Fire at detention centre Schiphol

Transcription

1 Fire at detention centre Schiphol Jos Post

2 Fire at the detention centre at Schiphol In the night of October 26, 2005, there was a fire in the detention centre at Schiphol airport. A wing of the centre burned down, resulting in 11 casualties. From 5 cells in the wing, people in custody could not be released. From the other 21 cells, guards were able to move the people to a safe place

3 The detention centre is part of the Dutch State prison system. Not part of Schiphol Airport. The people in the detention centre are illegal in the Netherlands. They are in the centre to be sent to their country of origin

4 Presentation Information of the detention centre Safety Board in the Netherlands Reconstruction of the fire (by the Safety Board) Construction of the building The FIRE Saving the people and fire fighting Concluding remarks

5 Prison, located in the Schiphol airport area Fire Station Sloten Fire Station Rijk Detention centre

6 D 2nd gate Entrance 1 1th gate K Corridor J A 1th gate 2nd gate Entrance

7 Safety Board Is an independent governmental body Detailed investigations severe accidents Causes and effects Broad working field, including crisis management Lessons learned and recommendations Before 2005, only Transport Safety Board

8 Reconstruction of the fire by the Safety Board Here, part of the reconstruction video of the fire by the Safety Board, will be shown

9 Construction of the building The detention centre is assembled from steel containers Inside each container a prison cell is installed The containers are placed in a second hull Between the containers and the outside wall and on top of the containers there is empty hull space On the roof of the containers (inside the hull space) utilities are located fresh and exhaust air ducts Dry sprinkler

10 Wing K, topview Fire started

11 Cross section Hull space

12 Text title

13 Time line Real Time 23:55:00 23:56:52 23:57:xx 23:57:14 23:57:42 23:58:01 23:58:08 +/- 23:59:30 0:00:32 0:08:56 00:13:xx 00:18:xx 00:23:xx min after alarm 0:00 1:52 2:00 2:14 2:42 3:01 3:08 +/- 04:30 5:32 13:56 18:xx 23:xx 28:xx automatic fire alarm in custody centre first guards arrive in K wing auto alarm is cancelled at fire dept emergency room Door cell 11 opened smoke halfway in corridor alarm confirmed at fire dept emergency room guards start opening other cells guards draw back, because smoke + fire first fire engines turn out from 'Sloten' first fire engines arive at gate 1 first fire engines arive at gate 2 first fire engines at position for fire fighting fire men enter J wing

14 Fire alarm and guards No guards are at night in K and J wing, nearest guard at A en D At 23:55:12 automatic fire alarm enters central emergency room of Military Police Alarm code is interpreted incorrect as fire in D wing, this causes delay of guards arriving in K wing (1:52 min) At 23:55:12 (0:12 min) the alarm is understood right, at central emergency room, as coming from K wing This starts a delay of 3 min before the alarm will be put forward to fire dept emergency room

15 Development of fire and action guards Fire starts in cell 11 (t=0) First guards arrive in K wing (1:52 min) Prisoner is released, door is left open (2:14 min) Smoke enters the corridor In less then 1:30 min there was a dense smoke layer under the ceiling of the whole corridor of the K wing Smoke vents (in corridor ceiling) were not opened Guards open other doors Guards had to draw back because of smoke (4:30 min) Flash over in cell 11 (after about 5 min) Doors of cells 9, 10, 12, 13, 14 stay closed

16 Development of fire and building construction Rapid development of fire and smoke after the flash over in cell 11 Ceiling material in corridor catch fire Fire moves into hull space on top of containers Smoke entered the cells via broken windows and air exhaust system air exhaust was connected with flexible plastic connects, which burned away The smoke concentrations in the (unopened) cells rises rapidly. The victims in the unopened cells die between 15 and 35 min after the fire started (00:10 and 00:30 clocktime) This was concluded from the reconstruction and model calculations

17 Roof K wing, molten EPF

18 Fire brigade and rescue Much time loss because of Delayed alarm Long driving time (8 min) from fire station Sloten Arriving at wrong gate Trouble with speed gate Bad cooperation between guards and fire men Rescue Fire men entered K wing at 00:21 clocktime Maybe (some) people remained in the cells were still alive Fire men could not reach the closed cells, because of the already largely developed fire and heat

19 Corridor K

20 Concluding remarks Many crucial fire safety aspects were poor or not existing Fire safety quality of the building incl heat and smoke exhaust and sprinkler Alarm system Fire training of the guards, including receiving the fire brigade Location of fire station Preparation and coordination of fire fighting

21 And now? Report of the Safety Board triggered a review of the Dutch fire safety approach, especially for buildings with people with less ability to save themselves Dept of State Prisons is reviewing the fire safety thoroughly Review of current situation (hardware and organisation) New total safety (and security) strategy Training of guards for emergency response Sprinkler systems in temporary units Fire safe construction, about 800 M invested Fire tests of real cell unit Focus on door construction Fire resistance and smoke tightness