32836 Bimini Lane Big Pine Key, FL or website:

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1 SCIENTIFIC FIRE ANALYSIS, LLC Bimini Lane Big Pine Key, FL or website: IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) ) ) v. ) Cr. No NG ) ) JAMES G. HEBSHIE ) ) AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN J. LENTINI, CFI, D-ABC STATE OF FLORIDA ) ) COUNTY OF BROWARD ) Before me, the undersigned authority, this day personally appeared John Lentini, who after first being legally duly sworn, deposes and says as follows: 1. My name is John J. Lentini. Jeanne Kempthorne, counsel for James Hebshie, has retained me to review the evidence in the above-captioned case. I am over the age of twenty-one and am not suffering from any disabilities. I make this affidavit of my own personal knowledge and/or expert opinion. 2. I have over 30 years of experience investigating fires. During my career, I have visited and inspected the scene of more than 2,000 fires. I have been accepted as an expert witness in more than 200 trials. My practice now

2 consists largely of review of fire investigations conducted by others. A copy of my resume is attached hereto as Exhibit 1 3. I have reviewed the reports, testimony, and photographs of the damage caused by the April 21, 2001 fire loss at 32 Main St., Taunton, MA. A list of materials that I reviewed prior to preparing this affidavit is attached hereto as Exhibit As a result of my review, I find it necessary to report to the Court that it has been misled by invalid testimony based on an incorrect determination of the origin of the fire. The methodology used to determine the origin was outdated, and recent work published in the fire investigation literature has shown that reliance on such methodology results in error rates of 90% or greater. These studies of the ability of fire investigators to accurately determine origin have only recently been published, and the information contained therein would not have been available at the time of Mr. Hebshie s trial. 1 In fire investigation, it is axiomatic that if the origin of the fire is not correctly determined, the cause will also not be correctly determined. 5. This fire did not start where the government's witnesses said it started. The hypothesized area of origin is surrounded by thin plywood paneling, often referred to as "flash paneling." The paneling in the alleged area of origin is not even completely charred through. Elsewhere in the building, and close to the alleged area of origin, the plywood paneling can be clearly seen to have burned through from the back side, i.e., a wall cavity behind the plywood, not the space inside the store. 6. Based on the testimony of the firefighter who saw fire in what was later misidentified as the area of origin, it is my opinion that there is no possibility that he was seeing the actual origin of the fire, but merely the result of the 1 Please see, Carmen, Steven, Improving the Understanding of Post-Flashover Fire Behavior. Proceedings of the International Symposium on Fire Investigation and Technology (ISFI 2008), May, 2008 Carmen, Steven, Progressive Burn Pattern Development in Post-Flashover Fires., Conference Proceedings Fire and Materials 2009, 11th International Conference and Exhibition, Interscience, London, (This paper is attached as Exhibit 3.)

3 spreading of the fire from a pipe chase into the retail space inside the store. This opinion is supported by the fact that shortly after he extinguished the fire in the alleged area of origin, fires broke through from numerous other places, eventually destroying the building. 7. Based on all of the photographs I have seen, it appears that there was only a cursory examination of the basement. In order to eliminate the basement as the origin of the fire, it should have been carefully examined, particularly those parts of the basement near the ceiling. In my experience, the ceiling of the basement is a common location of ignition sources and origins of accidental fires. 8. The fact that a thermal imaging camera showed hot spots on all four walls indicates that there were fires behind the walls, which is consistent with a basement origin. The thermal imaging evidence was explained away by Lt. Todd Myers, as having been caused by heating of the wood walls by the fire from the alleged origin, rather than fire behind the walls. This is an incredible explanation, given the extent of the fire only a few minutes later. This explanation also violates the laws of physics, which would dictate that if the fire really were in its incipient stages when it was extinguished at the alleged origin, the amount of heating should have fallen off quickly as one moved away from the alleged origin. This was not the case, but defense counsel failed to follow up on this seemingly obvious weakness in Lt. Myers testimony. 2 2 The following exchange occurs at pages 2-21 and 2-22 of Lt. Myers testimony: Q. Fair to say then that the fire had spread throughout the unit; is that true? A. I don t believe that to be the case. Q. Okay. But the thermal imaging would have suggested that there were hot spots? A. Well, to me the thermal imager camera showed that there was areas that were heated, that had been heated. Q. And those areas were all around the four walls of this unit? A. Yes. Q. It wasn t concentrated in any one particular area, correct? A. Correct. It is unclear whether these answers by the witness were deliberately misleading or merely ignorant. If the walls had been heated by the fire at the alleged origin, the thermal energy should have been concentrated around the cold spot created by the local extinguishment.

4 9. The damage in the building is consistent with fire coming up from below through the wall cavities and breaking out through the plywood paneling. The damage is not consistent with the fire somehow penetrating at the alleged area of origin and spreading laterally. Lateral spread would be impeded by the vertical wall studs, as well as by the natural tendency of fire to spread upward. The alleged area of origin does not account for simple fire dynamics. As with the thermal imaging testimony, the government s hypothesis of the way the fire spread violates the laws of physics. 10. The methodology employed in sample collection was also unscientific, in that no comparison samples were collected. Collection of comparison samples has been strongly recommended for many years by relevant scientific community. 3,4 Light petroleum distillates (LPDs) are frequently found in convenience stores, and are easily spread around by extinguishment water. The failure to collect and analyze a comparison sample from this scene makes it very likely that the finding of LPD was given far more weight by the jury than was actually warranted. 11. This was a dangerous fire scene, and it is likely that the investigators were unable to perform a thorough investigation. This inability, however, does not excuse the use of available evidence to reach an incorrect conclusion. FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT. EXECUTED AT PLANTATION, FLORIDA THIS 2 ND DAY OF JUNE JOHN J. LENTINI, CFI, D-ABC 3 International Association of Arson Investigators, Forensic Science Committee Position on Comparison Samples, Fire and Arson Investigator. Vol. 41, No. 2 December 1990, Attached hereto as Exhibit 4. 4 NFPA 921, Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations, 1995 edition 9-2.2, through 2008 edition

5 EXHIBIT 1 Resume of John J. Lentini, CFI, D-ABC

6 Capabilities Resume of John J. Lentini, CFEI, D-ABC Scientific Fire Analysis, LLC Bimini Lane Big Pine Key, FL (770) He can investigate fire or explosion scenes, locate the point of origin, and chemically determine the presence of flammable liquids or explosives. He can evaluate the validity of the work of other investigators through review of reports, testimony, photographs and other data..he is familiar with fire and building codes and can determine whether a structure, product, service or installation met applicable code requirements prior to a fire or other loss. He is also capable of performing all types of chemical and instrumental analyses, and giving expert testimony as to the results of his investigations. Scientific Fire Analysis Responsibilities President and Principal Investigator. Conducts preliminary evaluations of customer problems. Conducts, supervises or reviews investigations in the area of fire, arson, explosion, and asphyxiation, including review of chemistry issues. Prepares and presents expert testimony. Provides litigation support. Education B.A. in the Natural Sciences (Chemistry, Biology, Physics), New College, Sarasota, FL, June Postgraduate courses in Chemistry and Criminal Investigation at the University of Akron, OH, Twenty credit hours Graduate Level Chemistry, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, Training Short Course in Instrumental Analysis, F.B.I. Academy, Quantico, VA, Seminar on Arson and Fraud Investigation, University of Alabama at Birmingham, Seminar on Gas Fires and Explosions, University of Alabama at Birmingham, rd, 35 th, 37 th, 39 th, 40 th,42 nd and 59 th International Association of Arson Investigators Seminars, Southeast Arson Seminar, University of Georgia, , 1996, st, 2 nd and 3 rd Int l Symposia on Recent Advances in Arson Analysis and Detection, 1982, 88, 90. American Academy of Forensic Sciences (AAFS), Annual Meetings, National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Life Safety Code Seminar, Nashville, TN, IAAI Electrical Fire Investigation Seminar, Atlanta, GA AAFS Workshop on Contemporary Issues of Fire Investigation and Analysis (Panelist) Seattle, WA, FBI International Symposium on the Forensic Aspects of Arson Investigations, Fairfax, VA, Georgia Fire Investigators Association (GFIA) Seminar on Appliance Fires, Decatur, GA, Workshop on Fire Investigations, Forensic Science Society, Harrogate, England, Anglo-American Fire Investigation Conference, Brunel University, Uxbridge, England, Forensic Fire Engineering and Failure Analysis, Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE), International Fire Investigation Conference, Brunel University, Uxbridge, England, Fire Litigation Seminar, National Association of Fire Investigators (NAFI)/NFPA, Sarasota, FL, Lightning 101, Global Atmospherics, Inc., Atlanta, GA, Technical Working Group on Fire and Explosion Investigations, 2 nd, 3 rd and 4 th Annual Symposia, Orlando, FL, Fire Dynamics Seminar, NFPA Technical Committee on Fire Investigations, Baltimore, MD, 2003.

7 John J. Lentini Page 2 of 6 Resume (04/08/09) Training (continued) First International Symposium on Fire Investigation, Fire Service College, Moreton, England, th International Fire Science & Engineering Conference (Interflam), Edinburgh, Scotland, Introduction to Fire Dynamics Simulator and Smokeview, SFPE, Chicago, IL, International Fire Investigation Conference, Brunel University, Uxbridge, England, The Scientific Method for Fire and Explosion Investigations, CFI Trainer.net, Second International Symposium on Fire Investigation, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati OH, Third International Symposium on Fire Investigation, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati OH, Introduction to Fire Dynamics and Modeling, CFI Trainer.net, Professional Certifications and Licensure He holds certifications from both the International Association of Arson Investigators (IAAI) and the National Association of Fire Investigators (NAFI). These certifications are based upon a peer review of education, training and experience, and successfully completing a written certification exam. Maintenance of certification requires continuing education. He is also a certified Diplomate of the American Board of Criminalistics, with a specialty in Fire Debris Analysis. This certification requires successfully challenging a written general knowledge examination covering all phases of evidence handling and analysis, and a specialty examination on the details of fire debris analysis. Maintenance of Diplomate status also requires continued professional development. He holds Florida private investigator s license number C Florida has reciprocal license agreements with the following states: CA, GA, LA, NC, OK, TN, VA. Experience Applied Technical Services, Inc.: Manager, Fire Investigations. Authored over 3,000 technical reports. Supervised two fire investigators and an electrical engineer. Served as project manager for major fire investigations. Conducted site inspections, chemical analyses, designed and conducted physical experiments to recreate fire scenarios. Provided training, consulting and expert witness testimony. Metallurgical Engineers of Atlanta: May-December, 1977 Fire scene inspection. Chemical analysis of fire debris. Quantitative chemical and physical analysis on all types of metal. Radiographic inspection of fittings and welds. State of Georgia Crime Laboratory: August May 1977 Qualitative and quantitative analysis of all types of physical evidence associated with violent and/or property crimes, and testifying to the results of such analyses. Responding statewide to conduct field investigations for law enforcement agencies. Conducting air and water quality measurements for other state and federal agencies. Instruction of law enforcement officers in the collection and protection of physical evidence. Courtroom Experience Since 1975, he has given expert testimony in over two hundred cases in civil and criminal court in several states and in the Federal Courts. He has testified for both Plaintiffs and Defendants, and has served as a neutral expert hired to advise the court, as well. A schedule of testimony provided since 2000, both in trial and in depositions, is available upon request.

8 John J. Lentini Page 3 of 6 Resume (04/08/09) Professional Associations Vice Chair, ASTM Committee E30 on Forensic Sciences, elected 1995, re-elected 1997 and Chair, ASTM Committee E30 on Forensic Sciences, elected 1999, re-elected 2001 and Chair, ASTM Subcommittee E on Criminalistics, Director, American Board of Criminalistics (ABC), elected 1993, re-elected Chair, ABC Proficiency Administration Committee, Fellow of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences (AAFS) 1992-present. Chair, AAFS Criminalistics Section Nominating Committee, Member, Editorial Board, Journal of Forensic Sciences, 2003-present. Member, National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Technical Committee 921 on Fire Investigations, 1996-present. Member, Technical Working Group on Fire and Explosion Investigations, 1997-present. Planning Panel Member, U. S. Dept. of Justice, NIJ Technical Working Group on Fire Investigations, Peer Reviewer, U. S. Dept. of Justice, NIJ-Office of Science & Technology, 2002, 2007, Member of the National Association of Fire Investigators (NAFI), 1996-present. Member of the International Association of Arson Investigators (IAAI), , 2008-present. Member of the Florida Chapter of the IAAI, , 2008-present. Chair, IAAI Forensic Science Committee, Member of the Georgia Fire Investigators Association (GFIA), Member of the Metro Atlanta Fire Investigators Association, President, Member of the American Chemical Society, 1978-present. Peer Reviewed Publications Forensic Science Standards: Where They Come From and How They Are Used, Forensic Science Policy and Management: An International Journal, Vol.1, No. 1, February NFPA 921, Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations, NFPA, Quincy, MA, Contributor to the 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004 and 2008 editions as a principal member and task group leader of the Technical Committee on Fire Investigations. Persistence of Floor Coating Solvents, J. Forensic Sciences, Vol. 46, No. 6, November Fire and Arson Scene Evidence: A Guide for Public Safety Personnel, National Institute of Justice Office of Justice Programs, USDOJ Publication Number NCJ , Contributor to the document as a chapter author and editorial board member, June The Petroleum-Laced Background, (co-authored with Julia Dolan and Cheryl Cherry), J. Forensic Sciences, Vol. 45, No. 5, September A Calculated Arson, The Fire and Arson Investigator, Vol. 49, No. 3, April Differentiation of Asphalt and Smoke Condensates from Liquid Petroleum Distillates Using GC/MS, J. Forensic Sciences, Vol. 43, No. 1, January Comparison of the Eluting Efficiency of Carbon Disulfide with Diethyl Ether: The Case for Laboratory Safety, (co-authored with Dr. Andrew T. Armstrong), J. Forensic Sciences, Vol. 42, No. 2, March An Improved Method of Obtaining Ion Profiles From Ignitable Liquid Residue Samples, FBI International Symposium on the Forensic Aspects of Arson Investigations, Fairfax, VA, August 1, ASTM Standards for Forensic Sciences, J. Forensic Sciences, Vol. 40, No. 1, January 1995 Behavior of Glass at Elevated Temperature, J. Forensic Sciences, Vol. 37, No. 5, September Baseline Characteristics of Residential Structures Which Have Burned to Completion: The Oakland Experience, (co-authored with David M. Smith, C.F.I. and Dr. Richard W. Henderson, C.F.I.), Fire Technology, Vol. 28, No. 3, August Standard Test Method for Flammable or Combustible Liquid Residues in Extracts from Samples of Fire Debris by Gas Chromatography, ASTM E Principal Author as Task Group Coordinator. Guidelines for Laboratories Performing Chemical and Instrumental Analysis of Fire Debris Samples, Principal author as Co-Chair of IAAI Forensic Science Committee, June 1988.

9 John J. Lentini Page 4 of 6 Resume (04/08/09) Editorial Reviewed Publications Scientific Protocols for Fire Investigation, CRC Pres, Boca Raton, FL, The Standard of Care in Fire Investigation, Canadian Association of Fire Investigators Journal, Spring Report on the Peer Review of the Expert Testimony in the Cases of State of Texas v. Cameron Todd Willingham and State of Texas v. Ernest Ray Willis, submitted to the State of Texas Forensic Science Commission, May 2, (Co-authored with Douglas J. Carpenter, Daniel L. Churchward, David M. Smith and Michael A. McKenzie) Available at What You Don t Know Can Hurt You: How Do You Know Your Lab Has It Right? The Fire and Arson Investigator, Vol. 53, No. 3, April, Forensic Arson Investigation, McGraw-Hill Yearbook of Science and Technology, Fires, Arsons and Explosions, Chapter 26 in Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert Testimony, edited by Faigman, Kaye, Saks and Sanders, West Publishing Co., St. Paul, MN, 1997, (Revised 2001, 2007) Fires, Arsons and Explosions, Chapter 7 in Science in the Law, Forensic Science Issues, West, (Essentially a reprint of the 2001 revision in Modern Scientific Evidence) Standardization in the Criminalistics Laboratory, Standardization News, Vol. 23, No. 4, April Unconventional Wisdom: The Lessons of Oakland, The Fire and Arson Investigator, Vol. 43, No. 4, June The Lime Street Fire: Another Perspective, The Fire and Arson Investigator, Vol. 43, No. 1, Sept Melted Steel: How Important? (co-authored with J. Finis McCarver, P.E.), The National Fire and Arson Report, Vol. 10, No. 4, August The Behavior of Flammable and Combustible Liquids, (co-authored with Laurel V. Waters), The Fire and Arson Investigator, Vol. 42, No. 1, September Vapor Pressures, Flash Points, and the Case Against Kerosene Heaters, Fire Journal, Vol. 83, No. 4, July Appliance Fires: Determining Responsibility, (co-authored with R.I. Underwood, P.E.), The National Fire and Arson Report, Vol. 7, No. 2, April Presentations (1996-Present) Forensic Science in the 21 st Century: The National Academy of Sciences Report and Beyond, Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law at the University of Arizona, April 4, 2009, Tempe, AZ The State of the Art in Fire Investigation, Inaugural Lecture Series, Centre for Forensic Science and Medicine, University of Toronto Medical School, February 27, 2009, Toronto, Ontario Watching Paint Dry, Testing Spontaneous Ignition Hypotheses, American Academy of Forensic Sciences, February 20, 2009, Denver, CO Forensic Science Standards: Where They Come From and How They Are Used, Workshop # 18, American Academy of Forensic Sciences, February 17, 2009, Denver, CO Toward a More Scientific Determination: Minimizing Expectation Bias in Fire Investigations, Canadian National Advanced Fire, Arson and Explosion Investigation Training Program, October 28, 2008, Toronto, Ontario, Origin: A Fire Investigator s Most Important Hypothesis, Canadian National Advanced Fire, Arson and Explosion Investigation Training Program, October 28, 2008, Toronto, Ontario Evaluating Arson Cases: Avoiding Wrongful Prosecutions and Convictions, 63 rd Annual Short Course for Prosecuting Attorneys, Northwestern University School of Law, July 22, 2008, Chicago, IL. Toward a More Scientific Determination: Minimizing Expectation Bias in Fire Investigations, 3 rd International Symposium on Fire Investigations Science and Technology, May 20, 2008, Cincinnati, OH.

10 John J. Lentini Page 5 of 6 Resume (04/08/09) Presentations (continued) The Mythology of Arson Investigation, 59th Annual Training Course, International Association of Arson Investigators, April 30, 2008, Denver, CO. Sources of Error in Fire Investigation, AAFS Criminalistics Section, February 21, 2008, Washington, DC. Evaluating Arson Cases: Avoiding Wrongful Prosecutions and Convictions, 62 nd Annual Short Course for Prosecuting Attorneys, Northwestern University School of Law, July 24, 2007, Chicago, IL. The State of the Art in Fire Investigation, National Academy of Sciences, Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Sciences Community, April 23, 2007, Washington, D.C. Critical Evaluation of Arson Charges, California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, California Public Defenders Association Capital Case Defense Seminar, February 17, 2007, Monterey, CA. Distinguishing Fact from Fantasy in Arson Investigations, Indiana Public Defenders Council, September 15, 2006, Indianapolis, IN. The Mythology of Arson Investigation, 2 nd International Symposium on Fire Investigations Science and Technology, June 27, 2006, Cincinnati, OH. Critical Evaluation of Arson Charges, Third National Seminar on Forensic Evidence and the Criminal Law, Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts, January 28, 2006, San Antonio, TX. Sources of Error in Fire Investigation, Canadian National Advanced Fire, Arson And Explosion Investigation Training Program, October 25, 2005, Toronto, Ontario. Origin: A Fire Investigator s Most Important Hypothesis, Canadian National Advanced Fire, Arson And Explosion Investigation Training Program, October 24, 2005, Toronto, Ontario. Distinguishing Fact from Fantasy in Arson Investigations, Capital Cases: Third Seminar Series, Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Capital Cases, September 8, 2005, Springfield, IL. NFPA 921, Design and Development, Live, Learn & Pass It On, Training Conference, Gardiner Associates, Brunel University, June 29, 2005, Uxbridge, England. Distinguishing Fact from Fantasy in Arson Investigations, Capital Cases: Third Seminar Series, Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Capital Cases, May 13, 2005, Chicago, IL. Laboratory Analysis of Fire Debris: Why It s Important, How It Works, and How to Evaluate a Lab, Insurance Committee for Arson Control, 15th National Training Seminar, February 3, 2004, Sandestin, FL. Sources of Error in Fire Investigation, Technical Working Group on Fire and Explosion Investigations (TWGFEX), 3 rd Annual Symposium, University of Central Florida, November 21, 2003, Orlando, FL. Fire Debris Analysis: Evolution and Standardization of Techniques, Technical Working Group on Fire and Explosion Investigations (TWGFEX), 4 th Annual Symposium, November 19, 2004, Orlando, FL. Evaluating Allegations of Arson, National Defense Investigators Association, April 6, 2004, Boston, MA. Investigating Fire Scenes, University of Rhode Island, Forensic Seminar Series, April 2, 2004, Warwick, RI. Misadventures in Fire Investigations: Common Features, Common Errors, and How to Spot a Dog, AAFS, Interdisciplinary Session, February 20, 2004, Dallas, TX. Where Are the Scientists? AAFS, Criminalistics Section, February 19, 2004, Dallas, TX. Bogus Opinion Evidence: Exposing It Without DNA, AAFS, Plenary Session, February 18, 2004,Dallas, TX. Measurement, Certification, Accreditation, 30 th Annual FBI Symposium on Crime Laboratory Development, Sponsored by the FBI Laboratory. September 25, 2002, St. Louis, MO. Standards Development for Fire Investigations, Southeastern Arson Seminar, Sponsored by the Georgia State Fire Marshal and the Georgia Fire Investigators Association. August 8, 2001, Brunswick, GA. The State of the Art in Laboratory Analysis, Southeastern Arson Seminar, Sponsored by the Georgia State Fire Marshal and the Georgia Fire Investigators Association. August 8, 2001, Brunswick, GA. Understanding the Opposing Expert, Southeastern Arson Seminar, Sponsored by the Georgia State Fire Marshal and the Georgia Fire Investigators Association. August 8, 2001, Brunswick, GA. Consensus Standards: A Priority for Forensic Science, Crime Laboratory Improvement Program (CLIP) Summit, Sponsored by the U. S. Justice Department. July 14, 2000, Washington, D. C.

11 John J. Lentini Page 6 of 6 Resume (04/08/09). Presentations (continued) Cross-Examining Expert Witnesses, Institute of Continuing Legal Education, 18 th Annual Insurance Law Institute, September 14, 1999, St. Simons Island, GA. The Role of Experts in Fire Litigation, Anglo-American Fire Investigation Conference, Gardiner Associates, Brunel University, June 30, 1999, Uxbridge, England. The Petroleum-Laced Background, Southern Association of Forensic Scientists Spring Seminar, April 14, 1999, Decatur, GA. Accreditation, Certification and Standardization in the Forensic Sciences, AAFS Interdisciplinary Session, February 18, 1999, Orlando, FL. The Quality Triangle in the Forensic Sciences: The Role of Standardization, Certification and Accreditation, AAFS Criminalistics Section, February 18, 1999, Orlando, FL. Low Voltage Leads to High Heat Release, AAFS Engineering Section, February 13, 1998, San Francisco, CA. A Calculated Arson, Anglo-American Fire Investigation Conference, Gardiner Associates, Brunel University, June 15, 1997, Uxbridge, England. Misleading Evidence or Misreading Evidence? Joint Meeting of the Forensic Science Society and the California Association of Criminalists, June 11, 1997, Harrogate, England. Forensic Science Standards: How to Write Them, AAFS, February 22, 1997, New York, NY. Standardization in the Criminalistics Laboratory: The Role of ASTM Committee E 30, Eastern Analytical Symposium, November 20, 1996, Somerset, NJ. Differentiation of Asphalt and Smoke Condensates from Liquid Petroleum Products Using GC-MS, AAFS Criminalistics Section, February 22, 1996, Nashville, TN. Awards American Academy of Forensic Sciences, Criminalistics Section Special Meritorious Service Award, Boy Scouts of America Silver Beaver Award, Atlanta Area Council, ASTM Award of Merit, ASTM E30 Forensic Sciences Award, 1996.

12 EXHIBIT 2 MATERIALS REVIEWED PRIOR TO PREPARATION OF THIS AFFIDAVIT State Fire Marshal Fire Investigation Summary Report prepared by David P. Domingos Accelerant Detection Canine Report prepared by Douglas Lynch Trial Testimony of David P. Domingos Trial Testimony of Douglas Lynch Trial Testimony of John Drugan Trial Testimony of Linda Duquette Trial Testimony of Todd Myers Trial Testimony of John Titus Trial Testimony of Wayne Miller Approximately 100 fire scene photographs taken during immediately after the fire Twenty-five photographs of the fire scene taken by Dan Cronin of Phoenix Investigations John Titus trial binder

13 EXHIBIT 3 Carmen, Steven, Progressive Burn Pattern Development in Post-Flashover Fires Conference Proceedings, Fire and Materials th International Conference and Exhibition, Interscience, London, 2009.

14 PROGRESSIVE BURN PATTERN DEVELOPMENT IN POST-FLASHOVER FIRES Steven W. Carman, IAAI-CFI, ATF-CFI (Retired) Carman & Associates Fire Investigations, Dunsmuir, CA ABSTRACT In 2005, fire investigators from the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) designed and presented a seminar on fire dynamics. Two identical, one-room burn cells with standard-sized doorways were each burned for seven minutes. Later, fifty-three experienced fire investigators from the public and private sectors (who had not observed the fires) were asked to briefly examine the cells and identify in which quadrant they thought each fire had started. 5.7% of the students correctly selected the quadrant of origin in each cell. A subsequent review of experienced investigators responses to similar, post-flashover exercises at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Georgia revealed that since the early-1990s, about 8-10% of students correctly located the origins of similar fires. Those who were mistaken typically reported they were misled by burn patterns generated in fully involved, ventilationcontrolled conditions. In 2008, three follow-up tests fires were designed and conducted in single-room cells (similar to those from 2005) at the ATF Fire Research Laboratory in Ammendale, Maryland. The tests were used to evaluate burn pattern development in fully involved, ventilation-controlled fires with similar physical layouts, furnishings and ignition scenarios. The principle variable between the tests was time of exposure to full fire involvement. Analyses of heat flux, temperature and gas concentration data as well as examination of burn patterns were conducted to better understand the various mechanisms involved. Information from the tests was also used as the basis of a new Internet-based training module on Post-Flashover Fires at the training site, CFITrainer.net. BACKGROUND Since the early 1990s, a major shift has occurred in the field of fire investigation. Today there is a greater emphasis on fire science and engineering than ever before. For many years, the adage that fire investigation is a mixture of art and science was prevalent amongst investigators who tended to focus far more on the art of determining where and how a fire started than on the science. While honing the art of fire investigation is still a part of many training programs, a focus on fire science training is more prominent than ever before. Fire investigation seminars that once shrank from technical presentations now incorporate such discussions on a regular basis. Legal precedence and the prevalence of treatises such as NFPA 921 have mandated a shift in the investigative process more towards reproducible science. Live fire testing and demonstrations coupled with science-based classes are commonplace. In October 2005, a fire investigation seminar on fire dynamics presented by ATF Certified Fire Investigators (CFIs) and an ATF Fire Protection Engineer (FPE) coupled actual burn scenarios with classroom training. Two nearly identical, single-room burn-cells that measured 12 feet wide, 14 feet long and 8 feet high were furnished with identical contents and burned. Each had a single open doorway. Thermocouple trees were used to record gas temperatures. The cubicles were burned outside the presence of the students using similar ignition scenarios in different areas. Each exercise was designed to illustrate the importance and role of ventilation in fully involved fires. At the start of the training, a mixture of students/investigators from the public and

15 private sectors were asked to briefly examine the scenes and to identify the quadrants of the cells in which they thought the fires started. Only 3 of 53 correctly identified the quadrants in each cell, a success rate of 5.7%. Since around 1992 similar burns were examined at each two-week long Advanced Origin and Cause course offered by ATF at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco, Georgia. The course is used to train experienced public-sector fire investigators in advanced principles of fire science and fire investigation. At the start of each new class, students conduct a cursory examination of a complex fire scene and are tasked with identifying the area of fire origin and explaining their rationale. As with the 2005 burn cell exercise, the FLETC scenes are designed to gauge students familiarity with various concepts including ventilationcontrolled burning. While written records of students responses were not kept, anecdotal evidence revealed that since the inception of the program, the percentage of students correctly identifying the area of origin has consistently been less than 10% of each class. Severe fire damage that occurred well after ignition and in a completely different part of the building was often misinterpreted as the area of fire origin. TRAINING RESOURCES FOR POST-FLASHOVER FIRE BEHAVIOR The percentages of investigators correctly interpreting post-flashover burn patterns have been lower than desired. This may be in part due to a lack of focus on post-flashover fire behavior in investigator training. Fire science training for investigators is generally directed at pre-flashover fire behavior and the damage created under such conditions. Notably lacking are comprehensive discussions of both fuel- and ventilation-controlled burning. The relationship of these modes of burning are briefly discussed in popular investigation-related resources such as NFPA 921, A Guide to Fire and Explosion Investigation 1, Kirk s Fire Investigation 2, and the User s Manual for NFPA Unfortunately, the discussions do not always correlate burn modes with burn pattern development. There remains a need for more extensive coverage of these topics beginning in basic investigation classes. Most training relating to fire origin determination focuses on identification and interpretation of burn patterns. Many instructors tend to explain the damage in terms of the location of burning fuel items. Plume-related burn patterns such as V-patterns by definition, correspond to the locations of burning fuels. This information is valid up to a transition through flashover. Postflashover fire behavior however can vary greatly from pre-flashover situations. Techniques and theory taught for investigating pre-flashover fires must be supplemented with other information for successful post-flashover scene investigations. Too often, trainers have merely suggested that after the onset of flashover, temperatures and heat-fluxes throughout a fully involved compartment are near uniform. The 2005 fires illustrated the dangers of such thinking. In 2008, a series of test fires designed and conducted by the author, other ATF CFIs and the staff at the ATF Fire Research Laboratory (ATF FRL) was designed to gather additional information necessary to better understand the creation of burn patterns under post-flashover fire conditions. The results of the tests revealed enlightening information furthering the knowledge of ventilation-controlled burning and its impact on fire investigation. POST 2005 INVESTIGATIVE / TRAINING EFFORTS After the 2005 demonstration burns, it became clear that a new approach was needed to improve investigators understanding of ventilation-controlled fire behavior. To that end, in early 2006, the author employed computational fluid dynamics modeling to compute and display visualizations of the 2005 burn cell fires. Aware of the limitations of using any computer model to simulate actual fire growth 4, it was decided to make a best effort attempt at specifying the

16 type and locations of the fuels and ventilation sources and run the models. If the overall results seemed reasonable, then CFD capabilities might at least prove useful for demonstrating ventilation-controlled behavior during post-flashover fire conditions. Smokeview was used to generate snapshots and video sequences showing calculated gas concentrations and heat fluxes at various stages. These snapshots were later used in presentations to explain post-flashover fire behavior. Details of the modeling efforts were set forth in an earlier review of the results 5. In each of the 2005 demonstration fires, similar wide-based areas of clean burn were generated in each cell on the rear wall opposite the doorway. Neither of the fires was ignited in the areas of clean burn. In the first burn cell, the fire was ignited alongside the bed near the rear corner. In the second burn cell, the fire originated along the front side of the bed, about three feet from the open doorway. After the first fire, a second clean-burn pattern was also visible. It was on the wall between the bed and the chair and was attributed to fire impingement shortly after ignition. No distinct fire origin patterns survived the second fire that would have enabled any of the ATF CFIs or FPE to identify the origin despite knowing its location. FDS modeling of the 2005 fires suggested that the most energetic post-flashover burning and accompanying high heat fluxes occurred along the pathway that oxygen-rich air flowed from the open doorway to the wall directly across the cell. Because of compartment geometry, virtually no fresh air flowed towards the first fire s origin in the rear corner behind the bed. Without an oxygen supply in that area, vigorous post-flashover burning never occurred there, leaving the preflashover burn patterns visible. In the second cell, because there was a plentiful oxygen supply near the fire s origin, the resulting, energetic, post-flashover burning masked the initial patterns. Information learned from these efforts was first presented in 2006 at ATF Certified Fire Investigator training classes and later, at various training conferences of the International Association of Arson Investigators (IAAI). At each seminar, many of the principles underlying post-flashover burning were visually demonstrated using FDS data and Smokeview. During the training, the relevance of ventilation-controlled vs. fuel-controlled fires was stressed along with the principle of non-homogenous burning in post-flashover compartment fires. Investigative techniques were offered for hypothesis testing varying from simple visualization of gas flow during a fire to CFD modeling for more complex scenarios. Further, the applicability and limitations of methods such as depth of char and depth of calcination analyses were examined. Another topic emphasized in the training was the survivability of initial fire patterns through the post-flashover period. Heat fluxes in fully involved fires were compared with those of preflashover conditions. Simple techniques to calculate the cumulative thermal exposure from such fluxes were provided. Throughout the training sessions it was stressed that the highest postflashover fluxes are related to the location of ventilation sources and that the resulting fire damage is directly proportional to the time of heat exposure. While these training sessions were welcomed by investigators and seemed helpful, it was clear that additional efforts were needed to make information quickly available to a larger audience. In early 2008, training specialists from the IAAI recommended similar training be offered through the free, internet-based training venue, CFITrainer.net. Subsequently, the staff of the ATF Fire Research Laboratory (ATF FRL) agreed to assist with the design and execution of follow-up burn tests to the 2005 fires, and to allow video production crews to film the tests. Engineers at the FRL assisted in designing and three test burns that were held in July 2008 and intended to resemble the 2005 fires. New furnishings were purchased to match the previous

17 layout as closely as possible. Cell measurements were 14 feet by 12 feet by 8 feet high. Each cell had an open doorway in the east wall with a hinged, inward swinging, hollow core door. Every cell was furnished with a dressed queen-sized mattress and box springs, two foam pads under the sheets, two pillows, wooden headboard, footboard and bed frame, an upholstered wing back chair, wooden chest of drawers, wooden dresser with attached mirror, wooden nightstand, lamp, and small plastic trashcan with 10 sheets of crumpled newsprint. Cells were also carpeted with wall-to-wall carpeting over carpet pad. Electricity was supplied and lights illuminated. The principle changes from the 2005 were one upholstered chair in place of the wicker chairs, a chest of drawers in place of a second nightstand, and no table/tv combination in the northwest corner. An increase in fuel load of the chair was needed since the mattresses did not have high enough heat release (due to new flammability standards) to drive the cells to flashover. More instrumentation was used in the FRL cells than in 2005 when only 2 thermocouple trees were employed. Included were four thermocouple trees, three total heat flux (THF) gauges and one radiant heat flux (RHF) gauge, four gas sensors measuring oxygen, carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide, two interior and two exterior video cameras, smoke and carbon monoxide detectors and gas velocity probes at the doorway. Numerous photos were also taken both preand post-fire to document the scenes. Calorimetry data was not monitored during the tests. Figure 1. Layout of ATF FRL burn cells showing instrumentation In addition to the data gathered by ATF, the production team contracted with the IAAI to design the CFITrainer.net module, Post-flashover Fires also recorded high-definition video footage during the test series. That video was edited and used in the production of the training program. A final version of the training module was released in the fall of 2008 as is available for training at The test plan called for each fire to transition through flashover. The only planned variable in each test would be the length of time the cell was allowed to burn fully involved. Ignitions would be similar to the first test in 2005 using an open flame from a butane lighter to light newspaper in a trashcan between the bed and wingback chair. Accurate determination of the onset of flashover

18 can be challenging as several methods to identify it exist 6, 7. For the FRL tests, when upper layer temperatures reached 600 C, flashover was said to occur even though other factors commonly associated with flashover may not yet have been reached. To ensure equal datum points for measuring specific times of ventilation-controlled burning, the times of steady flame extension out of the doorways were used as reference points. The first fire was to be extinguished ten seconds after the onset of steady flame extension, and the second and third cells after two and four minutes respectively. ATF FRL FIRE TEST RESULTS The complete test results for all three tests were compiled and reported by Jason Ouellette of the ATF Fire Research Laboratory staff 8, 9, 10. The following is a summary of the three tests. Test Fire 1 The first burn test occurred much as anticipated. The fire was ignited in newspaper near the top of the wastebasket and at about 28 seconds, flames first reached the south wall next to the head of the bed. At 89 seconds the descending smoke layer obscured the light from the lamp in the northwest corner. At around 99 seconds, the top of the upholstered chair ignited. Upper layer temperatures at the south side of the room (TC trees A and D ) reached 600 C at 137 to 139 seconds. At the time, the upper layer temperatures near the foot of the bed at TC tree B and inside the doorway at TC tree C were still around 400 C but rose to 600 C within about 7 seconds. It was concluded that flashover (as defined by an upper layer temperature of 600 C) occurred at about 140 seconds. Maximum temperatures in the compartment ranged between 1,000 C at 157 seconds near the area of origin at TC tree A to 817 C just inside the doorway at TC tree C at 210 seconds. Total heat flux readings at gauges A and B peaked at about 140 and 170 seconds respectively near 200 kw/m 2. The THF readings at gauge C never reached much above 75 kw/m 2. Video taken inside the compartment of the west side of the bed showed steady flames at the bottom of the smoke layer between the nightstand and end of the bed at about the same time upper layer temperatures reached 600 C. The first visible flames outside the doorway appeared about 30 seconds later at 173 seconds. A rapid drop in oxygen concentrations at gas sensor A from near ambient to about 4% was complete at 180 seconds. Steady flames out the door commenced at about 205 seconds, approximately one minute after flashover temperatures were reached. Average upper layer temperatures at 205 seconds were about 800 C. Extinguishment began at 212 seconds, after about 10 seconds of fully involved fire conditions. Test Fire 2 The plan for the second fire was to burn fully involved for two minutes prior to extinguishment. Ignition occurred as in Test 1. Unlike the vertical flame growth in cell 1, flames tended to spread laterally on the bedding. Flames did not impact the wall near the headboard of the bed until 74 seconds, approximately 46 seconds later than in the first test. Ignition of the top of the upholstered chair did not occur until 220 seconds, two minutes later than in cell 1. The top of the chair in cell 2 ignited only after the hot gas layer pyrolyzed its upper portion. Smoke layer temperatures reached 600 C between 213 and 226 seconds and rose to a maximum temperature of around 1,000 C at TC tree A, similar to that experienced in test 1. Along with the difference in the time of ignition of the chair, another unexpected event occurred in test 2 when the cell door shut by itself on three occasions. It closed at 234 seconds for 9 seconds, at 256 seconds for 3 seconds and at 267 seconds for 3 more seconds. The total time of closure was approximately 15 seconds before it was wedged open by a concrete block. The

19 oxygen concentration at gas sensor D dropped to below 2% when the door shut the first time. It then spiked 3% to 8% upward each time the door closed and reopened. Video of the west side of the room showed clear disruptions in air flow each time the door closed as well as substantial turbulence created at each reopening. The first flame extension out the door was at 287 seconds and steady flame extension quickly followed at 289 seconds, about one minute after 600 C temperatures were reached. This is comparable with the one-minute delay between flashover and steady flame extension in cell 1. At the time of steady flame extension, average upper layer temperatures were around 750 C. Maximum heat flux readings at THF gauge C occurred at about 340 seconds, well after full fire involvement. Extinguishment commenced at 424 seconds, after about 140 seconds of fully involved burning. During extinguishment, a hose stream penetrated the rear wall opposite the door and caused a sheet of gypsum board to fall from the ceiling. Neither area experienced damage before extinguishment affecting the fire behavior. Test Fire 3 The test plan initially called for test 3 to burn for four minutes after steady flame extension out the doorway. After the unexpected events in test 2, it was decided that rather than allow cell 3 to burn for four minutes, the two-minute test should be repeated. Prior to commencing the test, screws were driven into the floor blocking the door open. The fire was ignited in the same manner as the first two tests. Flames reached the wall next to the headboard of the bed at 60 seconds, 14 seconds quicker than in test 2 but at about double the time of test 1. The smoke layer descended at about the same rate as in test 1, blocking out all light from the corner lamp at around 90 seconds. Flame spread from the origin up the chair ignited the upper back at 109 seconds, 10 seconds slower than in test 1. Upper layer gas temperatures reached 600 C between 155 and 162 seconds, approximately 20 seconds later than in test 1, but a minute earlier than in test 2. The maximum temperature of around 1,100 C occurred at TC tree A at 175 seconds and then dropped. Initial, temporary flame extension through the door was seen at 161 seconds and steady flame extension occurred at 246 seconds. The delay between 600 C upper layer temperatures and steady flame extension in test 3 was about 90 seconds, compared to a one-minute delay in each of the other tests. By the time of steady flame extension, the average upper layer temperature was about 750 C. Two peak total heat flux readings occurred in test 3 at THF gauge C. The first peak of about 215 kw/m 2 was at 270 seconds, 24 seconds after steady flame extension. Fluxes at C then dropped to about 80 kw/m 2 before again rising to over 220 kw/m 2 atabout345seconds.thf gauge A peakedatabout215kw/m 2 at154secondsaboutthetimeuppersmokelayer reachedflashovertemperatures.shortlythereafter,thfgauge A stoppedworking. Oxygen concentrations at gas sensor D fell to a low near 0% at about 212 seconds after ignition. For an unknown reason, the oxygen values at the same sensor then rose for 20 seconds to a peak of around 13% before again dropping to around 3%. It then dropped more slowly rate to less than 1%. Extinguishment commenced at 357 seconds enabling test 3 to burn fully involved for about 111 seconds. FIRE TEST SCENE EXAMINATIONS A major objective of the test series was to examine burn pattern creation under differing times of fully involved burning. Because of the unexpected airflow disruptions in test 2, it was

20 initially expected that the patterns in that test might not provide useful data. Accordingly cells 1 and 3 were first examined to identify burn pattern variations due to different burn times. Cell 1 In cell 1, burn patterns alone indicated the room had been close to flashover. Because the bottom of some furnishings had not burned, without witness statements indicating steady flame extension, an investigator may have concluded flashover had not occurred. An area of fire origin was identified near the trashcan between the bed and upholstered chair. A V-pattern was obvious amidst the vertical slats of the headboard showing flames or hot gases rising up from between the bed and the chair. Also, an off-white clean burn pattern was clearly visible on the south wall where flames initially contacted it. The irregular pattern measured about 18 inches across and was located between the top of the headboard and the top of the wingback chair. It was similar to the plume pattern in the first 2005 test fire created by the originating fire. Figure 2. View to S in cell 1 showing clean burn on wall near origin Figure 3. View to SE in cell 1. Localized damage to mattress and frame is evident Figure 4. View to W in cell 1 showing areas Figure 5. View to NW corner of cell 1. of clean-burn on south and west walls Note lesser damage towards the north end Clear delineation of burn damage to the mattress fabric was visible suggesting a heat source between the bed and chair. A plume-impact, clean-burn pattern was on the ceiling generally above the trashcan and chair. Uneven burn damage to the right arm of the chair revealed more fire damage on the outside of the chair closest to the bed than elsewhere. Protected areas on the gypsum wallboard were visible behind the chair and nearer to the nightstand. At the north end of the west wall, almost no damage had occurred to the wallboard near floor level. On the wall above the nightstand was what appeared to be the start of an area of clean burn. Elsewhere on the wall, smoke staining was worse towards the south end of the room.

21 Cell3 Post fire examination revealed clear evidence of fully involved, post flashover fire conditions.thewallswerebadlysmokestainedtofloorlevel.twoglaringburnpatterns were immediately obvious upon entering the compartment. First, a large V pattern of cleanburnwasvisibleonthewestwallandcenteredjustnorthofthenightstand.theapex ofthepatternwasabout15inchesabovethefloor.thelowerportionofthe V hadnearly vertical sides about a foot high above which the sides of the V spread outward. On the ceilingabovethe V wasawideareaofextensivedamagewherethewallboardhadbadly crackedandnearlyfailed. Figure6.ViewtoWwallofcell3showing Figure7.ViewofNwallofcell3through alarge,clean burn V pattern thedoorway.notetheareaofclean burn. Thesecondareaofextensiveclean burnwaslocatedonthenorthwallbetweenthedresser andtheopendoor.itextendedfromfloorlevelupaboutthreefeet(tonearthetopofthe dresser)andformedapatternsimilartoan inverted V.Theendofthedressernexttothe pattern,thoughcharredwasintact.theframeofthedooreastofthepatternwasalsobadly charredbutintact.thecenterweborpanelofthedoorhadburnedaway.thewallabove the clean burn was smoke stained and less badly damaged than the area below it. The ceiling directly above the clean burned area showed no indications of circular patterns as mightbeexpectedfromplumeimpact. The fire did not cause an area of clean burn on the south wall near the origin as had occurredincell1.sincethefireswerestartedinthesamemanner,participantsexpectedto find a similar clean burn from early flame contact. The wooden slats making up the headboardhad,asincell1,burnedina V whichappearedtobecausedbyflamesorhot gasesspreadingoutfrombetweenthebedandthechair.damagetothewoodenframeof the upholstered chair was slightly greater on the east side. Similarly, damage to the bed framewasmostextensiveneartheareaoforigin.withoutmoreinformation,thebedand chairburnpatternscouldhavebeenattributedtothecloseproximityofburningfuels. Damage to the mattress was uneven. Next to the area of origin, the fabric had mostly burnedaway.similardamageoccurredontheeastsideofthemattressclosetotheopen doorway.thedamagenearthedoorwaywasmoreextensivethanthatnearertheorigin.

22 Figure8.ViewtoSWincell3showing Figure9.ViewtoSEincell3.Notethe damagetothebed seastsidenearthedoorabsenceofclean burnneartheorigin Cell2 Becauseoftheirregularitiesexperiencedintestfire2,participantsexaminedcell2 last. Upon entry, a large clean burn V pattern was clearly visible on the west wall. The pattern was very similar in shape and location to a corresponding pattern in cell 3. The apexofthe V incell2wasabout14inchesabovethefloorandnorthofthenightstand with almost the same location, shape and size as the pattern in cell 3. As in cell 3, the bottomsectionoftheclean burnhadnearverticalsidesthatfurtherup,spreadoutward. Figure10.ViewtoWincell2showing Figure11.ViewtoNincell2.Notethe theclean burn V similartocell3lackofcleanburntotherightofthedresser No remarkable fire patterns were visible on the north or east walls of the cell. The doorframe of cell 2 had mostly burned away unlike in cell 3. No area of clean burn was visiblebetweentheedgeofthedoorandthedresser.theconcreteblockusedtopropthe dooropenduringthetestlikelyprotectedtheareabehinditfromextensiveburning. Asincell3,therewasnoclearlyvisible,clean burnpatternincell2onthesouthwallnear the fire origin. Close examination of the area revealed light cracks in the surface of the wallboardwhereflamescontactedthewall,howevernoobvioussurfacediscolorationwas visible.consistentwithcells1and3,theheadboardincell2showedindicationsofa Vpattern extendingupwardsfrombetweenthebedandthechair.visibledamagetothewall betweenthemattressandthechairwasgenerallyunremarkable.

23 Figure12.ViewtoSincell2.Notethe Figure13.ViewtoSEincell2.Notemore lackofcleanburnneartheoriginseveremattressdamagethanintests1&3 Thebedframenexttotheoriginwasthemostbadlydamagedsection.Aswithcell3,the damage could, without additional information, be attributed to the upholstered chair burningmereinchesaway.overall,mattressdamagewasthegreatestintest2,probably becausethesecondfireburnedlongerthanhadtheothers. AdditionalObservations The V patterns on the west walls of cells 2 and 3 were remarkably similar yet clearlyborenorelationshiptoeitherofthefires originswhichwereapproximatelysixfeet fromtheapexofeach V.Nofuelsotherthancarpetinghadbeenbelowthepatternsprior tothefire.thewestwallofcell1showedanareaofclean burned,wallboarddamagein thesamegenerallocationastheupperleftportionsoftheclean burned V sincells2and3. Hadtest1beenallowedtoburnlonger,itislikelythattheexistingsmallareaofcleanburn wouldhavegrowntobecomemorelikethoseareasintheothercells. The west wall V patterns in tests 2 and 3 were located in the same general areas as the worst damage in the test fires from In those fires, the more extensive damage was theorizedtobeduetoincreasedheatfluxesontherearwallscausedbytheinflowoffresh air during ventilation controlled burning. FDS calculations also showed that incoming air couldhaveledtothehigherheatfluxesonthewestwall.whilenotmeasuredinthe2005 tests,calculatedheatfluxeswereintherangeof150kw/m 2. WhilethecellsandfurnishingslayoutsintheFRLtestfiresweresimilartothe2005tests, thereweresomedifferences.first,therewasnotableinthenorthwestcornerofthefrl cells. Additionally, the bed frames used in 2005 did not elevate the box springs off of the floorasoccurredinthefrltests.thebottomsofthebedsatthefrlwereapproximately eightinchesabovethecarpet,allowingforfreeflowofgasesunderthebedsoncethelower portions of the bedspreads burned away. This air movement under the bed was clearly visibleintheinteriorvideo.suchlowlevel,below bedairflowdidnotoccurin2005since theboxspringswereplacedonthefloor. THF gauge C measured a significant rise in total heat flux in tests 2 and 3 only after the onsetofventilation controlledburning.heatfluxesatgauge C neverdidriseappreciably intest1,likelybecausethefirewasextinguishedshortlyafterfullinvolvement. Asinthe 2005 fires, heat fluxes along the west walls of the FRL cells were higher after the fires became ventilation controlled. This is because inflowing fresh air enabled efficient combustion of the unburned fuel gases along the airflow path unlike in other areas of the