Report on Proposals F2006 Copyright, NFPA NFPA 2001 Report of the Committee on

Transcription

1 Report of the Committee on George Unger, Underwriters Laboratories of Canada, Canada [RT] (Alt. to George E. Laverick) Gaseous Fire Extinguishing Systems Nonvoting Jeffrey L. Harrington, Chair Harrington Group, Incorporated, GA [SE] Ronald C. Adcock, Marsh USA Incorporated, AZ [I] Maurizio Barbuzzi, North American Fire Guardian Technology, Incorporated, Italy [M] Douglas J. Barylski, US Department of the Navy, DC [E] Todd A. Dillon, GE Insurance Solutions, OH [I] Philip J. DiNenno, Hughes Associates, Incorporated, MD [SE] William A. Eckholm, Firetrace International, AZ [M] Dale R. Edlbeck, Tyco Fire & Security/Ansul, WI [M] Don A. Enslow, BP Exploration (Alaska), AK [U] William A. Froh, US Department of Energy, DC [U] Matthew T. Gustafson, US Social Security Administration, MD [U] Howard S. Hammel, DuPont Fluoroproducts, DE [M] Robert H. Kelly, Fire Defense Equipment Company Incorporated, MI [IM] Rep. Fire Suppression Systems Association George E. Laverick, Underwriters Laboratories Incorporated, IL [RT] Norbert W. Makowka, National Association of Fire Equipment Distributors, IL [IM] Bella A. Maranion, US Environmental Protection Agency, DC [E] Robert C. Merritt, FM Global, MA [I] Robert G. Richard, Honeywell, Incorporated, NY [M] Paul E. Rivers, 3M Fire Protection, MN [M] Patrick W. Schoening, General Motors Corporation, MI [U] Joseph A. Senecal, Kidde-Fenwal, Incorporated, MA [M] Clifford R. Sinopoli, II, Exelon Corporation, PA [U] Rep. Edison Institute Louise C. Speitel, US Federal Aviation Administration, NJ [E] Brad T. Stilwell, Fike Corporation, MO [M] Al Thornton, Chemtura, TX [M] Klaus Wahle, US Coast Guard, DC [E] () Fred K. Walker, US Department of the Air Force, FL [E] Robert T. Wickham, Wickham Associates, NH [SE] Rep. Halon Alternatives Research Corporation Thomas J. Wysocki, Guardian Services, Incorporated, IL [SE] Jiann C. Yang, US National Institute of Standards & Technology, MD [RT] Alternates Philip B. Atteberry, Chemtura, IL [M] (Alt. to Al Thornton) Kenneth V. Blanchard, DuPont Fluoroproducts, DE [M] (Alt. to Howard S. Hammel) Charles O. Bauroth, Liberty Mutual Property, MA [I] (Voting Alt. to PCIAA Rep.) Randall Eberly, US Coast Guard, DC [E] (Alt. to Klaus Wahle) Steven A. Giovagnoli, GE Insurance Solutions, IL [I] (Alt. to Todd A. Dillon) Raymond N. Hansen, US Department of the Air Force, FL [E] (Alt. to Fred K. Walker) William Matt Hogan, Duke Power Company, SC [U] (Alt. to Clifford R. Sinopoli, II) Daniel J. Hubert, Kidde/Chemetron Fire Systems, IL [M] (Alt. to Joseph A. Senecal) Mary P. Hunstad, US Department of the Navy, DC [E] (Alt. to Douglas J. Barylski) Giuliano Indovino, North American Fire Guardian Technology, Incorporated, Italy [M] (Alt. to Maurizio Barbuzzi) Robert Kasiski, FM Approvals/FM Global, RI [I] (Alt. to Robert C. Merritt) Richard A. Malady, Fire Fighter Sales & Service Company, PA [IM] (Alt. to Norbert W. Makowka) Earl D. Neargarth, Fike Corporation, MO [M] (Alt. to Brad T. Stilwell) Ivan M. Nibur, Global Risk Consultants Corporation, KY [SE] (Voting Alt. to GRC Corp. Rep.) Steven W. Rhodes, US Social Security Administration, MD [U] (Alt. to Matthew T. Gustafson) James M. Rucci, Harrington Group, Incorporated, GA [SE] (Alt. to Jeffrey L. Harrington) John M. Schuster, 3M Company, MN [M] (Alt. to Paul E. Rivers) Len D. Seebaluck, Firetrace International, AZ [M] (Alt. to William A. Eckholm) Margaret A. Sheppard, US Environmental Protection Agency, DC [E] (Alt. to Bella A. Maranion) John C. Spalding, Healey Fire Protection, Incorporated, MI [IM] (Alt. to Robert H. Kelly) Rudolf Klitte, Ginge-Kerr Danmark A/S, Denmark [M] Ingeborg Schlosser, VdS Schadenverhutung, Germany [I] Fernando Vigara, Fernando Vigara & Asociados, Spain [SE] Staff Liaison: Mark T. Conroy Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents on the installation, maintenance, and use of carbon dioxide systems for fire protection. This Committee shall also have primary responsibility for documents on fixed fire extinguishing systems utilizing bromotrifluoromethane and other similar halogenated extinguishing agents, covering the installation, maintenance, and use of systems. This Committee shall also have primary responsibility for documents on alternative protection options to Halon 1301 and 1211 fire extinguishing systems. It shall not deal with design, installation, operation, testing, and maintenance of systems employing dry chemical, wet chemical, foam, aerosols, or water as the primary extinguishing media. This list represents the membership at the time the Committee was balloted on the text of this edition. Since that time, changes in the membership may have occurred. A key to classifications is found at the front of this book. The Technical Committee on Gaseous Fire Extinguishing Systems is presenting three Reports for adoption, as follows: Report I: The Committee proposes for adoption, amendments to NFPA 12, Standard on Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems, 2000 edition. NFPA 12 is published in Volume 1 of the 2004/2005 National Fire Codes and in separate pamphlet form. NFPA 12 has been submitted to letter ballot of the Technical Committee on Gaseous Fire Extinguishing Systems, which consists of 32 voting members. The results of the balloting, after circulation of any negative votes, can be found in the report. Report II: The Technical Committee proposes for adoption, amendments to NFPA 12A, Standard on Halon 1301 Fire Extinguishing Systems, 2004 edition. NFPA 12A is published in Volume 1 of the 2004/2005 National Fire Codes and in separate pamphlet form. This Report has been submitted to letter ballot of the Technical Committee on Gaseous Fire Extinguishing Systems, which consists of 32 voting members; of whom 31voted affirmatively, and 1 ballot was not returned (T. Dillon). Report III: The Technical Committee proposes for adoption, amendments to NFPA 2001, Standard on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems, 2004 edition. NFPA 2001 is published in Volume 12 of the 2004/2005 National Fire Codes and in separate pamphlet form. This Report has been submitted to letter ballot of the Technical Committee on Gaseous Fire Extinguishing Systems, which consists of 32 voting members; of whom 27 voted affirmatively, 5 negatively after circulation of negative ballots (M. Barbuzzi, D. Edlbeck, H. Hammel, B. Stillwell, T. Wysocki). Mr. M. Barbuzzi voted negatively stating: Comment on (Log #5): The standard makes no reference to the commercial evaluation criteria with regards to applicability and acceptability. Mr. D. Edlbeck voted negatively stating: (Log #16): Testing done to UL test parameters does not indicate a substantial increase in extinguishing time of Class A fires when the discharge time is extended to 120 seconds. Detection and control systems used with Clean Agent systems are designed to suppress a fire in its incipient stage, long before it achieves a high burning rate that would allow increased damage caused by any longer extinguishing times associated with a 120 second discharge time. The USCG currently allows the 120 second discharge time for 85 percent of the design concentration as verified by the UL listing. The Marine chapter of this standard allows the 120 second discharge time based on the USCG listing. The benefits to the customer for the extended discharge outweigh any slight increase in extinguishing times.

2 Mr. H. Hammel voted negatively stating: 1. There are a number of Accepted or Accepted in Principle proposals that if incorporated into the standard will cause a significant change in system design and will impact currently installed systems. There are no data or substantiation to support these changes. To the contrary, there are years of installed systems that indicate the current accepted practice achieves the necessary margin of safety in the design of Clean Agent Systems. 2. a) There is an effort to incorporate parts of an ISO standard that is still in the draft stage into NFPA This ISO standard utilizes Class A fire tests that are much larger than UL 2166/UL2127 and is based on visual interpretation only. There is very limited data for results from the ISO fire test. The reproducibility and consistency of this procedure is yet to be confirmed. In fact there was a wide difference in MEC data for the same agent depending if the system was super pressurized to 360 psig vs. 600 psig. UL standards have been used for many years. There is a proven margin of safety for systems based on the Class A fire test used in UL standards. b) Placing the Class A full-scale test data from the ISO method is not appropriate. Listing this data will only cause confusion. The hardware (especially nozzles) can effect the MEC and should be run for each hardware type, as is required by UL. If data is to place in NFPA 2001, it should be based on UL methodology. c) The current heptane cup burner data in NFPA is from the most current test method, current Annex B. It was determined form multiple tests from multiple sources. The ISO cup burner data is from one set of data from one source. Data derived from a different standard should not be included in NFPA Mr. B. Stilwell voted negatively stating: (Log #18) Disagree with Committee Action (Log #11) and (Log #21) Disagree with Committee Action. Mr. T. Wysocki voted negatively stating: After consideration of comments accompanying negative ballots of Edlbeck, Stillwell, Hammel and Barbuzzi, I vote negative on this document for the following reasons: There is insufficient technical justification for the proposed changes to design concentration requirements. On the other hand, there is justification for extension of the discharge time for Class A fire suppression using inert gases and this extension was rejected. The proposed document is inconsistent in its handling of the various competing agents. There is nothing of extreme urgency requiring immediate change in NFPA 2001 that justifies going forward with an ROP which is replete with such inconsistent handling of competing agents

3 Log #5 Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part (Entire Document) Submitter: Robert T. Wickham, Wickham Associates Recommendation: Delete all data for and references to the following three agents now covered in this standard: FC , HCFC Blend A and HCFC-124. Substantiation: Both FC and HCFC-124 are being withdrawn from ISO FC , according to the manufacturer, is not being employed in new systems. Neither HCFC Blend A nor HCFC-124 have received commercial acceptance in engineered systems in the U.S. and both are subject to a production halt by 2020 mandated by the Clean Air Act. The inclusion of these three agents in this standard gives the false impression that there are more alternatives to halon available than is actually the case. The removal of these three agents will thus make the standard more useful by presenting to the user information on only those agents that are truly commercially viable. in Principle in Part Delete all data for and references to the following two agents now covered in this standard: FC and HCFC Blend A. Committee Statement: HCFC-124 is currently available in pre-engineered systems, therefore the committee did not delete data and references to that agent Log #89 Final Action: Accept (1.1) Submitter: Bill Eckholm, Firetrace International Recommendation: Add a reference to local application systems in the first sentence 1-1 as follows: This standard contains minimum requirements for total flooding and local application clean agent fire systems. Substantiation: As addressed in the other submissions, it addresses the inclusion of local application systems in the standard Log #60 Final Action: Accept in Principle (Table ) Submitter: Bradford Colton, American Pacific Corporation Recommendation: Revise Table as follows: (first column) Halotron II (second column) tetrafluoromethane (86%), pentafluorethane (9%), carbon dioxide (5%) (third column) CH 2, FCF 3, CHF 2, CF 3, CO 2 (Note: The EPA did not assign a generic name to this blend.) Substantiation: Halotron II is an EPA SNAP approved halon 1301 replacement for total flooding. The timing for this submittal is based on increased customer interest in wider use of this agent. in Principle Revise Table as follows: (first column) HFC Blend B (this will be updated later) (second column) tetrafluoroethane (86%), pentafluorethane (9%), carbon dioxide (5%) (third column) CH 2, FCF 3, CHF 2, CF 3, CO 2 Committee Statement: Editorial changes Log #87 Final Action: Accept (Figure (C)) Submitter: Paul E. Rivers, 3M Fire Protection Recommendation: 1. Revise graphs for 360 psig and 25 bar. 2. Add new graphs for 610 psig and 42 bar. See graphs on the next page Substantiation: 1. Graphs have been updated since the last edition. 2. High-pressure systems are now specified, designed and installed for which the added data are useful to the designer Log #64 Final Action: Accept in Principle (Table 1.4.1(a)) Submitter: Bradford Colton, American Pacific Corporation Recommendation: Revise Table A.1.4.1(a) as follows: Molecular weight: 99.4 Boiling point at 760 mm Hg: C Freezing point: -103 C Critical temperature: C Critical pressure: 4060 kpa Critical volume: 198 cc/mol Critical density: kg/m 3 Specific heat, liquid at 25 C: 1.44 kj/kg C Specific heat, vapor at 1 atm, 25 C: kj/kg C Heat of vaporization at boiling point: C Thermal conductivity of liquid at 25 C: W/m C Viscosity, liquid at 25 C: centipoise Relative dielectric strength at 1 atm, 734 mm Hg, 25 C: Solubility of water in agent at 21 C: 0.11 %wt. Substantiation: Halotron II is an EPA SNAP approved halon 1301 replacement for total flooding. The timing for this submittal is based on increased customer interest in wider use of this agent. in Principle Heat of vaporization at boiling point should be kj/kg (instead of o C). Committee Statement: Editorially corrected the units Log #97 Final Action: Reject (Table , Inert Gas Agent, 4.1.3, , , , , , Annex A) Submitter: Denyse DuBrucq, AirWars Defense Recommendation: Add new text as follows: Table include N 2 Nitrogen - Liquid Nitrogen (add) These agents can be used in Liquid form. Agent Quantity of LN for portable device, four liters volume is suggested. It required topping off twice a week. For fire department truck or trailer, one thousand gallons is suggested. This amount will produce Nitrogen gas sufficient to fill a three story home. For larger facilities, additional fire departments can bring their supplies and the supplier can send a truck for yet further needs. Not a drop will be left behind and all Nitrogen gas will dissipate into the atmosphere upon ventilating building Storage Container Arrangement for LN portable, 4-liter units can be kept inside buildings n locations appropriate for fire extinguishers with markings notifying user of cryogenic material and cold temperature precautions. The latched chain securing the dewar and sieve should be standard and use evident. Training in application and removal from holster is required with installation of the devices in a building, vehicle, public area, or industrial site. Fire Department Liquid Nitrogen tanks, dewars, are to be stored out of doors, but in a place where they can be driven or pulled without snow removal or deicing area. A lean-to type covering or removable fabric cover is suggested just off driveway or on parking lot Storage Container for LN. Liquid Nitrogen must be stored in a dewar built to contain cryogenic materials. Both 4-liter and 1,000 gallon supply must be thermos-type containers Fittings. The 4-liter dewar has a pull-off cap exposing a one inch (1 in.) diameter opening from which the Liquid Nitrogen is poured into the sieve when it is over the event to be drowned in Nitrogen and cooled in its evaporation. The 1,000 gallon tank has a valve opening with a quarter turn off to full on rotation. The hose has a two-inch (2 in.) diameter and is expected to flow full rate into the installed delivery equipment. The crisis facility may have fixed Liquid Nitrogen equipment installed so the Liquid Nitrogen is poured directly into that system. If not, the fire department will use its mobile equipment kit components to build the appropriate configuration for Liquid Nitrogen distribution. System Design The portable Liquid Nitrogen device has a circular twelve-inch (12 in.) sieve unit with sides at least one inch (1 in.) high attached to the dewar so as to be horizontal and level. The Fixed Liquid Nitrogen system can be as simple as an outside wall mounted semicircular sieve unit at or above door height with a clear drop to the floor from that height giving the Liquid Nitrogen a good distance to fully evaporate before encountering the floor. For broad buildings, piping can carry Liquid Nitrogen to semicircular units in interior spaces. Tall buildings are plumbed to accept Liquid Nitrogen from helicopters or have a roof-level reservoir or higher if sharing availability among tall buildings. The mobile Liquid Nitrogen equipment kits contain 4 ft, 8 ft, and 12 ft straight troughs, some solid, some sieve bottomed with joints for long trough runs and elbows for encircling crisis. The joints and elbows have two sides, one solid, one sieve so one unit fits both modes in any angular configuration. Elbows come in 90 and 45 angles. Other kit contents include: the landmine legged doughnut shaped pan with hydraulic inserts in the legs that expand forming a basket around the landmine. With application of Liquid Nitrogen both the landmine and the hydraulic leg units freeze allowing the whole thing, ring, landmine, and legs to be lifted or shoveled into a shielded containment for bomb disposal. Piping with exhaust segments to build a structure in a flood circumstance on the source side of the flow, which will freeze the liquid in place making a dam covering a break or failure area of the material the original structure contains. A dyke holding back a water flow will have an ice dyke made with the tubes. While the pipe system is at cryogenic temperature, the dam will hold so the break can be repaired and, once it is cured or set and certified strong enough to hold, the Liquid Nitrogen application is stopped and the structure warms up melting the water. Then the pipe system is removed and dismantled until needed another time. Systematic checks for pipe condition is made after each such application to insure equipment reused will hold.

4 Pressure / psig lb/ft³ 88.6 lb/ft³ 65.5 lb/ft³ Temperature / F (a) To 360 psig at 70 F Pressure / psig lb/ft³ 88.6 lb/ft³ 65.5 lb/ft³ Temperature / F (c) To 610 psig at 70 F Pressure / bar (g) kg/m³ 1420 kg/m³ 1050 kg/m³ Pressure / bar (g) kg/m³ 1420 kg/m³ 1050 kg/m³ Temperature / C Temperature / C (b) To 25 bar at 20 C (d) To 42 bar at 20 C

5 The Liquid Nitrogen equipment kits can be divided having a reasonable number of pieces of the fire trucks and extra and unique materials as part of regional kits that can be flown to the scene or driven as the urgency of the situation demands. Where a known fault of weakness exists in a levee or dyke, the piping can be installed so if it does give way, the Liquid Nitrogen application can be immediate to prevent flood damage below the structure. It can be used during planned repairs to contain the water away from the work area Flame Extinguishments. Nitrogen drowning of flames is instantaneous. Liquid Nitrogen can be rained directly over the flame event or rained elsewhere flooding the area with Nitrogen gas. As the Nitrogen gas takes over the area of the flames they are out. Annex A References: AirWars Defense lp s Airport Manual. Quad Charts, and Liquid Nitrogen Enabler patent. Substantiation: Just what agent is as clean as Liquid Nitrogen in fire control, flood control, chem and bio toxin control, spill recovery, ordnance explosion prevention and as non-lethal weapon. Committee Statement: The standard does not cover portable devices. The submittal is not in a form that can be integrated into the standard Log #99 Final Action: Accept in Principle ( ) Submitter: Giuliano Indovino, Maurizio Barbuzzi, Safety Hi-Tech S.R. L. Recommendation: In clause of NFPA it is written that: Where a total flooding system is used, a fixed enclosure shall be provided about the hazard that allows a specified agent concentration to be achieved and maintained for a specified period of time, however how long this period of time should be is not specified. Substantiation: A correct design of a gaseous fire extinguishing system should guarantee not only that an effective agent concentration is achieved but also that it is maintained for a specific period of time at the highest hazard area. This time should be sufficient both to allow an effective emergency action by trained personnel and to prevent a possible re-igniton. A protected enclosure could have unclosable openings which can substantially lower the actual agent concentration, so that an extinguishing concentration is not guaranteed over a certain height. This is a serious design concern because a re-ignition source could be present above a certain height. Where reasonable confinement of agent is not possible, an extended discharge should be provided in order to maintain the extinguishing concentration for the required duration of protection. Consequently, in order to ensure the safety of personnel and properties it would be important to determine the time during which the protection of the volume at the highest hazard area should be maintained so that at the end of this time the agent concentration at this point is not lower than its extinguishing concentration. We do also think that the Annex C of NFPA 2001 (Enclosure Integrity Procedure) should be normative rather than recommended. A calibrated door fan test should always be performed in order to determine the period (retention time) during which the extinguishing concentration will be reached and maintained within the protected enclosure at the highest hazard area. in Principle Committee Statement: See Committee Action on (Log #20) Log #6 Final Action: Accept ( (2)) Submitter: Robert T. Wickham, Wickham Associates Recommendation: Revise as follows: (2) Halocarbon systems for spaces that are normally occupied and designed to concentrations above the NOAEL [see Table (a)] shall be permitted, given that means be provided to limit exposure to the design concentrations shown in Table (b) through Table (e) that correspond to a maximum permitted an allowable human exposure time of 5 minutes. Higher design concentrations associated with human exposure times less than 5 minutes as shown in Table (b) through Table (e) shall not be permitted in normally occupied spaces. Higher design concentrations shall be permitted to be used, provided that exposure shall be limited to the corresponding maximum permitted human exposure time shown in Table (b) through Table (c) and an An exposure and egress analysis shall be performed and approved. Substantiation: The current language is unclear and is being misinterpreted by some who are employing agents at concentrations not considered appropriate by the technical committee where it developed the safe exposure requirements based on the PBPK model. The proposed revision will leave no room for misinterpretation Log #22 Final Action: Accept (Table (a)) Submitter: Howard S. Hammel, DuPont Fluoroproducts Recommendation: Replace HFC-227ea LOAEL of >10.5 with Replace HFC-23 LOAEL of >50 with >30. Substantiation: The LOAEL of HFC-227ea is 10.5 percent. This is the actual value. The LOAEL of HFC-23 is >30 percent. This is the highest value tested without added oxygen Log #61 Final Action: Accept in Principle (Table (a)) Submitter: Bradford Colton, American Pacific Corporation Recommendation: Revise Table (a) as follows: Agent: Halotron II NOAEL: 5.0 LOAEL: 7.5 Substantiation: Halotron II is an EPA SNAP approved halon 1301 replacement for total flooding. The timing for this submittal is based on increased customer interest in wider use of this agent. in Principle Revise Table (a) as follows: Agent: HFC Blend B NOAEL: 5.0 LOAEL: 7.5 Add a note for these values as follows: These values are for the largest component of the blend (HFC 134A). Committee Statement: Clarification Log #38 Final Action: Accept in Principle ( (New) ) Submitter: John Spalding, Healey Fire Protection Inc. / Rep. Fire Suppression Systems Association, Baltimore MD Recommendation: Add a new section to read as follows: Where the clean agent design concentration exceeds that approved for use in normally occupied spaces (see Section 1.5) systems shall include with the following: (1) System lockout valves (2) Pneumatic pre-discharge alarms (3) Pneumatic time delays (4) Warning signs Substantiation: To protect personnel from inadvertent exposure to an agent-air atmosphere where the design agent concentration exceeds recommended limits for exposure in, for example, marine hazards such as those spaces referred to in Section 7.3. in Principle Add a new section to read as follows: Where the clean agent design concentration exceeds that approved for use in normally occupied spaces, (see Section 1.5) systems shall include the following: (1) Supervised system lockout valves (2) Pneumatic pre-discharge alarms (3) Pneumatic time delays (4) Warning signs Committee Statement: Lockout valves should be supervised to ensure safety while systems are locked out Log #98 Final Action: Accept in Principle ( ) Submitter: Daniel J. Hubert, Chemetron Fire Systems Recommendation: Add new text to read as follows: All persons who inspect, test, maintain or operate fire extinguishing systems shall be trained in all aspects of safety related to the systems Before system cylinders are handled or moved: (1) Cylinder outlets shall be fitted with antirecoil devices whenever the cylinder outlet is not connected to the system pipe inlet. (2) Actuators shall be disabled or removed before cylinders are removed from retaining bracketing Safe handling procedures shall be followed when transporting system cylinders Proper equipment shall be used to transport cylinders. When dollies or carts are used means to secure the cylinders are required Consult system manufacturer s representative and/or service procedures for specific details on system operation, maintenance and/or safety considerations. Substantiation: Much detail has been given to exposure to fire suppression agents, however minimal direction has been provided in regards to injury or death due to mishandling, lack of training or election to ignore training and/ or safety measures developed for the handling of system equipment and or

6 components. in Principle Add new text to read as follows: All persons who inspect, test, maintain or operate fire extinguishing systems shall be trained in all aspects of safety related to the systems Before system cylinders are handled or moved: (1) Cylinder outlets shall be fitted with antirecoil devices, cylinder caps, or both whenever the cylinder outlet is not connected to the system pipe inlet. (2) Actuators shall be disabled or removed before cylinders are removed from retaining bracketing Safe handling procedures shall be followed when transporting system cylinders Equipment designed for transporting cylinders shall be used. When dollies or carts are used, cylinders shall be secured System manufacturer s service procedures shall be followed for specific details on system operation, maintenance, and safety considerations. Committee Statement: Added criteria for safe handling of cylinders Log #CP1 Final Action: Accept (Chapter 3 Definitions (GOT)) Submitter: Technical Committee on Gaseous Fire Extinguishing Systems Recommendation: Adopt the preferred definitions from the NFPA Glossary of Terms for the following terms: Class A Fire. (preferred) NFPA 10, 2002 ed A fire in ordinary combustible materials, such as wood, cloth, paper, rubber, and many plastics. Class A Fires. (secondary) NFPA 2001, 2004 ed. Fires in ordinary combustible materials, such as wood, cloth, paper, rubber, and many plastics. Class B Fire. (preferred) NFPA 10, 2002 ed. A fire in flammable liquids, combustible liquids, petroleum greases, tars, oils, oil-based paints, solvents, lacquers, alcohols, and flammable gases. Class B Fires. (secondary) NFPA 2001, 2004 ed. Fires in flammable liquids, combustible liquids, petroleum greases, tars, oils, oil-based paints, solvents, lacquers, alcohols, and flammable gases. Class C Fire. (preferred) NFPA 10, 2002 ed. A fire that involves energized electrical equipment. Class C Fires. (secondary) NFPA 2001, 2004 ed. Fires that involve energized electrical equipment where the electrical nonconductivity of the extinguishing media is of importance. Substantiation: Adoption of preferred definitions will assist the user by providing consistent meaning of defined terms throughout the National Fire Codes Log #39 Final Action: Accept (3.3.x Lockout Valve (New) ) Submitter: John Spalding, Healey Fire Protection Inc. / Rep. Fire Suppression Systems Association, Baltimore MD Recommendation: Add a new definition to read as follows: Lockout Valve. A manually operated valve in the discharge pipe between the nozzles and the agent supply, which can be locked in the closed position to prevent flow of agent to the protected area. Substantiation: The new definition compliments the new requirement that a lockout valve be used as described in the proposed new Log #91 Final Action: Accept in Principle ( Local Application) Submitter: Bill Eckholm, Firetrace International Recommendation: Add a new definition as follows: Local Application: The act and manner of discharging an agent for the purpose of achieving a specified minimum agent concentration in proximity to the specified fire hazard, but not necessarily throughout the hazards total volume. Renumber remaining sections. Substantiation: Local applications were not included in the original NFPA 2001 document as no systems were listed or approved for local application with clean agents addressed by this document. This has changed. Therefore, the standard needs to incorporate the definition of Local Application. in Principle Add the following definition: Local application system. A system consisting of a supply of extinguishing agent arranged to discharge directly on the burning material. Committee Statement: This definition was lifted from NFPA Log #56 Final Action: Accept in Principle (Figure (n), and Table ) Submitter: Bradford Colton, American Pacific Corporation Recommendation: Add the Halotron II total flooding agent into this standard. Table A.1.4.1: Max fill density: 58 lb/ft 3 Minimum container working pressure: 400 psig Pressure at 70 F: 195 psig (vapor pressure of agent) Add new Figure A (n). See Figures on the following pages Substantiation: Halotron II is an EPA SNAP approved halon 1301 replacement for total flooding. The timing for this submittal is based on increased customer interest in wider use of this agent. in Principle Change name from Halotron II to HFC Blend B. Committee Statement: Editorial Log #36 Final Action: Accept (Table (b)) Submitter: David Rausch, Kidde-Fenwal, Inc. Recommendation: Add new system pressure data as shown in the following table: Table (b) Minimum Design Working Pressure for Halocarbon Clean Agent System Piping Agent Agent Container Maximum Fill Density (lb/ft 3 ) Agent Container Charging Pressure at 70 F (21 C) (psig) Agent Container Pressure at 130 F (55 C) (psig) Minimum Piping Design Pressure at 70 F (21 C) (psig) HFC-227ea 79 44* FC HCFC Blend A HFC * * 608.9* * * HCFC HCFC HFC HFC HFC-236fa HFC-236fa HFC-238fa FK *Not superpressurized with nitrogen. 360* Nitrogen delivered to agent cylinder through a flow restrictor upon system actuation. Nitrogen supply cylinder pressure is 1800 psig at 70 F (21 C).

7 2001-7

8 2001-8

9 Substantiation: The proposed addition to Table (b) supplies technical data that is presently absent for a commercially available HFC-227ea fire extinguishing system Log #63 Final Action: Accept in Principle (Table (b)) Submitter: Bradford Colton, American Pacific Corporation Recommendation: Revise Table (b) as follows: Agent: Halotron II Max Fill Density: 58 lb/ft 3 Agent Charging Pressure: 360 psig Container Pressure at 130 F: 586 psig Minimum Piping Design Pressure: 469 psig Agent: Halotron II Max Fill Density: 58 lb/ft 3 Agent Charging Pressure: 600 psig Container Pressure at 130 F: 888 psig Minimum Piping Design Pressure: 710 psig Substantiation: Halotron II is an EPA SNAP approved halon 1301 replacement for total flooding. The timing for this submittal is based on increased customer interest in wider use of this agent. in Principle Change name from Halotron II to HFC Blend B. Committee Statement: Editorial Log #88 Final Action: Accept (Table (b)) Submitter: Paul E. Rivers, 3M Fire Protection Recommendation: 1. Delete the asterisk next to the 360 psig reference for FK Add pertinent data for FK that applies to a system superpressurized to 610 psig. Add new text to read as follows: Where directional valves are used for multi-hazard protection, the directional valves shall be listed or approved for use with the installed suppression system Where directional valves are used for multi-hazard protection, the control equipment shall be listed or approved for the number, type and operation of those valves. Committee Statement: Adding or approved allows the AHJ to decide on installations in addition to the listing Log #40 Final Action: Accept in Principle ( , A (New) ) Submitter: John Spalding, Healey Fire Protection Inc. / Rep. Fire Suppression Systems Association, Baltimore MD Recommendation: Add the following new sections: * A discharge pressure switch shall be required where mechanical system actuation is possible. Add the following new annex material: A A discharge pressure switch can serve to initiate electrical functions that normally occur upon system actuation such as shutdown functions and control panel actuation. Substantiation: A discharge pressure switch provides a suitable means to initiate electrical functions that normally occur upon system actuation by automatic or manual electric actuation. in Principle Add the following new sections: * A discharge pressure switch shall be required where mechanical system actuation is possible The discharge pressure switch shall provide an alarm initiating signal to the releasing panel. Add the following new annex material: A A discharge pressure switch can serve to initiate electrical functions that normally occur upon system actuation such as shutdown functions and control panel actuation. Committee Statement: Correlated this requirement with NFPA 12. Table (b) Minimum Design Working Pressure for Halocarbon Clean Agent System Piping Agent Agent Container Maximum Fill Density (lb/ft 3 ) Agent Container Charging Pressure at 70 F (21 C) (psig) Agent Container Pressure at 130 F (55 C) (psig) Substantiation: 1. Editorial correction. 2. High-pressure systems are now specified, designed and installed for which the added data are useful to the designer Log #17 Final Action: Accept in Principle ( and (New) ) Submitter: David Rausch, Kidde-Fenwal, Inc. Recommendation: Add new text to read as follows: Where directional valves are used for multi-hazard protection, the directional valves shall be listed or approved for use with the installed suppression system Where directional valves are used for multi-hazard protection, the control equipment shall be specifically listed for the number, type and operation of those valves. Substantiation: There is no current text in NFPA 2001 to specifically address multi-hazard, directional valve, system protection and the completeness (i.e., Suppression system, Operation of and Control system) needed of these systems. in Principle Minimum Piping Design Pressure at 70 F (21 C) (psig) FC FK * FK HCFC HCFC HCFC Blend A HCFC Blend A HFC HFC HFC-227ea HFC-227ea HFC-227ea HFC * HFC * HFC-236fa HFC-236fa HFC-236fa * Not superpressurized with nitrogen Log #41 Final Action: Accept ( (New) ) Submitter: John Spalding, Healey Fire Protection Inc. / Rep. Fire Suppression Systems Association, Baltimore MD Recommendation: Add a new section to read as follows: Warning and safety instruction signs shall be located such that they will be readily visible to personnel in the area where the clean agent design concentration exceeds that approved for use in normally occupied spaces. The safety sign format, color, letter style of the signal words shall be in accordance with ANSI Z535. Substantiation: Life safety aspects of clean agent systems used at agent design concentrations exceeding those approved for use in normally occupied spaces will be enhanced by adoption of the generally recognized practice for the use of safety signs as given in ANSI Z Log #42 Final Action: Accept in Principle ( (New) ) Submitter: John Spalding, Healey Fire Protection Inc. / Rep. Fire Suppression

10 Systems Association, Baltimore MD Recommendation: Add a new section to read as follows: Committee Statement: Editorial Warning and safety instruction signs shall be located outside Log #45 Final Action: Accept in Principle each entrance to clean agent cylinder storage rooms. The safety sign format, color, letter style of the signal words shall be in accordance with ANSI Z535, Standard for Environmental and Facility Safety Signs. Substantiation: Clean agent concentrations higher than approved for normally occupied spaces can occur in these areas. Life safety of personnel will be enhanced by adoption of the generally recognized practice for the use of safety signs as given in ANSI Z535. in Principle Committee Statement: Corrected the ANSI reference. (5.3.5, , ) Submitter: John Spalding, Healey Fire Protection Inc. / Rep. Fire Suppression Systems Association, Baltimore MD Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.3.5* Other than the ventilating systems identified in and , f F orced-air ventilating systems, including self contained air re-circulation systems, shall be shut down or closed automatically where their continued operation would adversely affect the performance of the fire extinguishing system or result in propagation of the fire. Delete Log #43 Final Action: Reject Delete ( ) Substantiation: The existing language is in conflict with and with NFPA Submitter: John Spalding, Healey Fire Protection Inc. / Rep. Fire Suppression Systems Association, Baltimore MD Recommendation: Delete the last sentence of Substantiation: Elimination of the requirement that a time delay be employed in the case of fast growth fire risk does not promote personnel safety. Time delays are required in marine systems where fast growth fire hazards are the norm; representatives of marine systems have not indicated that this is a problem. Committee Statement: The statement does not require that time delays be eliminated, only that they be permitted to be eliminated. 75 (2003) in Principle 1. Revise text to read as follows: 5.3.5* Other than the ventilating systems identified in , forced-air ventilating systems, including self contained air re-circulation systems, shall be shut down or closed automatically where their continued operation would adversely affect the performance of the fire extinguishing system or result in propagation of the fire. 2. Delete Committee Statement: Ventilation systems necessary to ensure safety should remain Log #34 Final Action: Accept Log #44 Final Action: Accept ( ) (4.3.6) Submitter: John Spalding, Healey Fire Protection Inc. / Rep. Fire Suppression Systems Association, Baltimore MD Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 4.3.6* Unwanted System Operation. To avoid unwanted discharge of a clean agent system, a supervised disconnect switch shall be provided. The disconnect switch, when operated, shall interrupt the releasing circuit to the suppression system. Substantiation: Clarifies the fact that the disconnect switch only interrupts the releasing circuit to the suppression system when the disconnect switch is operated. Submitter: Dale R. Edlbeck, Jeff Harris, Tyco Fire & Security/Ansul Recommendation: Renumber to and revise to read as follows: If not shut down or closed automatically, the volume of the self-contained recirculating ventilation system and associated ductwork shall be considered as part of the total hazard volume when determining the quantity of agent. Substantiation: applied only to self-contained recirculating ventilation systems before the standard was rewritten to conform to the Manual of Style requirement. As currently written, it now applies to all ventilation systems. Renumbering will change it back to the original intent. Adding If not shut down or closed automatically and self-contained recirculating clarifies under what circumstances the designer must include the ductwork volume of self-contained recirculating ventilation systems in the Log #92 Final Action: Accept calculation for determining the agent quantity for the enclosure. (5.1.1) Submitter: Bill Eckholm, Firetrace International Committee Statement: Needs to be renumbered due to (Log #46). Recommendation: Add a reference to local application systems in the first Log #46 Final Action: Accept sentence of as follows: ( ) Specifications for total flooding and local application clean agent fire systems... Substantiation: Recognizes that the same comments apply to local application systems, as apply to total flooding systems. Submitter: John Spalding, Healey Fire Protection Inc. / Rep. Fire Suppression Systems Association, Baltimore MD Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: The volume of the ventilation system and associated ductwork undampered ventilation system ducts and components mounted below the ceiling Log #29 Final Action: Accept height of the protected space shall be considered as part of the total hazard ( (10) (New) ) volume when determining the quantity of agent. Submitter: Jeffrey L. Harrington, Harrington Group, Inc. Recommendation: Add the following as a new , item 10 and renumber accordingly: (10) For an enclosure protected by a clean agent fire extinguishing Substantiation: The original wording is ambiguous, and the revised wording guides the designer to employ dampers on affected ducts to avoid adding agent to provide duct coverage. system an estimate of the maximum positive and the maximum negative Log #30 Final Action: Accept in Principle pressure, relative to ambient pressure, expected to be developed upon the (5.3.7) discharge of agent shall be made. (see section 5.3.7) Substantiation: The failure of an enclosure due to discharge pressures that exceed the ability of the enclosure to remain intact presents a safety concern for people in or near the protected space. Steps must be taken to assure safety. Submitter: Jeffrey L. Harrington, Harrington Group, Inc. Recommendation: Add the following new section 5.3.7: 5.3.7* An analysis shall be conducted of the protected enclosure to determine the structural strength and integrity of the enclosure relative to the pressures generated by the discharge of the system Log #62 Final Action: Accept in Principle An agent discharge pressure relief device shall be provided where the (Table 5.1.2(d)) pressure changes would otherwise cause damage to the enclosure. Submitter: Bradford Colton, American Pacific Corporation Recommendation: Add new Table 4.1.2(d): Component Amount (wt%) HFC-134a 86% ± 5% HFC-125 9% ± 3% CO2 5% ± 2% Substantiation: Halotron II is an EPA SNAP approved halon 1301 replacement for total flooding. The timing for this submittal is based on increased customer interest in wider use of this agent. in Principle Change Halotron II to HFC Blend B The enclosure strength shall be at least two times the greater of the estimated peak positive or peak negative pressure that will be developed upon discharge of the clean agent fire extinguishing system. Substantiation: The failure of an enclosure due to discharge pressures that exceed the ability of the enclosure to remain intact presents a safety concern for people in or near the protected space. Steps must be taken to assure safety. in Principle Add the following new section 5.3.7: 5.3.7* An analysis shall be conducted of the protected enclosure to determine the structural strength and integrity of the enclosure relative to the pressures generated by the discharge of the system under worst case temperature conditions

11 An agent discharge pressure relief device shall be provided where the pressure changes would otherwise cause damage to the enclosure The enclosure strength shall be at least two times the greater of the estimated peak positive or peak negative pressure that will be developed upon discharge of the clean agent fire extinguishing system. Committee Statement: The analysis should include considerations under fire conditions Log #47 Final Action: Reject (5.3.7 (New) ) Submitter: John Spalding, Healey Fire Protection Inc. / Rep. Fire Suppression Systems Association, Baltimore MD Recommendation: Add a new section to read as follows: The power to all electronic equipment shall be disconnected upon activation of a total flooding clean agent system. Substantiation: The effectiveness of total flooding clean agents has not been tested or proven on energized electrical fires. Committee Statement: There are essential services where the equipment should not be shut down upon activation of the system Log #9 Final Action: Reject ( ) Submitter: Robert T. Wickham, Wickham Associates Recommendation: Revise as follows: * The flame extinguishing concentration for Class A fuels shall be determined by test as part of a listing program. As a minimum, the listing program shall conform to UL 2127, Standard for Inert Gas Clean Agent Extinguishing System Units, or UL 2166, Standard for Halocarbon Clean Agent Extinguishing System Units, or Gaseous Media Fire Extinguishing Systems Physical Properties and System Design Part 1: General Requirements, ISO , or equivalent. Substantiation: Add the reference to the ISO standard as an equivalent to the UL standards in light of the fact that the most current Class A clean agent fire extinguishing test results were achieved, reviewed and reported to the requirements of the referenced ISO document. Committee Statement: The ISO document was not available for review by the committee Log #18 Final Action: Accept in Principle ( ) Submitter: Philip J. DiNenno, Hughes Associates, Inc. Recommendation: Add a new sentence to the end of to read: The Class A flame extinguishing concentration shall not be less than 85 percent of the minimum extinguishing concentration for Heptane as determined in accordance with Substantiation: Apparent weaknesses in the test procedure for Class A fuel extinguishing concentration have resulted in the use of unacceptably low extinguishing concentrations for Class A fuels obtained from listing tests. For example, over the past several years the minimum extinguishing concentration for HFC-227ea has decreased from 5.8 to 5.25 percent, while the Class A extinguishing concentration value for HFC 227ea in ISO is 6.1 percent. This is a range of 16 percent for the same agent in the same application. (See Table below) One way to evaluate the consistency of the Class A EC values is by comparison with Class B values for various agents is shown in Table 1. Extinguishment of a Heptane flame is a reasonable approximation of extinguishing a flame above a thermoplastic polymer surface fire, (not electrically energized, heated in depth or charring). Further, the Heptane cup burner EC has shown reasonable agreement with full scale data and there is excellent reproducibility of the test method and its results. Agent Cup Burner Heptane Extinguishing Concentration Table 1 Class A Extinguishing Concentration (1) The Heptane cup burner EC and the Class A EC value from ISO and the ratio of the Class A to Class B EC is shown. Historically the Class A extinguishing concentration has been greater than the Heptane cup burner extinguishing concentration by at least 50 percent (see CO 2 and Halon 1301). The initial recommendation in NFPA 2001 was to use the Heptane EC value for Class A fuels. This requirement was modified with the introduction of the Class A polymeric sheet test, primarily to resolve a conflict with the data for HFC Blend A. As of the last edition of the standard, the worst case ratio of Class A EC to Class B EC was.87 for HFC 227ea. It is now as low as.78. This proposed change returns the design of systems to a reasonable minimum value and avoids future problems associated with listing test method variability, and/or hardware/enclosure effects. Establishing minimum Class A concentrations based on in part Heptane cup burner values is further supported by a wide range of full scale testing performed with a range of fuel packages and arrangements. A partial review of this data, contained in the 19th edition of the NFPA Fire Protection Handbook shows at least 7 failed extinguishing tests at concentrations above 85 percent of the Heptane cup burner values for energized electrical wire fires. By contrast all of the successful extinguishing test data we have for Class A fuels is at an extinguishing concentration greater than 85 percent of the Heptane cup burner value. Tests conducted at the Loss Prevention Council (UK) indicated that an extinguishing concentration of 85 percent Heptane cup burner gave marginal to good performance on Class A fuels for a range of agents. in Principle Add a new sentence to the end of to read: The Class A flame extinguishing concentration shall not be less than 77 percent of the minimum extinguishing concentration for Heptane as determined in accordance with Committee Statement: Data supports a 77 percent minimum threshold Log #19 Final Action: Accept in Principle ( (New) ) Submitter: Philip J. DiNenno, Hughes Associates, Inc. Recommendation: Add a new section to read as follows: The extinguishing concentration shall be the greater of 95 percent of the Heptane cup burner value as determined in or the Class A flame extinguishing concentration as determined in , where any of the following conditions exist: (a) cable bundles greater than 100 mm in diameter; (b) cable trays with a fill density greater than 20 percent of the tray crosssection; (c) horizontal or vertical stacks of cable trays (closer than 250 mm); (d) equipment energized during the extinguishment period where the collective power consumption exceeds 5 kw. Substantiation: The extinguishing concentration needed for extinguishing fires in cable bundles and cable tray arrays are known to require higher extinguishing concentrations than simple surface fire conditions. This is due to a number of factors including the possibility of char formation and smoldering, hot metal surfaces in close proximity to cables, as well as energized electrical equipment. This wording is extracted from ISO and represents the most recent international consensus on the subject, including the position of USTAG. in Principle Add a new section to read as follows: A Where any of the following conditions exist higher extinguishing concentrations might be required: (a) cable bundles greater than 100 mm in diameter; (b) cable trays with a fill density greater than 20 percent of the tray crosssection; (c) horizontal or vertical stacks of cable trays (closer than 250 mm); (d) equipment energized during the extinguishment period where the collective power consumption exceeds 5 kw. Committee Statement: More appropriate as annex material. Ratio Class A/Class B Halon CO2 20 ~ HFC /5.8/5.25 (2).91/.87/.78 HFC HFC IG IG IG IG FK Notes: (1) All values except as noted from ISO (2) 5.8 and 5.25 values are UL/FM listing values in U.S.