Technical Committee on Fire Protection for Nuclear Facilities

Transcription

1 Technical Committee on Fire Protection for Nuclear Facilities NFPA 804/805/806 (F2014) First Draft Meeting Agenda Augusta Marriott at the Convention Center 2 Tenth Street Augusta, GA Thursday, April 25, 2013 (8:00 am 5:00 pm ET) 1. Call to order at 8:00 am ET 2. Greetings and Self-Introductions 3. Comments and General Procedure a. Exits b. Committee Membership Update c. Review of Revision Cycle and New Process 4. Review and Approval of Minutes from Last Meeting 5. Review of NITMAM for Review and Action on Public Input to NFPA 804/805/ Recess at 5:00 PM ET Friday, April 26, 2013 (9:00 am 12:00 pm ET) 1. Tour of Vogtle Nuclear Generating Station, Waynesboro, GA Plan is to leave the hotel around 8:00 am and carpool to the facility, which is about 45 minutes from downtown Augusta. Carpool arrangements will be made on Thursday and a map will be provided to the site.

2 Address List No Phone Fire Protection for Nuclear Facilities 03/22/2013 Susan Bershad William B. Till, Jr. Chair Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC 197 Till Hill Road Orangeburg, SC Alternate: Eric R. Johnson U 4/17/1998 Ivan Bolliger Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 280 Slater Street Ottawa, ON K1P 5S9 Canada E 8/5/2009 Craig P. Christenson US Department of Energy Richland Operations Office 825 Jadwin Avenue, A5-17, Room 586 Richland, WA Alternate: James G. Bisker E 1/14/2005 Stanford E. Davis PPL Susquehanna LLC Susquehanna Steam Electric Station 769 Salem Boulevard Berwick, PA Alternate: Frank S. Gruscavage U 4/17/1998 Richard L. Dible AREVA NP, Inc Southwest Blvd., Suite 400 Fort Worth, TX M 11/2/2006 Edgar G. Dressler SE 87th Bourne Avenue The Villages, FL American Nuclear Insurers Alternate: Seth S. Breitmaier I 4/1/1995 David R. Estrela Orr Protection Systems, Inc. 38 Blanchard Road Grafton, MA IM 10/28/2008 Daniel J. Hubert Janus Fire Systems 1102 Rupcich Drive, Millennium Park Crown Point, IN IM 10/28/2008 Steven W. Joseph Xtralis, Inc SW Foothill Drive Portland, OR M 10/18/2011 Robert Kalantari EPM, Incorporated Engineering Planning & Management 959 Concord Street Framingham, MA Alternate: Paul R. Ouellette SE 1/15/1999 Robert P. Kassawara Electric Power Research Institute 3412 Hillview Avenue Palo Alto, CA Alternate: John P. Gaertner U 7/24/1997 Elizabeth A. Kleinsorg Kleinsorg Group Risk Services, LLC A Hughes Associates Company 1430 South Mint Street, Suite 105-A Charlotte, NC Alternate: Andrew R. Ratchford SE 10/10/1997 1

3 Address List No Phone Fire Protection for Nuclear Facilities 03/22/2013 Susan Bershad Neal W. Krantz, Sr. Krantz Systems & Associates, LLC Bretton Livonia, MI Automatic Fire Alarm Association, Inc. Alternate: A. M. Fred Leber M 1/1/1992 Christopher A. Ksobiech We Energies 231 West Michigan, P378 Milwaukee, WI Alternate: Jeffery S. Ertman U 7/17/1998 Paul W. Lain US Nuclear Regulatory Commission MS: O-10C15 Washington, DC Alternate: Daniel M. Frumkin E 4/3/2003 John D. Lattner Southern Nuclear Company 40 Inverness Center Parkway Birmingham, AL Alternate: Joseph Whitt U 8/9/2011 Charles J. March Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 625 Indiana Avenue Washington, DC E 10/20/2010 Anca McGee Ontario Power Generation Box 4000, Internal Mail: D10-2 Bowmanville, ON L1C 3Z8 Canada U 8/9/2011 Frank Monikowski Tyco/SimplexGrinnell 220 West Kensinger Drive Cranberry Township, PA National Fire Sprinkler Association Alternate: James Bouche M 7/23/2008 Bijan Najafi Science Applications International Corp Dell Avenue, Suite 100 Campbell, CA SE 7/12/2001 Robert K. Richter, Jr. Southern California Edison Company 5000 Pacific Coast Hwy, AWS D2J San Clemente, CA Nuclear Energy Institute Alternate: Michael Fletcher U 4/15/2004 Clifford R. Sinopoli, II Exelon Corporation Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station 1848 Lay Road, MS SMB3-4 Delta, PA Edison Electric Institute U 1/1/1990 Cleveland B. Skinker Bechtel Power Corporation 5275 Westview Drive Frederick, MD Alternate: Arie T. P. Go SE 1/15/2004 Wayne R. Sohlman Nuclear Electric Insurance Ltd Market Street, Suite 1100 Wilmington, DE Alternate: Thomas K. Furlong I 1/1/1993 James R. Streit Los Alamos National Laboratory PO Box 1663, Mail Stop K493 Los Alamos, NM Alternate: Neal T. Hara U 1/16/1998 2

4 Address List No Phone Fire Protection for Nuclear Facilities 03/22/2013 Susan Bershad Donald Struck Siemens Fire Safety 8 Fernwood Road Florham Park, NJ National Electrical Manufacturers Association Alternate: Daniel P. Finnegan M 8/5/2009 William M. Sullivan Contingency Management Associates, Inc. 109 Miller Sreet Middleboro, MA SE 4/17/1998 Ronald W. Woodfin TetraTek, Inc. Fire Safety Technologies West Cool Breeze Lane Montgomery, TX Alternate: David M. Hope SE 1/15/2004 James G. Bisker Alternate US Department of Energy Nuclear Facility Safety Programs, HS Independence Avenue, SW Washington, DC : Craig P. Christenson E 8/2/2010 James Bouche Alternate F. E. Moran, Inc. Special Hazard Systems 2265 Carlson Drive Northbrook, IL National Fire Sprinkler Association : Frank Monikowski M 7/23/2008 Seth S. Breitmaier Alternate American Nuclear Insurers 95 Glastonbury Boulevard, Suite 300 Glastonbury, CT : Edgar G. Dressler I 10/18/2011 Jeffery S. Ertman Alternate Progress Energy 410 South Wilmington Street Raleigh, NC : Christopher A. Ksobiech U 4/15/2004 Daniel P. Finnegan Alternate Siemens Industry, Inc. Building Technology Division Fire Safety Unit 8 Fernwood Road Florham Park, NJ National Electrical Manufacturers Association : Donald Struck M 10/18/2011 Michael Fletcher Alternate Ameren Corporation 4810 Shale Oaks Avenue Columbia, MO Nuclear Energy Institute : Robert K. Richter, Jr. U 10/29/2012 Daniel M. Frumkin Alternate US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Rockville Pike, MS 011A11 Rockville, MD : Paul W. Lain E 11/2/2006 Thomas K. Furlong Alternate Nuclear Service Organization 1201 North Market Street, Suite 1100 Wilmington, DE : Wayne R. Sohlman I 1/12/2000 John P. Gaertner Alternate Electric Power Research Institute PO Box Charlotte, NC : Robert P. Kassawara U 10/23/2003 3

5 Address List No Phone Fire Protection for Nuclear Facilities 03/22/2013 Susan Bershad Arie T. P. Go Alternate Bechtel National, Inc. 50 Beale Street San Francisco, CA : Cleveland B. Skinker SE 10/1/1993 Frank S. Gruscavage Alternate PPL Susquehanna LLC 769 Salem Boulevard Berwick, PA : Stanford E. Davis U 1/18/2001 Neal T. Hara Alternate Idaho National Laboratory PO Box 1625 Idaho Falls, ID : James R. Streit U 03/05/2012 David M. Hope Alternate TetraTek Inc. Fire Safety Technologies 204 Masthead Drive Clinton, TN : Ronald W. Woodfin SE 4/15/2004 Eric R. Johnson Alternate Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC Savannah River Site Bldg H, Room 10 Aiken, SC : William B. Till, Jr. U 03/07/2013 A. M. Fred Leber Alternate Leber/Rubes Inc. (LRI) Yonge Eglinton Center 2300 Yonge Street, Suite 2100 PO Box 2372 Toronto, ON M4P 1E4 Canada Automatic Fire Alarm Association, Inc. : Neal W. Krantz, Sr. M 10/20/2010 Paul R. Ouellette Alternate EPM, Incorporated Engineering Planning & Management 959 Concord Street Framingham, MA : Robert Kalantari SE 7/19/2002 Andrew R. Ratchford Alternate Ratchford Diversified Services, LLC 346 Rheem Blvd. Suite 207D Moraga, CA : Elizabeth A. Kleinsorg SE 4/16/1999 Joseph Whitt Alternate Southern Nuclear Company 42 Inverness Center Parkway, Bin B054 Birmingham, AL : John D. Lattner U 10/29/2012 David Sean O'Kelly Nonvoting Member National Institute of Standards & Technology 100 Bureau Drive Gaithersburg, MD RT 10/29/2012 Tzu-sheng Shen Nonvoting Member Central Police University 56 Shu-Jen Road Ta-kan-chun, Kuei-san Taoyuan, 333 Taiwan SE 7/29/2005 Leonard R. Hathaway Member Emeritus 1568 Hartsville Trail The Villages, FL I 1/1/1976 4

6 Address List No Phone Fire Protection for Nuclear Facilities 03/22/2013 Susan Bershad Wayne D. Holmes Member Emeritus HSB Professional Loss Control 508 Parkview Drive Burlington, NC I 1/1/1980 Walter W. Maybee Member Emeritus 2200 Lester Drive NE, Apt 475 Albuquerque, NM /1/1971 Susan Bershad Staff Liaison National Fire Protection Association 1 Batterymarch Park Quincy, MA /11/2012 5

7 There are only three actions a TC can take at the First Draft (ROP) meeting: 1. Resolve a Public Input (no change to the document) 2. Create a First Revision (change to the document) 3. Create Committee Input Resolve Public Input (no change to the document) TC must provide a response (Committee Statement/CS) to ALL Public Input (proposal). CS for not doing what is suggested Sample Motion: I make a motion to resolve PI#_ with the following committee statement. Approval by meeting vote (simple majority). Not subject to Ballot. Create a First Revision (change to the document) TC must create a First Revision (FR) for each change they wish to make to the document, either using Public Input for the basis of the change or not using a Public Input for the basis. One or more Public Input can be considered for the FR. All Public Input requires a response TC can use a Public Input for basis i. Sample Motion: I make a motion to revise section using PI#_ as the basis for change. Approval by meeting vote (simple majority) and final approval through ballot. TC develops revision without a Public Input for basis i. Sample Motion: I make a motion to revise section as follows. Approval by meeting vote (simple majority) and final approval through ballot. First Revisions require a committee statement Committee Input TC may create a Committee Input (CI). This replaces the old system rejected Committee Proposals. CIs will get printed in the report but will not be balloted or shown as a change in the draft. CIs are used to solicit public comments and/or as a placeholder for the comment stage. i. Sample Motion: I make a motion to create a CI with a proposed revision to section as follows. Approval by meeting vote (simple majority). Not subject to ballot. Requires a committee statement to explain the intent of making a CI.

8 Comparison to Previous Process: PREVIOUS ACTIONS NEW PROCESS ACTIONS Sample Motion 1) Committee generates a First Revision and Substantiation (CS) for change Accept or any variation of Accept (APA, APR, APP) on a public proposal 2) Committee provides response (CS) to each PI that is associated with the revision 1) I make a motion to revise section using PI#_ as the basis for change. 2) I make a motion to resolve PIs#_ through ## with the following statement Rejected Public Proposal Accepted Committee Proposal Rejected Committee Proposal Committee provides response (CS) to PI Committee generates a First Revision and Substantiation (CS) for change Committee generates a Committee Input (CI) and reason (CS) for proposed change I make a motion to resolve PI#_ with the following committee statement. I make a motion to revise section as follows. Committee generates a statement for reason for change. I make a motion to create a CI with a proposed revision to section as follows. Committee generates a statement for reason for CI. Notes: 1) All meeting actions require a favorable vote of a simple majority of the members present. 2) All First Revisions will be contained in the ballot and will require a 2/3 affirmative vote to confirm the meeting action. 3) Only the First Revisions will be balloted. PIs and CIs will be contained in the report but will not be balloted. 4) Comments may be submitted on all PIs, FRs and CIs

9 New Terms: NEW TERM Input Stage Public Input (PI) First Draft Meeting Committee Input Committee Statement (CS) First Revision (FR) First Draft Report First Draft Comment Stage Public Comment Second Draft Meeting Committee Comment Committee Action Second Revision Second Draft Report Second Draft OLD TERM ROP Stage Proposal ROP Meeting Committee Proposal that Fail Ballot Committee Statement Committee Proposal or Accepted Public Proposal ROP ROP Draft ROC Stage Public Comment ROC Meeting Committee Comment that Fail Ballot Committee Action Committee Comment or Accepted Public Comment ROC ROC Draft Note: The highlighted terms are the ones that will be most applicable at the First Draft Meeting.

10 2014 FALL REVISION CYCLE *Public Input Dates may vary according to standards and schedules for Revision Cycles may change. Please check the NFPA Website for the most up to date information on Public Input Closing Dates and schedules at (i.e. and click on the Next Edition tab. Process Stage Process Step Dates for TC Dates for TC with CC Public Input Closing Date* 1/4/2013 1/4/2013 Final Date for TC First Draft Meeting 6/14/2013 3/15/2013 Public Input Posting of First Draft and TC Ballot 8/2/2013 4/26/2013 Stage Final date for Receipt of TC First Draft ballot 8/23/2013 5/17/2013 (First Draft) Final date for Receipt of TC First Draft ballot recirc 8/30/2013 5/24/2013 Posting of First Draft for CC Meeting 5/31/2013 Final date for CC First Draft Meeting 7/21/2013 Posting of First Draft and CC Ballot 8/2/2013 Final date for Receipt of CC First Draft ballot 8/23/2013 Final date for Receipt of CC First Draft ballot recirc 8/30/2013 Post First Draft Report for Public Comment 9/6/2013 9/6/2013 Public Comment closing date 11/15/ /15/2013 Final Date to Publish Notice of Consent Standards (Standards that 11/29/ /29/2013 received no Comments) Appeal Closing Date for Consent Standards (Standards that received 12/13/ /13/2013 no Comments) Final date for TC Second Draft Meeting 5/2/2014 1/24/2014 Comment Posting of Second Draft and TC Ballot 6/13/2014 3/7/2014 Stage Final date for Receipt of TC Second Draft ballot 7/7/2014 3/28/2014 (Second Final date for receipt of TC Second Draft ballot recirc 7/14/2014 4/4/2014 Draft) Posting of Second Draft for CC Meeting 4/11/2014 Final date for CC Second Draft Meeting 5/23/2014 Posting of Second Draft for CC Ballot 6/13/2014 Final date for Receipt of CC Second Draft ballot 7/3/2014 Final date for Receipt of CC Second Draft ballot recirc 7/11/2014 Post Second Draft Report for NITMAM Review 7/18/2014 7/18/2014 Tech Session Notice of Intent to Make a Motion (NITMAM) Closing Date 8/22/2014 8/22/2014 Preparation Posting of Certified Amending Motions (CAMs) and Consent 10/17/ /17/2014 Standards (& Issuance) Appeal Closing Date for Consent Standards 11/1/ /1/2014 SC Issuance Date for Consent Standards 11/11/ /11/2014 Tech Session Association Meeting for Standards with CAMs 6/22 25/2015 6/22 25/2015 Appeals and Appeal Closing Date for Standards with CAMs 7/15/2015 7/15/2015 Issuance SC Issuance Date for Standards with CAMs 8/20/2015 8/20/2015 Approved October 18, 2011 _ Revised_October 30, 2012

11 NFPA 1 Batterymarch Park, Quincy, MA USA Phone: (617) Fax: (617) org NFPA 801 ROC Meeting March 27-28, 2012 Charleston, SC Tuesday, March 27, 2012: 1. Meeting called to order at 8:30AM ET by Chair, Bernie Till. 2. Meeting and web conference attendees were self-introduced and their attendance recorded. ATTENDEE PRESENT ATTENDEE PRESENT PRINCIPAL ALTERNATE William Bernie Till Yes James Naylor Yes Ivan Bollinger Yes Craig Christenson James Bisker Yes Stanford Davis Frank Gruscavage Richard Dible Yes Edgar Dressler Yes Seth Breitmaier David Estrela Daniel Hubert Yes Yes

12 Steven Joseph Robert Kalantari Yes Paul Ouellette Robert Kassawara John Gaertner Elizabeth Kleinsorg Yes Andrew Ratchford Yes Neal Krantz Fred Leber Christopher Ksobiech Jeffery Ertman Yes Paul Lain Daniel Frumkin John Lattner Charles March Anca McGee Yes Yes Yes Frank Monikowski Yes James Bouche Yes Bijan Najafi Ronald Rispoli Robert Richter Clifford Sinopoli Cleveland Skinker Yes Arie Go Wayne Sohlman Yes Thomas Furlong James Streit Neal Hara Yes Donald Struck Yes Daniel Finnegan Yes William Sullivan Yes Ronald Woodfin Yes David Hope VOTING ALTERNATE NONVOTING MEMBER

13 Tzu-sheng Shen MEMBER EMERITUS Leonard Hathaway Walter Maybee STAFF Paul May Yes GUESTS 3. The Chair made opening remarks relating to the comment phase and gave status updates of the committee membership, hold list, and newly appointed members. 4. NFPA Staff Liaison, Paul May provided exit information to the in-person attendees. And direction to the committee on the process and procedures that are appropriate for the ROC stage. He also discussed the NFPA Research Foundation s Code Fund and its services as a resource for the committee. A review of the on-line process and living document planned for future implementation was also covered. 5. Minutes of the previous meeting (June 21-22, 2011 ROP) were approved as revised. 6. The Committee reviewed and took action on public comments to NFPA The Committee recessed at 5:19 PM ET. Wednesday, March 28, 2012: 1. Meeting re-convened at 8:30AM ET by Chair, Bernie Till. 2. The NFPA 801 Application Task Group chair gave the report of the group s findings. While the NRC licensing limits of 10 CFR 30 may be conservative, they do provide a clear and specific limit for determining applicability of NFPA 801. Alternative approaches would risk the potential for certain areas to be overlooked or could lead to

14 implementing methods (with a multitude of associated uncertainties) for each sitespecific scenario. The group could find no other suggestions for establishing a threshold value. Given the lack of a compelling reason to change the values in NFPA 801 under 1.3 Applicability, the suggestion was to retain the current reference to 10 CFR The Committee reviewed and took action on public comments to NFPA The Committee generated and approved 3 committee comments. 5. The next meeting is scheduled to take place near the Alvin W Vogtle Electric Plant south in the Augusta, Ga area between January 4, 2013 and June 14, 2013 for the Fall 2014 First Draft Meeting. The actual days of the meeting will be determined at a later date. 6. The meeting was adjourned at 12:15PM ET.

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17 Proposal Accept Comment Log #36 Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part (Chapter 7) Submitter: Andrew Minister, Battelle Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Comment on Proposal No: Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 7.1* General Flammable and Combustible Liquids and Gases Flammable and combustible liquids shall be stored and handled in accordance with NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code Flammable and combustible gases shall be stored and handled in accordance with NFPA 54, National Fuel Gas Code; NFPA 55, Compressed Gases and Cryogenic Fluids Code; and NFPA 58, Liquefied Petroleum Gas Code * In As determined by fire hazards analysis, combustible gas analyzers shall be installed in enclosed spaces with the potential for accumulation of combustible gases enclosed spaces in which combustible gas could accumulate outside of the storage vessels, piping, and utilization equipment, combustiblegas analyzers that are designed for the specific gas shall be installed. A Enclosed spaces refers to any enclosure within a building, including gloveboxes, hot cells, caves, plenums, etc * As determined by fire hazards analysis, Fflammable and combustible liquids in enclosed spaces in which vapors have the potential to accumulate outside of the storage vessels, piping, and utilization equipment shall be installed with combustible-vapor analyzers appropriate for the vapors generated. A See the explanation for enclosed spaces under A The analyzer specified by Section or Section shall be set to alarm at a concentration no higher than 25 percent of the lower flammable explosive limit Safety controls and interlocks for combustible, flammable liquids and flammable gases and their associated delivery systems shall be tested on a predetermined schedule and after maintenance operations Hydraulic fluids used in presses or other hydraulic equipment shall be the fire-resistant fluid type Solvents * Where a flammable or combustible solvent is used, it shall be handled in a system that does not allow uncontrolled release of vapors Approved ooperating controls and limits appropriate for the hazard shall be established An approved fixed fire-extinguishing system shall be installed or its absence justified to the satisfaction of the AHJ by fire hazards analysis * Solvent distillation and recovery equipment for flammable or combustible liquids shall be isolated from areas of use by 3-hour fire barriers of appropriate rating for the hazard * In order to ensure the operation of process evaporators, such as Plutonium Uranium Reduction and Extraction (PUREX), means shall be provided to prevent entry of water-soluble solvents into the evaporators Specialized Processes and Equipment Furnaces or Ovens used in facilities handling radioactive materials shall comply with the applicable requirements of NFPA 86, Standard for Ovens and Furnaces, NFPA 86C, Standard for Industrial Furnaces using a Special Processing Atmosphere, or NFPA 86D, Standard for Industrial Furnaces using Vacuum as an Atmosphere, as appropriate NFPA 115, Standard for Laser Fire Protection shall apply to processes and systems utilizing lasers Incinerators shall be in accordance with NFPA 82, Standard on Incinerators and Waste and Linen Handling Systems and Equipment Special Materials Combustible metals shall be stored and handled in accordance with NFPA 484, Standard for Combustible Metals * Operating controls and limits for the handling of pyrophoric materials shall be established to the satisfaction of the AHJ A supply of an appropriate extinguishing medium shall be available in all areas where fines and cuttings of pyrophoric materials are present Solid and liquid oxidizing agents shall be stored and handled in accordance with NFPA 430, Code for the Storage of Liquid and Solid Oxidizers Fissile materials shall be used, handled, and stored with provisions to prevent the accidental assembly of fissile material into critical masses Fissile materials shall be arranged such that neutron moderation and reflection by water shall not present a criticality hazard * For locations where fissile materials might be present and could create a potential criticality hazard, combustible materials shall be excluded Hot Cells, Caves, and Glove Boxes, and Hoods * AllAs determined by fire hazards analysis, hot cells, caves, and glove boxes, and hoods shall be provided with fire detection in accordance with NFPA 72. A Sprinkler water flow indication can serve as a possible means of fire detection * As determined by fire hazards analysis, Ffire suppression shall be provided in all hot cells, caves, and glove boxes, and hoods A The preferred selected method of automatic suppression has to be compatible with the fire hazards and consider interaction between the suppression agent and materials that are present (e.g., reactive metals). The selection of a fire suppression system must address the potential for the spread of radioactive materials due to pressurization of the enclosure or by the flooding of the enclosure wil liquid fire suppression methods such as water. Accessibility for inspection, maintenance, and testing in radiation or contamination environments must also be considered in the design. Selected systems should be is an automatic sprinkler system, although other methods of suppression can also be permitted when installed in accordance with the applicable NFPA standard. Refer to Section 5.10 for drainage provisions Hot Cells and Caves Hot cells and caves shall be of noncombustible construction. Where combustible shielding is necessary for the radiation hazard, appropriate fire protection features shall be installed as determined by fire hazards analysis Where hydraulic fluids are used in master slave manipulators, fire resistant fluids shall be used Combustible materials inside the cells and caves shall be kept to a minimum If explosive concentrations of gases or vapors are present, an inert atmosphere shall be provided, or the cell or cave and its ventilation system shall be designed to withstand pressure excursions * Glove Boxes and Hoods The glove boxes, including windows, and hoods shall be of noncombustible construction. Where combustible shielding is necessary for the radiation hazard, appropriate fire protection features shall be installed as determined by fire hazards analysis * The number of gloves shall be limited to the minimum necessary to perform the operations. A Gloves are typically the most easily ignitable component of gloveboxes and, therefore, should be minimized. When gloves fail, potential loss of confinement can result * When the gloves are not being used, they shall be withdrawn and secured outside the box if fire hazards are present inside the box. A Securing of the gloves outside the box positions them such that fixed fire suppression in the room can be more effective and that they do not contribute to the fuel loading in the glovebox or provide a source of ignition to other fuels in the glovebox. Positioning them outside also reduces potential for gloves contributing to fires inside the glovebox * When the gloves are no longer needed for operations, they shall be removed and glove port covers installed if fire hazards are present inside the box. A Gloves should be removed if work has been completed and no additional work requiring access to the glovebox via use of the specific gloves is identified, the glove box will not remain in-service, or fire hazards remaining in the glovebox dictate that the gloves be removed. Gloves should not be removed strictly because immediate or short term use is unnecessary. Unnecessary removal of gloves creates unnecessary generation of radioactive wastes as well as potential exposures to radioactive materials during changeout activities Doors shall remain closed when not in use The concentration of combustibles shall be limited to the quantity necessary to perform the immediate task * Fixed inerting systems shall not be utilized in lieu of fire suppression system A Fire suppression should be considered in addition to fixed inerting systems to address potential concerns during glovebox maintenance or failure of inerting systems If fixed extinguishing systems are utilized, the internal pressurization shall be calculated in order to prevent gloves from failing or being blown off effects of system discharge on glovebox integrity shall be considered in evaluating the design of the system * As determined by fire hazards analysis, Aa means shall be provided to restrict the passage of flame between glove boxes and hoods that are connected Hoods * Fume hoods containing radioactive materials shall meet the requirements of NFPA 45, Standard on Fire Protection for Laboratories Using Chemicals. Lining materials shall be compatible with the chemical environment, and capable of decontamination. A Fume hoods provide minimal capability to confine radioactive materials. The fire hazard is generally associated with the chemicals in-use and NFPA 45 provides the necessary requirements for design and fire protection of fume hoods Combustible materials shall not be stored in fume hoods and should be the minimum necessary to support the work activity Radioactive contaminated combustible waste shall not be stored or allowed to accumulate in fume hoods. Procedures for timely waste characterization and removal shall be established * Construction, Demolition, and Renovation. Construction, demolition, and renovating activities that conform to the requirements of NFPA 241, Standard for Safeguarding Construction, Alteration, and Demolition Operations, such as the following:

18 (a) Scaffolding, formworks, decking, temporary enclosures, temporary containment structures, and partitions used inside buildings shall be noncombustible or fire retardant treated. (b) If wood is used, it shall be one of the following: i. Listed, pressure-impregnated, fire-retardant lumber ii. Treated with a listed fire-retardant coating iii. Timbers 15.2 cm 15.2 cm (6 in. 6 in.) or larger (c) Tarpaulins (fabrics) and plastic films shall be certified to conform to the weather-resistant and flame-resistant materials described in NFPA 701, Standard Methods of Fire Tests for Flame Propagation of Textiles and Films. A The use of noncombustible or fire-retardant concrete formwork is especially important for large structures where large quantities of forms are used. Pressure-impregnated fire-retardant lumber should be used in accordance with its listing and the manufacturer s instructions. Where exposed to the weather or moisture (e.g., concrete forms), the fire retardant used should be suitable for this exposure. Fire-retardant coatings are not acceptable on walking surfaces or surfaces subject to mechanical damage. Use of fire-retardant paint requires special care. Inconsistent application and exposure to weather can reduce the effectiveness of fire-retardant coatings. Large timbers are occasionally used to support large pieces of equipment during storage or maintenance. The size of these timbers makes them difficult to ignite, and they do not represent an immediate fire threat. 7.2* Hospitals The appropriate form of fire protection for areas where radioactive materials exist in hospitals shall be based on the fire hazards analysis Precautions shall be taken, as required, if the radioactive materials are stored or used in ways that cause them to be more susceptible to release from their containers. 7.3 Uranium Enrichment, Fuel Fabrication, and Fuel Reprocessing Facilities General. Special hazards related to protection from fire shall be controlled by a defense in depth strategy that utilizes a combination of the following: (1) Location and separation (2) Safe operating procedures (3) Fixed detection and suppression systems (4) Inerting (5) Any other methods acceptable to the AHJ 7.4 Laboratories * The requirements of Sections and are applicable to laboratories where the requirements of NFPA 45 do not provide sufficient fire protection and control of the material hazards or when determined by fire hazards analysis. A Laboratories, such as those involved in research and development, often work with small quantities of chemicals and radioactive materials in any given operation or work activity. Laboratories frequently change configurations of hazardous and radioactive materials as well as associated laboratory equipment and confinement in support of constantly changing projects. These often changing conditions and the quantities of materials present do not lend themselves to the controls specified in Sections and for gas and vapor analyzers, safety controls and interlocks, control of solvents, and control of handling and storage of combustible metals. NFPA 45 provides adequate controls for most laboratory operations involving chemical hazards in the presence of radioactive materials. Additional fire protection that may be required is determined by fire hazards analysis The requirements of NFPA 45 shall also be applicable Laboratories which handle pyrophoric materials shall comply with Laboratory enclosures shall comply with the requirements for hot cells, gloveboxes and hoods unless otherwise justified in thea FHA concludes that the amount of radioactive material is inconsequential. 7.5 Research and Production Reactors Reactivity control shall be capable of inserting negative reactivity to achieve and maintain subcritical conditions in the event of a fire Inventory and pressure control shall be capable of controlling coolant level such that fuel damage as a result of a fire is prevented Decay heat removal shall be capable of removing heat from the reactor core such that fuel damage as a result of fire is prevented Vital auxiliaries shall be capable of performing the necessary functions in the event of a fire Process monitoring shall be capable of providing the necessary indication in the event of a fire. 7.6 Facilities Handling Waste (Reserved) 7.7 Accelerators (Reserved) 7.8 Process Facilities (Reserved) 7.9 Irradiation Facilities (Reserved) Substantiation: The term nuclear facilities as applicable to NFPA 801 represents an extremely broad spectrum of facilities with tremendous variation in mission, function, design, operations, hazardous chemicals, radioactive material inventories, fire risks and protection needs. The types of facilities covered by NFPA 801 and the requirements of this chapter may include small research and development laboratories, large processing facilities, or nonpower reactors. The fire protection needs for these facilities are as varied as the facilities themselves. For this reason, inflexible, prescriptive fire protection requirements do not meet the specific facility and hazard protection needs and the fire hazards analysis becomes paramount in defining and evaluating the appropriate level of protection for the hazards and configurations unique to the facility. The importance of the FHA and flexibility in the application of requirements for the variability in nuclear facility hazards is the primary basis for the proposed changes and this approach is consistent with Chapter 4 and 6 of this standard. Additional discussion of the specific changes follows: Sections and is revised to indicate that gas- or vapor-analyzers should be installed if determined by fire hazards analysis. There are options to designing protection against combustible gases and vapors that do not involve the complexities of installing and maintaining analyzers. The standard is not clear on the conditions that must be assumed for installation of the analyzers (e.g., normal operation, upset conditions, ventilation on or off). The standard provides no guidance relative to the design, installation, operation, or response to analyzer output or alarms. In the case of laboratory operations, the types of gases or vapors may change frequently with work activities or new projects. The changing configuration of the work space, equipment, and materials does not support use of these types of devices in most cases. Section The use of the term lower flammable limit is consistent with the terminology that is used in NFPA 30. Although both terms have the same meaning, the reference to flammable limits when referring to hazards associated with flammable liquids should follow NFPA 30. If lower flammable limit is not used, lower explosive limit needs to be defined. Section is revised to provide flexibility to implement appropriate level of control if necessary. Approved is deleted as this implies the AHJ must accept the limits that are established, which is not consistent with typical practice. Controls and limits on use solvent is typically established in user procedures. The exception may be where permitting is required for quantities that exceed fire code or other similar regulatory thresholds. Section is revised to allow flexibility. Arbitrarily establishing a 3-hour separation does not allow for consideration of the magnitude of the hazard. Solvent distillation can be as small as 0.25 liter or on a much larger scale. Fire protection should be provided at a level appropriate for the hazard. Section is deleted on the basis that control of fissile materials is governed by its own set of regulatory requirements and national standards. These criticality specific requirements and standards encompass the issues of neutron moderation or configuration changes that might occur as a result of automatic or manual suppression actions. These requirements in NFPA 801 for criticality are not appropriate for a fire protection standard, are not sufficiently complete to address the criticality hazard, and are covered in other governing regulations. Sections , and associated Annex A content is revised to base the selection and installation of fire detection and suppression on the basis of the fire hazards analysis. The committee s substantiation for the significant change to require ALL hot cells, caves, and gloveboxes to have automatic fire suppression systems was not substantiated based on number of fires, significant fires, or any other data that justified the change to require all hot cells, caves, and gloveboxes to have automatic fire suppression systems. There has to be a graded approach to determining which hot cells, caves, and gloveboxes need to have automatic fire suppression systems. The fire hazards analysis is the correct tool for evaluating the hazards and determining the whether or not a hot cell, cave, or glovebox needs automatic fire suppression. The variability of hot cell, cave, and glovebox design and operations demands the capability to engineer appropriate protection based on the specific configuration, use, and hazards. Our laboratory operates may caves that have not fire hazards associated with them and it would be very expensive to install and maintain automatic fire suppression systems when there is no value added. Spread of radioactive materials associated with the activation of a fire suppression system also has to be considered in the selection of an automatic fire suppression system. Hoods have been separated from these requirements into a separate section (discussed later) because they do not serve the same purpose or function relative to radioactive material confinement and shielding. The application of suppression systems must be done with consideration for material compatibilities, hazards, post-actuation cleanup, and inspection testing and maintenance of the systems in radiation environments. Sections and are revised to note that combustible shielding may be necessary in some applications, particularly where neutron shielding is necessary. Fire protection for these applications should be based on the fire hazards analysis. Section is deleted because regulating the necessary number of gloves is impractical and isn t considered in an integrated manner with the other fire hazards that are present. Gloveboxes are generally designed to place gloves where they are needed. This level of control should be left to the operating entity as part of overall fire hazards management. Section (renumbered) and Section are similarly revised to provide a more practical level of control for gloves. Not all gloveboxes necessarily have significant fire hazards. Section (renumbered) is revised to focus the requirement on evaluating the extinguishing system effects on glovebox integrity, not simply over-pressurization. Under fire conditions, glove failure may occur prior to system actuation so glove failure from over-pressurization is not necessarily governing. The extinguishing system is designed according the hazard present and the appropriate rate of application of agent. The objective to extinguish the fire may not support the objective of protecting the box, but the impacts on box integrity should be understood and the design should consider these impacts appropriately.

19 Section (renumbered) is revised to base the design of restrictions between gloveboxes on the fire hazards analysis. Gloveboxes come in all sizes and connection restrictions are not always necessary relative to the hazards present. There is usually an air lock with 2 doors between the glovebox and any other connected hoods, so proper operation of the air lock would prevent direct passage of flames. Section is a new proposed section on hoods. Hoods in the context of radioactive material handling and use are significantly different than hot cells, gloveboxes, and caves. Hoods provide no shielding or significant confinement capability for work with radioactive materials and the hazards associated with radioactive materials in hoods are generally dominated by the hazards of the chemicals. Hoods are designed and tested to remove vapors and not to confine radioactive materials. On this basis, NFPA 45, which has extensive requirement for hoods, should be the governing standard. Where additional protection is necessary, the fire hazards analysis required elsewhere in this standard will govern the determination. The placement of detection and/or fire suppression in most fume hoods has not been established as being necessary unless operations with open containers of flammable liquids are performed. Due to the nature of the operations that are typically performed in fume hoods, there are no specific types of fire detection or fire suppression that would provide reliable detection and /or suppression for all types of hazardous materials that are typically used in fume hoods. NFPA does not require automatic fire suppression for fume hoods unless there is a hazard present that warrants automatic fire suppression. Section and A are revised to identify NFPA 45 as the governing standard for fire protection in laboratories using chemicals in the presence of radioactive materials as opposed to the requirements in Sections and unless NFPA 45 is not sufficient in its requirements or additional protection is specified by a fire hazards analysis. Protection against the chemical hazards in laboratory-scale work activities will generally provide the necessary protection against loss of control or confinement of radioactive materials. The requirements for hot cells, gloveboxes and hoods are followed unless otherwise justified. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle in Part Revise only the specifically-identified (making no changes to those paragraphs not shown here) submitted text, add new definition Section 3.3.X, and the reference to Annex D to read as follows: 3.3.X Fume Hood. A ventilated enclosure designed to contain and exhaust fumes, gases, vapors, mists, and particulate matter generated within the hood interior. [45; 2011] The analyzer specified by Section or Section shall be set to alarm at a concentration no higher than 25 percent of the lower flammable explosive limit * Approved ooperating controls and limits appropriate for the hazard shall be established. A This requirement is not intended to allow quantities of materials that exceed requirements in other applicable codes and standards. A The preferred selected method of automatic suppression should be compatible with the fire hazards and consider interaction between the suppression agent and materials that are present (e.g., reactive metals). The selection of a fire suppression system should address the potential for the spread of radioactive materials due to pressurization of the enclosure or by the flooding of the enclosure with liquid fire suppression methods such as water. Accessibility for inspection, maintenance, and testing in radiation or contamination environments should also be considered in the design. Selected systems should be is an automatic sprinkler system, although other methods of suppression can also be permitted when installed in accordance with the applicable NFPA standard. Refer to Section 5.10 for drainage provisions * If fixed extinguishing systems are utilized, the internal pressurization shall be calculated in order to prevent gloves from failing or being blown off effects of system discharge on glovebox integrity shall be considered in evaluating the design of the system. A Some system discharge variables to be considered are enclosure pressures during a non-fire discharge, potential fire size, heat output created by the fire event, the latent heat of the suppression agent, potential impact to the ventilation system, evaporation rate of the suppression agent and expansion ratio of the agent. Additional information can be found in the Guide to Estimating Enclosure Pressure and Pressure Relief Vent Area for Applications Using Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems by the Fire Suppression Systems Association Fume Hoods * Fume hoods containing radioactive materials shall meet the requirements of NFPA 45, Standard on Fire Protection for Laboratories Using Chemicals Lining materials shall be compatible with the chemical environment and capable of decontamination. A Fume hoods provide minimal capability to confine radioactive materials. The fire hazard is generally associated with the chemicals in-use and NFPA 45 provides the necessary requirements for design and fire protection of fume hoods Combustible materials shall not be stored in fume hoods and should be the minimum necessary to support the work activity Radioactive contaminated combustible waste shall not be stored or allowed to accumulate in fume hoods Procedures for timely waste characterization and removal shall be established Laboratory enclosures shall comply with the requirements for gloveboxes and hoods. unless the FHA concludes that the amount of radioactive material is inconsequential. D FSSA Publications. Fire Suppression Systems Association, 5024 R Campbell Blvd., Baltimore, Maryland , USA. Guide to Estimating Enclosure Pressure and Pressure Relief Vent Area for Applications Using Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems, 2nd Edition, January Committee Statement: The committee addressed Section and Section under the action taken on Committee Comment (Log #13) and Committee Comment (Log #14). Section and Section were accepted with the addition of a clarifying annex statement to Section Section and Section were previously addressed by Committee Comment (Log #15) and Committee Comment (Log #16). Section and associated subparagraphs were retained with modifications by actions taken on Committee Comment (Log #18) and because those requirements for fissile materials are appropriate within the scope of the standard. Additional criticality requirements may also be applicable from other codes and standards. Section retained the term hoods as it is specifically defined and within the scope of in the standard. A new section for fume hoods was accepted and a definition, extracted from the 2011 edition of NFPA 45, was created to clarify the distinction from hoods. Section was dispositioned by the action taken on Committee Comment (Log #19). Section was rejected, based on the philosophy that requirements should be deterministic and not developed by the FHA. A was accepted, revised, and merged with the previous language created under Committee Comment (Log #20). Section was rejected, based on the philosophy that requirements should be deterministic and not developed by the FHA. Section retained the term hoods as it is specifically defined and within the scope of in the standard. Section and Section with associated annex were rejected with Section , as previously addressed under Committee Comment (Log #21). Section was rejected because the gloves once withdrawn reduce the combustible loading within the glovebox. Section and associated annex was rejected because the fire presence inside the box is not well-definable and fails to address the external hazard. Section was accepted with new annex material provided. Section was rejected, based on the philosophy that requirements should be deterministic and not developed by the FHA. Section and associated subparagraphs were accepted with the heading being changed to fume hoods with the section being renumbered to Section Section and associated annex, along with 7.4.2, was rejected to retain the original language as the committee believed the original language to sufficiently address the issue. Section was accepted and modified to delete the entire paragraph as the intent of the language was unclear. A reference was added to Annex D for the FSSA guide under A Number Eligible to Vote: 28 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 26 Ballot Not Returned: 2 Kassawara, R., Najafi, B. Backup Proposal Log #38 Final Action: Accept in Principle (Chapter 7) Submitter: William B. Till, Jr., Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Chapter 7 Special Hazards in Nuclear Facilities 7.1* General Flammable and combustible liquids shall be stored and handled in accordance with NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code Flammable and combustible gases shall be stored and handled in accordance with NFPA 54, National Fuel Gas Code; NFPA 55, Standard for the Storage, Use, and Handling of Compressed Gases and Cryogenic Fluids in Portable and Stationary Containers, Cylinders, and Tanks; and NFPA 58, Liquefied Petroleum Gas Code Solid and liquid oxidizing agents shall be stored and handled in accordance with NFPA 430, Code for the Storage of Liquid and Solid Oxidizers Combustible metals shall be stored and handled in accordance with NFPA 484, Standard for Combustible Metals Fire protection for laboratories involved with radioactive materials shall be in accordance with NFPA 45, Standard on Fire Protection for Laboratories Using Chemicals Ovens, furnaces, and incinerators involved with radioactive materials shall be in accordance with the requirements of NFPA 82, Standard on Incinerators and Waste and Linen Handling Systems and Equipment, and NFPA 86, Standard for Ovens and Furnaces Combustion and safety controls and interlocks shall be tested after maintenance activities, and at other intervals in accordance with the equipment manufacturer s recommendations.