Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)

Transcription

1 Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) Technologies for Critical Incident Response Conference and Exposition 2006 Radiological and Nuclear Detection Programs September 8, 2006 Howard Reichel DNDO Assistant Director Systems Development and Acquisition Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Department of Homeland Security FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

2 Mission & Objectives The DNDO is a jointly-staffed, national office established to develop the global nuclear detection architecture, and acquire and support the deployment of the domestic detection system to detect and report attempts to import or transport a nuclear device or fissile or radiological material intended for illicit use. Develop the global nuclear detection & reporting architecture Develop and acquire the domestic detection & reporting system Fully characterize detector system performance before deployment Establish situational awareness through information sharing & analysis Establish operation protocols to ensure that detection leads to effective response Conduct a transformational research and development program Lead the National Technical Nuclear Forensics programs (FY07) A key DNDO objective is to provide effective systems for operational end users, including Customs Agents and Border Patrol Officers 2

3 DNDO Organization Director s Office Director Deputy Director Chief Strategic Integration Chief State & Local Affairs Office of the Chief of Staff Advisor to the Director for Policy Communications Legislative Affairs Assistant Director, Systems Engineering & Architecture Assistant Director, Systems Development & Acquisition Assistant Director, Assessments Assistant Director, Operations Support (FBI) Assistant Director, Transformational R&D Assistant Director, Technical Forensics for Nuclear Attribution (FY 07 Stand Up) 3

4 Architecture Structure Geographic Layers Threats Pathways Exterior Nuclear Weapons Air Border Interior Nuclear Material Radiological Material Land Maritime Detection Approaches Fixed Mobile Re-locatable Continuous Periodic Event Threats could originate in either the Exterior (international) or Interior (domestic) layers Depending upon origin, threats may pass though one or three layers Adversaries may use one or more pathways in each layer or layer transition 4

5 Integrated Nuclear Detection at POEs Detection of special nuclear material must be accomplished with both passive radiation portal monitors and active automated x-ray imaging. Detection of unshielded or lightly shielded materials accomplished with current and next-generation radiation portal monitors Automated x-ray imaging to detect high density shielding that might be used to avoid passive detection DHS programs will deploy integrated technologies domestically FOR PUBLIC RELEASE September 8,

6 Passive Radiation Portal Monitors RPMs provide a passive means to screen containers, cars, trucks and other conveyances for radioactive and nuclear materials. Current Generation systems (referred to as PVT RPMs), built from plastic scintillator (Polyvinyl Toluene PVT) material for gamma detection and He-3 Tubes for Neutron Detection Next Generation systems (referred to as Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP RPMs), built with Sodium Iodide or Germanium (for gamma ray detection) and He-3 Tubes (for Neutron Detection), use the spectra of radiation to improve system effectiveness by optimizing sensitivity, probability of detection, and false alarm rate 6

7 ASP Prime Contractors Competively Awarded Contracts Data Collection Prototypes, Full Scale Engineering Development, Low Rate Initial Production, Full Scale Production, and Deployment Support Raytheon, Tewksbury, MA (NaI(Tl)) (with Bubble Technology) Thermo Electron, Santa Fe, NM (NaI(Tl)) Canberra, Meriden, CT (HPGe) Standard Variants Potential Seaport Variants Variant C Variant H Variant NS1 Variant NS2 7

8 ASP Example Depleted Uranium Hidden in Truckload of Naturally-Radioactive Fertilizer PVT system incorrectly focuses on radiation hotspot produced by innocent fertilizer and misses hidden Uranium ASP system correctly finds, identifies, and locates the Uranium concealed in the fertilizer 8

9 Sodium Iodide (NaI) Manufacturing Program Typical ASP Radiation Portal Monitor Panel Gamma Ray Detector Assembly Crystal Housing PMT & Interface NaI(Tl) Crystal Mission & Requirements Provide a reliable supply of the most critical hardware component for the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Increase NaI production capacity in FY06 - FY08 to ensure a sufficient crystal supply - Fourfold increase in production capacity dedicated to DHS mission - Approximately 18 months to facilitize Provide NaI crystal detector assemblies as government furnished equipment (GFE) from FY07 - FY10 - ASP Units purchased with detectors as contractor furnished equipment in FY06 - First GFE order to be placed in FY07 Create a more competitive crystal manufacturing market to reduce costs - 25% cost reduction anticipated 9

10 Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System Program Current System Deficiencies Current gamma-ray radiography systems cannot achieve goal of 100% physical inspection - Manual image processing (throughput rate of 12 per hour) - No information content available in current image makes automated detection extremely problematic Limited penetration Performance Goals Automated detection of small (volume > 100 cm 3 ), very dense (Z > 72) objects in containerized cargo Improved penetration capability (>16 steel) Automatically inspect containers or cargo at a throughput rate of per hour ASP and CAARS in tandem automatically detect and flag >90% of threat materials Next Steps Prototype testing (Sep-Nov 2008) Low-Rate Initial Production Start (Winter 2008) 10

11 CAARS Prime Contractors Competively Awarded Contracts Demonstration and Data Collection Prototypes; and Possible Followon Full Scale Engineering Development, Low Rate Initial Production, Full Scale Production, and Deployment Support AS&E, Billerica, MA (with Passport Systems, Inc.) L-3, Woburn, MA (with Bio-Imaging Research) SAIC, San Diego, CA Initial Developmental Configurations 11

12 Human Portable Radiation Detection Systems (HPRDS) Current System Deficiencies Sodium Iodide systems (broadly used as a primary and secondary inspection tools): - Provide only a 40-50% probability of correct identification - Provide virtually no neutron detection sensitivity High Purity Germanium Systems (Used for high fidelity identification) - System weight (25.3 lbs) substantially limits ConOps - Substantial Cost (approx $35K) Performance Goals Develop a lightweight (4.5 lbs) system with probability of identification of 90% at a price of < $15K Options include: - Weight and power reduction in Germanium devices - Alternate detector materials Capability Development Program Award up to three contracts for the development and production of scintillation (e.g.. Sodium Iodide and Lanthanum Bromide) and semiconductor (High Purity Germanium) handheld detection devices 88 Early Production Units (EPU) in early FY07 Production capacity necessary to fulfill CBP, USCG, FBI, and other agency requirements Improve systems using Spiral Development - Advanced algorithms - Common display 12

13 Spiral Development Process Improvement Sp 4 Consensus Sp 3 Consensus Sp 2 Consensus Contract Award PDR PDR PDR PDR SPIRAL 4 Sp 4 CDR Production SPIRAL 3 Sp 3 CDR SPIRAL2 Sp 2 CDR SPIRAL 1 Development Production Development Production Etc. Development Sp 1 CDR Production FY08 production FY07 production FY10 production FY09 production 13

14 Algorithm and Display Spiral Development Follow an Advanced Processing Build (APB) spiral development process incorporating proven approaches - Peer Review Process - Technology Insertion Assist ASP and HPRDS vendors in successfully developing algorithms for gamma ray and neutron detection - Detection - Identification Objective - Classification Use Use the the Collaborative Development Approach, the the - Alarm Developers Kit, Kit, and and the the APB-to-System Transition Independently validate Approach Use Use the the IPT IPT As As a Forum to to Control Items That - Detection capability Affect Multiple Organizations - Identification capability Use Use an an Open Architecture SW SW Design and and Tech - Performance Insertion approach That Will Will Help to to Introduce New - Efficiency HW HW and and SW SW While Ensuring Stability of of the the Entire APB-to-System Transition Cycle - Software stability - Upgradeability once deployed Develop standardized displays and controls - Use Human Systems Integration (HSI) and Human Factors techniques to ensure optimized displays 14

15 Long-Dwell, In-Transit Monitoring Goal: Exploit long dwell time in transit for the detection of threat materials in cargo and conveyances Challenge: Develop cost-effective technology with unprecedented discrimination capability: - False Alarm rate < 1:10,000,000 container voyages - Cost < $200 per detector - Integrated information system real-time communication in transit Deployed system would be an integral part of an integrated supply chain security system Applicable to air, land, and sea vectors Applicable to overt and covert applications 15

16 Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex (RadNucCTEC) Establish a national test bed at the Nevada Test Site to conduct high-fidelity systems performance testing against threats in a near-operational environment Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex Interim Test Track 16

17 a closing thought "The most powerful investments may be for improvements in technologies...such as scanning technologies designed to screen containers that can be transported by plane, ship, truck or rail...." Ref: 9-11 Commission Report (pg 392) 17

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