INSIGHTS GAINED FROM A REVIEW OF FIRE PRA RISK CONTRIBUTION BY IGNITION FREQUENCY BINS

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Transcription:

INSIGHTS GAINED FROM A REVIEW OF FIRE PRA RISK CONTRIBUTION BY IGNITION FREQUENCY BINS

AUTHORS JENSEN HUGHES Jazmin NeVille Usama Farradj Kiang Zee EPRI Ashley Lindeman Presentation by Mark Wishart (JENSEN HUGHES) www.jensenhughes.com 2

OVERVIEW Fire PRAs have been developed for a majority of US power plants to support transition to NFPA 805 and/or other risk based license applications Results of FPRAs indicate that fire risk is a large fraction of total plant risk, when compared to internal events risk How much of this result is a function of conservatism in the methods versus a realistic comparison of fire to non-fire risk? www.jensenhughes.com 3

PRESENTATION OUTLINE Review of Total Risk fire risk contribution non-fire risk contribution Review Contribution to Fire Risk by Ignition Sources (i.e., bins) Fire Risk Contribution of Electrical Cabinet (bin 15 fires) severe fires impacting targets beyond the ignition source non-severe fires no additional target impacts Predicted Fire Frequency vs. Operational Experience Areas of Further Analysis www.jensenhughes.com 4

FIRE RISK VERSUS NON-FIRE RISK, NFPA 805 SUBMITTALS TOTAL CDF 1E-04/yr 9E-05/yr Post-Modification Total CDFs Reported for NFPA 805 Non-Fire CDF Fire CDF 8E-05/yr 7E-05/yr 6E-05/yr CDF 5E-05/yr 4E-05/yr 3E-05/yr 2E-05/yr 1E-05/yr 0E+00/yr B01 B02 B03 B04 B05 B06 B07 B08 P01 P02 P03 P04 P05 P06 P07 P08 P09 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 P31 P32 P33 www.jensenhughes.com 5

FIRE RISK VERSUS NON-FIRE RISK - PERCENT OF TOTAL RISK 100% Contribution to Total Reported CDF 90% 80% Contribution to Total CDF 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% Other Hazards Fire Scenarios 10% 0% B01 B02 B03 B04 B05 B06 B07 B08 P01 P02 P03 P04 P05 P06 P07 P08 P09 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 P31 P32 P33 Plant ID www.jensenhughes.com 6

OBSERVATIONS AND QUESTIONS Observation: For most cases, the fire CDF contribution is more than 50% of total plant risk Question: What s driving Fire CDF, and is this realistic? www.jensenhughes.com 7

REVIEW OF FIRE PRA RESULTS - APPROACH Evaluate Contribution by Ignition Frequency Bin (per guidance presented in NUREG/CR-6850) and Identify Bins with Largest Contributions for Further Assessment Collect Data from Available Sites / Units need access to various data sources to support this evaluation obtain utility concurrence with use of data Evaluate Fire PRA CDF Results by Ignition Frequency Bin Evaluate Total Fire Frequency (i.e., fires per year) by Ignition Frequency Bin, and Compare to Operating Experience www.jensenhughes.com 8

DATA SOURCES Initial Data Collection obtained from 43 NPPs at 25 sites Developed under an EPRI project Utility concurrence obtained for use of data (no plant names or risk values provided) Not all available Fire PRAs readily supported extraction of required data Data with sufficient detail to support this review was available from 27 NPPs (62% of initial population) at 14 sites 24 PWRs and 3 BWRs (89%, 11%)* 8 plants have incorporated NUREG-2178 & NUREG-2169 data and methods 9 plants transitioning to NFPA 805 Presenter Comment: Industry data (PRA insights and operating experience) is critical for development of future insights *Current US Commercial Nuclear Fleet is 100 Operational Reactors, 66% PWR, 34% BWR www.jensenhughes.com 9

DATA ANALYSIS - GENERAL Extracted Relevant Data from the Fire PRA Databases (e.g., FRANX, cutset files, etc.) Aggregated Risk Contributions for Ignition Frequency Bins (per the ignition source counting / frequency guidance presented in NUREG/CR-6850) Quantified the Fraction of Total Risk (CDF) Associated with each Ignition Frequency Bin Developed the Fire Frequency (fires per year) www.jensenhughes.com 10

DATA ANALYSIS FIRE FREQUENCY (1) Electrical Panels Non-Severe (panel only) Severe (panel and external targets) Transient Fires (sum for all transient ignition frequency bins) Bins 3, 6, 7, 24, 25, 36 and 37 General Transient Fires and Transient Fires caused by welding and cutting Containment, Control/Aux/ Reactor Bldg, Diesel Generator Room, Plant Wide, Turbine Building High Energy Arcing Faults (Bins 16a/b, non-bus duct) www.jensenhughes.com 11

DATA ANALYSIS FIRE FREQUENCY (2) Used as a Basis for Comparison with Operating Experience Data allowing this analysis was limited to 23 plants Defined as: Sum of IGF x NSP x SF for: Electrical panels fires Transient fires HEAF events Binned by CCDP Range Fires per year per plant for each CCDP range focus on high risk CCDPs, > 1E-03 and > 1E-04 To allow comparison to NRCs Accident Sequence Precursor Program (SECY 14-0107) Extrapolated Data to 100 Plants to Define Expected Frequency for Industry www.jensenhughes.com 12

IGNITION FREQUENCY BIN PERCENT CONTRIBUTION TO FIRE CDF Key Insights: Electrical cabinets are important at all plants Transients and HEAF also important but to a lesser degree Importance of other bins seems to be plant-specific www.jensenhughes.com 13

CONTRIBUTORS TO TOTAL FIRE CDF 100.00% 90.00% Fractional Total Fire CDF Contributed 80.00% 70.00% 60.00% 50.00% 40.00% 30.00% 20.00% 10.00% 0.00% Plant 1 Plant 2 Plant 3 Plant 4 Plant 5 Plant 6 Plant 7 Plant 8 Plant 9 Plant 10 Plant 11 Plant 12 Plant 13 Plant 14 Plant 15 Plant 16 Plant 17 Plant 18 Plant 19 Plant 20 Plant 21 Plant 22 Plant 23 Plant 24 Plant 25 Electrical Cabinets Transients HEAF All Other MCB Transformers Pumps Battery Chargers Junction Boxes Self Ign Cables Diesel Generators Plant 26 Plant 27 Average 2178 Average Non 2178 www.jensenhughes.com 14

CONTRIBUTORS TO TOTAL FIRE CDF 100.00% 90.00% Fractional Total Fire CDF Contributed 80.00% 70.00% 60.00% 50.00% 40.00% 30.00% 20.00% 10.00% 0.00% Plant 1 Plant 2 Plant 3 Plant 4 Plant 5 Plant 6 Plant 7 Plant 8 Plant 9 Plant 10 Plant 11 Plant 12 Plant 13 Plant 14 Plant 15 Plant 16 Plant 17 Plant 18 Plant 19 Plant 20 Plant 21 Plant 22 Plant 23 Plant 24 Plant 25 Electrical Cabinets Transients HEAF All Other MCB Transformers Pumps Battery Chargers Junction Boxes Self Ign Cables Diesel Generators Plant 26 Plant 27 Average 2178 Average Non 2178 www.jensenhughes.com 15

BIN 15 PERCENT OF FIRE CDF 100.00% 90.00% 80.00% Percent of Total Plant Risk 70.00% 60.00% 50.00% 40.00% 30.00% 20.00% 10.00% 0.00% www.jensenhughes.com 16

BIN 15 PERCENT OF FIRE CDF Percent of Total Plant Risk 100.00% 90.00% 80.00% 70.00% 60.00% 50.00% 40.00% 30.00% 2178 Plants Key Insight: Application of 2178 methods reduced the average bin 15 Percent of Total Plant CDF by ~15% 20.00% 10.00% 0.00% www.jensenhughes.com 17

RANGE OF RELATIVE CONTRIBUTION (PERCENT OF CDF BY BIN) 80.00% 70.00% 60.00% 50.00% 40.00% 30.00% Max Average Min 20.00% 10.00% 0.00% www.jensenhughes.com 18

TOTAL FIRE FREQUENCY (PER YEAR) BY CCDP RANGE www.jensenhughes.com 19

TOTAL FIRE FREQUENCY (PER YEAR) BY CCDP RANGE Key Insight: Based on this analysis, we would expect to see several high risk fire events over the past decade (across the entire US fleet) www.jensenhughes.com 20

SECY 14-017 ACCIDENT SEQUENCE PRECURSOR DATA 7 events > 1.00E-04/yr (2004 2013) No events >1.00E-03/yr were identified 2 of the 7 events involved a fire Robinson (2010) est. CCDP = 4.00E-04 Ft Calhoun (2011) est. CCDP = >1.00E-04 FPRA would have estimated ~12 with CCDP >1.00E-04 in same period FPRA would have estimated ~5 with CCDP > 1.00E-03 www.jensenhughes.com 21

PROBABLE CAUSES OF OVERESTIMATION OF FIRE RISK Fire Size and Severity OE indicates damage from most fire events is confined to the source FPRA indicates over 2/3 of cabinet fire are severe HRR vs Time (i.e., Fire Growth Profile) OE indicates a significant duration pre-growth/smoldering fire phase FPRA electrical panel and transient fires have fixed/short time to peak Non-Suppression Probability OE indicates control of fire prior to extinguishment FPRA NSPs based on time to extinguishment In Some Cases, Additional Detailed Fire Modeling is Warranted Fire Modeling Parameters (e.g., HRR Distributions, Time to Peak HRR, Time to Suppression, etc.) Will Result a Reduction of Overall Fire Risk www.jensenhughes.com 22

CONCLUSION Question: What s driving Fire CDF, and is this realistic? Conclusions: Ignition Frequency and Modeling of Electrical Panels is Driving Fire CDF Results Additional Ignition Sources (e.g., Transients and HEAFs) Also Contribute to the Overall Fire Risk The High Fire Risk is not Substantiated by Recent Industry Operating Experience www.jensenhughes.com 23

POTENTIAL AREAS OF RESEARCH TO REDUCE OVERESTIMATION OF FIRE RISK Fire Pre-growth Phase: Believed to be significant, but not currently accounted for in FPRA methods (this is difficult to model). Analysis of Fire Events: Should consider how to deter differentiate ignition frequency and NSP of various fire sizes, ignition source types, etc. Transient Fires: Differentiate between the types of transient fires (e.g., past operating experience indicates that misc. transients are related to ignition source fires, but do not involve not combustible materials). www.jensenhughes.com 24