Photos courtesy of FDNY Photo Unit

Transcription

1 Photos courtesy of FDNY Photo Unit

2 : The Times Square Shuttle operates from Times Square to Grand Central Station underneath 42 nd Street. This shuttle subway line connects the 7 th Avenue subway line to the Lexington Avenue subway line. The subway stations on this line allowed access to shops, office buildings, and hotels without having to exit to the street. It also allowed access to Grand Central Terminal. There were three subway tracks underneath East 42 nd Street near Grand Central Station. At the time of the fire, the center track contained idle 4-car subway train. The third track was empty. The north side track had a three-car automated train which was idle at the time of the fire. The third track (southernmost) was empty. The three tracks were served by two subway platforms which were connected to platforms with wooden decks at the end of the tracks. On Tuesday morning April 21, 1964 the day was just beginning for the city that never sleeps. At 0446 hours, the Manhattan Fire Alarm Dispatchers received a telephone call reporting a fire in the subway at 42 nd Street and Park Avenue. Manhattan Box 789 was tapped out. Engines 65, 21, 8, Ladders 2, 4, Rescue 1, and Battalions 8 and 9 and the 3 rd Division would turn out. The 8 th Battalion arrived at the box at 0452 hours and immediately transmitted the All Hands. Deputy Chief Patrick E. Conlisk of the 3 rd Division arrived at 0456 hours and saw the magnitude of the fire situation. He transmitted a 2 nd alarm for box 789. Engines 54, 16, 1, Ladder 7, Squad 5 and the Field Communications Unit All photos courtesy of FDNY Photo Unit

3 would respond. At 0457 hours, a special call for an additional engine was sent. Engine 2 would respond. The 3 rd Division had difficulty in confirming that power was off for the third rail in the fire area. At 0457 hours, the last train from the Times Square Station arrived at Grand Central Station. The train was to arrive on Track #1, the only available track. As Motorman Patsy DeSena approached the station, he saw the two trains at their terminal on fire. Heavy smoke filled the underground subway station. He stopped short of the fire. He discharged a handful of passengers and rapidly removed the train and returned to the Times Square Station. As New York City Fire Department (FDNY) units arrived at the scene, an incredible sight was on display. Heavy smoke filled the street. Smoke and embers were rapidly rising from sidewalk subway grates. It was obvious to all responding Firefighters that this was not an ordinary Subway System fire. Fire had spread beyond the two subway cars on fire. The wooden deck of the platform was on fire. Token booths and turnstiles were involved in fire on three mezzanines. An incredible amount of heat was being produced and was spreading the fire by conduction, convection, and radiation. The restaurants, stores, and building entrances were in danger of fire overtaking them. The opening for Grand Central Terminal itself All photos courtesy of FDNY Photo Unit

4 was in danger. There were 6 openings into the subway station. Only one of them went to the street. The rest of the openings went to stores or high-rise buildings. Engine 65 would stretch the first 2 ½ inch hose line down the subway station stairway from the street. The were going down into the heavy plume of smoke and heat. Multiple Engine Companies would be used to stretch multiple hose lines. Engine 21 was the second due engine. Working in Engine 21 was Probationary Firefighter Joe Domiano and Firefighter Richie Polizio. This would be Pr. Fr. Domiano s first major fire. They were ordered to stretch a 2 ½ inch hose line down the subway entrance stairway as well. Pr. Fr. Domiano said it they had to slide down the stairway on their stomachs to stay below the heat. As they were descending, the tiles on the subway station ceilings and walls were popping from the heat. In 1964, fire companies did not have a full compliment of Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA). Engine 21 only had two SCBAs assigned to them. The SCBAs were generally used by the Door and Control Firefighters. As Engine 21 stretched their hose line, the Officer sent Fr. Polizio back to get the second of their SCBAs. This scene of fire operations was now a couple of city blocks wide. The 3 rd Division had to manage the assignment of units to this vast area. All photos courtesy of FDNY Photo Unit

5 The area involved was not only the subway station but all the buildings on either side of East 42 nd Street between Park Avenue and Madison Avenue. Communications underground via portable radios was sporadic. Fire was now spreading to the stores and building entrances that opened into the subway system. The 3 rd Division transmitted a 3 rd alarm at 0510 hours. Hose lines were ordered to be stretched via the subway ventilation grates in an attempt to avoid the punishing heat coming up from the subway stairway to the street. Engine 14, 34, 23, Ladder 24, Battalion 7 and Ambulance 1 would turnout for the 3 rd Alarm. In addition to the incredible heat condition coming up from the subway platform, searches had to be conducted in this labyrinth of subway platforms, tunnels, stores, restaurants, and high-rise building entrances. A 4 th Alarm was transmitted at 0519 hours which would send Engines 39, 5, 40, 33, and Ladder 21 to the fire. Transit officials informed the 3 rd Division that power indeed had been shut off and that everyone was probably evacuated from the subway station. Ladder Companies started searching along the perimeter of the fire area while progressively moving closer to the seat of the fire. All the buildings that had a smoke condition in them had to be searched as well. All photos courtesy of FDNY Photo Unit

6 This fire scene was extraordinarily dangerous for operating Firefighters. The dark subway station and tunnel was made even more dangerous due to the thick acrid smoke and extreme heat. The 3 rd Division transmitted a 5 th alarm at 0541 hours which would bring Engines 18, 3, 22, 74, 13 and Ladder 3 to the scene. A special call was sent at 0556 for Rescue 2 to respond. FDNY units were very concerned about the fire spreading to stores on the street level due to the heat and sparks rising from the sidewalk ventilation openings. Finally, the hose lines broke through the heat that was being produced from this massive underground fire. Some hose lines were ordered shut-down because there were opposing streams. As Firefighters got closer to the subway cars that were involved in fire, a horrifying discovery was made. Steel columns that extended from the subway platforms to support 42 nd Street were warped and distorted. 42 nd Street dropped 8 to 10 inches from Vanderbilt Avenue to Madison Avenue. Fire apparatus and other vehicles were quickly removed from 42 nd Street to prevent total collapse of the street and tunnel into the subway station below. It was estimated that the temperature of the steel was 1200 degrees Fahrenheit to cause so much damage to the steel. There were 40 steel columns that were severely damaged from the heat. At 0626 hours, a 6 th Alarm was transmitted for relief purposes which brought fire companies from Queens to the fire. They were: Engines 258, 259, 215, Ladders, 115, 128, and Rescue 4. The fire was declared Under Control at 0652 hours. All photos courtesy of FDNY Photo Unit

7 Fire Commissioner Edward Thompson and Chief Fire Marshal Martin Scott ruled out sabotage or arson as a cause of the fire. It was determined that it was caused by spontaneous electrical ignition at a dispatch booth at the western end of the tracks between tracks 1 and 3. Fire Commissioner Thompson stated by 0530 hours, the station was an inferno. He went on to state: It was as hot down there as a man can possibly stand, even hotter. You couldn t see, couldn t breathe, the only light was from the flames themselves. Transit Authority Chairman Joseph E. O Grady said it is the worst subway fire he had ever seen. Mr. O Grady stated that the target time to get the shuttle train line up and running will be noon of the next day. The burned out subway cars would have to be cut-up with torches and used as scrap metal. Crews of up to 300 men were used around the clock to meet this goal. The Buildings Department Commissioner Harold Birns sent out many structural engineers to inspect the foundations of all the buildings exposed to the massive fire. All the foundations were found to be safe. Highways Commissioner John T. Carroll inspected the damage to 42 nd Street. He stated that 42 nd Street between Park Avenue and Madison Avenue would have to ripped open to install new beams, girders, and columns. There were eleven members of the FDNY that were injured at this fire. Their injuries were contusions, abrasions, conjunctivitis, 1 st and 2 nd degree burns, smoke inhalation, heat exhaustion, dislocated shoulder, chest pains, and lacerations to the hand. Young Firefighter Joe Domiano of Engine 21 finally made it home later in the day. He saw his wife Pamela and told her: I was in hell today. All photos courtesy of FDNY Photo Unit

8 All photos courtesy of FDNY Photo Unit

9 All photos courtesy of FDNY Photo Unit

10 Line: IRT Times SquareGrand Central Shuttle Location: Grand Central Car: R-17 (St. Louis, ) 6597 Photo by: Herbert P. Maruska Date: 4/23/1964 Photos courtesy of FDNY Photo Unit

11 Line: IRT Times Square-Grand Central Shuttle Location: Grand Central Car: R-17 (St. Louis, ) 6595/6601 Photo by: Herbert P. Maruska Date: 4/23/1964 Notes: Aftermath of Grand Grand opening of Shuttle System: New York City Transit Line: IRT Times Square-Grand Central Shuttle Location: Grand Central Photo by: Barry Pollack Date: 4/1964 Notes: Aftermath of Grand Central Shuttle fire.

12 The first decision that must be made by FDNY Personnel at subway fires and emergencies is that does the power have to be shut down. Power must be removed and confirmed off if any FDNY Personnel have to enter a track area. The only exception to this is that if life is in imminent peril and immediate action is required to save a life. (Power must still be requested to be shut off.) All caution should be exercised if this is the case. Unexpected train traffic should be expected. Transit Authority Motormen have been instructed to, in the event of power removal, to coast to the next station. If FDNY Personnel must enter the tracks before power off confirmation, the power removal box at the blue light can be utilized. The train dispatcher must be contacted by the phone at the blue light immediately or the train dispatchers will restore the power. However, power removal must be requested always through the FDNY Boro Dispatcher. Auxiliary contact can be made through the Transit Authority Police or other Transit Authority (TA) employees equipped with a TA radio.

13 If the first arriving Chief Officer thinks it is necessary, contact the FDNY Dispatcher to notify the Transit Authority Dispatcher and request a Transit Supervisor respond to the fire/emergency. When FDNY Personnel are required to operate under a subway car, request that TA personnel deploy wooden slippers between the contact rail shoes and the third rail. The handi-talkie relay is a rapid method to communicate at subway fires/emergencies. The relay is set up as follows: Ladder Chauffeur Sets up at the bottom of the subway entrance stairs. If a token booth is within 50 yards of the stairs to the street, contact the train dispatcher through the token booth clerk. Outside Vent Firefighter Position at the foot of the stairs leading to the platform if it is within 50 yards of the Chauffeur. Roof Firefighter Positioned approximately 50 yards from the stairs on the subway platform. Engine Officer Positioned approximately 100 yards in the line of sight from the Roof Firefighter on the platform. Truck Officer Goes to the location of the fire. Selected units and the Field Communications unit have these devices and handsets. There are sound-powered telephone jacks in the dry standpipe box, and at the dry standpipe Siamese. A` 1620 key and an emergency exit key will be necessary to put the sound powered phones into operation along with the handsets.

14 In zone A of the handi-talkies, there are subway repeater channels on channel 14 and 15. Channel 14 is the primary repeater channel. If the repeater in the subway station is not working, these channels will not work. Check to make sure the repeater is operational before committing to this method of communication. The repeater channels should be used as a Command Channel. All members not designated to go to the repeater channel must stay on the Primary Tactical Channel. The First Due Truck must still establish the handi-talkie relay even if the repeater channels are being used. Post radios have been utilized at subway fires and emergencies. The additional wattage on the post radio has been beneficial. However, their use has had mixed results. : Depending upon where the hose line will be stretched, it may be desirable to have the Pumper close to the subway entrance or emergency exit. This pumper can then be supplied by another Engine Company. Engine Companies will have to pair-up to get the hose line into position. The hose line stretch will be a long a difficult stretch. The FT-2 Fog Nozzle should be used due to the possibility of the stream conducting electricity. The rubber tip of the FT-2 tip is also safer in reference to conductivity. The fog stream can also be used for ventilation. The dry standpipe with folded lengths of 2 ½ inch hose can be used for rapid hose line deployment to a subway platform. A subway emergency exit key is needed to access the standpipe discharge cabinet. All underriver tubes are equipped with a wet standpipe system.

15 Avoid contact with the third rail at all times. Do not step on the cover of the third rail. If one contact rail shoe is in contact with the third rail and is energized, then all the contact rail shoes are energized, even if not in contact with the third rail. When FDNY personnel are committed to the track area, firefighters should be deployed in pairs at the perimeter of the operation. The purpose of this assignment is to alert operating firefighters of oncoming trains. These firefighters should have a light and move it horizontally across their chest to warn the motorman of the FDNY operation. An exceptionally dangerous condition exists where the operation is near a tunnel entrance or exit. The visibility for the motorman will be hampered. Firefighters should per-select an area of safety when operating on the tracks or catwalks. If a wall has diagonal red and white signs on the tunnel wall, it indicates no clearance and is not an option as an area of safety. In the subway tunnel, an emergency exit is marked by a cluster of 5 white lights or a prism shaped sign.

16 Thanks to the following people who contributed to this essay: Captain Dennis Stack (Ret.), Fr. Joe Domiano (Ret.), Pamela Domiano, Fr. Rich Polizio (Ret.), Katy Clements (FDNY Photo Unit), FM Dan Maye (Mand Library), Deputy Chief Vincent Dunn (Ret.), Firefighter Chris Roberto (Engine 48). Resources: WNYF 3 rd Issue 1964, NY Daily News April 22, 1964, NY Post April 22, 1964, All Units Circular 207, Communications Manual Chapter 11 and 13. TIP OF THE HELMET TO: The Never Forget Foundation headed by Fr. Gene Lynch (Ret.) for their efforts in conceiving, constructing, and planning the September 11 th Memorial at the Redwood Club at 2680 Schurz Avenue in the Bronx. The unveiling and blessing of the new monument was conducted on April 7 th, Well done. FIREFIGHTER GEORGE F. FROEHLICH (RET.), LADDER 87: Passed away on Thursday, March 29, 2018, from injuries sustained at Manhattan Box This was the rescue and recovery effort at the World Trade Center after September 11, May he rest in peace. MARINE ENGINEER JOHN L. BUHLER (RET.), MARINE 6: Passed away on Saturday, March 24, 2018, from injuries sustained at Manhattan Box This was the rescue and recovery effort at the World Trade Center after September 11, May he rest in peace.

17 Location: Coney Island Yard Car: R-22 (St. Louis, ) 7513 Collection of: David Pirmann Date: 6/18/1960 Notes: Automatic shuttle train System: New York City Transit Line: IRT Times Square-Grand Central Shuttle Location: Grand Central Collection of: David Pirmann Date: 4/26/1964 Notes: Aftermath of Grand Central Shuttle fire