Conference on Behavioral & Experimental Agri-Environmental Research: Methodological Advancements & Applications to Policy

Transcription

1 The effect of informational nudges and financial incentives to promote voluntary behavior to reduce nonpoint source pollution: A randomized controlled trial Conference on Behavioral & Experimental Agri-Environmental Research: Methodological Advancements & Applications to Policy Haoran Miao a, Simona Trandafir a, Emi Uchida a, and Michael Price b a Department of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, University of Rhode Island, Kinston, RI b Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies,University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL Acknowledgements: This material is based upon work supported in part by the RI Agricultural Experiment Station Hatch Regional RI0015-W3133 and National Science Foundation EPSCoR Track-2 Cooperative Agreement IIA , Collaborative Research: North East Water Resources Network.

2 Nonpoint source (NPS) pollution problems Permission of using this illustration given by Paul Mirocha

3 Urbanization in Rhode Island

4 Algal blooms in the Greenwich Bay, Rhode Island (Source: Rhode Island NSF EPSCOR) Fish Kill in the Greenwich Bay, Rhode Island (Source: Rhode Island DEM)

5 Potential policies to reduce NPS pollution Mandatory regulations to change current behavior Voluntary and outreach programs to stimulate environmentfriendly behavior Financial incentives Informational nudges

6 Research question Which types of tools work-informational nudges, financial incentives, or both-to reduce nonpoint source pollution from residential lawns?

7 Literature review Which one will work better, Informational nudges or/and financial incentives? Informational nudges change willingness to pay Depositario et al. [2009], Rousseau and Vranken [2011], and Stemle et al. [2016] Informational nudges change behavior Mathios [2000], Bertrand & Morse [2011], and Allott [2011] A tension exists between informational nudges and financial incentives Alpízar and martinsson [2011], [Lacetera et al., 2012], and Pellerano et al., [2016]

8 Environment-friendly behavior Best management practices (BMP) examples for lawn care Mow high Don t fertilize early Avoid fertilizers from impervious surfaces Challenge: Difficult to observe behavior in the field

9 Integrate BMP with Law care contracts Rhode Island Department of Environment Management Green Certification for lawn care companies (2015) To be certified, lawn care companies must fulfill selected best management practices to protect water quality, conserve water, and contribute to the sustainability of the landscape. Here are some practices the green-certified companies have adopted: mow appropriately fertilize appropriately use safer pesticides

10 Research question What would make residents change from an existing lawn care service contract (or no contract) to a contract with a green-certified green services, informational nudges and/or financial incentives?

11 Randomized field experiment Time: March 22 April 15, 2017 Partnership Rhode Island Nursery and Landscape Association (RINLA) Three green-certified lawn care companies Subject pool Households in Rhode Island and some adjacent counties of Massachusetts and Connecticut Local organizations Qualtrics panel- online survey software Final sample size 1,736

12 Randomized field experiment The online survey Part I: screening questions + consent form Part II: lawn characteristics, and lawn management in 2016 Part III: Information randomization Basic information (1/3) Basic information + informational nudges 1(1/3) Basic information + informational nudges 1 + informational nudges 2(1/3) Part IV: Incentive randomization No incentive (1/4) Low incentive (1/2) High incentive II (1/4) Part V: Demographic questions, the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) Scale, and the Self-Report Altruism (SRA) Scale

13 Outcome variables 1. Willingness to pay There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If you were to hire a green certified lawn care company to manage your lawn in 2017, how much would you be willing to pay for these services for the entire season? 2. Likelihood to hire green-certified lawn care companies Given the information provided to you, how likely are you going to hire a green-certified lawn care company to manage your lawn? Extremely likely/ Moderately likely/ Slightly likely/ Slightly unlikely/ Moderately unlikely/ Extremely unlikely

14 Outcome variables 3. Whether or not the subjects gave contact information (Phone numbers and addresses) to green-certified lawn care companies to request on-site free estimations For this research project, the researchers at University of Rhode Island are collaborating with the following three green-certified lawn care companies (in alphabetical order): A Cut Above ( Dana Designs ( SeaScape ( Are you interested in signing up here to receive more information about their services? If you sign up, one or more of the three green-certified lawn care companies serving your area will contact you to give you more information, including a free estimate. Yes, I am interested in signing up. No, I am not interested at this time.

15 Treatment table Treatments No incentive Incentive I Incentive II Basic info. Baseline Treated Treated Basic info. + Info. Nudges 1 Treated Treated Treated Basic info. + Info. Nudges 1+2 Treated Treated Treated

16 Financial incentives No incentive Low: 25% of contract value, up to $75 High: 50% of contract value, up to $150

17 Basic information: A short description in words + Infographic

18 Informational nudges 1

19 Informational nudges 2

20 Treatment table Treatments No incentive Incentive I Incentive II Basic info. Baseline Treated Treated Basic info. + Info. Nudges 1 Treated Treated Treated Basic info. + Info. Nudges 1+2 Treated Treated Treated Treatments No incentive Incentive I Incentive II Basic info. Baseline Treated Treated Basic info. + Info. Nudges Treated Treated Treated

21 Main findings from the experiment Informational nudges increases WTP for green-certified lawn care contracts. Informational nudges and financial incentives both may work to encourage homeowners to buy green-certified lawn care contracts. They may substitute each other, especially when the financial incentives are small.

22 Results: Willingness to pay Dependent variable: Willingness to pay for a green-certified lawn care contract ($ per year, Tobit model analysis) Variables (1) (2) (3) Informational nudges 125.7* 134.9* 140.5** (67.87) (69.99) (69.87) Cost in *** 0.955*** 0.845*** (0.0715) (0.0726) (0.0867) Informational nudges * Cost in ** ** ** (0.171) (0.174) (0.161) Panel (52.21) (58.66) (54.89) NEP Scale (39.84) (41.89) SRA Scale (1.865) (1.943) Other lawn care characteristics ü Other individual characteristics ü Pseudo R square N 1,544 1,462 1,348 Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

23 Results: Stated Likelihood Given the information and rebate provided to you, how likely are you going to hire a green-certified lawn care company to manage your lawn? (Please choose one) Treatments Extremely unlikely Moderately unlikely Slightly unlikely Slightly likely Moderately likely Extremely likely No nudges *no incentives No nudges * Low incentive 38.84% 11.57% 9.92% 22.31% 13.22% 4.13% 31.43% 10.36% 11.43% 26.79% 14.29% 5.71% Nudges * High incentive 22.83% 8.66% 7.09% 30.71% 23.62% 7.09% Nudges * High incentive 25.71% 13.93% 10.00% 24.29% 16.79% 9.29% Nudges * Low incentive 30.54% 13.42% 11.09% 21.21% 17.51% 6.23% Nudges * High incentive 25% 12.31% 9.07% 20.90% 22.01% 10.07%

24 Results: Stated Likelihood Ordered Logit model Extremely Moderately Slightly unlikely Slightly likely Extremely unlikely unlikely Moderately likely (marginal effects) likely Treatments No nudges * Low incentive ψ * ** * ** ** (0.0409) ( ) ( ) (0.0146) (0.0186) ( ) No nudges * High incentive ψ *** *** *** *** *** (0.0441) ( ) ( ) (0.0138) (0.0245) (0.0178) Nudge 1 * No incentive ψ ** *** ** *** ** (0.0411) ( ) ( ) (0.0144) (0.0191) (0.0107) Nudge 1 * Low incentive ψ ** *** ** *** *** (0.0388) ( ) ( ) (0.0139) (0.0176) ( ) Nudge 1 * High incentive ψ *** *** *** *** *** (0.0409) ( ) ( ) (0.0140) (0.0201) (0.0122) Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Ψ: Baseline category is the treatment without nudges or incentives.

25 Results: Action rate Percentage of participants who left their personal information to the green-certified lawn care companies No Nudges Nudges No Incentives 4.76% 10.67% Low Incentives 11.11% 12.13% High Incentives 14.00% 16.67%

26 Results: Action rate Variables (LOGIT model) Act Coef. Marginal effects No nudges * Low incentive *** (2.823) (0.0324) No nudges * High incentive ψ *** (3.261) (0.0437) Nudges * No incentive ** (2.892) (0.0304) Nudges * Low incentive ψ *** (2.557) (0.0277) Nudges * High incentive ψ *** (2.866) (0.0331) Panel *** *** (0.243) (0.0234) NEP Scale 0.890** *** (0.442) (0.0191) SRA Scale (0.0233) ( ) Treatments # NEP scale ü Treatments # SRA scale ü Lawn care characteristics ü Other individual characteristics ü Robust standard errors in parentheses for the coefficient column and delta method standard errors in parentheses for marginal effect column. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Ψ: Baseline category is the treatment without nudges or incentives.

27 Thank you! Please kindly offer your comments and suggestions! Haoran Miao Ph.D. candidate on the job market University of Rhode Island