The objective is to issue warnings so that local authorities, agencies, and people can take action to reduce loss of life, injury, and damage. (2) Warnings about predictable events (for example, severe weather, volcanic eruption, tsunami) are to be given as quickly as practicable. (3) For unpredictable events like earthquakes, where warning is not possible, the objective is to inform emergency response by providing assessments of the likely impact on any affected areas. (4) The responsibility for issuing warnings rests with the agency that through its normal function is involved with the identification and analysis of the particular hazard or threat (see Appendix 1). (5) Relevant government agencies, CDEM Groups, local authorities, and lifeline utilities must maintain arrangements to respond to warnings. 61 Scope (1) Warning systems are to provide warnings about significant hazards with the potential to affect human populations, geographical areas, or social or economic activities. (2) This plan does not cover (a) localised, long-term, or slowly-evolving threats; or (b) the local actions and procedures required to disseminate or respond to warnings. (3) The effectiveness of a warning depends on its delivery and receipt, recipients understanding of what they should do under the particular threats, and readiness and response at all levels. 62 National warning system (1) The national warning system establishes a process for the receipt of general warnings and communication of civil-defence-emergency-management related information for warning purposes at all hours by MCDEM. (2) MCDEM maintains the national warning system to issue civil defence warnings received from responsible agencies. (3) The standard operating procedure under this system specifies the principles and methods for disseminating national warnings. (4) National warnings must be provided by MCDEM to CDEM Groups, local authorities, police, certain government departments, lifeline utilities, and certain broadcasters. (5) Different hazards require different types of warnings and procedures. The civil defence emergency management hazards for which national warnings may be issued are listed in Appendix 1. (6) CDEM Groups are responsible for (a) disseminating national warnings to local communities; and (b) maintaining local warning systems. (7) If arrangements are made with the duty officer of MCDEM, the national warning system is available to issue warnings with respect to hazards for which warning arrangements are decided and maintained by other responsible agencies. GNS Science Report 2007/04 51

58 APPENDIX 2 INTERNATIONAL EXAMPLES Warning systems have been constructed in many countries for a wide range of events that pose a risk to populations. However, there is considerable variation in methods of notification, costs, effectiveness, monitoring and evaluation. There appears to be little universal guidance as to what constitutes best practice. In addition, technologies are advancing rapidly and with recent events such as the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami in the Indian Ocean and 2005 Hurricane Katrina in the USA, many local and national systems are under review. This section reviews several examples of warnings systems in place at regional and local levels. Several reviews of national systems are available elsewhere but are not the focus of this report. The systems range from very elaborate, in the case of Japanese tsunami systems, to more simple community-based alerting systems. A2.1 Japan: Tsunami Japan has an elaborate tsunami warning system, delivering a range of messages to at-risk coastal populations. The sections below 22 summarise the system. Japan Tsunami System Reproduced with permission from State of Oregon The Japanese Meteorological Agency (JMA) is responsible for issuing tsunami warnings. There is one main observatory (in Tokyo) and five regional observatories, all capable of issuing a warning. Data is continuously collected using satellites and cellular communication techniques to avoid failures associated with landline and Internet technologies. The goal is to broadcast a tsunami warning less than five minutes from the initial sensing of the earthquake. If an earthquake occurs off shore, the observatories close to the epicentre will issue tsunami bulletins to their areas of responsibility. The bulletins will go to the prefectures (similar to U.S. states) through the Local Automatic Data Editing and Switching System (L-ADESS). L-ADESS will also send forecast results (tsunami heights) to the main observatory will issue bulletins to other prefectures and alert other government agencies through the Central Automated Data Editing and Switching System (C- ADESS). There are three types of tsunami bulletins (warning, watch, information). The bulletins are well defined and are similar to those of the United States Tsunami Warning Centres. Ministries and agencies at the national level that contribute to disaster mitigation are linked together in the Central Emergency Management Communication Network (CEMCN). Members of the CEMCN include Ministry of Construction, Tokyo Electric Power, and Nippon Broadcasting Corporation. Once notified by the Japanese Meteorological Agency, the CEMCN transmits tsunami bulletins to their own regional offices. Redundancy is built into the Japanese system, so no one will be missed. The prefecture receives the bulletin at the same time as the CMCN. The prefecture then transmits the bulletin to the local governments (cities, towns) for action. The following are local notification methods: Simultaneous Announcement Wireless System (SAWS) SAWS is a dedicated system of transmitters and receivers installed by local authorities for all types of messages. The transmitters are located in the local government office and receivers are found in GNS Science Report 2007/04 52

59 hospitals, schools, fire stations, emergency management offices and other places. Many residents have purchased receivers for their homes, the receivers are activated when a message, such as a tsunami bulletin, is being transmitted. Receiver towers or posts with loudspeakers are also installed on streets and roof tops of prominent government and commercial buildings. SAWS effectiveness is reduced (as much as 15-20% in urban areas) during inclement weather, when people close their windows. There is also an attachment to the telephone that can serve as a dedicated radio receiver. A triggering signal from the broadcast source will turn on the loudspeaker and the SAWS message can be heard. SAWS is known as tone alert radio in the United States. Mobile Announcer System This system is designed for those areas without SAWS Fire trucks mounted with loudspeakers cruise their area of responsibility to announce the warning that they receive. Television and Radio Tsunami warning announcements have priority to cut into ongoing programs on government and commercial television and radio stations. Stations receive tsunami bulletins from the main and regional observatories by C-ADESS or L-ADESS, respectively. On television the message is either a subtitle on the bottom of the screen or a window. Later, the window has a map where the watch or warning applies. However, the map would not be shown fast enough in the case of a local tsunami. In the case of the radio, an ongoing program is interrupted with the message. This would have more impact than a message on a television screen. Tsunami warnings shown on Japanese TV. Sirens and bells Sirens are found in some villages. The sirens prompt residents to turn on their radio or television for further information. Some villages stick to traditional ways by clanging a bell to announce tsunami warnings. Telephone network and word of mouth Some communities have formed telephone networks to spread important information. In some communities, the only way to reach people is by going from house to house. Both methods are time consuming, but are necessary to reach populations that lack the other systems. Finally, local communities have extensive training, allowing them to respond automatically to tsunami warnings. Tsunami awareness is part of coastal Japan s culture to the extent that upon sounding a high level tsunami warning, the majority of the at-risk population, even if asleep, have evacuated to safe ground within five minutes. GNS Science Report 2007/04 53