Provisions for the Means of Escape and Means of Access by Using Lifts and Escalators in the MTRC Main (U/G) Station

Transcription

1 Provisions for the Means of Escape and Means of Access by Using Lifts and Escalators in the MTRC Main (U/G) Station

2 Content 1. Means of Escape in the Guidelines on New Railway Infrastructure 2. Means of Access in the Guidelines on New Railway Infrastructure 3. Requirements and Example of Special Means of Escape and Means of Access Arrangements in Deep-sited Station by Using Lifts 4. Requirements and Example of Special Means of Escape and Means of Access Arrangements in MTRC (U/G) Station by Using Escalators

3 1. Means of Escape (MoE) in the Guidelines on New Railway Infrastructure

4 1. Means of Escape (MoE) There shall be adequate means of escape for all calculated population under the worst scenario to escape safely from the fire scene to an adjacent Place of Safe Passage within 4.5 minutes without being overwhelmed by the effects of fire and smoke. Inside the passage, a smoke clear height of not less than 2.5 m is maintained by the smoke extraction system for a minimum period of 60 minutes for evacuation. This will normally be on the floor immediately above or below or an area adjacent to where a fire occurred. Place of Safe Passage shall be provided with stairway and/or escalator to the next level or Ultimate Place of Safety.

5 1. Means of Escape (MoE) The maximum travel distance in public areas, including platform, concourse, paid area, unpaid area and concession area, from the egress point to the foot of the stair or escalator or other Points of Safety, leading to the Place of Safe Passage at another level or the Ultimate Place of Safety, shall not be more than 50 m (25 m for dead end situation) measured in actual walking distance. This principle is not applied by just reaching an adjacent smoke zone maintained as a Place of Safe Passage. In case there are site constraints rendering it impossible to fully comply with the above requirements, an alternative approach will be adopted on a case-by-case basis, such as the case of long adit scenario.

6 1. Means of Escape (MoE) The maximum travel distance in unoccupied non-public areas to the Point of Safety shall not be more than 50 m (25 m for dead end situation). A long adit, apart from forming part of the Place of Safe Passage, also serves as an escape route from the station. It may connect various areas of the station via a series of smoke zones, e.g. platform and concourse or concourse and entrance. The long adit shall be constructed of low combustible materials and finishes due to long travel distance.

7 1. Means of Escape (MoE) Setting up of vending machines and concession areas along the long adit or in any of the related lift lobby areas are not desirable. The types, numbers and positions of advertising panels shall be restricted and limited to the minimum in the long adit.

8 2. Means of Access (MoA) in the Guidelines on New Railway Infrastructure

9 2. Means of Access (MoA) At least one designated emergency entrance (DEE) and one supplementary emergency entrance (SEE) shall be provided from street level. Additional DEE/SEE may be required due to unique layout or topographic nature. Parking spaces for 7 numbers of 12 m long fire appliances shall be provided near the DEE/SEE of the station. Every part of the station shall be within the distance of 60 m from the door of the lobby to the Firefighting and Rescue Stairway (FRS) or fireman access point measured along actual passages.

10 2. Means of Access (MoA) Provision of fire separated corridors extending from the FRS as a mitigation measure shall be subject to the acceptance of FSD on a case-by-case basis and other enhancement measures may be required as considered necessary. The configuration of the fireman s lift and fireman s staircase shall adhere to the FS Code for FRS. Fireman s lift shall be provided when any above ground floor exceeds 15 m or when any basement floor exceeds 9 m from the mean level of the lowest street. The fireman s lift and fireman s staircase at the DEE, if required, shall lead from the entrance at ground level to the station control room or fire control room.

11 2. Means of Access (MoA) Horizontal MoA route connection by fire separated corridor will be provided between FRS and station control room or fire control room. Provision of fire separated corridors extending from the FRS as a mitigation measure shall be subject to the acceptance of FSD on a case-by-case basis and other enhancement measures may be required as considered necessary. Fire protection facilities such as Fire Services inlets, sprinkler inlets, Fire Services control panels, automatic fire alarm panels, FSD telephone panel and remote unlocking devices will be located in the vicinity of DEE/SEE.

12 3. Requirements and Examples of Special Means of Escape Arrangements and Means of Access in Deep-sited Station by Using Lifts

13 3.1 Requirements of Special MOE Arrangements in Deepsited Station by Using Lifts For very deep-sited stations (e.g. Sai Ying Pui Station (SYP) and Hong Kong University (HKU) Station of WIL as well as Lei Tung Station (LET) of SIL(E)), lift-assisted evacuation is considered as a supplementary MoE provision for public safety. Evacuation lifts are designed for pedestrians in the long adit only, while the evacuation population for other areas of the station is handled by other station entrance/exits in case of a fire. Long adits may be utilized to connect station concourse to various entrances and all long adits shall be designed as Place of Safe Passage. The above special provision may be adopted on a case-by-case basis taking into consideration of special circumstances including site constraints.

14 3.1 Requirements of Special MOE Arrangements in Deepsited Station by Using Lifts Lift-assisted evacuation will typically only be adopted to evacuate those pedestrians at the long adits leading to the lift-only entrance, however may also be appropriate for other small evacuation population. A protected staircase adjoining to the lift should always be provided for the lift-assisted evacuation. Passengers at the adits near the concourse lift lobby will evacuate into the protected staircase at the adit end. The staircase connects to the refuge lift lobby typically located one level above and passenger will use the high capacity lifts for evacuation to the final exit level (i.e. ground level).

15 3.1 Requirements of Special MOE Arrangements in Deepsited Station by Using Lifts Deep Stations - High Speed Lift at HKU Station Lift shaft deeper than 100m Speed = 4 5 m/s Capacity = persons HKU

16 3.1 Requirements of Special MOE Arrangements in Deepsited Station by Using Lifts Figure 1 shows the example layout of lift lobby on concourse level for reference.

17 3.1 Requirements of Special MOE Arrangements in Deepsited Station by Using Lifts Figure 2 shows the example layout of lift lobby on refuge lift lobby at one level above for reference.

18 3.1 Requirements of Special MOE Arrangements in Deepsited Station by Using Lifts The protected staircase is in two sections: 1. the lower section of the staircase between the lift lobby at concourse level and the refuge lift lobby above; and 2. the upper section of the staircase connecting the refuge lift lobby and the final exit level for discharge. The two sections of the staircase are disconnected at the refuge lift lobby.

19 3.1 Requirements of Special MOE Arrangements in Deepsited Station by Using Lifts Adequate advice and means to passengers on the use of the lift for evacuation should be provided in the design of station public areas including the adits and lift lobbies 1. Warning signs; 2. PA messages; and 3. flashing exit signage While this system has been designed as self-help in nature without relying on staff to operate, station management of railway corporation will assign dedicated staff to assist passengers wherever necessary.

20 3.2 Example of Special MOE Arrangements in Deep-sited Station by Using Lifts Station Control Room Remote control and monitoring Communications Lift Machine Room Driving machine Lift controller Ground Level Front & rear doors Refuge Lobby Evacuation use only Concourse Level Front & rear doors 2017/10/13 MTR Corporation Limited

21 3.2 Example of Special MOE Arrangements in Deep-sited Station by Using Lifts Lift Car & Shaft Individual lift shafts 2-hr FRP Car Frame - hot dip galvanized structure, safety factor of 3 Lift can resume normal automatically as a post-volt dip operation Car Intercom, vent fan UPS for vent fan, light, intercom, etc. 2-hr Control Evacuation mode can be activated manually from Station Control Room Evacuation command received by lift controller individually 2017/10/13 MTR Corporation Limited Lift Machine Room Compartmented into 2 separated FRP zones Essential power supply fed from 2 different individual power sources Ground Public Announcement Signage Refuge Lobby FRP 4-hr (wall), 2-hr (door) Pressurized area Sprinkler PA, CCTV, Intercom (UPS) Concourse Fire curtain, 1 hr FRP Landing door, min. 1-hr FRP integrity & insulation Visual fire alarm

22 3.2 Example of Special MOE Arrangements in Deep-sited Station by Using Lifts Refuge lift lobby Fire at Adit 避火區 緊急通道 Concourse lift lobby

23 3.2 Example of Special MOE Arrangements in Deepsited Station by Using Lifts 1. Number of lifts Year 2031 patronage forecast adopted Maintenance & Fault downtime incorporated Waiting time ~ 30 sec 2. Lift lobby Distinct boarding and alighting area Provision for queuing and crowd control Boarding lobby Alighting lobby

24 3.2 Example of Special MOE Arrangements in Deepsited Station by Using Lifts Fire Curtain Concourse level Full height Lower to cover lift door Prevent smoke & fire getting into lift and lift shaft Soft aerospace material with high thermo insulation performance One hour FRP Visual fire alarm Operating speed 0.15m/s

25 Ground level 地面 NORMAL MODE 正常模式 Refuge Lift lobby 避火區 Concourse 大堂

26 Ground level 地面 Evacuation Mode 緊急疏散模式 Refuge Lift lobby 避火區 Concourse 大堂

27 3.3 Example of Special MOA Arrangements in Deepsited Station by Using Lifts MOA by using Fireman s Lift Individual lift shafts are 2 hours fire rated 1:1 roping without suspension pulleys Keep fire curtain open above the lift door on the concourse level 4 ventilation fans with at least 40 air change per hour Safety devices / switches with IP55 minimum Visual fire alarm Water level detector provided for detecting the ingress of water to park the lift if required

28 Ground level 地面 FIREMAN MODE 消防模式 Refuge Lift lobby 避火區 Concourse 大堂

29 4. Requirements and Examples of Special Means of Escape Arrangements and Means of Access in MTRC (U/G) Station by Using Escalators

30 4.1 Requirements of Special MOE Arrangements in MTRC (U/G) Station by Using Escalators For Escalators at West Island Line, Kwun Tong Line Extension and South Island Line (East) of MTRC, using escalators for evacuation are considered as a supplementary MoE provision for public safety. Escalators for Evacuation are designed for pedestrians in the mega station only where has installed many escalators. According to the requirement of Section E, Part 4, Clause , before stopping of escalator, the person who operates the switch shall have means of ensuring that nobody is using the escalator before making this operation. According to the requirement of Section E, Part 4, Clause , Stopping Distance for Operation Brake of Escalators

31 4.1 Requirements of Special MOE Arrangements in MTRC (U/G) Station by Using Escalators According to the requirement of Section E, Part 4, Clause (Stopping Distance for Operation Brake of Escalators), the stopping distance for unloaded and downward moving loaded escalator shall be checked and be between the following values: The above requirement can be exempted by application for Smooth Control Stopping (SCS) system taking into consideration of special circumstances including site constraints.

32 4.2 Example of Special MOE Arrangements in MTRC (U/G) Station by Using Escalators The escalators installation at West Island Line, Kwun Tong Line Extension and South Island Line (East) of MTRC shall be designed and constructed as stated in the relevant countermeasures: Only the Smooth Control Stopping (SCS) system of escalators at MTRC is allowed to stop the incoming escalators under emergency evacuation situation. The maximum jerk for stopping under different loading conditions shall be no more than 0.6 m/s 3. The stopping will only be operated by authorized persons in Station Control Room.

33 4.2 Example of Special MOE Arrangements in MTRC (U/G) Station by Using Escalators The escalators installation at West Island Line, Kwun Tong Line Extension and South Island Line (East) of MTRC shall be designed and constructed as stated in the relevant countermeasures (cont.): The computer for controlling SCS is equipped with a time-out function. Re-login is required after the pre-set idling time is expired. The situation before stopping of the escalator shall be monitored through CCTV. Announcement to alert passengers to hold the handrail will be broadcasted before the stopping actually comes to effect.

34 4.3 Requirements of Special MOE / MOA Arrangements in MTRC (U/G) Station by Using Escalators According to the requirement of Section E, Part 4, Clause (Notices Near the Entrances of Escalators), The following notices for the user shall be fixed in the vicinity: 1. Stand facing the direction of travel; keep feet away from sides 2. Hold the handrail

35 4.3 Example of Special MOE / MOA Arrangements in MTRC (U/G) Station by Using Escalators The escalators at West Island Line, Kwun Tong Line Extension and South Island Line (East) of MTRC shall be used as one of means of escape (MOE) and means of access (MOA) under emergency situation after activation of the Smooth Control Stopping (SCS) system of escalators. In Holborn London Underground station a persuasive voice instructs people not to walk up the escalators and tells passengers to stand on both sides of the escalators.

36 4.3 Example of Special MOE / MOA Arrangements in MTRC (U/G) Station by Using Escalators The experiment carried out at the London Underground s report that the behavior of people walking on the escalator has been no significant improvement with regard to accidents. However, the congestion was reduced and the passenger flow increased by 30%. Therefore, under the emergency situation, all escalators in MTRC station will be considered as one of means for Access and Escape in addition to the staircases, emergency accesses, corridors, etc.

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