Proper Staffing. Makes. Proper Tactics. Makes. Firefighters Survive

Transcription

1 Proper Staffing Makes Proper Tactics Makes Firefighters Survive By: Jeffrey S. Parker Independent Fire Research Professor William Kramer, PhD October 25th, 2008

2 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 2 This report is dedicated to the memory of all the firefighters contained in these incidents who gave the ultimate sacrifice for service to their fellow citizens. May we continue to learn from the past to prevent similar tragedies in the future. 2

3 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 3 ABSTRACT The subject of this research is to specifically look at selected incidents that resulted in firefighter fatalities, and to retrospectively consider how staffing deficits may have affected these incidents. It is proposed that applying proper staffing to incidents will allow for proper tactics to be applied to accomplish a strategy that fits the scenario presented. These proper tactics will lead to increased firefighter survival. The world today sees a much more sophisticated, intelligent, and protected fire service. Working fire incidents are fewer than in the past, however firefighter fatalities remain unchanged. Firefighter deaths associated with the tragedy at the World Trade Center in 2001 were excluded from the study. The fire service is expected to be an all-hazard service, yet with less personnel. This retrospective review of structure fires will focus on how proven tactics and safe practices have been sacrificed due to improper staffing, and this has caused numerous firefighters to unnecessarily lose their lives. This selected review will show that where sacrifices in tactics were made, many times what contributed to this in some degree was inadequate personnel at critical times during the incident. What this report will also show is how inadequate staffing for pre-incident functions such as fire code compliance enforcement, training, pre-incident planning, and unappreciated administrative functions also indirectly negatively impacts firefighter survivability. 3

4 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 4 The fire service in general has a severe shortage of both line and administrative staffing. When line staffing is short, administrative staffing is sacrificed to compensate. There is an overall under appreciation of the importance of the administrative function and the contribution that the right kind formal education can contribute towards a safer world, for both firefighters and civilians. The National Fire Protection Association Standard 1710 for career depts. states i, It is recommended that a minimum acceptable fire company staffing level should be 4 members responding on or arriving with each engine and each ladder company responding to any type of fire. The minimum acceptable staffing level for companies responding in high-risk areas should be 5 members responding or arriving with each engine company and 6 members responding or arriving with each ladder company." The industry standards body also states, When structural fire fighting takes place, it is recommended that backup personnel, a RIT team, and other fire fighters be in place to perform any operations needed (i.e., stretch lines to protect exposures, vertical ventilation, horizontal ventilation, forcible entry to secondary exits, etc.). If the personnel are not available, the operations and tactics can be hindered or delayed. NFPA 1720 applies to volunteer fire depts. This standard also states ii that minimum numbers of personnel should be assembled prior to interior structure fire attack. It states that sufficient personnel shall be available to provide a sustained attack and mentions many typical functions that must be undertaken such as, ventilation, rapid intervention, forcible entry, etc. The fundamental requirement for both standards is that sufficient personnel must be at the scene in the early, initial, critical high risk, high benefit potential period of time at a structure fire to perform using proper strategy and tactics. We should consider prevention as the most effective and preferred way to keep the public and our firefighters safe. When prevention fails, rescue suppression must be relied upon. The fire service and the public have suffered from emphasis on suppression, while 4

5 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 5 sacrificing the prevention function. Similarly, when a structure fire has occurred, and we must engage in rescue and suppression, prevention of firefighter harm should also be considered as the most effective and preferred way to keep firefighters safe. By prevention, we mean proper tactics that prevent adverse situations. The fire service has also focused on handling an adverse outcome. This has been in the form of firefighter survival and rescue training, the rise of RIT, RAT, and FAST teams. These developments have all been lifesaving and obviously very beneficial. At the same time, we need to insure that improper tactics do not cause these situations, such as flashover, backdraft, smoke explosions, disorientation, and structural collapse, that make these types of firefighter rescues unfortunately necessarily, and more frequent. The fire service is again attempting to compensate for inadequate staffing, by taking forced shortcuts in proper information gathering, decision making, and tactics. Invariably, when this diminished use of, or complete abandonment of proven practices gets us into lifethreatening trouble, we are again adapting by adding additional risk to more firefighters to attempt to mitigate the original dire situation. The risk analysis for these situations are usually high benefit, high risk, and ones that we always want to avoid, but are duty bound to aggressively and offensively handle. This is where fire prevention, and proper strategies & tactics have a direct affect on firefighters. These situations many times are beyond the margins of an offensive mode, and forcing a defensive posture with only a recovery mode when made safe. The focus of this report will be confined to fireground cases not directly primarily caused by a previously medical condition. Although, realistically all the cases may have some degree of previous medical condition as some factor in the ultimate survivability. The report will attempt to isolate actions on the fireground that contribute to bad outcomes. An NFPA 5

6 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 6 report found that iii, While the rate of non-heart attack deaths outside structure fires has been dropping, the rate for deaths inside has been rising. This report includes statistics from as early as 1977 until Firefighter fatalities have been as high as 173 in 1978 to a low of 75 in In 2007, there were 102 firefighter fatalities, with a median number of 108 per year 6

7 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 7 Firefighter Deaths Per Year The main source of detail concerning structure fire where fatalities occurred is the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. There are investigations of firefighter fatalities by NIOSH as early as However, the number of studies were sporadic and at 1 Year or 2 per year. This number was greatly increased in 1998, when the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program experienced a dramatic increase in funding after a strong push from the International Association of Fire Fighters, and the International Association of Fire Chiefs. Starting in 1999, the average number of reports published was about 39 per year. An incident that occurred on November 29 th, 2006, is the earliest pending investigation. This example shows a lead time of nearly 2 years. There is 1 pending investigation from 2006, 28 from 2007, and as of October 7, 2008, 22 thus far for

8 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 8 Looking at firefighter fatalities, all fires, and civilian deaths by year from 1977 thru 2007, the trends show that the numbers of fires are decreasing, and the number of civilian deaths from fire are also, but the civilian deaths are not decreasing at the same rate as the fire numbers. This long trend shows the decrease of fires compared to firefighter death trend lines. They appear to be both decreasing in parallel fashion, however, the trend line for firefighter deaths is widening slightly. It appears that firefighter deaths are not decreasing as they should along with the trend for fire numbers. The lines should converge with all the emphasis on firefighter safety in the past 35 years iv. 8

9 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival Thru 2007 Fire Problem All Firefighter Deaths All Fires 10,000s Structure Fires 10,000s 300 Structure Fire Civilian Deaths 100s All Fires 10,000s 250 FF Deaths at Structure Fires Residential Structure Fires 10,000s , All Firefighter Deaths R 2 = All Fires 10,000s Residential Fire Civilian Deaths 100s All Civilian Fire Deaths 100s 150 Poly. (Structure Fires 10,000s) All Firefighter Deaths, 102 Poly. (Structure Fire Civilian Deaths 100s) 100 Poly. (All Fires 10,000s) Poly. (All Firefighter Deaths) 50 Poly. (FF Deaths at Structure Fires) R 2 = Poly. (All Civilian Fire Deaths 100s) Poly. (Residential Structure Fires 10,000s) Year 9

10 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival Thru 2007 "STRUCTURE" Fire Problem 173, All Firefighter Deaths All Firefighter Deaths 150 Structure Fires 10,000s 100 All Firefighter Deaths All Firefighter Deaths, 102 Structure Fire Civilian Deaths 100s FF Deaths at Structure Fires Structure Fires Poly. (Structure Fires 10,000s) 50 Structure Fire Civilian Deaths Structure Fire Firefighter Deaths Poly. (Structure Fire Civilian Deaths 100s) Log. (FF Deaths at Structure Fires) Year 10

11 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 11 There are 377 Firefighter Fatality Reports listed by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Heath Administration. All firefighter deaths however are not investigated. NIOSH has guidelines that it follows to determine whether an investigation is warranted based on a decision tree shown below. Firefighter Fatality Reports Per Year Number of Studies Published Pending 2004 Completed

12 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 12 Source: Of these 377, many pertain to motor vehicle accidents, accidents not on the fireground, such as during training, in the station, or at some other activity. A large percentage are due to heart disease. The number of investigations planned for each year has decreased somewhat since 2003, from a high of 44 for that year, 35 for 2007, to 23 in 2008 with almost 3 months to go in the year (this would trend to about 31 for Looking at the prioritization guidelines, this may be because similar issues are still emerging and are not re-studied. 12

13 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 13 Of the 377 reports, 63 v or about 17% involved structure fires. These were filtered out for study to see patterns in tactics and staffing shortages that lead to comprised practices and lead to these tragic outcomes. Staffing deficits cause a lack of information flow, or indirectly impact proper command decisions, with pre-incident planning deficits, training available, and inconsistency in personnel groups in both rank and numbers from one incident to the next. The focus will retrospectively look at tactics that were involved and how staffing inadequacies affected these outcomes. The real goal of this report is to add to the body of research that not only the fire service, but society in general can point to in gaining understanding and eventual acceptance of a cultural change that includes adequate fire personnel in initial structure fire response. 13

14 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 14 NIOSH Firefighters Fatality Reports Years Structure Fires All Other Causes There are many fire departments in our country that operate in a climate of overdependence on mutual aid. There are limitations on mutual efficiency and safety. A large, geographically expansive department is not the same as many smaller departments using frequent mutual aid operation serving the same jurisdiction. Increasingly, understaffed departments, rely on other surrounding understaffed departments to ramp-up adequate staffing for relative routine bread and butter structure fires. These departments are not organized consistently, do not train together sufficiently, have awareness of each other s jurisdiction, have preplanned, or have real administrative control prior to incidents of all resources that will interact at a scene. Small issues lead to inefficiencies such as inconsistent 14

15 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 15 apparatus numbering systems, firefighter PPE coloring and helmet identification colors, SOPs, and operational philosophies. Confidence in decision making and skill abilities in each other has not been developed. The organizational level in a particular incident s command system that a separate mutual aid department now commonly operates is not at a branch level but more commonly much nearer a task level. Department members are commonly intermixed into sectors, groups and divisions. Most the time this works well, but is not ideal. This condition will never be eliminated, however the condition occurs much more frequently now than in previous eras. There were multiple examples where this contributed to unsafe conditions. Government leaders have seen this type of environment as the alternative answer to a properly staffed, cohesive department that can handle properly a residential or moderately sized structure fire incident within the confines of its department. The more we progress in the direction of encouraging separate departments to train together, operate as one, etc, the more we need to be in fact be a single, organized department with a single organizational structure. This will only occur if it is accomplished by full consensus of all stake holders including the represented citizens, through their elected and appointed government leaders, and most importantly, employee groups, who are the risk takers. The overall added risk of fires in large buildings became quickly evident in this review. Tactics that are daily used and reinforced by positive results can not be used on these fires. A quote from one particular multiple firefighter report stated vi, A study by the NFPA from 1989 to 1993 revealed that 3.1 firefighters died for every 100,000 residence occupancy fires, and that 11.6 firefighters died for every 100,000 non residential occupancy fires, such as stores, offices and warehouses. This is nearly a 3 fold increase in risk of death for firefighters (274%). A later report stated that for the 5 year period of 2002 thru 2006, 3.1 firefighters died for every 100,000 residence occupancy fires. This compares to 13.9 for stores and offices,

16 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 16 for vacant/special, 8.8 public assembly, 6.8 in manufacturing, and 1.3 in storage. This shows an almost 5 fold increase in risk of death for firefighters in stores and offices over residential. (448%). vii What contributes to this added risk to firefighters in the non-residential occupancies? Larger floor spans o Lightweight or engineered elements that fail faster in fire. o Increased disorientation risk. Firefighters must use guidance by hose or guideline. o Larger void spaces above ceilings o Firefighters are deeper into hazardous environment and more distant from safe exit 16

17 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 17 o Command system organization needs are increased o Reliance of sectoring, information feedback, and reconnaissance is increased Of note in reviewing these firefighter fatality reports is the relative lack of success of firefighters that must depend on rescue efforts from RIT, FAST or RAT teams for their survival. Prevention of these situations is key and a renewed emphasis on doing our job using proper strategies and tactics is of paramount importance if we are going to eliminate these unnecessary deaths of these heroes. Looking at these events in totality, the same things are happening over and over again. The advent of the information age will undoubtedly improve our awareness and ability to learn by other s experiences. The goal of this review is to boil these reports down to the common factors so they can be more easily digested as critical factors to avoid in our operations. CONCLUSIONS This research may be added to the body of knowledge that is accumulating as the result of much post incident analysis. As the review of the fatality reports referenced within were being conducted, various factors were found that to a varying degree, in combination or by themselves contributed to these tragic outcomes. This list accumulated to about 28 categories. The factors themselves were reviewed to determine duplicative results, and combined with others where appropriate. The frequency of occurrence was tabulated. The numbers derived are not scientifically true as to frequency of occurrence. As noted earlier, the decision tree allows that not all incidents are investigated. Also, recommendations listed by NIOSH were not consistent from the early years until now. However, this report included more factors observed in earlier incidents that are only apparent now. One example is thermal imaging camera use that was not widely used early on. An attempt was made to compensate 17

18 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 18 for this. The point to be made is that the conclusions of factor frequency can not be statistically proven, but reasonably formed. The list was then refined to 25. These are the most common factors found to be present in the firefighter fatality investigative reports conducted by NIOSH. The body of reports was reviewed in chronological order from most recent backwards. It was found that we have generally improved on the way we do things, the protection that we have, and the availability of technology we have. However, there are many examples of tried and true principles being violated. Why are we repeatedly violating these principles? Are we unaware, or are we forced to? 18

19 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 19 TOP 25 Firefighter Fatality Factors in Structure Fires Command System, Organization, Transfer of Command RIT Ventilation Staffing Inadequacy or Delayed Collapse 51% 48% 46% 44% 43% Thermal Imager Accountability 38% 38% No Separate Safety Officer Inappropiate Strategy Buddy System/Crew Integrity IC involved in tasks Pre-Incident Planning Basement Fire - 1st Floor Entry Search w/out hose or guideline Operating Above Fire Water Problem LTWT Structural Members Search w/out water Backup Line Defensive Offensive Overlap Delayed Alarm 1 35% 35% 32% 32% 29% 25% 25% 22% 21% 19% 17% 14% 14% Opposing Attack Directions Pulled Attack Line out prior to all FFs out. Fire Attack crew large distance from entry (safe point) Utility Control 3% 3% 5% 8% Communications is obviously a vital part of how we manage incidents. This was not isolated as a separate factor as it is such a fundamental need for anything we do on the fireground. However, early reports frequently mentioned the need for interior firefighters to have portable radios. In later times, it was seen that only officers that lead interior crews had portable radios, and still later reports rarely mentioned the absence of portable radios by firefighters. So we have less of the communication problems created by the absence of radios, 19

20 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 20 but do have communication problems such as too much radio traffic, need for additional channels, or the lack of reporting of remote or interior conditions back to command. Since command has a need to be generally stationary, command must have others do reconnaissance and report back credible information. With the totality of the entire report information in mind, it becomes very apparent of the need to separate proactive preventative measures from reactive rescue measures. The factor that was listed as very frequently present was RIT. RIT itself is obviously a reactive approach. This absence or implementation difficulty of a rapid intervention team was seen, however the successful remedy or bearing on the outcome of the situation could not be determined. There is no doubt that the presence and effectiveness of this concept is critical because it is the last resort to turn a desperate situation around. There are several documented rescues of firefighters in trouble. However, we must remember that prevention efforts have a much greater degree of impact on saving firefighters. We are being forced by society to practice unsafely, and then react to the results. We do not have the resources to practice safely, or even rescue ourselves from the bad situations created. There are many examples that show how fast firefighters can be killed, where a rapid intervention, however skillful, will not change the outcome, while putting more firefighters under greater risk than what caused the original need for their involvement. We are also faced with the dilemma of a decision to assign early arriving firefighters to RIT, or instead to early needs related to prevention of adverse events on the fireground, while attempting to manage a personnel deficit. This includes ventilation, second or back-up lines, forcible entry, ladder placement, etc. There are examples of futile attempts at rescue, and research that shows the time and difficulty involved in interior firefighter rescue. The Phoenix fire department viii found that there are severe limitations with the firefighter rescue concept even in a relatively well-trained, motivated, adequately staffed department. In research that 20

21 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 21 they conducted they recorded data on several rescues of a pair firefighters from inside a building with partially obscured vision. None of the firefighters to be rescued were entrapped in any way and generally located within 100 feet of the exit. The research showed the following: Average Time Rapid Intervention Team Data ii Task 21.8 Time it takes to locate, package, transfill and extricate a downed firefighter out of a commercial structure from Mayday call Amount of Work Time With a 3000 psi Bottle 2.5 Time for RIT to Prepare for Rescue 2.6 Time for RIT to Enter After Mayday 12 : 1 Ratio of Rescue Firefighters to Victim Firefighter 5 : 1 Ratio of Rescue Firefighters To Those Who Get Into Trouble We must focus on increased awareness and use of tried and true, scientifically researched preventative measures. This includes good strategic decision-making and coordinated good practice tactics. Report No. Incident Date F /16/07 FACTORS PER REPORTS REVIEWED SORTED BY DATE (LATEST TO EARLIEST) Title Volunteer fire fighter dies after falling through floor supported by engineered wooden-i beams at residential structure fire - Tennessee F /16/07 Career fire fighter dies in wind driven residential structure fire - Virginia 7 F /4/07 F /30/06 Career fire fighter dies when trapped by collapsed canopy during a two alarm attached garage fire Pennsylvania Career fire fighter dies and chief is injured when struck by 130-foot awning that collapses during a commercial building fire - Texas F /10/06 Career fire fighter dies in residential row house structure fire - Maryland 8 F /27/06 F /13/06 Floor collapse at commercial structure fire claims the lives of one career lieutenant and one career fire fighter New York Career engineer dies and fire fighter injured after falling through floor while conducting a primary search at a residential structure fire Wisconsin Total Factor Count

22 F /25/06 Volunteer deputy fire chief dies after falling through floor hole in residential structure during fire attack - Indiana 22 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 22 F /14/06 Career Lieutenant dies in residential structure fire - Colorado 3 F /21/06 Two volunteer fire fighters die when struck by exterior wall collapse at a commercial building fire overhaul - Alabama F /7/05 Career fire fighter killed while riding manlift to assess a silo fire - Missouri 2 F /18/05 F /19/05 F /13/05 A volunteer fire fighter and volunteer assistant lieutenant die after a smoke explosion at a town house complex - Wyoming Career fire captain dies when trapped by partial roof collapse in a vacant house fire Texas Career captain electrocuted at the scene of a residential structure fire California F /23/05 Career fire fighter dies while exiting residential basement fire - New York 2 F /23/05 F /20/05 F /20/04 F /8/04 F /4/04 Career lieutenant and career fire fighter die and four career fire fighters are seriously injured during a three alarm apartment fire - New York Career captain dies after running out of air at a residential structure fire Michigan One probationary career firefighter dies and four career firefighters are injured at a two - alarm residential structure fire - Texas Volunteer chief dies and two fire fighters are injured by a collapsing church facade Tennessee Career fire fighter dies and two career captains are injured while fighting night club arson fire Texas F /18/04 Career fire fighter dies searching for fire in a restaurant/lounge - Missouri 11 F /9/04 F /16/03 Residential basement fire claims the life of career lieutenant Pennsylvania Career fire fighter dies of carbon monoxide poisoning after becoming lost while searching for the seat of a fire in warehouse - New York F /29/03 Basement fire claims the life of volunteer fire fighter - Massachusetts 6 F /15/03 F /31/03 F /20/03 F /19/03 F /25/02 F /1/02 F /30/02 Partial roof collapse in commercial structure fire claims the lives of two career fire fighters Tennessee Career fire fighter dies and two career fire fighters injured in a flashover during a house fire Ohio Career firefighter dies from injuries received during a chimney and structural collapse after a house fire - Pennsylvania Volunteer fire fighter dies following nitrous oxide cylinder explosion while fighting a commercial structure fire Texas Structural collapse at an auto parts store fire claims the lives of one career lieutenant and two volunteer fire fighters - Oregon Volunteer lieutenant dies following structure collapse at residential house fire Pennsylvania Parapet wall collapse at auto body shop claims life of career captain and injures career lieutenant and emergency medical technician - Indiana F /14/02 Career fire fighter dies after roof collapse following roof ventilation - Iowa 8 F /11/02 F /13/01 F /17/01 One career fire fighter dies and another is injured after partial structural collapse Texas High-rise apartment fire claims the life of one career fire fighter (captain) and injures another career fire fighter (captain) - Texas Hardware store explosion claims the lives of three career fire fighters - New York

23 F /9/01 F /8/01 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 23 Career fire fighter dies after becoming trapped by fire in apartment building - New Jersey Career fire fighter dies after falling through the floor fighting a structure fire at a local residence Ohio F /17/01 Two volunteer fire fighters die fighting a basement fire - Illinois 7 F /11/01 Volunteer fire fighter (lieutenant) killed and one fire fighter injured during mobile home fire Pennsylvania F /28/00 Roof collapse injures four career fire fighters at a church fire - Arkansas 8 F /25/00 Residential house fire claims the life of one career fire fighter - Florida 8 F /29/00 F /20/00 F /31/00 F /3/00 A volunteer assistant chief was seriously injured and two volunteer fire fighters were injured while fighting a townhouse fire - Delaware Residential structure fire claims the life of one career fire fighter Alabama Career fire fighter dies and three are injured in a residential garage fire Utah Arson fire claims the life of one volunteer fire fighter and one civilian and severely injures another volunteer fire fighter - Michigan F /14/00 Restaurant fire claims the life of two career fire fighters - Texas 12 F /22/99 Structure fire claims the lives of three career fire fighters and three children Iowa 99-F48 12/18/99 Warehouse fire claims the life of a battalion chief - Missouri 7 99-F47 12/3/99 99-F04 12/31/98 98-F21 8/29/98 Six career fire fighters killed in cold-storage and warehouse building fire Massachusetts Roof collapse in arson church fire claims the life of volunteer fire fighter Georgia Commercial building fire claims the lives of two volunteer fire fighters Mississippi 98-F18 7/11/98 Vacant dwelling fire injures two fire fighters - Virginia 2 98-F07 3/8/98 Commercial structure fire claims the life of one fire fighter - California 7 98-F05 2/11/98 98-F06 2/5/98 98-F04 1/21/ /27/ /19/ /4/ /17/ /18/96 F /23/95 Backdraft in commercial building claims the lives of two fire fighters, injures three, and five fire fighters barely escape - Illinois Single-family dwelling fire claims the lives of two volunteer fire fighters Ohio Supermarket Fire Claims the Life of Volunteer Fire Fighter - West Virginia Two fire fighters die of smoke and soot inhalation in residential fire Pennsylvania Restaurant/tavern fire results in the death of one fire fighter and serious injuries to three other fire fighters Indiana One fire fighter dies of smoke inhalation, one overcome by smoke while fighting an attic fire - New York Floor collapse in a single family dwelling fire claims the life of one fire fighter and injures another Kentucky Sudden roof collapse of a burning auto parts store claims the lives of two fire fighters - Virginia, March 18, 1996 Fire fighter receives severe electrical shock causing cardiac complications, forcing his retirement, and eventually causing his death Massachusetts

24 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival /27/85 Three fire fighters killed fighting silo fire in Ohio 2 63 TOTAL Report No. FACTORS PER REPORTS REVIEWED SORTED REPORTS WITH MOST FACTORS TO LEAST Incident Date 98-F06 2/5/98 F /25/06 F /31/00 Title Single-family dwelling fire claims the lives of two volunteer fire fighters Ohio Volunteer deputy fire chief dies after falling through floor hole in residential structure during fire attack - Indiana Career fire fighter dies and three are injured in a residential garage fire Utah Total Factor Count F /14/00 Restaurant fire claims the life of two career fire fighters - Texas /17/97 Floor collapse in a single family dwelling fire claims the life of one fire fighter and injures another Kentucky F /18/04 Career fire fighter dies searching for fire in a restaurant/lounge - Missouri 11 F /22/99 F /13/06 F /19/03 F /9/01 99-F47 12/3/99 F /4/07 F /11/01 F /20/00 98-F21 8/29/98 98-F04 1/21/ /27/ /18/96 F /16/07 Structure fire claims the lives of three career fire fighters and three children Iowa Career engineer dies and fire fighter injured after falling through floor while conducting a primary search at a residential structure fire Wisconsin Volunteer fire fighter dies following nitrous oxide cylinder explosion while fighting a commercial structure fire Texas Career fire fighter dies after becoming trapped by fire in apartment building - New Jersey Six career fire fighters killed in cold-storage and warehouse building fire Massachusetts Career fire fighter dies when trapped by collapsed canopy during a two alarm attached garage fire Pennsylvania Volunteer fire fighter (lieutenant) killed and one fire fighter injured during mobile home fire Pennsylvania Residential structure fire claims the life of one career fire fighter Alabama Commercial building fire claims the lives of two volunteer fire fighters Mississippi Supermarket Fire Claims the Life of Volunteer Fire Fighter - West Virginia Two fire fighters die of smoke and soot inhalation in residential fire Pennsylvania Sudden roof collapse of a burning auto parts store claims the lives of two fire fighters - Virginia, March 18, 1996 Volunteer fire fighter dies after falling through floor supported by engineered wooden-i beams at residential structure fire - Tennessee

25 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 25 F /10/06 Career fire fighter dies in residential row house structure fire - Maryland 8 F /18/05 F /20/05 A volunteer fire fighter and volunteer assistant lieutenant die after a smoke explosion at a town house complex - Wyoming Career captain dies after running out of air at a residential structure fire Michigan F /14/02 Career fire fighter dies after roof collapse following roof ventilation - Iowa 8 F /28/00 Roof collapse injures four career fire fighters at a church fire - Arkansas 8 F /25/00 Residential house fire claims the life of one career fire fighter - Florida 8 F /16/07 Career fire fighter dies in wind driven residential structure fire - Virginia 7 F /9/04 F /16/03 F /15/03 Residential basement fire claims the life of career lieutenant Pennsylvania Career fire fighter dies of carbon monoxide poisoning after becoming lost while searching for the seat of a fire in warehouse - New York Partial roof collapse in commercial structure fire claims the lives of two career fire fighters Tennessee F /17/01 Two volunteer fire fighters die fighting a basement fire - Illinois 7 F /29/00 F /3/00 A volunteer assistant chief was seriously injured and two volunteer fire fighters were injured while fighting a townhouse fire - Delaware Arson fire claims the life of one volunteer fire fighter and one civilian and severely injures another volunteer fire fighter - Michigan 99-F48 12/18/99 Warehouse fire claims the life of a battalion chief - Missouri 7 99-F04 12/31/98 Roof collapse in arson church fire claims the life of volunteer fire fighter Georgia 98-F07 3/8/98 Commercial structure fire claims the life of one fire fighter - California /19/97 F /30/06 F /23/05 Restaurant/tavern fire results in the death of one fire fighter and serious injuries to three other fire fighters Indiana Career fire fighter dies and chief is injured when struck by 130-foot awning that collapses during a commercial building fire - Texas Career lieutenant and career fire fighter die and four career fire fighters are seriously injured during a three alarm apartment fire - New York F /29/03 Basement fire claims the life of volunteer fire fighter - Massachusetts 6 F /25/02 F /13/01 F /8/01 F /8/04 F /31/ /4/97 F /20/04 F /1/02 Structural collapse at an auto parts store fire claims the lives of one career lieutenant and two volunteer fire fighters - Oregon High-rise apartment fire claims the life of one career fire fighter (captain) and injures another career fire fighter (captain) - Texas Career fire fighter dies after falling through the floor fighting a structure fire at a local residence Ohio Volunteer chief dies and two fire fighters are injured by a collapsing church facade Tennessee Career fire fighter dies and two career fire fighters injured in a flashover during a house fire Ohio One fire fighter dies of smoke inhalation, one overcome by smoke while fighting an attic fire - New York One probationary career firefighter dies and four career firefighters are injured at a two - alarm residential structure fire - Texas Volunteer lieutenant dies following structure collapse at residential house fire Pennsylvania

26 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 26 F /14/06 Career Lieutenant dies in residential structure fire - Colorado 3 F /19/05 F /13/05 F /20/03 F /30/02 F /11/02 F /27/06 F /21/06 Career fire captain dies when trapped by partial roof collapse in a vacant house fire Texas Career captain electrocuted at the scene of a residential structure fire California Career firefighter dies from injuries received during a chimney and structural collapse after a house fire - Pennsylvania Parapet wall collapse at auto body shop claims life of career captain and injures career lieutenant and emergency medical technician - Indiana One career fire fighter dies and another is injured after partial structural collapse Texas Floor collapse at commercial structure fire claims the lives of one career lieutenant and one career fire fighter New York Two volunteer fire fighters die when struck by exterior wall collapse at a commercial building fire overhaul - Alabama F /7/05 Career fire fighter killed while riding manlift to assess a silo fire - Missouri 2 F /23/05 Career fire fighter dies while exiting residential basement fire - New York 2 F /4/04 F /17/01 Career fire fighter dies and two career captains are injured while fighting night club arson fire Texas Hardware store explosion claims the lives of three career fire fighters - New York 98-F18 7/11/98 Vacant dwelling fire injures two fire fighters - Virginia /27/85 Three fire fighters killed fighting silo fire in Ohio 2 98-F05 2/11/98 F /23/95 63 TOTAL Backdraft in commercial building claims the lives of two fire fighters, injures three, and five fire fighters barely escape - Illinois Fire fighter receives severe electrical shock causing cardiac complications, forcing his retirement, and eventually causing his death Massachusetts FACTORS Command System, Organization, Transfer of Command Just over half (51%) of all the reports included this factor. One problem reported was when command was transferred to personnel that had not yet arrived at scene. This becomes a source for confusion involving location, action, and function of personnel already at the scene. It does not follow proper principles of transfer of command. It is usually a function of a staffing deficit. Ideally, an officer should be directing the scene that is available to properly 26

27 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 27 hand over this function to a higher ranking officer if needed. This also results from the fastattack mode, and the nothing showing, investigating mode. The fast attack mode is called fast-action mode by Chief Alan Brunacini and may be indicated when the incident commander personally performing at the task level can quickly solve or stabilize the problem. Chief Brunacini goes on to state the operation is now in a somewhat compromised, nonstandard command status. Klaene and Sanders ix state that It would certainly be desirable if the first-arriving company officer could establish a formal command post outside of the structure and direct operations. However, few departments have sufficient staff to allow the company officer to establish a stationary command post on arrival. When the first arriving officer uses the nothing showing, investigating mode, once something is found that requires attack, this command mode should be converted into a stationary mode or fast attack mode. When these modes are not converted early or without transfer of information is when problems ensue, such as in strategic decision making, accountability, or lack of a coordinated one-directional, one strategic mode attack. As stated earlier, NIOSH also notes that command functioning difficulty increases with the number of separate departments are operating on one scene increases. In one report, a mutual aid dept looked on their own Chiefs as the incident command. We must keep in mind that separate companies or crews in one department are not the same as multiple companies or crews from multiple departments. Ideally we all operate, and have standard capabilities, but in reality is not the case. We talk about the importance of proper command transfer. This concept also applies to whenever someone else takes over any functional responsibility. In one case, a transfer of sector responsibility may have hindered A Side accountability. The separation of roles from strategic, to tactical, to task must be respected. A 27

28 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 28 factor found was a when an officer performing as a sector officer also became involved in tasks that adversely effected the performance as the sector officer. In general, scenes need to be organized. Our job is to find chaos wherever it exists, and organize it. One report stated how crews were getting confused as to geographic directions. This involved designations such as north, south, east, and west. The address for the subject building should always be designated the A side, then B, C, & D as we travel around the building in a clockwise fashion. Numerical designations should be reserved for vertical floors. We should not use Side 2, as the officer for responsibility of the 2 nd floor, may also be called Division 2 or Sector 2. This will eventually be the subject of a problem on a fireground. Part of the officer s job as a crew leader is to solve problems for the crew. If solving the problem, takes out your ability to lead and supervise sufficiently, the problem solving needs to be delegated. When a RIT scenario has occurred, the scene organization must be maintained and reinforced. In one case, the RIT operation became chaotic as all hands wanted to help. There should be a formal assignment of functions. There must be no question of who is commanding and must be one individual that directs the operations. This must be enforced as it has been shown to be deadly for firefighters. Firefighters from the start of their career must be shown how discipline in the command system is a life and death issue. Several of the reports showed how well intentioned free-lancing can be deadly not only for the freelancer but others as well. There needs to be a strong effort to impress on officers rising through the ranks of the need to let go of task level actions, and concentrate on the role that they must play. Part of this difficulty is that individuals frequently perform at all vertical levels of a department. One day, they are incident command, the next they are driving the truck, the next day they are putting a hole in a roof. This task level involvement goes back to staffing deficits. We are trying (forced) to do 28

29 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 29 strategic, tactical, and task level work at the same time. In one incident the incident commander was faced with running the fire or getting a rescued child to a hospital. A decision was made that should not have had to be made. We need to practice (tabletop) the command system at structure fire scenarios. All personnel need to do a better job of reporting conditions to their superiors. This will help the commanders and sector officers concentrate on decision making rather than recon. Inadequate available staffing leads to disorganization, and we are all trying to do more than we are capable of. The time we have for education at out level of function is also decreased because we are performing non-emergency function needs of lower levels Command System, Organization, Transfer of Command Rate of Factors Per Year of FF Fatalities Studied in a Particular Year 1996 thru Year Trend % 71% 67% % Rapid Intervention Teams Again, about half (48%) of all the reports included this factor. As stated earlier, the factor was noted; however, the prevention of the fatality related to this factor is unknown and would vary greatly from one situation to another. Many of the reports listed noted that a rapid intervention team was not assigned prior to the need for firefighter rescue. There were reports 29

30 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 30 where the operation of the RIT was disorganized. Organization of the operation is essential for efficiency, chances of success, and minimization of risk to the victim and rescuers. In some reports, the RIT was formed by pulling firefighters from other assignments. This abandonment of these assignments may increase danger to all involved and these firefighters may be fatigued and be low on air. We must remember that any attack lines in any area may be the only source of orientation for lost firefighters attempting to escape, serve as protection from heat by downed firefighters, and the quickest method to find lost or trapped firefighters. This line IS their lifeline. Any firefighting required in the rescue attempt prior to locating downed firefighters must be by additional lines brought in by the Rapid intervention Team. Attack lines with differing colors are helpful in identifying crews. Reports indicated requests for RIT that went unanswered by command. This invariably is due to radio communication difficulties. These may include scene noise, such as PPV gas fans, truck engines, etc. It may include too much radio traffic on the same frequency. It may include command distractions, talking or monitoring one channel, while the request is given by a second channel. We need to insure that hazard zone personnel are the listening priority. We need more thermal imagers. There are many uses for the TIC. It is a technological advancement that is analogous to the SCBA of the 1960s. TICs are needed for exterior size-up and reassessment, interior assessment, interior orientation for rescue and attack, overhaul, and firefighter rescue. Many of these occur simultaneously on a fire scene. We need to emphasize the need for the liberal opening up of a building to provide for later emergency escape needs. At the same time, additional ventilation created by this must be coordinated through command, because the next fatality factor expanded on is ventilation (too much or too little). All preparatory operations should be coordinated with command. Preparatory tasks should not inhibit readiness of the team, and should not put the team in hazardous situations, as most likely no secondary RIT will be assigned with the first one not deployed. 30

31 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 31 RIT teams need to think of 3 modes of their function, firefighter rescue preparation, hazard zone firefighter safety enhancement, and firefighter rescue. The first two should always occur, the third when called upon. In the prep mode, the RIT crew needs to assemble anticipated equipment needs and make estimates on probable firefighter trouble scenarios. In this mode, RIT may consult with the safety sector officer as they are also making similar considerations. The minimization of distances from hazard zone rescue to safe areas must be emphasized. This reduces risk, and maximizes efficiency. Wall breaches by additional teams should be assigned, and reporting to the RIT officer. This all takes added staffing Rapid Intervention Team Rate of Factors Per Year of FF Fatalities Studied in a Particular Year 1996 thru Year Trend % 67% 67% 6 57% % 29% 29% 33% Ventilation The third most prevalent factor (46%) in the firefighter fatality reports pertained to ventilation. It is the number 1 factor related to the science of fire behavior. There are deaths related to too much, too little, or uncoordinated ventilation. We have learned and been taught for decades that ventilation must be coordinated with fire attack. We need to have a much 31

32 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 32 better emphasis on the science of fire behavior. Ventilation often gets nixed due to staffing shortages, or gets modified to a form that fits the tactic that can be performed with lesser equipment and staffing available, and this is killing us. We must be cognizant of the fact that positive pressure ventilation will push heat and combustion products into spaces and out of a building. This is good and bad. Eliminating heat and combustion products is good. Putting oxygen in deficient spaces is bad. Flashovers and backdrafts are both prevented and caused from PPV use. We must remember that the air goes in, and heat and smoke comes out. If we don t let it out, it is forced into somewhere else in the structure. We must control the exit point. The ideal exit point is horizontally at the point where the seat of the fire is at, and vertically as high as practical and safely accomplished. This is the hottest part of the fire, and where the most hazard and damage is, and where the margin of survivability is the lowest. Knowing this, the technique used to make the exit point at this location must fit into safety for firefighters. Wind must be considered. Natural wind direction may change the ideal exit point at a less than ideal location, and may change the attack direction. Firefighters must have a safe are to retreat back to that correlates to enough air for escape back to this area. If this area is a stairwell, the stairwell must be vented. Elimination of smoke must be greater than entrance of smoke. Firefighters can not count on a chimney for an escape path. This includes the interior stairs to a basement fire. Uncoordinated ventilation tactics without fire behavior considerations are deadly in serious fires. Windows that are used for significant venting should not be counted on for escape. There are times when the impossibility of proper venting should be an indicator for a shift in strategy from offensive to defensive. Due to our need to check void spaces such as above false ceilings, we need to be prepared for smoke explosions, backdrafts or flashovers, when checking. Where there are spaces rich in heated combustion by-products, the venting 32

33 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 33 needs to be on the exit point, rather than the air entrance point. This lets heat out, without letting oxygen in. This is easier said than done. There were a couple of reported backdrafts from necessary lifting of ceiling tiles for fire extension checks. Subsequent adverse sudden change in conditions caused deadly disorientation, and untenable environments. Firefighters need to remember three killers with all PPE in place: explosion, flashover, and collapse. Ventilation also causes accumulated fine fuels such as dust to be stirred up, and increase their surface areas exposed to oxygen, causing rapid combustion up to and including explosions. 12 Ventilation Rate of Factors Per Year of FF Fatalities Studied in a Particular Year 1996 thru Year Trend % 71% 67% % 29% 29% Staffing Inadequacy or Delayed Staffing Of the incidents studied, 44% had firefighting staff deficits that affected the poor outcome. Many preventable known factors come in to play because there aren t bodies available to do what we know is right. Klaene and Sanders iii say, Offensive attacks are people intensive. There is also a possible loss of experience and knowledge at the top of the chain of command as this level of personnel are indirectly forced out from the physical demands of firefighting task needs of a lower level because of lower level staffing deficits. 33

34 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 34 The fire service needs a comprehensive campaign to educate the general public on the need for people to fight fires. It is our need and theirs. In one report, the crew took an aggressive approach to insure adequate fire flow, and deployed a 2 ½ line. The staffing available for this line was 2 personnel. It is recommended that 3 to 4 handle a line of this size. In several reports staffing numbers ramped up to higher numbers, but only after several minutes in the critical stages of the incidents elapsed. Department performance indicator criteria should include staff number arrival times. It does no good to have 50 firefighters on the scene with an initial arrival of 3. The common staffing of 3 on an engine prevents any meaningful task in a hazardous area due to OSHA 2 in, 2 out considerations. It also means, these departments are planning and expecting exceptions to this rule be made in life threatening rescue situations, which happens to be our primary mission. As mentioned earlier, there are limitations with operations that routinely depend on multiple mutual aid companies for relatively routine incidents. The incident command importance has been stressed in theses factors previously. Critical task needs force leaders to abandon critical management functions, or at least cause their effectiveness to diminish. We must refrain from attempting to handle multiple incidents with inadequate personnel. This practice lowers everyone s safety. We need to have an automatic tactical reserve operation or move-up established. One report involved an agency whose personnel were cross-trained as law enforcement and firefighters. This author believes there are severe limitations of the effectiveness of this type of operation in terms of capacity for needed expertise, experience, and availability when emergencies occur that commonly require complements of both functions. There were reports that specifically addressed incidents that aggressive tactics were employed that suffered from inadequate apparatus, equipment, and staffing. There are 34

35 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 35 undoubtedly many jurisdictions that are capable of only properly and safely employing defensive tactics. This is firefighting of decades previous, without the advent of the modern breathing apparatus. 12 Staffing Inadequacy or Delayed Rate of Factors Per Year of FF Fatalities Studied in a Particular Year 1996 thru Year Trend % % 33% 43% 33% 29% 43% Structural Collapse Tied for the third most prevalent factor (43%) in the firefighter fatality reports studied pertained to structural collapse. It is also tied for the number 1 factor related to the science of fire behavior. There are numerous reports of firefighters falling through burned floor structures. These floor failures had no mention of trusses as a major contributor in the failures. They included joisted full dimension structures. The reports did not specify if the structures were protected by encasement of drywall. Many roof collapses were present with the usual weakness indicators of lightweight metal and wood truss construction, as well as large open, long span areas. Facade, porch roof, and wall collapse examples were included. We must recognize and respect these hazards. We must designate and enforce collapse zones. Vertical roof ventilation 35

36 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 36 is still conducted at the most dangerous, structurally damaged area of a building on fire. This should only be performed when personnel are supported by something other than the burned roof structure, such as a roof ladder, or aerial device. Full PPE including SCBA, at least one buddy, and a hose line must be in place. The firefighting community should move building construction education to the top of the list for structural firefighting. According to a 2003 study x conducted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST); the number of collapse fatalities on an annual basis has declined since Compared to limited historical data, the percentage of collapse fatalities that occurred in residential properties has increased. Collapse fatalities are generally caused two ways: by being caught or trapped in the structure or by being struck by an object. Compared to limited historical data, the percentage of collapse fatalities caused by being caught or trapped in the structure has increased. A majority (over 65 %) of collapse fatalities occurred during fire attack. Over half of collapse fatalities occurred during the first three months of the year and over 42 % occurred in the first eight hours of the day (Midnight to 8:00 AM) Collapse Rate of Factors Per Year of FF Fatalities Studied in a Particular Year 1996 thru Year Trend % % 4 25% 43% 43% 33% 29% 2 17%

37 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 37 Thermal Imager Not Used About 38% of the fatality reports were of incidents where thermal imaging technology was not used. The first thermal imagers were introduced to the fire service in the early 1990s, after being developed by the military. We are experiencing phases in this technology. We have experienced the rarity of a department possessing one, to departments struggling to afford one then eventually purchasing one, to interior crews overdependence on one, to forgetting to pull it off the truck. We now see the need to increase its use in exterior size-up and other fireground applications. Departments now are more commonly having one for each apparatus. The technology is progressing to the point that every firefighter will have their own miniature thermal imager much the same as the U.S. soldier does. It is very sad in today s world to see firefighters still getting lost in smoke, unable to escape before running out of air. When considering what we primarily deal with darkness and heat, the TIC should be a primary required tool for every firefighter, as basic as the fire helmet Thermal Imager Not Used Exterior Size-Up and/or Interior Rate of Factors Per Year of FF Fatalities Studied in a Particular Year 1996 thru Year Trend % % 43% 29% 29% 2 17% 17%

38 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 38 Accountability of Firefighters Not Maintained Tied for 7 th most frequent factor of the 25 is related to accountability. This was 38% of all the reports. A more common problem in earlier years was a total lack of any system. More recently, as accountability is earnestly attempted to be maintained, a member is accidentally misidentified. A personal accountability report by all members results in all accounted for, only to later discover a missing member. In one report, an electronic accountability system showed vulnerability as there was a misidentified firefighter. The I.C. received a PAR when in actuality the member was still missing. The system at the basic level relies on the crew leader to know who they have and this does not change until out of the hazard area and the crew is formally disbanded and put back into the pool of standby, tactical reserve, rehab, or on-deck resources. Some of the reports showed when crews inter-mix in the hazard area, or one crew member runs out of air, exits, and is replaced, confusion occurs. This concept is crew integrity. The leader can not keep track of changing personnel in the darkness and chaos of the fire environment. You get ready together, enter, and leave together. You stay together until officially regrouped. Large areas, both horizontally and vertically require subdivision of the scene or sectoring. This assists with management and accountability. No personnel in the hazard area should be without a crew of least two or more. Accountability also means that personnel in the hazard area or being paid attention to. We must keep close tabs on the status of these personnel. Every person on the incident must have an assignment, even if that assignment is standby. Personnel can not perform without direction. This is termed freelancing. Arriving firefighters unconsciously assess the level of control that is exerted by command, and quickly learn what degree of free-lancing is acceptable. Early strong command presence is needed to avoid this phenomenon. 38

39 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 39 Command also needs to be able to know at all times for each member, their location, function, level of hazard, who they report to, who reports to them, their radio identifier if applicable, and name. Various tools may be used to assist in this. At the basic level are tags that are given to their sector officer or command. A command board or tactical worksheet can be used. These can show all functional and geographic positions filled, and the name that is filling the position. Crews reporting to these positions can also be shown. However, below the crew leader, individual members are usually not shown on larger incidents. The crew leaders will be shown on the accountability board along with the detail of what members are actually in the crew. When a personal accountability report or PAR is called for by the incident commander, the I.C. asks each individual holding a position for a check of resources reporting to them. They in turn do the same. An example is included below. A limited number of positions are included for illustrative purposes. The I.C. radios to all to the effect, standby for a PAR. The crew leaders such as FF Andrews, leader of Crew Andrews checks the 4 individuals he has responsibility for and makes sure he knows their 4 names by whatever method he cares to use. He then has a PAR of 5, including himself. Division 2 will call Crew Andrews and ask for a PAR. Crew Andrews will advise a PAR of 5. Command will call Division 2 and ask for a PAR. When Division 2 has checked for a PAR from both Crew Franks and Crew Andrews. Division 2 will report a PAR of 10. This includes all personnel he has responsible for including himself. After getting a report from 4 individuals he has reporting to him, he will match this to his accountability board and see if the number matches. He should know the number in each position under him by using the accountability system. The total number should be 22 including himself. The command board should show relationships of positions. The accountability board should show each individual in each crew and the crew leader. Members not accounted for at any 39

40 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 40 level will be discovered by count, then by name to isolate where the missing member is. This has to be practiced along with command procedures at the tabletop level using something to represent the individuals at the bottom. 7 I.C. Ass t Chief 1 3 Division 1 Captain Parker 10 Division 2 Captain Bennett Salvage Sector Lt. King EMS Sector Chief Hill Fire Attack Div 1 Captain Newman S & R Division 1 FF Watson Crew Franks Lt. Franks Medic 680 FF/Medic FF Zorn FF Webster FF Smith FF/Medic Pickler FF Specht FF Shepherd FF Jones FF Adams Crew Andrews FF Andrews On Accountability Board FF Brown Eng Grove FF White FF Masters 40

41 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival Accountability Rate of Factors Per Year of FF Fatalities Studied in a Particular Year 1996 thru Year Trend 86% 67% % 33% % Incident Safety Officer Not Assigned For the reports studied, 35% of them had reported that the position of Safety was not assigned. This means this function is not the sole focus of any individual on the scene. When this is the case, the incident commander retains this function, even though the I.C. always retains responsibility for safety of all responders. Nothing in the reports states that the absence of a safety officer in itself directly caused adverse events. They do point out that this helps put more focus on safety. When the incident commander retains the safety function, command at times has competing interests. These competing interests are the benefits of fulfilling the mission vs. the risks to safety of responders. One example of a need for a safety officer is at a scene with a live wire down. Word of mouth about safety concerns are not enough, as we are distracted, and lose focus. Strong physical barriers and/or strong, direct enforcement of exclusionary zones for safety concerns like wires down or collapse hazards need to take place. Safety is a mobile position that may be 41

42 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 42 arranged as a stationary CP position with safety assistants that are mobile or sectored. The buddy system in hazardous areas still applies to safety personnel. 12 No Safety Officer Assigned Rate of Factors Per Year of FF Fatalities Studied in a Particular Year 1996 thru Year Trend % 67% % 29% 33% 2 17% 2 14% Strategic Decision Making The reports showed that strategic decision making as an area in need of improvement in 35% of the reports. Once the initial strategy is decided, a continual re-evaluation needs to be undertaken as conditions change and additional information is received. According to an article xi in everyonegoeshome.com, acceptable risk is stated this way: 1. What is the survival profile of any victims in the involved compartment? 2. We will not risk our lives at all for buildings or lives that are already lost. 3. We may only risk our lives a little, in a calculated manner, to save savable property. 4. We may risk our lives a lot, in a calculated manner, to save savable lives. 42

43 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 43 NFPA Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety & Health Program includes these principles: 1. Significant risk only for potential to save lives. 2. Activities to protect property have inherent risks, that we should reduce or avoid. 3. No risk if no possibility to save lives or property. Another simple concept to our acceptance of risk was stated by Jeff Goins in an article titled xii Risk Analysis at Normally Occupied Structure Incidents - We will risk a lot to save a lot. We will risk a little to save a little. We will risk nothing to save nothing. One fact bears repeating, three killers with all PPE in place: explosion, flashover, and collapse. In Structural Firefighting, the authors state iii, From a fire fighter safety viewpoint the worst case scenario is one in which the fire fighter arrives near the end of the buildup to flashover with occupants lives at risk in a large, undivided area. There were several reports where no lives were at risk with significant firefighter risk. Situations were experienced where the fire department received repeated reports of occupants in the building. The incident commander needs to recognize the areas where, and the point in time reached that is beyond victim survivability. Firefighters need to emphasize and train dispatchers to thoroughly question callers as to the status of occupants. The mere possibility of occupants that need rescue may suffice at some level of risk; however situations with higher risk to firefighters require an assessment of information credibility and accuracy. There are many examples of firefighter fatalities and injuries from significantly risky rescue attempts based on questionable information. If the firefighters themselves do not have time to thoroughly question reporting parties, or have access to them, which is the case most all the 43

44 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 44 time, then others need to be assigned to do this, and understand the importance, such as dispatchers, police, or other responsible persons Interior conditions need to be reported to command. All members need to be trained to recognize pertinent info and be able to succinctly communicate it to the I.C. Another concept that also must be emphasized is that situations presented must be paired with resources available. While we may recognize very similar situations on different days and can see them as standard events, resource availability and capability may be very different from one day to the next. Most departments have a constantly dynamic resource list to draw from, except for the larger metropolitan departments who may assign standard resources to standard events. These dynamics make an offensive mode fire today and a defensive fire tomorrow. All departments should have a goal to standardize staffing, apparatus, and rank structures, on standardized responses. Strategic decisions do not involve black or white decisions, but many shades of gray. There is not a card system to use or a flip book to consult. The time factor involved in a building must be evaluated. Increased time in a burning building without a catastrophic event should not increase our confidence, but decrease it. Incident commanders are being forced to make very tough decisions to provide a service level the public expects, but doesn t support with the operational resources to provide that service following best practices and industry standards. Fire departments may be pushing the envelope not only to save lives, and save property, but also to justify their existence to the public. We need to educate the public on how we should be operating, so that they may make 44

45 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 45 an informed decision on expectations. 12 Strategic Decision Making Rate of Factors Per Year of FF Fatalities Studied in a Particular Year 1996 thru Year Trend % % 4 33% 4 33% 29% 33% 2 17% 2 14% Buddy System/Crew Integrity Concept Not Maintained About a third (32%) of all firefighter fatality reports from structure fires contained incidents where either the crew integrity was lost or firefighters worked in hazard areas without a partner in close contact working together. When working in the hazard zone, the minimum number of members in a crew is two. This is called the buddy system. If one member gets into trouble, the other is there to assist. Many tasks take a minimum of two to complete. Each other s personal protective equipment should also checked by their buddy prior to entry. This concept has been a tried and true firefighter safety concept for many decades. Crews may have more than two members up to a manageable span of control for the task and environment. There must be a leader. The leader must know who is in the crew, and the crew members must know who the leader is. In a zero visibility, hostile environment, this 45

46 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 46 number may be limited to a maximum crew size of 1 leader and about 5 subordinates. We commonly work with total crew sizes of 2, 3, and 4 members. Most departments do not (although we should) have the luxury of crews that match companies that respond. In this case, a pool of personnel must be assembled into crews, assigned a radio designation, and briefed on assignment (by SOP or other). This crew should stay together through assignment, rehab, and on to On Deck. At this point they may stay as a crew or be re-assembled. When one firefighter gets low on air, all should exit together, and all bottles should be refilled. Obviously, if this does not occur, as soon as the crew returns, another firefighter will need air, etc. When you re family is on a road trip, everyone goes when one of the kids has to stop at the gas station. According to Klaene and Sanders, splitting crews inside the hazard area is inviting disaster. Firefighters must instinctively stay associated with their crew and their source of orientation, even in relatively good conditions. There were several examples of sudden unexpected changes of conditions to hostile zero-visibility conditions where firefighters could not orient themselves to their hose line or their respective crew members. Fire scene personnel accountability was another factor that was elaborated on earlier. Crew integrity is essential if this system is to work. We need to remember that mistakes made in this system, cause false missing personnel reports. A report of a missing firefighter, initiates a harrowing search with the greatest of risks to other firefighters. This is very important to understand. 46

47 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival Buddy System or Crew Integrity Rate of Factors Per Year of FF Fatalities Studied in a Particular Year 1996 thru Year Trend 67% 6 57% % 33% 43% % Incident Commander Involved in Tasks One out of three (32%) of all the reports contained incidents that had the incident commander involved directly in performing at the task level. The incident commander needs to appreciate and be able to focus on performing the functions of this level of responsibility. This also applies to, sector, group leaders, or division officers. However, the greater the gap between levels of command, the greater the detriment to operations, such as the I.C. constrained in their job by performing task level functions. This includes pumping the truck, attack line deployment, ventilation, interior size-up, etc. The nothing showing mode of operation is when the first company must investigate, because there is no indication of fire or smoke that must be dealt with. Once, the investigation reveals otherwise, the I.C. needs to deploy additional resources, assign his crew members as needed, and revert to a stationary, strong command mode. Hopefully, there will be resources near that are at level 1 staging. Incident commanders should guard against overzealous task involvement under the fast-attack mode. When the I.C. can not avoid 47

48 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 48 being involved in tasks, these tasks should ideally be ones that allow him to be in a position to see the overall picture, available to receive information, and direct others. Firefighters must develop a level of mastery at their level so the supervisors have confidence that tasks will be or are being performed as well as or better than they could. While we need to mitigate relatively simple problems, early, before they get out of hand, and save lives, we should always take a second and make this consideration. Many of these examples are plain and simple staffing deficits. 8 7 Incident Commander Involved at Task Level Rate of Factors Per Year of FF Fatalities Studied in a Particular Year 1996 thru Year Trend 67% % 43% 43% 4 33% 33% % Pre-Incident Planning Needs 29% of the reports showed needs involving pre-incident planning. This was the 8 th most frequent factor of the 25. Every department should have a pre-incident planning program. A good source list for development, that combined covers the subject comprehensively and from a practical approach includes, NFPA standard 1620 Pre-Incident Planning, Alan Brunacini s Fire Command, and NFPA s, Structural Firefighting, by Bernard J. Ben Klaene & Russell E. Sanders. We need to start our size-up before the incident ever happens. Pre-incident planning does not have to only involve buildings and structure fires. It may also cover typical non- 48

49 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 49 building fires, technical rescue, or hazardous materials incidents. Frank Brannigan, author of Building Construction For The Fire Service strongly encouraged us to Know your buildings. We want to ascertain things like construction features, obscure hazards, and ventilation profiles prior to a middle of the night emergency. There are varying amounts of information we want or need at the scene on each of our properties. Some we will want complex pre-incident plans, such as strip malls, hospitals, and industrial complexes. In most cases, we will only want a single building pre-plan. This could be the layout of a typically constructed house in our response district. Some may require only a partial plan, or a small bit of information or a note, for example an owner or tenant has called us to let us know about oxygen tanks or there is a handicapped person on the second floor. Priority criteria for properties to preplan are based on complexity, civilian life hazard, and firefighter hazard. Each property could be assigned a judged numerical value of 1 through 5. The properties with higher totals would be prioritized and completed first, and so on. The fire service needs to take advantage of modern technology to decrease our risk and add to efficiency. This is another example of a staffing deficit that hinders our ability to enhance the way we do our job. This takes an educated fire safety professional to coordinate a program from design, to information gathering, to system implementation, to final plan production, and ongoing revisions Pre-Incident Planning Deficiency Rate of Factors Per Year of FF Fatalities Studied in a Particular Year 1996 thru Year Trend % 4 43% 2 14% 17% 14%

50 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 50 Basement Fire - 1st Floor Entry About a fourth of the fatality reports pointed out the issue of entering the first floor over a basement fire. Many firefighters fall through the first floor after making entry. Many times the actual location of the fire is unknown. This lack of information can be eliminated with a proper size-up with a walk around and use of a thermal imager. Firefighters should not enter an area over the fire until the area below is at least under the control of hose attack crews on the same floor, and preferably when the structural integrity has been reasonably been confirmed. I know of a few examples in years passed, where firefighters fell through the floor, but there were numerous firefighters and hose lines in place where they fell through. The firefighter was injured but not killed. Now, when the same thing occurs, there is no crew or hose line beneath. The firefighter succumbs to an untenable fire environment and/or disorientation. We also teach firefighters to use a roof ladder when ventilating a roof. This is to keep him or her from sliding off, and to spread out the load of the firefighter to prevent collapse, or in case it collapses. In this case we recognize we are cutting a hole over the hottest part of the fire. We are careful of this potential failure of the roof structure, and similarly we should be very wary of floor structures over basement fires. When the basement is on fire and other floors are involved, the basement should be the first attack entry point. An attempt should be made to vent the basement preferably on the hottest (burn) side to the outside. The concept of protecting the interior stairs from the rest of the building must be accomplished by a second crew, only after the basement is well controlled, or enough where a fall through firefighter will not lose his life from burns or asphyxiation. There will be crews below with coverage of the entire basement area. Fires need to be fought from the lower levels up, because we all know heat rises. There are many examples of firefighters killed operating above the fire floor. 50

51 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 51 When a basement on fire has an exterior entrance, this should be the fire attack point. When a basement has an exterior stair entrance and an interior stair entrance, the exterior stairs is our best bet for safety. This is because both may cause us to descend stairs (down a chimney), but the exterior has less chance to be burned out. The path to the interior stairs may not be structurally sound, and a fall through leaves one needing to ascend out a hole for orientation and escape out of the hazard. The exterior stair entrance will provide an escape path more often even with structural collapse of the floor above. A fall through the floor many times leaves you without your hose line for protection, and orientation back to the safety escape. Whereas, a first floor collapse when you have entered the basement, at least leaves you with your hose line. When a flashover occurs in the basement, an exterior stair escape path provides a much shorter, direct, albeit untenable path to safety, than the interior stairs (chimney). In the interior stairs, when the stairs are ascended, we still have to maneuver on the first floor to get to safety. We will likely have to endure a second untenable environment on the first floor while attempting to escape. We should consider wall breaches in basement fires more often depending on construction. 51

52 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival Basement Fire - First Floor Entry Rate of Factors Per Year of FF Fatalities Studied in a Particular Year 1996 thru Year Trend 67% % 4 33% 3 29% 2 14% 2 14% Searching Without Either a Hose or Guide Rope One fourth of reports had firefighters becoming disoriented when not following a hose line or rope line back to an area of safety. Firefighters should not overly rely on a right to left or left to right search, except for the smaller area, simplest, open buildings. An open building is one with a good set of windows. Windows serve as orientation guideposts, and sources of emergency escape and access to help. A common finding is a non-line search above the fire. This is the typical scenario in the 3am house fire. Fire is on lower levels, occupants are probably on upper levels. This is performed on moderately sized homes routinely and even those have experienced deadly disorientation. These same tactics on the modern, larger open layout homes, businesses, and larger commercial stores, etc, become very dangerous. Firefighters also became disoriented with sudden environmental changes to prolonged zero visibility xiii. The concept of staying with a hose line or rope has limits also. When the distance is greater, the chances of a firefighter losing the hose are also greater. The concept of strict attack from unburned to burned areas must be revised in larger structures 52

53 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 53 such as commercial, supermarkets, or warehouses. These occupancies should probably have been sprinklered. A few examples of excessive attack line loops in the interior and intermingled, crossed attack lines contributed to disorientation or at least confusion and delay of firefighter escape. Staffing must be available to properly advance, and withdraw attack lines. We would prefer a straighter path of line to the exit with most of the extra line outside, but this requires the extra staff to feed, retrieve, and withdraw line as needed. When the fire is knocked down, smoke is vented high, fresh air is coming in low, before the structural integrity is affected, search will be more successful. However, we must have the staffing, and coordination of tactics to make this happen. It begins to look like a chain of survival for interior firefighting. 12 Search Without Hose or Guideline Rate of Factors Per Year of FF Fatalities Studied in a Particular Year 1996 thru Year Trend Cold Storage Warehouse Fire. Wooster, Mass. 4 25% 43% 29% 29% 29% 33% 2 17% 17% Operating Above Fire Simply operating above the fire was a factor in 22% of all firefighter fatality reports. This includes first floor entry above a basement fire, searching the upper floors over a fire, and a vent crew on a roof. We are well aware that heat rises; causing smoke to rise, and this weakens our work platform. Many of these tragedies can be avoided if Operating Above 53

54 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 54 Fire became Operating Above a Well Under Control Fire. This does not address the structural weakness, but the fire and disorientation/asphyxia is usually the real killer in these cases. Whether operating above a fire with or without a hose line, the danger is increased with the rise in elevation in relation to the seat of the fire. However, the presence of available water decreases risk. The added distance and need to descent through a chimney like area for escape adds to this risk. 8 7 Operating Above The Fire Rate of Factors Per Year of FF Fatalities Studied in a Particular Year 1996 thru Year Trend 67% % 4 33% 33% 3 25% 29% 2 14% 2 14% Water Problems About 21% of the fatality reports showed where water delivery problems were a factor. Attack line kinking contributes to loss of water when needed. Fire behind attack crews have burned through their attack line. This calls for a second or back-up line. Firefighters must know the water is at the nozzle with air bled, before making entry into the fire environment. Supply line tactics must be practiced at the pump hookup and at the hydrant. We are emphasizing attack lines with adequate fire flow, but aren t supplying the staffing to handle these larger lines. We can deliver the needed fire flow through single large lines or 54

55 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 55 multiple, smaller more maneuverable lines, however may not have the staffing for either option. Pumps, hose, and nozzles all need to be maintained like our lives depend on them. 4 35% Water Problem at Attack Rate of Factors Per Year of FF Fatalities Studied in a Particular Year 1996 thru Year Trend 33% 33% 33% 33% 3 29% 25% 25% 2 15% 14% 14% 14% 1 5% % Lightweight Structural Members (Truss and Others) Ten cases of the sixty three had lightweight material assemblies involved in collapse. These include bar joist trusses, 2 x 4 wood trusses, pre-fabricated wood I-joists, weight suspended by metal rods, and both roofs and floors. This category is a subset of the overall collapse factor that is the number 1 factor related to the fire science and the expected outcomes of fire behavior. Modern construction design s challenge is to balance construction cost with structural fire integrity. In a very broad, general sense, it is a struggle of mass vs. math. Overall, fire resistance rises with more material mass, and construction cost rises with more material mass. This applies to all building materials, specifically including wood and steel. As technology advances, and advancements in computerization are realized, more precise design is made possible that enables more and more efficient structural design. In this case, efficiency means 55

56 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 56 less material is constructed in a method that provides superior strength as an assembly. An assembly requires connections to remain assembled. Many times these connections are the first to go in a fire, and there goes the structural strength that was dependent on the assembly being in place. Also, components with less mass react poorly in fire. Hence, more efficient, lighter weight (mass) structural assemblies and components don t do as well in a fire. The late Frank Brannigan xiv said, In recent years, the economics of using geometry (e.g. truss shapes) over mass had a tremendous effect on structures. FIRE RESISTANCE - Mass vs. Math HIGH HIGH MATH MASS LOW LOW LOW FIRE RESISTANCE HIGH As more is known about actual fire severity, efficiency of fire safe design will increase, however this will place more burden on inspection of construction and maintenance of the same. This puts additional burden on the fire service to provide staffing properly. A good example with the fallacy of design assumptions is the World Trade Center collapse. Fire service experts predicted a catastrophic failure of these specific buildings with the right circumstances long before it actually occurred. They compared these high rises to another famous high rise, the Empire State Building. The Empire State Building was an example of the use of more mass, whereas the WTC was a clever, efficient design. The Empire State Building weighs about 23 lbs. per cubic foot, and modern high rises weigh about 8 lbs. per cubic foot. vii 56

57 Staffing Tactics Firefighter Survival 57 The assumptions that had to be made did not imagine the fire load that occurred, with the simultaneous loss of passive and active fire protection. A strong argument could be made that the Empire State Building would have survived structurally to allow many more occupants and rescuers to escape. We are moving from a lower surface to mass ratio to a much higher surface to mass ratio. Trusses are used for roof and floor structures. Compounding the problem is the fact that they are also used to assist in spanning long distances to enable wide open spaces. The connections of members are depended on for the assembly strength. Steel connections are vulnerable to heat, as well as adhesives are also vulnerable in heat. Modern buildings today are so dependent on compartmentation that nearly any fire that breeches the inner fire barrier into the structural frame will force decisions with 2 bad choices, quick decisions for defensive attacks, or an increase even further of firefighter injuries and fatalities. These newer buildings will not have much structural fire resistance when you take away the inner shell and active fire protection. Lightweight structural components have added to the building collapse hazard that firefighters have always had to contend with. Staffing needs to contend with this challenge relate to enhanced code development, code compliance inspections and enforcement to insure protection of structural components, pre-incident planning so that we are aware of its existence, and the ability to mitigate the problem rapidly before we fall through the building, or the building falls on us and the public. 57