Urban Testbed Initiative

Transcription

1 UNCLASSIFIED Urban Testbed Initiative Tim Dasey (781) April 2001 MS This work was sponsored under Air Force contract F C The views expressed are those of the Author and do not reflect official policy or position of the United States Government. TJD 1

2 Report Documentation Page Report Date 03APR2002 Title and Subtitle Urban Testbed Initiative Author(s) Dasey, Tim Report Type N/A Dates Covered (from... to) 03APR APR2002 Contract Number F C-0002 Grant Number Program Element Number Project Number Task Number Work Unit Number Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es) Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Address(es) Air Force ESC/XPK (Richard Axtell) Hanscom AFB, MA Performing Organization Report Number Sponsor/Monitor s Acronym(s) Sponsor/Monitor s Report Number(s) Distribution/Availability Statement Approved for public release, distribution unlimited Supplementary Notes Workshop paper from the held 3-4 april 2002 at MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, MA, The original document contains color images. Abstract Subject Terms Report Classification unclassified Classification of Abstract unclassified Classification of this page unclassified Limitation of Abstract SAR Number of Pages 19

3 Outline Thoughts on Urban Biodefense Importance of Testbeds MIT LL Urban Testbed Initial Approach MBTA subway experiments Algorithmic approach Future Work TJD 2

4 Challenges Associated with Civilian Biodefense Any high-density site (city, airport, facility, building) represents a potential target Population to be protected is diverse (age, mobility, health) No environmental sensing systems will be tolerated that have high false negative or false positive rates If they alarm too much or miss events, they will be ignored Current clinical diagnostic technologies and medical infrastructure are not suited to rapid detection of bioagent events Advanced diagnostics (e.g., PCR) use is rare, even in large city hospitals No medical reporting systems are in use that have real-time detection of infectious disease patterns as their objective TJD 3

5 Biodefense Components Homeland Biodefense Numerous relationships between portions of this hierarchy are not shown. Response Management Health Care Environmental Monitoring Threat Management Training Publicity Mgmt Decontamination Inoculation Diagnosis Treatment Public Health Surveillance Sample Analysis Individual Protection Air Food Water Intelligence Facility Protection City-wide defense Base Protection Destruction Redteaming Attribution Indoor Outdoor Aircraft Airport Terminal Large Subway building Arenas Stadium Shopping mall Public Gathering TJD 4 Biodefense development must be multi-faceted.

6 Needed Biodefense Investments Point-of-care and public health not well integrated Health care system is the current detector System (multi-sensor) environmental monitoring development Focus has been on basic technology and devices Characterization of environments of high-threat facilities Sensor technology not universally applicable Helps to set requirements Large-scale urban protection Sparse sampling/sensing Low probability event with catastrophic consequences (akin to nuclear detonation) Red-teaming TJD 5

7 Environmental Monitors DoD environmental monitors designed for outdoor force protection High sensitivity preference Current cost prohibits mass-production Unproven performance in urban or indoor areas where air is filled with interferents Urban Civil Protection has markedly different requirements from military use Low false alert rate and low cost a priority Lower sensitivity partial solution may be preferred Wide variation in environments (e.g. stadium vs. subway) Densely populated areas add to natural biological interferents Airflow, HVAC are important design considerations TJD 6

8 BAWS III Background Measurement Campaign DRES, Canada 9/2000 (rural/arid) Salt Lake City 2/2001, 2002 (urban/arid) Dugway, UT 6/10/98-6/30/98 10/19/98-10/27/98 (Arid) Hawaii 6-7/2001 (Coastal) TJD 7 Ft Leonard Wood, MO 4/8/98-4/18/98 10/6/98-10/13/98 Ft McClellan, AL (Rural/Deciduous) 3/16/98-3/26/98 (Rural/Deciduous) Porton Down UK 10/2000 (Mixed urban/coastal/rural) Boston, MA 12/17/98-12/23/ ,2000,2001 (Urban) Panama City, FL 5/4/98-5/12/98 (Coastal) Washington DC 2/4/98-2/14/98, 1999 (Urban) Curtis Bay, MD 7/20/98-7/28/98 (Coastal) Atlanta, GA 11/2/98-11/10/98 (Urban/Light Industry) Camp Doha, Kuwait 1999 (Arid desert)

9 Testbeds as an Important Development Tool Environmental Monitoring Biodefense testbed Public Health First Responders Law Enforcement Physician Testbeds are needed for both public health and environmental monitoring systems Understand the problem and set system requirements Improve training Infuse emerging technologies in realistic settings Understand unique environments of various facility types TJD 8

10 BAWS July 4,2001 Esplanade Measurement Uv - Elastic / Uv + Elastic Uv - Visible / Uv + Visible 180 Uv - Elastic / Uv + Elastic Uv - Elastic / Uv + Elastic Uv - Visible / Uv + Visible Uv - Visible / Uv + Visible Uv - Elastic / Uv + Elastic Uv - Elastic / Uv + Elastic Uv - Visible / Uv + Visible Uv - Visible / Uv + Visible Event Counts (Hz) People sitting in tents Increased human activity Charles River Storrow Drive Boston Pops playing People leaving JFT-4 trial 8 average level :00 AM 07/04/ :00 AM 1:00 PM 3:00 PM 5:00 PM 7:00 PM 9:00 PM 11:00 PM Date & Time Event Counts (Hz) Landscaping Charles River Storrow Drive :00 AM 07/04/ /03/2001 TJD 9 9:00 AM 10:00 AM 11:00 AM 12:00 PM 1:00 PM 2:00 PM Date & Time

11 MIT/LL Urban Testbed Project Goals Define a system architecture for facility defense using environmental monitors Understand the natural air composition and the response of existing instruments in those facilities Develop decision logic methodology that is extensible to other urban defense problems TJD 10

12 Urban Testbed Status Project funding began in June, 2001 Coordination with Boston-area authorities for the past 1-2 years MA Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), Boston Emergency Management Authority (BEMA), MA Emergency Management Authority (MEMA), MA Dept of Public Health, National Guard, Logan airport, others BAWS measurements at Boston Marathon, July 4 th celebration Measurements in MBTA subway station; sensors being installed in a station. Particle counters, airflow, temperature, humidity, train motion. Periodic measurements in other locations or with sensors that cannot be installed for long periods. Develop alerting algorithm approach Controlled chamber releases Discussing measurements in other Boston locations TJD 11

13 Subway Protection Considerations Threat has been established Aum Shinrikyo Tokyo Sarin gas release Numerous entry points and hiding places Train piston effect moves air through the system System is spatially distributed Many low cost sensors preferred over few high cost sensors Release point cannot be anticipated apriori Important to find dual-use applications for system Principal response actions Stop trains (plug tunnels?) Activate vent fans? Evacuate and prevent additional access TJD 12

14 Station Particle Counts y g p, Particle Counts for 2-5 micron region Particles/Liter :30:00 16:45:00 17:00:00 17:15:00 17:30:00 17:45:00 Time (LST) micron Outbound Inbound Train Train Traffic Traffic significantly significantly alters alters particle particle counts counts y g, Particle Counts for 2-5 micron region Diurnal Diurnal Cycle Cycle significantly significantly alters alters particle particle counts counts Particles/Liter TJD :00 2:00 4:00 6:00 8:00 10:00 12:00 14:00 16:00 18:00 20:00 22:00 0:00 Time (Local)

15 Subway effects on Particle Counter Sensors y g Particle Counts for 5.0 micron and larger 5.0 micron Daily Mean Daily Median Particles/Liter TJD Oct Oct Oct Oct Oct Oct Oct Oct Oct Oct-01 Date 12-Oct Oct Oct Oct Oct-01 Particle Particle counter counter sensors sensors degrade degrade quickly quickly due due to to laser laser optics optics contamination. contamination. Full Full instrument instrument sensitivity sensitivity regained regained after after cleaning. cleaning.

16 Subway Alerting Algorithm Architecture Station 2 Station 1 Sensor Cluster Sensor Cluster Sensor Cluster Sensor Cluster Sensor Cluster Alerting Logic Multi-station evidence correlation Inter-station Transport Model Possible bioattack alert Operations Center, Police, Fire Outside weather Particle Counter Anemometers Temp, humidity Possible Actions Additional sampling and testing Activate vent fans Stop trains Evacuate Tunnel plugs Low-level data Evidence for bioattack Sensor cluster Generation Train motion Multiple Multiple sensors sensors required required to to agree agree and and sensitivity sensitivity reduced reduced to to reduce reduce risk risk of of false false alert. alert. TJD 15 Fusion of co-located sensors (cluster)

17 Health Care Provider and Public Health Integration Currently Patients 1-5 days Physician Sporadic reporting, multi-day delay Public Health Multiple days Manual Disease Pattern Detection Laboratory Diagnosis Prevent Future Outbreaks Needed Patients Physician Public Health Weather Report Public Health < 30 minutes Routine symptomatic data < 1 day Automated Disease Pattern Detection On-site Diagnostics Laboratory Confirmation Proactive Treatment of Current Outbreak TJD 16 Collateral benefit outside of biodefense

18 Merging of Health Care with Defense Against Biological Weapons Concept: Implement advanced point-of-care diagnostics (including but not limited to gene-chips), into IT networked system Enables rapid determination of biological attack Benefits natural infectious disease diagnosis, effective treatment Patient HCP Diagnostics Information assurance Network C2 Actionable Authorities Point of Care Terminals... Other data sources Data mining tools Dynamic Data base Direct Patient Benefit TJD 17 Surveillance

19 Boston Area Agencies with Biodefense Responsibilities Existing Structure Suggested Added Organizations National Guard NIH FBI FEMA CDC Medical, Bio, Public Health Facilities, e.g., Whitehead, HSPH, Partners Hospitals Command Center BEMA Boston Emergency Management Agency Command Center Boston Fire Department & EMS Federal / Research Facilities e.g., MIT/LL, MITRE DARPA DTRA Bio JPO DoE MBTA Police Public Health Logan Massport FAA TJD 18

20 Summary Civilian bioterrorism defense requires that the environment of high-threat locations be well understood Environment drives sensor & system design Initial testbed being installed at Boston subway station Measurements to date point out deficiencies of current sensors & software Modern recognition/data fusion techniques being applied to data Measurements at additional Boston threat locations under discussion TJD 19