Document No Amendment No Approved By Approval Date Review Date NS236 INSTALLATION OF ELECTRONIC PERIMETER SECURITY AT MAJOR SUBSTATIONS

Transcription

1 Network Standard NETWORK Document No Amendment No Approved By Approval Date Review Date : : : : : NW000-S Chief Engineer 14/05/ /12/2015 NW000-S0060 NS236 INSTALLATION OF ELECTRONIC PERIMETER SECURITY AT MAJOR SUBSTATIONS NW000-S0060 UNCONTROLLED IF PRINTED Page 1 of 22

2 ISSUE For issue to all Ausgrid and Accredited Service Providers staff involved with the design and installation of perimeter security at major substations and is for reference by field, technical and engineering staff. Ausgrid maintains a copy of this and other Network Standards together with updates and amendments on Where this standard is issued as a controlled document replacing an earlier edition, remove and destroy the superseded document DISCLAIMER As Ausgrid s standards are subject to ongoing review, the information contained in this document may be amended by Ausgrid at any time. It is possible that conflict may exist between standard documents. In this event, the most recent standard shall prevail. This document has been developed using information available from field and other sources and is suitable for most situations encountered in Ausgrid. Particular conditions, projects or localities may require special or different practices. It is the responsibility of the local manager, supervisor, assured quality contractor and the individuals involved to make sure that a safe system of work is employed and that statutory requirements are met. Ausgrid disclaims any and all liability to any person or persons for any procedure, process or any other thing done or not done, as a result of this Standard. All design work, and the associated supply of materials and equipment, must be undertaken in accordance with and consideration of relevant legislative and regulatory requirements, latest revision of Ausgrid s Network Standards and specifications and Australian Standards. Designs submitted shall be declared as fit for purpose. Where the designer wishes to include a variation to a network standard or an alternative material or equipment to that currently approved the designer must obtain authorisation from the Network Standard owner before incorporating a variation to a Network Standard in a design. External designers including those authorised as Accredited Service Providers will seek approval through the approved process as outlined in NS181 Approval of Materials and Equipment and Network Standard Variations. Seeking approval will ensure Network Standards are appropriately updated and that a consistent interpretation of the legislative framework is employed. Notes: 1. Compliance with this Network Standard does not automatically satisfy the requirements of a Designer Safety Report. The designer must comply with the provisions of the Workplace Health and Safety Regulation 2011 (NSW - Part 6.2 Duties of designer of structure and person who commissions construction work) which requires the designer to provide a written safety report to the person who commissioned the design. This report must be provided to Ausgrid in all instances, including where the design was commissioned by or on behalf of a person who proposes to connect premises to Ausgrid s network, and will form part of the Designer Safety Report which must also be presented to Ausgrid. Further information is provided in Network Standard (NS) 212 Integrated Support Requirements for Ausgrid Network Assets. 2. Where the procedural requirements of this document conflict with contestable project procedures, the contestable project procedures shall take precedent for the whole project or part thereof which is classified as contestable. Any external contact with Ausgrid for contestable works projects is to be made via the Ausgrid officer responsible for facilitating the contestable project. The Contestable Ausgrid officer will liaise with Ausgrid internal departments and specialists as necessary to fulfil the requirements of this standard. All other technical aspects of this document which are not procedural in nature shall apply to contestable works projects. INTERPRETATION In the event that any user of this Standard considers that any of its provisions is uncertain, ambiguous or otherwise in need of interpretation, the user should request Ausgrid to clarify the provision. Ausgrid s interpretation shall then apply as though it was included in the Standard, and is final and binding. No correspondence will be entered into with any person disputing the meaning of the provision published in the Standard or the accuracy of Ausgrid s interpretation. KEYPOINTS This standard has a summary of content labelled KEYPOINTS FOR THIS STANDARD. The inclusion or omission of items in this summary does not signify any specific importance or criticality to the items described. It is meant to simply provide the reader with a quick assessment of some of the major issues addressed by the standard. To fully appreciate the content and the requirements of the standard it must be read in its entirety. AMENDMENTS TO THIS STANDARD Where there are changes to this standard from the previously approved version, any previous shading is removed and the newly affected paragraphs are shaded with a grey background. Where the document changes exceed 25% of the document content, any grey background in the document is to be removed and the following words should be shown below the title block on the right hand side of the page in bold and italic, for example, Supersedes document details (for example, Supersedes Document Type (Category) Document No. Amendment No. ). NW000-S0060 UNCONTROLLED IF PRINTED Page 2 of 22

3 KEY POINTS OF THIS STANDARD Scope and Risks Addressed Specifications Design Requirements The intention of this document is to facilitate the creation of a design/quote from supplies/installers for the purpose of installing perimeter security at Ausgrid Major Substations. The scope of the document is limited by excluding: commercial arrangements technical design requirements working safely on sites component models cabling standards video standards It references a number of national/state critical infrastructure protection plans and counter terrorism documents. The document addresses a number of business objectives which include: Detection of attempted and actual breaches of the substation perimeter Improved security Allow Ausgrid to meet government critical infrastructure security requirements Cost savings The outcomes based specification for electronic perimeter security includes eight items some of which are: Perimeter of live yard fence and substation building to be monitored by intruder detection system for attempted and actual breaches Gates and access points to be protected by access control alarms and existing keylock systems System to be remotely monitored from Ausgrid Security Control Room Entire perimeter monitored by recording CCTV camera system Internal spaces monitored to confirm perimeter breach Specific site designs will be carried out by Ausgrid Security Operations and Infrastructure Protection staff. Some of the general requirements include: Network Cabling: Connection to MPLS network via Ausgrid network switch installed at each site. Internal site communications using 12 core multi-mode OM2 fibre optic ring Damage to a single fibre optic cable will still allow communication via secondary path Cabling from field cabinets to security devices will be via cat 6 ethernet cable Security Management: Centralised security management capability Suitable for use in HV electrical switchyard Minimum alarm indications to be provided by security system CCTV System: CCTV alarm activated video recording External, internal and intercom Camera minimum specifications and capabilities License plate recognition camera Where to for more information? Sections 7 & 8 Where to for more information? Section 9 Where to for more information? Sections 1, 2 & 5. Tools and Forms Annexure A Compliance Checklist Tools and Forms Annexure A Compliance Checklist NW000-S0060 UNCONTROLLED IF PRINTED Page 3 of 22

4 Contents Network Restricted Standard NS236 Installation of Electronic Perimeter Security at Major Substations 1.0 PURPOSE SCOPE REFERENCES Ausgrid documents Other standards and documents Acts and regulations National and state agency security documentation National Counter Terrorism Plan, 3r d Edition National Terrorism Public Alert System NSW Counter Terrorism Plan NSW Critical Infrastructure Protection Management Framework Ausgrid Security Documentation Critical Infrastructure Protection Manual DEFINITIONS INTRODUCTION General Responsibility ASBESTOS BUSINESS OBJECTIVES SPECIFICATIONS Electrical infrastructure Administration buildings DESIGN REQUIREMENTS General Network cabling MPLS cabling Fibre cabling Category 6 ethernet cabling Rack cabinets Security Management System CCTV System CCTV alarm activated video External cameras Internal cameras Intercom cameras Licence plate recognition (LPR) cameras Camera lens Illumination Power supply NW000-S0060 UNCONTROLLED IF PRINTED Page 4 of 22

5 9.4.9 Equipment placement Earthing Conduits RECORDKEEPING AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES DOCUMENT CONTROL ANNEXURE A SAMPLE COMPLIANCE CHECKLIST NW000-S0060 UNCONTROLLED IF PRINTED Page 5 of 22

6 1.0 PURPOSE Network Restricted Standard NS236 outlines the minimum requirements for the installation of electronic security equipment for detecting attempted or actual breeches into the live yard perimeters of major substations. 2.0 SCOPE NS236 is intended to be given to suppliers/installers for the purpose of facilitating the creation of a design/quote. It lists the technical considerations and general requirements that if met will provide real-time alarms for detected intrusions and enable the appropriate response. It is not intended as a guide on how to position and install components that may be required to meet the objectives. Hence it excludes such things as: Commercial arrangements, Technical design requirements, Working safely on sites, Component models, Cabling standards, and Video standards. NW000-S0060 UNCONTROLLED IF PRINTED Page 6 of 22

7 3.0 REFERENCES All work covered in this document shall conform to all relevant Legislation, Standards, Codes of Practice and Network Standards. Current Network Standards are available on Ausgrid s Internet site at Ausgrid documents Bush Fire Risk Management Plan Company Form (Governance) - Network Document Endorsement and Approval Company Procedure (Governance) - Network Document Endorsement and Approval Company Procedure (Network) - Production / Review of Network Standards Customer Installation Safety Plan Electrical Safety Rules Electricity Network Safety Management System Manual NS104 Network Project Design Plans NS116 Design Standards for Distribution Equipment Earthing NS122 Pole Mounted Substation Construction NS127 Specification for Low Voltage Cable Joints and Terminations NS181 Approval of Materials and Equipment and Network Standard Variations NS212 Integrated Support Requirements for Ausgrid Network Assets NS238 Supply Quality NS261 Requirement for Design Compliance Framework for Network Standards PINC Network Technical Specification Public Electrical Safety Awareness Plan Tree Safety Management Plan 3.2 Other standards and documents AS/NZS Intruder Alarm Systems (Set) AS/NZS Electrical Installations (Wiring Rules) AS/NZS Electrical Installations Generating Sets AS/NZS Electrical Installations Verification Guidelines AS/NZS CCTV Management and Operation AS/ACIF S009 - Installation Requirements for Customer Cabling ENA Doc National Electricity Network Safety Code Guidelines on Overt Video Surveillance in the Workplace November 1995 (NSW Privacy Commissioner) 3.3 Acts and regulations Electrical (Consumer) Safety Act, 2004 Electricity Supply (General) Regulation 2014 (NSW) Electricity Supply (Safety and Network Management) Regulation 2014 Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) Work Health and Safety Act 2011 and Regulation 2011 Workplace Surveillance Act 2005 NW000-S0060 UNCONTROLLED IF PRINTED Page 7 of 22

8 3.4 National and state agency security documentation National Counter Terrorism Plan, 3r d Edition 2012 The National Counter-Terrorism Plan (NCTP) outlines responsibilities, authorities and the mechanisms to prevent, or if they occur manage, acts of terrorism and their consequences within Australia National Terrorism Public Alert System The National Terrorism Public Alert System is a range of four levels (low, medium, high, extreme) that communicate an assessed risk of terrorist threat to Australia. The National Terrorism Public Alert System guides national preparation and planning. It also dictates levels of precaution and vigilance to minimise the risk of a terrorist incident occurring. The Australian Government regularly reviews alert levels NSW Counter Terrorism Plan This publicly available plan details the counter terrorism arrangements within NSW, including the roles and responsibilities of NSW agencies in relation to counter terrorism. The NSW Government has developed this unclassified version of the Counter Terrorism Plan to inform the general public, business and government about the responsibilities, authorities and mechanisms in place to prepare, prevent, respond to and recover from acts of terrorism within NSW. The NSW Counter Terrorism Plan incorporates existing NSW State Disaster Plan arrangements and complements the National Counter Terrorism Plan. Comprehensive information on the national arrangements is described in the National Counter Terrorism Plan NSW Critical Infrastructure Protection Management Framework 2005 To ensure consistency between Australia, State and Territory Governments and industry, the Commonwealth has developed the National Guidelines for Protecting Critical Infrastructure from Terrorism. The guidelines articulate agreed responsibilities for the States and Territories and industry. NSW s responsibility is to develop and implement a sustainable program for Critical Infrastructure (CI) Protection including the engagement of all relevant agencies and CI owners and operators. The NSW Critical Infrastructure Protection Management Framework, 2005: Clearly assigns roles and responsibilities in accordance with the National Guidelines and provides a basis for the efficient of finite protection and response planning resources; Includes a NSW Security Position in respect of CI protection; Establishes clear detentions and criteria for the identification and rating of CI within NSW. 3.5 Ausgrid Security Documentation Critical Infrastructure Protection Manual The applicable documents within the Critical Infrastructure Protection Manual are as follows: Ausgrid Protective Security Manual, October 2010 Ausgrid Security Risk Policy, v1.4, 2008 Ausgrid Critical Security Plan, v2.7, 2009 NW000-S0060 UNCONTROLLED IF PRINTED Page 8 of 22

9 4.0 DEFINITIONS Access Accredited Service Provider (ASP) Alarm condition Alarmed area Area Arming Auto iris Business Management System (BMS) CCTV CCTV system CCTV camera housing Clarity of image Data Data-gathering panel (DGP) Detection device Disarming Distributed system Document control A disarmed zone or a disarmed intruder alarm system. An individual or entity accredited by the NSW Government Trade & Investment in accordance with the Electricity Supply (Safety and Network Management) Regulation 2014 (NSW). The status resulting from any one of the following: (a) Activation of a detection device. (b) Activation of a tamper-detection device or circuit. (c) Deliberate operation of a detection device. (d) Fault in the system. That part of an area to which detection is afforded by an intruder alarm system. A logical grouping of zones that are armed and disarmed simultaneously. Each area is identified by a number and name. The activating of an intruder alarm system, such that an alarm condition created by any of the connected detection devices is signalled. A special camera lens with the ability to open or close its iris automatically in response to changing light levels. An Ausgrid internal integrated policy and procedure framework that contains the approved version of documents. Closed circuit television. Totality of arrangements for CCTV systems including, but not limited to, the technological system, staff and operational procedures. Surveillance items comprising cameras and associated equipment for monitoring, transmission and controlling purposes, for use in a defined security zone. A protective enclosure that a camera can be placed in to protect it from outside weather conditions. The technical quality of the image, represented in terms of resolution, noise, grey scale depth and colour. All information, including that about a person. Note: In CCTV systems, this includes pictures, sound and any other associated, linked or processed information. Equipment used to multiplex and relay signals to control and indicating equipment. A device designed to generate an alarm condition in response to intrusion, an attempted intrusion or deliberate interference. Deactivating an intruder alarm system. Subsystem, any part of which may be linked temporarily or permanently for remote monitoring within the CCTV system. Ausgrid employees who work with printed copies of document must check the BMS regularly to monitor version control. Documents are considered NW000-S0060 UNCONTROLLED IF PRINTED Page 9 of 22

10 Evidence quality False alarm Fault condition Genuine alarm Hard copy (print) Image archive Data-gathering panel (DGP) Image authentication Image verification Incident Intruder alarm system Local alarm warning device Lux Manager Monitored circuit (supervised circuit) Network Standard Observation mode Operator UNCONTROLLED IF PRINTED, as indicated in the footer. Evidence is required to provide all the necessary elements that can legally stand up in court. Note: Some of the elements that would be required are: acceptable and clear content, creation date, data and time stamp, proof of non-tamper and verification methodology. Any alarm condition other than a genuine alarm or a fault indication. A condition caused by malfunction of the equipment or circuit. An alarm condition caused by the intended operation of the alarm system. Paper copy of an image or images that already exist on the recorded material. Images that are stored for long periods of time on long-term permanent, or partially permanent storage. Note: For example CDs, DVDs or digital tape are considered to be archived. Equipment used to multiplex and relay signals to control and indicating equipment. A means of providing proof that images presented as evidence have not been tampered with. A method of verifying images and associated data so that the origin, date and time can be used to support its credibility and acceptability in a legal process. Activity that raises cause for concern that an offence has been, is being, or is about to be, committed or that an occurrence has taken place warranting a specific action. Any system designed to detect and signal the presence, entry or attempted entry of an intruder into an alarmed area. Any device installed within the perimeter used to annunciate an alarm condition. Unit of measure of light sensitivity for a camera. Person or persons designated, and trained to have, direct responsibility for the implementation of the policies, purposes and methods of control of a CCTV system, as defined by the owner of the system. A circuit arranged to provide an alarm condition in the event of interference to, or failure of, the circuit. A document, including Network Planning Standards, that describes the Company's minimum requirements for planning, design, construction, maintenance, technical specification, environmental, property and metering activities on the distribution and transmission network. These documents are stored in the Network Category of the BMS repository. Mode of operation of a CCTV system whereby monitoring is carried out live, the sole purpose of which is to observe an operation in real time. Person specifically designated and authorised by the owner of a CCTV system to carry out the physical operation of controlling that system. NW000-S0060 UNCONTROLLED IF PRINTED Page 10 of 22

11 Owner Pan-Tilt-Zoom (PTZ) Power over Ethernet (PoE) Recorded information Review date Secure Security Control Room Storage medium Legal person or entity, agency or individual designated as having overall responsibility for the formulation and implementation of the policies, purposes and control of a CCTV system. Note: The role of owner also includes all statutory responsibilities of the data controller, such as Federal, State and Territory Privacy and Surveillance Legislation. The owner may be a partnership, provided it has a formal constitution. PTZ cameras have motors that allow them to be remotely moved up-down, side-to-side, and the camera lens zoomed in or out. PoE is a technology for wired Ethernet LAN s (local area networks) that allows the electrical current necessary for the operation of each device to be carried by the data cables rather than by power cords. PoE uses two twisted pairs in a standard TIA-568B CAT5/6 RJ-45 Ethernet cable connection to carry DC power to a PoE-enabled device. Any data recorded on any recording medium (e.g., electronic, magnetic or optical) that contains information of events and camera views that have happened in the past. The review date displayed in the header of the document is the future date for review of a document. The default period is three years from the date of approval however a review may be mandated at any time where a need is identified. Potential needs for a review include changes in legislation, organisational changes, restructures, occurrence of an incident or changes in technology or work practice and/or identification of efficiency improvements. An armed zone or an armed intruder alarm system in the non-alarmed state. Area in a building where CCTV data is monitored, retrieved and analysed and security alarms are annunciated and actioned. Any medium that has the capacity to permanently store data even when power is switched off and from which data can later be retrieved. Storage system Supervisor Zone CCTV system with the capability, in any medium, to effectively capture and store data that can later be retrieved, viewed or processed. Person trained and specifically designated and authorised by the owner of a system to ensure that the system is at all times operated in accordance with this Standard and any procedural instruction issued by the owner or manager. That part of an alarmed system (an area) to which at least one detection device is allotted and for which individual indication is provided. NW000-S0060 UNCONTROLLED IF PRINTED Page 11 of 22

12 5.0 INTRODUCTION 5.1 General This Network Standard details the requirements for the installation of electronic perimeter security devices at major substations. As an electricity infrastructure owner, Ausgrid has a responsibility to prevent unauthorised access to hazardous areas within its control. As part of its risk management framework, the organisation has employed a variety of control measures to maintain a safe electricity supply and reduce the likelihood of public exposure to electrical hazards by minimising unauthorised access to electrical infrastructure. Such measures include the replacement of all live yard fences with intruder resistant fencing and monthly inspections by Ausgrid personnel. The latter measure was introduced as a result of a direction to do so by the NSW Coroner in 2003, following the fatality of a teenager who had gained unauthorised entry into Cronulla Zone substation. Ausgrid defines an intruder resistant fence as.a fence with limited access over, through and under the fence. The intruder resistant fence is designed to minimise the likelihood of unauthorised access. Reducing the likelihood of other security threats such as malicious damage, terrorism and theft can be leveraged off the measures already in place to reduce exposure to electrical hazards. While Ausgrid has undoubtedly improved the level of security with the roll out of intruder resistant fencing, our major substations still experience breaks-ins through the use of cutting implements. Such breaches, once intruders have left, leave the site and exposed live equipment susceptible to entry by others, such as inquisitive children. International events over recent years, and breaches such as that illustrated above, highlight the value of a renewed focus on security and particularly a security in depth approach. This concept is heavily endorsed within the Commonwealth Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF), which links into the Commonwealth Physical Security Management Protocols. This concept is also utilised by electricity networks in the USA. Ausgrid falls into the category of a Critical Infrastructure (CI) Operator / Operator. It has a number of sites (both corporate sites and major substations) which have been classified as CI, some of which have been additionally classified as assets of national significance. As such, Ausgrid has obligations to demonstrate compliance with Critical Infrastructure Protection Management Framework, and the National Guidelines For Protecting Critical Infrastructure From Terrorism. A part of this framework dictates an obligation to be able to detect a security-related incident within a certain period, based on the national threat level, as outlined below: Low level threat detection within 48 hours; Medium level threat detection within 24 hours; High level threat detection within 12 hours; Extreme level threat immediate detection. It is not the intent of this Network Standard to limit how the perimeter security objectives are achieved. Any design that meets the listed business requirements will be examined on its merits in line with the general requirements for safety, security, legality, maintainability and operability that underlie this Standard. 5.2 Responsibility All substation security designs must be approved by Ausgrid s Manager - Security Operations and Infrastructure Protection, or their authorised representative. NW000-S0060 UNCONTROLLED IF PRINTED Page 12 of 22

13 6.0 ASBESTOS All materials and equipment used for construction of Ausgrid s assets are to be free from Asbestos and or Asbestos related products. Suppliers are expected to comply with the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (NSW) together with the Work Health and Safety Regulation 2011 (NSW) and confirm in writing that all products supplied to Ausgrid contain no Asbestos related materials. 7.0 BUSINESS OBJECTIVES The implementation of Electronic Perimeter Security will enable Ausgrid to detect both actual and attempted breaches of substation perimeters prior to individuals gaining access to live yard environments; removing the risk of death/injury to, or malicious damage/sabotage caused by, unauthorised intruders. Electronic Perimeter Security involves the use of electronic cameras and the integration of these devices with other perimeter security services. The implementation of the project will provide the following benefits to the business: detection of a attempted and actual breaches of substation perimeters in real time; real time verification of breaches and ability to identify false positive alarms, i.e. alarms triggered by fauna; the public address function will enable announcements to be made when intruders are detected, acting as a significant deterrent; ability of Network Control Room to leverage off the system s cameras to identify developing faults on electrical infrastructure; robust system in place that will satisfy Commonwealth mandated National threat level response timelines for reporting incidents affecting Ausgrid s CI sites; cost savings associated with alarm responses; cost savings associated with outsourced monitoring fees; cost savings associated with security surveillance (removal of random patrols); and enhancing Ausgrid s duty of care. Cost savings are also leveraged off the use of Ausgrid s Security Control Room. Video verification of alarm activation removes the inefficiencies associated with traditional alarm monitoring. The ability to identify and discount false positive alarms saves the costs of despatching mobile patrols, while the identification of actual intruders permits the timely deployment of Police and/or other emergency services personnel as well as Ausgrid personnel, as the case may be. 8.0 SPECIFICATIONS There are multiple options, from a component point of view, for facilitating the business objectives. These options will not be discussed in this document, since they will be derived during the design phase and presented by the suppliers as part of a competitive quote process. The outcomes-based specifications for Electronic Perimeter Security are described below. NW000-S0060 UNCONTROLLED IF PRINTED Page 13 of 22

14 The following eight requirements relate to the electronic security measures for Critical Infrastructure. These requirements are a direct extract from the Ausgrid s Protective Security Manual, October Electrical infrastructure Specification 1 All sections of the perimeter formed by the live yard fence and substation building are to be monitored by an intruder detection system designed to detect and annunciate an attempted and/or actual breach of the perimeter. Specification 2 All entry points into the perimeter formed by the live yard fence and substation building, such as gates in fences and doors into buildings, are to be protected by electronic access control alarms, in addition to the existing key locking system. Specification 3 The intruder detection system at each substation is required to be able to be monitored and managed remotely from Ausgrid s Security Control Room (SCR). Specification 4 The entire length of the perimeter formed by the live yard fence and substation building, including gates in fences and doors into buildings, including multi-storied buildings, shall be monitored via a CCTV camera system. The video output from the camera is to be recorded. Specification 5 The internal spaces of perimeter entry/exit points are to be monitored by intrusion detection devices to provide confirmation of a breach in the perimeter. 8.2 Administration buildings Specification 6 All entry points into the administration building are to be fitted with an intruder detection device, which is to be connected to an intruder alarm system and monitored at Ausgrid s SCR. Specification 7 All entry points into the administration building are to be monitored via a CCTV camera. The video output from the camera is to be recorded. Specification 8 Internal spaces of perimeter entry/exit points within the building are to be monitored by an intrusion detection device, which is to be connected to an intruder alarm system and monitored at Ausgrid s SCR. 9.0 DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 9.1 General Site designs for access control and intruder detection will be carried out by Ausgrid s Security Operations & Infrastructure Protection staff. Once approved, these designs become the formal design for each site. NW000-S0060 UNCONTROLLED IF PRINTED Page 14 of 22

15 9.2 Network cabling MPLS cabling In order to facilitate remote monitoring all electronic perimeter security components are to be connected to Ausgrid s MPLS network, via an Ausgrid standard network switch installed at each site Fibre cabling Communications within the site will be via a 12 core multi-mode OM2 fibre optic ring connection to field 19 rack cabinets, placed in locations throughout the installation site. SC FOBOT s are required in each field cabinet. The ring shall be designed so damage to one fibre optic cable will still allow communications via a secondary path Category 6 ethernet cabling Cabling from field cabinets to end devices will be via Cat 6 Ethernet cabling with a maximum distance of 90m. All Cat 6 cable runs are to be protected with a suitable surge protection device Rack cabinets 19 rack cabinets are to be located to minimize the length of all copper Ethernet cabling to field devices. Cat 5/6 Ethernet cabling has a maximum distance of 90m. This distance MUST NOT be exceeded. Cable routes and installation must be planned with this maximum distance in mind. Cabinets will be organised and laid out in such a way that all equipment has adequate access for maintenance and sufficient cable management is installed. Each cabinet lock barrel shall be capable of being keyed or changed to the Ausgrid Keying System. 9.3 Security Management System Ausgrid uses Challenger products, managed through the Forcefield system, for intrusion detection and access control throughout all Ausgrid sites. Any additional systems shall be compatible with the current security infrastructure. The Security Management System shall be designed to achieve the following success criteria: Prevent unauthorised access to Ausgrid sites. Prevent theft of Ausgrid assets. Community safety. Staff safety. Detection of security breaches within National Threat Alert Level timeframes. All security system equipment shall meet Ausgrid s requirements. All equipment shall be suitable for installation in a High Voltage electrical substation. Criteria include, but are not limited to, power system and lighting transients, induction, capacitive coupling and earth potential rise. The security system supplied shall include all necessary equipment required for the effective and reliable operation of the system. The security system shall be arranged in a regular manner suitably programmed to enable authorised personnel to readily operate the system. All security system hardware equipment and wiring shall be protected against tampering. The following minimum indications of the electronic security system are to be received at the Security Control Room: NW000-S0060 UNCONTROLLED IF PRINTED Page 15 of 22

16 Armed/Disarmed (by area). Sector Isolated (by input). Perimeter/Internal Alarm (by input). Tamper Alarm (by input). Mains Failure (by power supply). Battery Low (by power supply). 9.4 CCTV System The purpose of the video footage is to enable Ausgrid to verify that an alarm is a real intrusion or attempted intrusion event, therefore the quality of video required should enable the operators to distinguish between a person and another object (animal or debris). The video is not intended for use in identifying individuals in legal proceedings. Therefore Face Identification quality video footage is not required. The CCTV system installed will be an IP based solution with local cameras recording back to a central Security Control Room via the Ausgrid MPLS Fibre Network. All installed equipment will be compatible with Ausgrid s Integrated Security Management and Digital Management System CCTV alarm activated video Ausgrid uses Challenger products managed through the Forcefield system, for intrusion detection and access control throughout all Ausgrid sites. To meet the objectives of the program the CCTV must be capable of verifying a perimeter intrusion of attempted breach when an alarm is activated. The CCTV system MUST be configured to enable access/intrusion events from the Security Management System (Forcefield) to trigger camera footage onto the control room video wall External cameras Selected external IP cameras are at a minimum to have the following specifications and capabilities: Image Sensor: CMOS Image Sensor Size: ¼ Megapixel Sensor: 1+ Min Colour Illumination: Min B/W Illumination: 0.3 Lux 0.05 lux Min Video Resolution: 1280 x 800 Min Frames per second: Streaming frame rate: Alarm recording frame rate: 30 fps 5 fps 25 fps Compression: H.264 Video Motion Detection: Yes Either vandal resistant dome cameras or full body cameras with suitable lenses and vandal proof enclosures are acceptable. The selected camera should also have installed onboard storage via memory card of at least 8GB to provide local recording in the event of the camera losing communications with the SCR Internal cameras Selected internal IP Cameras are at minimum to have the following specifications and capabilities: NW000-S0060 UNCONTROLLED IF PRINTED Page 16 of 22

17 Image sensor: CMOS Image sensor size: ¼ Megapixel sensor: 1+ Min colour Illumination: Min B/W illumination: 0.3 Lux 0.05 lux Min video resolution: 1280 x 800 Min Frames per second: Streaming frame rate: Alarm recording frame : 30 fps 5 fps 25 fps Compression: H.264 Video Motion Detection: Yes Vandal resistant dome cameras are the preferred option, however, full body cameras with suitable lenses and vandal proof enclosures will be considered. The selected camera should also have installed onboard storage via memory card of at least 8GB to provide local recoding in the event of the camera losing communications with the SCR Intercom cameras Selected intercom IP Cameras are at minimum to have the following specifications and capabilities: Image sensor: CMOS Image sensor size: ¼ Megapixel sensor: 1+ Min colour Illumination : 1 Lux Min video resolution : 800 x 600 Min frames per second: 30 fps Compression: H.264 Video Motion Detection: Yes Miniature vandal resistant dome cameras are the preferred option. The selected camera should also have installed onboard storage via memory card of at least 8GB to provide local recording in the event of the camera losing communications with the SCR Licence plate recognition (LPR) cameras The selected licence plate camera will have the ability to read number plates of vehicles entering the transformer runway and will be interfaced to the Security Control Room to compare the number against known vehicles to alarm when an unknown or unauthorised vehicle enters. All additional processing units and/or software licences need to be supplied and installed Camera lens The lens selected for each camera shall be suitable for the field of view that the camera is required to achieve. The lens shall be matched to the image sensor size and shall be electronic auto-iris. Either varifocal or fixed focal length lens are both acceptable providing the desired field of view is achieved. Day/Night camera compatibility is also required. NW000-S0060 UNCONTROLLED IF PRINTED Page 17 of 22

18 9.4.7 Illumination Where indicated, external cameras are to include suitable IR Illuminators to flood the area with Infrared light to provide acceptable images in low light situations. IR Illumination is to be activated automatically based on ambient light levels Power supply Power for cameras preferably is to be supplied by a stand alone power supply rather than rely on POE due to the limited amount of POE ports available on the Ausgrid supplied Cisco switches. The use of at POE mid span injectors (such as Black Box part # LPJ016A-T) maybe considered if non POE powered IP cameras cannot be sourced Equipment placement The placement of CCTV cameras and other equipment within the site may be restricted due the design standards of particular sites, in particular the installation poles for mounting equipment. Advice should be sought from the relevant Ausgrid departments before Electronic Perimeter Security design for each site is commenced. 9.5 Earthing When working in Ausgrid s sites, earthing of equipment may be required for safety reasons. Ausgrid s earthing guidelines/procedures are to be observed at all times when carrying out work in live yard environments. 9.6 Conduits In order to ensure that the system is flexible enough for future expansion, if required, any below ground conduits should have a minimum diameter of 50 mm RECORDKEEPING The table below identifies the types of records relating to the process, their storage location and retention period. Table 1 Recordkeeping Type of Record Storage Location Retention Period* Approved copy of the network standard Draft Copies of the network standard during amendment/creation Working documents ( s, memos, impact assessment reports, etc.) BMS Network sub process Standard Company TRIM Work Folder for Network Standards (Trim ref. 2014/21250/xxx) TRIM Work Folder for Network Standards (Trim ref. 2014/21250/xxx) Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited * The following retention periods are subject to change eg if the records are required for legal matters or legislative changes. Before disposal, retention periods should be checked and authorised by the Records Manager. NW000-S0060 UNCONTROLLED IF PRINTED Page 18 of 22

19 11.0 AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES For this network standard the authorities and responsibilities of Ausgrid employees and managers in relation to content, management and document control of this network standard can be obtained from the Company Procedure (Network) Production/Review of Network Standards. The responsibilities of persons for the design or construction work detailed in this network standard are identified throughout this standard in the context of the requirements to which they apply DOCUMENT CONTROL Content Coordinator : Transmission and Distribution Substations Engineering Manager Distribution Coordinator : Engineering Information and Services Manager NW000-S0060 UNCONTROLLED IF PRINTED Page 19 of 22

20 Annexure A Sample Compliance Checklist NW000-S0060 UNCONTROLLED IF PRINTED Page 20 of 22

21 NW000-S0060 UNCONTROLLED IF PRINTED Page 21 of 22

22 NW000-S0060 UNCONTROLLED IF PRINTED Page 22 of 22