14 Shaft Fire. Jacey Kruger

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1 Impala Rustenburg 14 Shaft Fire Jacey Kruger

2 Index Overview Fire 22 January 2016 Conveyor rehabilitation

3 Impala Rustenburg

4 Impala Rustenburg Lease Area

5 Introducing 14 Shaft Impala 14 Shaft is one of the Big 5 shafts 2 x Sections: Upper Section Conventional Decline Section B&P and conventional Daily tons planned at per shift (BP16) Conventional UG2 : 31% Conventional Mer : 34% Bord & Pillar (Hybrid ):35% 36 Half levels mining

6 14 Shaft Impala Infrastructure 15 LEVEL 16 LEVEL 17 LEVEL 18 LEVEL 19 LEVEL 20 LEVEL 21 LEVEL 22 LEVEL 23 LEVEL 24 LEVEL 25 LEVEL 26 LEVEL 27 LEVEL 28 LEVEL

7 Mining Methods Conventional narrow reef mining: 65% of the Weighline tons are mined conventional, both Merensky and UG2. Two shifts, day and night. Scraper cleaning on night shift. Support, drilling and charging up on dayshift. Predominantly conventional double sided breast mining. Footwall drives, 18m - 24m below reef. Rse/Wze connections, 180m and 250m apart. Panel Face length varies between 15m 30m. Panels are separated by 6 x 3m grid pillars with 2m ventilation holings. Stoping widths, 1.1m - 1.3m. Stoping team size: 13 people at work.

8 Mining Methods ( Continue ) Bord and Pillar Hybrid mining: 7 x 7 meter, bord and pillar. It contributes 35% of the weighline tons, only Merensky tons. Two shifts, day and nightshift. LHD cleaning on nightshift and tipping on follow-on strike belts. Making safe, handheld pneumatic drilling of faces, roof support with bolters and charging up, on dayshift. 1 x blast per bord in a 24 hour cycle. (2 x 8 hour shifts and re-entry period) Each dayshift team consist of 5 team members, excluding the Miner and nightshift. Average stoping width 1.9m

9 14 Shaft Fire Incident on 22 January 2016

10 IMPALA PLATINUM - NO.14 SHAFT General Ventilation Layout - Existing System 14 Vent Shaft 14 Shaft 14A Shaft 14B Shaft Surface 355 kg/s [ 17.8 m/s ] 515 kg/s [ 10.5 m/s ] 560 kg/s [23.2 m/s ] 370 kg/s [ 12.4 m/s] 15 Level 16 Level 17 Level 18 Level 19 Level 21 Level 22 Level Level Distance Below Collar Surface 0.0 m 15 Level m 16 Level m 17 Level m 18 Level m 19 Level m 20 Level m 21 Level m 22 Level m 23 Level m 24 Level m 25 Level m 26 Level m 27 Level m 28 Level m 23 Level 24 Level 25 Level 26 Level 27 Level 28 Leve

11 Merensky Reef Horison CO and Smoke Detectors 14V Shaft 2 x 1050KW Fans 343m 3 /s CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO 14 Shaft 14MW Plant 458m 3 /s CO 14A Shaft CO 2 x 2.2MW Fans 512m CO 3 /s CO CO CO CO 14B Shaft 12MW Plant 387m 3 /s

12 Conveyor Decline CO and Smoke Detectors C2 CO C1 CO C3 CO 14A Shaft 2 x 2.2MW Fans 512m 3 /s CO CO 23 TM3 RAW 23 Decline RAW q CO CO CO C4 T1 CO CO T2 14B Shaft CO CO T3 12MW Plant 387m 3 /s CO CO T4 CO C4 tail

13 Description of Accident On Friday, 22 January 2016 at approximately 17H02 the CO detection head at the main dip conveyor tail end failed to safe (200 ppm) and lost communication. This activated the fire suppression systems on the belt and alarmed at the Shaft Control Room and Central Control Room. From here onwards a number of CO detection heads alarmed which activated the fire suppression systems on the belt installation and alarmed in the Shaft Control Room and Central Control Room. At approximately 17H27, the 23 RAW CO detection head alarmed in Shaft Control Room, Central Control Room and also in the Banksman s cabin. The centralised blasting commenced from the control room at approximately 18H05 although all the fire detection heads had not cleared. The three hour re-entry period expired at 21:05 and despite the fact that three of the fire detection heads in the lower section was in alarm, the night shift was lowered to the top section at 21:18.

14 Description of Accident 144 employees proceeded underground to the top section of the mine. After the instruction was issued to withdraw all employees from underground, 140 employees were safely evacuated and 4 employees were overcome by noxious gases. The emergency control room was established at 22:55 The fire is the subject of an enquiry in terms of the MHSA and cannot comment on the cause of the fire and any related matter.

15 Locality plan

16 14 Shaft Control Room

17 14 Shaft Bank

18 Position of deceased

19 21 Level CO 14A Ventilation Shaft CO CO SM CO SM 14 B Shaft CO SM Total Underground Power Failure occurred at 02:29 CO SM q CO SM CO SM CO SM CO SM CO SM CO SM CO SM We respect, Settlers care and deliver

20 14 Shaft Conveyor Decline Rehabilitation

21 Conveyor decline layout

22 Conveyors schematic Level 14# Surface COB (46 m) COC (46m) C1 (194 m) C2 (410 m) Total Conveyor Lenght: m Belts on Dip: m Belts on Strike: 440 m Tipping on C3 C3 (950 m) 25 T1 (110 m) Tipping on C4 C4 (980 m) T2 (110 m) T3 (110 m) T4 (110 m) 29 30

23 Physical Damage On 22 January 2016 a fire started in the conveyor decline in the vicinity of T4 on C4 conveyor and burnt up and down the excavation. The conveyor excavation extend from 21 Level through to below 28 Level m of excavation. The excavation was originally supported with grouted rebar tendons and expanda bolts as well as 50 mm fibre-crete lining heat caused failure of expanda bolts and expansion cracks in lining The conveyor excavation houses the conveyor structure (1 350 mm steelcord belt), the diesel mono rail system (DMTS)and all services e.g. fibre optic, control and LT cables and piping (water, compressed air) The complete conveyor up to 150m from the tail-end of C4 belt was damaged (all belt destroyed and structure deformed) All services were damaged (burst pipes, electrical and instrumentation cables destroyed) Two monorail units damaged and rails distorted in some areas

24 Damage to excavation

25 Damage to structure

26 Damage to services

27 Damage to DMTS

28 Access Safety Risk assessment conducted on safe making process Make safe from level into conveyor excavation Barring only to be done from the top down From scaffold - dress and waterjet loose rocks Progress scaffold 2.5 metres Bar and sound till solid from scaffold waterjet clean Replace failed and protruding bolts Do coring of shotcrete lining for test Perform pull test on bolts and replace where required Do full cover shotcrete Risks identified Falling objects/rocks Falling from height Dust Live electricity Heavy equipment handling(motors, gearboxes, pipes, conveyor belt, pulleys)

29 Scaffolding

30 Water jetting

31 Re-install support

32 Rocks after barring

33 Rehabilitation

34 Shotcreted Workshop and Excavation

35 Structural Rehabilitation

36 Completed areas

37 Labour Strategy Before fire After fire Total Employees Total Vertical Total Decline Teams Tonnes 7275t 3210t

38 Scope of this Project Rehabilitation and reconstruction of the No 14 shaft decline conveyor and services broadly comprising: Rehabilitation of the conveyor decline primary and secondary support. Rehabilitation of cable, fibre and piping in the conveyor decline Installation and commissioning of the service DMTS. Stripping, removal and reconstruction of the burnt C0B, C0C, C1, C2, C3 and C4 conveyor belts

39 Procurement Schedule

40 Progress on Decline Rehabilitation 1824 metres made safe 1318 metres shotcreted 1040 metres cleaned 1062 metres structural steelwork completed

41 Current Progress T1 conveyor completed. Temporary relay pumping system installed and commissioned to accommodate water from waterjets. Second Diesel Shunting trolley delivered and commissioned underground. Redesigns for C3 transfer box, C2/C1 transfer box, C0c and C0b pendula's. C3 conveyor currently 53% complete. Gearboxes and Motors for C3 refurbished and delivered. All C3 bearings replaced. Lagging - 7/15 pulleys for C3 completed.

42 Opportunities Identified More access points for safe making. Appears that only 60% of steelwork need replacement. Refurbishment of long lead items e.g. motors, gearboxes, VSD panels, transformers will reduce lead times. Additional DMTS shunter will alleviate logistic delays and assist with handling of heavy components approved by insurance Pulley bearing replacement and lagging will be done in situ. Two steel work erectors will work concurrently on stripping/replacement.

43 Shunting Trolley

44 Project Milestones Key Milestone Application Approved Commission C3 Commission C0C Commission C0B Commission C4 Commission C2 Commission C1 March th Oct th Dec th Dec th Feb th Feb th Mar 2017 Due Date Completion

45 Rehabilitation Schedule 48

46 Interim Measures Commission C3 during October Discharge through temporary orepass to level capacity approximately 1300tonnes/day Tram to shaft orepasses Will allow 24 level to start up B&P : 17 Stoping and 9 Development teams Conventional : 5 Stoping teams

47 Early start-up Phase 1 Phase 2

48 QUESTIONS

INCREASING SAFETY THROUGH THE INTRODUCTION OF AN ELECTRONICALLY-BASED CENTRALIZED BLASTING SYSTEM. P J Laubscher DetNet South Africa

INCREASING SAFETY THROUGH THE INTRODUCTION OF AN ELECTRONICALLY-BASED CENTRALIZED BLASTING SYSTEM 1. Introduction: DetNet South Africa The mining industry is continually under pressure to prevent injuries