Fire Protection Approaches and Experiences in NPP Speaker: Aleksandr STROKIN, Republic of Lithuania IAEA Technical Meeting TM-50054, Vienna, Austria, 27-29 May 2015
Nuclear facilities in Lithuania Nuclear facilities in Lithuania: 1. Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant 2. Spent nuclear fuel storage 3. Cemented radioactive waste storage facility 4. Very low level waste storage facility 5. Closed Maišiagala storage facility of radioactive waste Projected (under construction) nuclear facilities: 1. Visaginas Nuclear Power Plant 2 sites 2. New spent nuclear fuel storage facility 3. Facilities for treatment and storage of solid radioactive waste 4. Very low lewel radioactive waste repository 5. Low and intermediate radioactive waste repository 2
Operation Basics Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant overview The Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant operated the RBMK-1500 water-cooled graphite-moderated channel-type power reactors During the 26 years of operation Ignalina NPP has produced 307, 9 billion kwh of electricity: Unit 1 136, 9 billion kwh and Unit 2 170, 2 billion kwh. The total amount of electricity sold is 279, 8 billion kwh. Both Ignalina NPP units were finally shut down (Unit 1 in 2004, and Unit 2 in 2009), and decommissioning works have been carried out there. Plant type Number of units Power per unit Staff in 2015 RBMK-1500 2 (of 4 planned) 1500 MW ~2100 (max 5600 during operat.) Unit 1 Unit 2 First operation Dec 1983 Aug 1987 Final Closure Dec 2004 Dec 2009 Power generation 137 TWh 170 TWh Construction Operation Decommissioning 1974-1987 1983-2009 2010-2038 3
Fire Protection Programme in Ignalina NPP Designed according to State Regulatory Requirements INPP Fire Protection Procedure establish detailed administrative measures of fire prevention activities (control of combustible materials and ignition sources, etc.), also emergency response. Educating and testing personnel according to a INPP fire protection program, consulting departmental personnel, conducting accident and fire exercises ensure availability of personnel to properly act in case of fire. Annual external audits (State Nuclear Safety Inspectorate, Fire and Rescue Department under the Ministry of the Interior) evaluates the procedures, operations and activities in order to verify conformity to establishes requirements. During past 10 years independent safety assessment was accomplished under OSART missions in 2006 and 2008. 4
Fire Protection Systems in Ignalina NPP Automated fire safety system designed to detect, liquidate fires and to mitigate their effects. The automated fire safety systems are completely autonomous in each of the Units and consist of: Detection and alarm systems protect all fire hazardous rooms and areas. Water-spray fire suppression systems protect rooms with a safety important system s cables. Foam fire suppression systems protect oil systems of Main Circulation Pumps. Fire dampers systems prevent the spread of fire through the ventilation systems. Smoke removal and overpressure generating systems ensure safe personnel evacuation by corridors, staircases, elevators. Detailed operating manuals include description and frequency of Inspection, Testing and Maintenance (ITM) for each component of Fire Protection System. 5
Emergency Response at Ignalina NPP INPP Fire Protection Procedure establishes the detailed order of notification and INPP personnel actions during a fire incident. Detailed Fire pre-plans include strategies for response to fire alarm, Local Fire and Rescue Service coordination with operations and security personnel, fire-fighting techniques and response to potential radiological hazards. 6
Emergency Response at Ignalina NPP Plant Shift Supervisor must call the Local Fire and Rescue Service through Emergency Response Center, also Plant Shift Supervisor inform INPP Security Brigade at the State Border Guard Sevice. Plant Shift Supervisor in charge of the incident (management of the Shift Personnel fire-fighting actions using available equipment) until Local Fire and Rescue Service arrives. 7
Fire events which occurred in Ignalina NPP Year Description Root causes Corrective actions 2004 Ignition of compressed gas (acetylene) cylinder during preparation for hot work INES: out of scale Unit 2 at planned maintenance 2011 Ignition of pipeline s thermal insulation during hot work INES: out of scale Unit 2 at reactor defueling phase The lack of supervision of operation staff, contractor staff The lack of supervision of operation staff. The lack of supervision of using materials During inspections pay attention to the fulfillment of the Hotwork preparation pocedures requirements The check-list (as work-order annex) on appropriate conditions of welding equipment has been developed Conduct the audit of hot workorders The use of non-combustible materials (e.g. insulation, seals). Check of absence combustible materials in preparation for hot work 8
Ongoing challenges and issues Increasing dismantling using hot works (welding, flame cutting, disk cutting) may affect to false activation of Fire Protection Systems. Personnel (preparing hot work-orders or supervising hot works) must consider the potential impact of hot work on Fire Protection System in adjoining rooms and areas. 9
Ongoing challenges and issues During Fire and Resque Department reorganization (due to economic reason) Plant Fire Brigade was joined with Local Fire and Resque Servise. Time of arrival of the Fire brigade at the INPP has increased to 15-20 minutes. Safety Analysis Reports, Fire pre-plans and Procedures has to be reviewed. 10
Feedback on a draft IAEA publication General comment to the draft of Guidelines : The main text of the document should contain links to all the Appendixes. Some data in Appendixes is missing or useless. Detailed comments on the document will be presented during the Round Table Discussions 11
Thank you for attention! Drūkšinių km, Visagino sav LT-31500, Lithuania Phone +370 386 29000 Fax +370 386 29174 E-mail strokina@iae.lt