How would a major nuclear incident be handled in Hong Kong? Security Bureau Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government

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Edwin Pierce
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1 How would a major nuclear incident be handled in Hong Kong? Security Bureau Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government 1

2 Daya Bay Nuclear Power Station 2

3 Daya Bay Nuclear Power Station Joint venture between Hong Kong Nuclear Investment Co. Ltd (HKNIC) & Guangdong Nuclear Investment Co. Ltd (GNIC) Construction started Operation started 70% power output supplying Hong Kong Meeting 23% of local demand 50 km from Tsim Sha Tsui 3

4 Daya Bay Contingency Plan (DBCP) 1987 Consultancy Study by the UK Atomic Energy Authority Windscale (1957), Three Mile Island (1979) & Chernobyl (1986) experience Risk assessment for HK Prudent approach fully meeting international standards Development of the DBCP by Security Bureau Development of monitoring, assessment & response capabilities by departments Proven by exercises 4

5 Emergency Response Management Contingency Plans ( *Emergency Response System *Contingency Plan for Natural Disasters *Contingency for Dealing with an Aircraft Crash in Hong Kong *Contingency Plan for the Salvage of Crashed Aircraft *Contingency Plan for Maritime and Aeronautical Search and Rescue *Daya Bay Contingency Plan (DBCP) *Emergency Response Operations Outside the Hong Kong SAR 5

6 Questions? How can we know of an accident? How might Hong Kong be affected? What will we do? Are we coping with changes? 6

7 How can we know of an accident? (1) Environmental Radiation Monitoring Programme (HKO) - Radiation monitoring network *10 radiation monitoring stations * including gamma spectrometry system at Ping Chau * on-line, automated - Testing of environmental samples * drinking water * sea water * underground water * soil * sediment * foodstuff 7

8 Environmental Radiation Monitoring Programme 8

9 How can we know of an accident? (2) On-line water contamination monitor (Water Supplies Department) - Two identical systems at Muk Wu Pumping Station (near Man Kam To) - Monitor incoming water from Guangdong - Alarms to HK Observatory & Water Supplies Department 9

10 How can we know of an accident? (3) Notification by Guangdong (GD) authorities - Plant operator to notify GD authorities of any emergency event - GD authorities to notify HKSAR Government immediately of off-site emergency 10

11 How can we know of an accident? (4) Notification by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) - China a signatory to the United Nations Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident. - State notification to IAEA - HK Observatory to receive information from IAEA 11

12 How can we know of an accident? (5) Notification by CLP Power HK Ltd -CLP obliged to notify EMSD of power interruption (Electricity Ordinance) - CLP System Control Centre will alert EMSD & HKO - Power interruption may or may not be related to nuclear abnormality - 2 Government Representatives on Board of HKNIC 12

survey teams (HKO) - 13 fire stations as additional

13 How might HK be affected? (1) Enhanced monitoring in the event of a nuclear emergency - Radiation monitoring network (HKO) - Aerial monitoring System (HKO & GFS) - Two radiation mobile survey teams (HKO) - 13 fire stations as additional monitoring centres (HKO, FSD & CAS) - More drinking water sampling (WSD) - Food monitoring (AFCD & FEHD) 13

14 How might HK be affected? (2) Consequence Assessment - Accident Consequence Assessment System (ACAS) run by HKO - Computerised system based on real-time meteorological data, information on radiological releases, etc - Models the dispersion of radiological releases - Predicts the radiation dose to public 14

15 How might HK be affected? (3) Possible consequences - Exposure to radioactive plume - Ingestion of contaminated foodstuff and drinking water - Contaminated persons and cargo entering Hong Kong - Countermeasures needed 15

16 What will we do? (1) Activation of DBCP * Observation Level * Ready Level * Partial Activation Level * Full Activation Level 16

17 What will we do? (2) Emergency Response Structure *Steer by senior officials *Advice by professional departments *Central coordination *Operational departments Government Emergency Response Structure 17

18 What will we do? (3) Public Information - Media strategy - Information Policy Committee (convened by DIS) - Combined Information Centre (ISD plus Police Public Relations Bureau) - Press Briefing Centre - Overseas information 19

19 What will we do? (4) Counter-Measures * Plume Emergency Planning Zone (within 20km from plant) - Evacuation or Sheltering - Issue of Potassium Iodate Tablets - Monitoring/decontamination of persons who have been within the hot zone - Monitoring of incoming cargo * Ingestion Emergency Planning Zone (within 85km from plant) - Control of food - Control of livestock - Control of water 20

20 Are we coping with changes? (1) New Nuclear Power Stations - Lingao Nuclear Power Station (LNPS) close to DBNPS in Daya Bay - commenced operation in notification arrangements for emergencies with GD updated - The DBCP equally applicable to LNPS 21

21 Are we coping with changes? (2) More transparency - Non-emergency operational events of DBNPS (INES Level 0 & 1) - Monthly disclosure on HKNIC website - Higher public expectation - Agreement reached with the owners of DBNPS lately to advance disclosure within 2 working days - Parallel notification to HKSAR Government 22

with appropriate reference to DBCP * Enhanced environmental radiation monitoring * Food and drinking water monitoring *

22 Are we coping with changes? (3) Fukushima Accident - HKSAR Government requested HKNIC to review DBNPS for safe operation - Taking necessary measures, with appropriate reference to DBCP * Enhanced environmental radiation monitoring * Food and drinking water monitoring * Sea and air cargo monitoring * Enhanced radiation safety education * Health desk service at airport * Assistance to HK residents in Japan / travel alert - Public concerns about nuclear safety and emergency preparedness 24

23 Way Forward: Review To undertake comprehensive review on DBCP To learn lessons from Fukushima accident and follow international nuclear safety standards Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety to be held by the IAEA from 20 to 24 June 2011 in Vienna and beyond To take into account the comprehensive safety review by National Nuclear Safety Administration on all nuclear power plants in China Actual situation of Hong Kong SB to coordinate and work with all concerned 25

24 Way Forward: Review Review Scope * Review the application of the DBCP * Strengthen the notification mechanism for nuclear incidents * Step up radiation monitoring & assessment in Hong Kong * Follow closely the latest nuclear safety standards & contingency measures * Step up measures subsequent to activation of contingency plan 26

25 Way Forward: Exercise To test our preparedness and emergency response under the revised plan Large scale, inter-departmental exercise in early 2012 Experts (local, from Mainland and abroad) be invited as observers Parties outside Government and Hong Kong be involved Public participation as appropriate Further adjust the revised plan after exercise Promote community understanding of contingency plan Enhance public education on nuclear power and radiation safety 27

26 THANK YOU 28

International Framework for Preparedness and Response to Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies

CAPSCA First Meeting in Europe Paris, 20 to 22 September 2011 International Framework for Preparedness and Response to Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies Vladimir Kutkov IEC Incident and Emergency Centre